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Since privatisation in 1991, there has been a transformation in electricity generation 
technology within the British electricity supply industry (ESI). In a sudden dash-for-gas, 
previously unused combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology has been adopted for 
all new power stations in Britain. The dominant generation technologies before 
privatisation - coal-fired steam turbines and nuclear power - have been marginalised, and 
all proposals for new coal-fired and nuclear plant cancelled. Using a wide range of 
sources, including the evidence submitted to various parliamentary select committee 
inquiries, an analysis is made of the causes of recent changes in electricity generation 
technology in Britain. Particular generation technology projects are analysed in greater 
depth using personally-conducted interviews. 
The research suggests that technological changes in the British ESI since privatisation can 
only be understood by reference to a range of technical, economic, regulatory, 
organisational, political and historical factors. The different technical forms of electricity 
generation reflect particular technical opportunities, economic criteria, institutional 
interests, and political priorities prevalent at different times in the industry's development. 
Before privatisation, the forms of generation technologies were largely a reflection of the 
vested interests of government and the corporate institutions of the ESI. During 
privatisation, the dominant influences on change were the government's dual policy goals 
of economic liberalisation, and securing the future of nuclear power. The post- 
privatisation changes reflect the radically different economic environment for the ESI, 
and also institutional rivalry in a semi-competitive market structure. CCGT technology, 
politically and institutionally excluded from the industry before privatisation, has gained 
ascendancy due to the interaction of a number of coinciding and largely unrelated 
dynamics. These include improved gas turbine technology, greater availability of natural 
gas, structural changes in the ESI, and the introduction of pollution abatement legislation. 
Consideration is also given to the value, in analysing technological change in the British 
ESI, of a number of concepts and models from the technology studies and social shaping 
of technology literature. It is argued that since technological change is a complex and 
often unpredictable process involving a number of interacting dynamics, no single 
analytical model provides a fully satisfactory explanation. In the pre-privatised industry, 
Hughes' model of evolving sociotechnical systems offers the most insight. During and 
after privatisation, other concepts emphasising institutional interests and micro-social 
actor networks are of more value. Attention is also given to the notions of technological 
autonomy and determinism in the context of the British ESI. Although often associated 
with electricity generation technologies, especially nuclear power, autonomy and 
determinism are seen to neglect the dependency of technologies on their surrounding 
economic, institutional and political environments. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a 
distinctive dynamism of sociotechnical systems - generation technologies have been both 
cause and effect of the development of the ESI. CCGT technology, as well as reflecting 
the restructuring of the industry since privatisation, has enabled and promoted change. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Themes and Perspectives 
1.1.1 Technological Presuppositions 
Technological change seems to be a powerful engine of change in modern society. For 
many people, new technology is something developed and implemented by others, 
bringing with it, in a deterministic fashion, certain inevitable personal and social 
consequences. It appears to be an essentially non-human force - the product of science or 
economics. As a result, technological artifacts are seen as politically 'neutral', or in the 
Baconian tradition, socially progressive. 1 
Technology as an external autonomous phenomenon impacting onto society is an oft- 
repeated theme in discussions of technological change. It has been particularly common 
in relation to electricity generation technologies, especially nuclear power. Electricity 
itself is invisible and intangible, and electricity generation technology is remote, large- 
scale, and removed from the everyday experience of most people; as Donald MacKenzie 
and Judy Wajcman pointed out, "we think about electricity only when the bill has to be 
paid, or the supply fails". 2 Similarly, Stewart Russell stated that "the challenge in 
studying energy/utility systems is that they are black-boxed by most people; for all but 
the closely involved, their output are taken for granted". 3 
Traditional accounts of technological development have been dominated by descriptions 
of the technical properties of artifacts, and accounts of how one technology succeeded 
another due principally to its superior technical performance. In such internal histories of 
technology, wider economic, political, and cultural concerns - if mentioned at all - are 
relegated to the margins. At the same time, the social sciences and humanities have 
generally tended to ignore technology as a proper subject of study, or concern themselves 
solely with the 'impacts' of technological change on society, and leave unexamined the 
I Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds. ), 'Introductory Essay', in The Social Shaping of Technology, Milton 
Keynes, Open University Press, 1985, pp2-25: 4 
2 ibid: 2 
3 Stewart Russell, 'Heating Networks', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 24, pp587-95,1994: 587 
1 
internal workings of the technological world, and those concerned with its development. 
By doing so, they have implicitly reinforced the widely-held perception of the otherness 
of technology 
In practice, technology is by definition situated within a particular social setting, and 
technological artifacts are designed to meet particular economic or social needs; as Barry 
Barnes pointed out, "technology is necessarily connected into its social, political, and 
economic environment; if technical activity is not so connected, we do not call it 
technology" .4 
In recent years, there has been a greatly increased effort within the social 
sciences - particularly within technology studies - to study technological change as a 
social process, and to examine technological artifacts as the products of a range of 
technical, economic, institutional, and political influences. 
1.1.2 Generation Technology in the British Electricity Supply Industry 
The privatisation of the British Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) between 1988 and 1991 
was associated with dramatic and largely unexpected changes in electricity generation 
technology. The Government imposed substantial restructuring on the ESI ahead of 
flotation, involving the breaking-up of the monopoly generation and transmission 
company, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). At the same time as this 
reorganisation was being devised and implemented, the dominant technical forms of 
electricity generation under nationalisation were cast aside in favour of a previously 
unused technology. In a sudden 'dash-for-gas', all proposals for new coal-fired steam 
turbine and nuclear power plants were abandoned in favour of combined-cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT) power plant schemes. Within a short period of time, therefore, long- 
established and apparently highly stable organisational forms - and their technological 
affiliations - were broken-down and replaced. 
Privatisation represented the most significant change to the British ESI since 
nationalisation in 1947-48. It was also the most radical reorganisation of any 
comparable ESI in recent years. The Watt Committee on Energy described the 
privatisation of the British ESI as "an act of faith, based on political belief in the virtues 
4 Barry Barnes, 'Review of Thomas Hughes' Networks of Power', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 14, pp309-1,1984: 313 
2 
of competition and market forces". 5 The independent energy analyst Andrew Holmes 
suggested that in carrying through its proposals, the Government had passed through 
largely unchartered policymaking for electricity generation and supply: 
Two aspects of the British system have not been sufficiently appreciated: 
its radicalism and its uniqueness ... Nowhere, 
in the UK or outside it, has 
privatisation involved such a thorough change of ownership, structure, and 
method of operations, as that carried out on the British electricity supply 
industry. The system that has resulted has no real resemblence to any other 
electricity system in the world. There is no other system which has gone 
nearly so far in disaggregation, emphasis on competition, and the attempt 
to establish a free market ... The concept of open, commercial competition between rival power generators has not played a major part in the 
electricity planning of any major industrial economy. 6 
At the same time, although unique in certain respects, the structural, regulatory, and 
technological changes to the British ESI reflected worldwide trends towards liberalisation 
and privatisation in utility/network industries in the 1980s and 1990s. The British case, 
because it went much further in the scope of its reforms and the degree consequences, can 
therefore be considered to lie at the extreme 'radical' end of a spectrum of change. This is 
reflected in the changes in generation technology in the period during and after 
privatisation in the British ESI as compared to similar systems elsewhere over the same 
period. As Tables 1 and 2 show below, whilst there has been (and will continue to be) a 
growing use of gas-fired generation and CCGT technology in the 1990s and beyond, 
nowhere else is this trend as strong as in the case of the British dash-for-gas . 
5 House of Commons Energy Select Committee, Consequences of Electricity Privatisation, HC 113,1991-92, 
Vol. 11: 36 
6 ibid: 70 
3 
Table 1: Net Maximum Generation Capacity by Type of Generation Plant (GW) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
ST 53.76 50.83 47.22 44.21 41.08 40.91 
UK SGT 3.55 3.61 3.18 2.73 2.56 2.56 
CCGT -- -- 1.34 5.61 8.75 9.37 
ST 463.71 465.72 467.37 467.46 466.22 467.02 
US SGT 47.24 48.81 51.16 52.44 56.07 58.31 
CCGT 20.2 23.76 27.46 31.92 38.26 39.94 
ST 63.14 80.82 77.84 76.52 75.48 76.23 
Germany SGT 5.08 5.95 6.05 6.07 6.84 6.86 
CCGT -- -- -- -- -- -- 
ST 21.11 21.04 20.66 21.6 21.58 21.78 
France SGT 1.21 1.18 1.45 1.47 1.47 1.61 
CCGT -- -- -- -- -- 
ST 13.85 13.58 13.31 13.19 13.64 13.55 
Netherlands SGT 1.1 1.18 1.19 1.3 1.35 1.32 
CCGT 1.71 1.76 1.82 1.79 1.89 2.26 
ST 116.14 116.75 118.73 119.98 123.86 125.31 
Japan SGT 2.37 2.67 3.68 4.37 4.61 4.77 
CCGT 3.66 4.72 5.04 6.26 5.83 7.57 
Key: ST=Steam Turbine; SGT=Simple Gas Turbine; CCGT=Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine 
Source: International Energy Agency, Electricity Information 1996, Paris, OECD/IEA, 
July 1997; based on Table 18. 
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Table 2: Electricity Generation by Fuel Type (TWh) 
1973 1980 1995 2000 2005 2010 73-95* 95-05* 
UK Total 281.3 284.1 332.9 366.3 395.3 412.8 0.8 1.7 
Gas 2.74 2.12 58.31 133.9 138.0 203.6 14.9 9.0 
U5 Total 1695 2427 3558 3896 4199 4447 2.7 1.7 
Gas 364.9 370.5 528.8 727.4 981.9 1192 1.7 6.4 
Germany Total 374.3 466.3 532.5 550.9 566.0 583.6 1.6 0.6 
Gas 40.95 65.99 43.17 56.3 61.7 68.5 0.2 3.6 
France Total 182.5 256.9 489.3 552.1 584.9 612.0 4.6 1.8 
Gas 10.09 7.01 3.84 17.05 19.55 22.45 -4.3 17.7 
Netherlands Total 52.63 64.81 81.07 71.29 87.54 107.1 2.0 0.8 
Gas 41.85 25.81 42.03 46.39 63.99 77.68 -- 4.3 
Japan Total 465.4 572.5 980.9 1030 1111 1198 3.4 1.3 
Gas 10.5 81.11 191.0 231.5 226.5 212.5 14.1 1.7 
* Average Annual Percentage Change 
Source: International Energy Agency, Electricity Information 1996, 
Paris, OECD/IEA, July 1997; based on Table 4. 
The changes in generation technology in the British ESI at this time were clearly related 
in some way to the restructuring of the industry associated with privatisation. At the same 
time, they also reflected international changes in the technology and economics of 
generation. From different perspectives, therefore, this example of technological change 
could be seen to be, variously, as being politically-driven: an outcome of liberalisation 
and privatisation; economically-driven: a result of changes in the relative cost of 
generation plant and fuel supplies; or technologically-driven, in response to technical 
improvements in the performance of CCGT plant. 
The broad aim of the research presented here is to analyse the causes of changes in 
electricity generation technology in the British ESI associated with privatisation, and to 
consider the extent to which they can be seen the result of technological, economic, and 
5 
political factors. At the same time, the ESI case has been used to 'test' a range of concepts 
and theories found within that part of the social sciences - known as technology studies - 
which attempts to analyse the relations between technology and wider socio-economic 
processes. In employing this literature, I have been, particularly concerned with how 
technology itself may be conceived as a distinctive influence on socio-economic change, 
and how technological dynamics relate to, and interact with, economic and political 
forces. 
1.1.3 Thesis Outline 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents a selected review of the technology 
studies literature. Consideration is first given to notions of technological determinism and 
autonomy as applied to electricity generation technology, especially Langdon Winner's 
suggested autonomy of nuclear power. This is followed by a critique of autonomy and 
determinism offered by a 'social shaping of technology' perspective. The rest of the 
chapter reviews a range of social shaping concepts and models, including Thomas 
Hughes' model of technologies as evolving sociotechnical systems, social constructivism 
and actor-network theory, and finally, a range of institutional-level approaches. At the 
end of the chapter there is a statement of my own analytical perspective and research 
design. 
Chapter 3 analyses the development of electricity generation technology within the 
British ESI before privatisation, up to the mid-1980s. Within this, particular attention is 
given to periods of significant changes in generation technology, and also to episodes of 
restructuring of the industry. A separate section reviews the development of gas 
turbine/CCGT technology, which took place largely outside of the confines of the British 
ESI. At the end of the chapter there is a summary of the various influences on changes in 
generation technology in Britain in the period before privatisation. 
The next three chapters address the interaction of the major forms of generation 
technology in Britain with the ESI privatisation process. In each case, the relevant 
changes are considered in broadly chronological order. As will be described in the next 
chapter, the primary research resource drawn on here was official papers and the evidence 
submitted to various parliamentary select committee inquiries. Additional evidence has 
been sought from a wide range of published and unpublished material from within the 
6 
industry and from independent analysts, and also a small number of personally-conducted 
interviews with industry insiders. 
Chapter 4 analyses the interaction of the ESI privatisation process with nuclear power 
technology, and the fortunes of nuclear power technology in Britain in the post-privatised 
ESI. Because much of the debate on privatisation centred on nuclear power technology, 
this chapter also details more general aspects of privatisation, such as the formulation of 
the Government's proposals, and the passage of the privatisation Bill through parliament. 
A separate section focuses on the impact of privatisation on the fast reactor research 
programme - the dominant R&D project in the nationalised ESI. 
Chapter 5 analyses the interaction of gas turbine/CCGT generation technology with the 
ESI privatisation process, and the dash-for-gas in the post-privatised ESI. The chapter 
includes sections on the international commercialisation of CCGT technology in the late- 
1980s, on the introduction of CCGT plant proposals in the British ESI during the 
privatisation process, and on parliamentary and industry analysis of the dash-for-gas. A 
small number of CCGT schemes are analysed in greater depth using personal interviews 
with those involved. 
Chapter 6 considers the changes affecting coal-fired steam turbine technology - the 
dominant form of generation technology in the nationalised ESI - associated with the ESI 
privatisation process. Attention is first given to the anticipated impact of ESI 
restructuring on coal-fired generation, and then, to the declining fortunes of coal-fired 
generation in the post-privatisation period, including the coal crisis. A separate section 
analyses the changes affecting steam turbine research and development associated with 
ESI privatisation, and on the impact on the British plant manufacturing industry. 
Chapter 7 returns to the technology studies literature presented in Chapter 2. 
Consideration is given here to the value of the different concepts and models in 
understanding the changes in generation technology associated with British ESI 
privatisation. At the same time, an analysis is undertaken of the extent to which the ESI 
case supports or undermines the concepts and models reviewed earlier. At the end of the 
chapter, a comment is made on the particular analytical insights offered by a technology 




APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of concepts and models from social science analyses of 
technological change - the so-called technology studies literature. The review is 
necessarily selective - within what Robin Williams and David Edge referred to as the 
"broad church" of social shaping approaches, numerous analytical themes have emerged 
in recent years. 1 Rather than following Williams and Edge in attempting a comprehensive 
overview of these developments, my aim has been to identify and examine those theories 
and concepts which appear most useful for the present study - an analysis of recent 
changes in electricity generation technology in Britain associated with ESI privatisation. I 
have therefore concentrated particularly on those analysts who have studied energy or 
electricity technologies. At the same time, some attention is given to more general 
technology studies issues, such as technological autonomy and determinism, the role of 
technology as both cause and effect of socio-economic change, and the analytical 
'separability' of the various technical, economic, and political influences involved in 
technological change. 
For the social sciences, the study of technology and technological change present 
intractable conceptual and methodological problems. In their review of social science 
theories of technological change, Arie Rip and Rene Kemp described the abstraction 
involved in the disciplinary study of technology: 
Technology, clearly, does not fall into one neat category of the social 
sciences. It cuts across levels and categories so that no one social scientific 
discipline, oriented to its own methods and ideals of explanation, can 
capture the complexity ... social sciences abstracts those aspects of 
technology that fit their respective disciplinary moulds. 2 
I Robin Williams and David Edge, The Social Shaping of Technology', Research Policy, Vol. 25, pp865-899,1996: 866 2 Arie Rip and Rend Kemp, Towards a Theory of Socio-Technical Change', limited circulation monograph, School of 
Philosophy and Social Science, University of Twente and MERIT, University of Limburg, May 1996. Published in 
edited form as Chapter 4 of Human Choice and Climate Change, prepared by Batelle Pacific Northwest Labs., 
Washington DC. 
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The interdisciplinary concepts and methods of technology studies represent an attempt at 
a more realistic analysis of technological change. However, Edge argued that almost all 
approaches within technology studies lack a "satisfactory conceptualisation of the precise 
way new technologies emerge and evolve over time", and added that "even the most 
perceptive authors retreat to rather loose metaphors". 3 In practice - as a number of other 
analysts have pointed out - such is the complexity of technological change, and the 
variety of influences that are capable of shaping technical forms, any attempt at 'overall 
theory' is doomed to over-generalisation and simplification. Barry Barnes suggested that 
where theory becomes too "strict and formal" in this area, it is perhaps wiser not to 
follow 4 Similarly, in a review of attempts to describe the links between technology and 
politics, John Street argued that the interrelations were so complex and changeable, that 
no satisfactory general theory was possible: "the very idea that we can generate a 
complete theory of political and technical change seems misconceived. There is too much 
to be accommodated". 5 Street went on to discuss the limitations of general claims 
concerning the relationship between technological and political dynamics; for example, 
he argued that the "political-choice model" - which views different technological designs 
as outcomes of different political priorities - ignored the way technological change can 
reconstruct politics: 
By concentrating on the external influences on technical change, it allows 
no room for the internal dynamics of technical innovation and 
development ... 
[it] overlooks the micropolitics of innovation, and fails to 
explain how the larger political interests are realised in the application of 
scientific knowledge ... 
[it] imbues the political structure with the capacity 
to control and anticipate change. In doing so, the model makes little 
allowance for the unintended consequences of technology ... or for the systemic character of technology which is expressed in the idea of 
technological momentum. 6 
Street argued that, in reality, "it makes more sense to talk of political interests coping 
with technology rather than controlling it" .7 He concluded that, in the face of this 
complexity, and the limitations of any attempt at general theory, "there is no single 
approach to the relationship between politics and technology. In analysing the connection 
we need to retain a spirit of eclecticism". 8 He added, however, that this was "not meant as 
an unqualified embrace of empiricism nor a renunciation of theory ... It is rather a 
rejection of a general theory, and a request for a broader range of hypotheses about how 
3 David Edge, 'The Social Shaping of Technology', Edinburgh University PICT Working Paper No.!, 1988: 2 
4 Barry Barnes, 'Review of Thomas Hughes' Networks of Power', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 14, pp309-314, 1984: 311 
5 John Street, Politics and Technology, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1992: 40 
6 ibid: 39-40 
7 ibid: 40, emphasis in original. 
8 ibid: 45, emphasis added. 
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technology and politics may combine". 9 The futility of attempts to construct a theory of 
technological change means that analytical concepts and models concerning 
technological change must address more modest - but nevertheless useful - purposes. 
'0 
My concern here has therefore been to review a range of more relevant theoretical 
concepts and models, and, in accordance with Street's "spirit of eclecticism", to identify 
their relative strengths and weaknesses, so as to develop an appropriate analytical 
framework for the British ESI case. Section 2.2 considers notions of technological 
autonomy and determinism. Section 2.3 reviews Thomas Hughes' sociotechnical systems 
model. Section 2.4 considers social constructivist and actor-network approaches. Section 
2.5 reviews a number of approaches focused on the institutional level. Finally, Section 
2.6 reflects on the concepts and themes discussed in the chapter in terms of their 
suitability for the British electricity supply industry case, and also offers a statement of 
my own research design and methodology. 
2.2 Technological Autonomy, and Determinism 
2.2.1 Introduction: Autonomy and Determinism in Technology Studies 
As David Edgerton pointed out, technological autonomy and technological determinism 
strictly relate to different social spheres: autonomy is a theory of technology, specifically 
an assertion of the auto-generative nature of technological change, whereas determinism 
is a theory of society, and suggests that in industrial societies, technological imperatives 
dictate the pace and direction of social change. " In practice, they often come together, 
and they are recurrent themes in studies of the role of technology in society. Merrit Roe 
Smith stated that "the belief in technology as the governing force in society dates back at 
least to the early stages of the Industrial Revolution". 12 Although he cautioned against 
simplistic technological determinism, Lewis Mumford, in his 1934 book Technics and 
Civilization, nevertheless postulated a close association between technical and social 
form. 13 In the post-war period, autonomous and determinist notions of technology were 
9 ibid: 45 
10 Thomas J. Misa identified three purposes of theories of technological development: theories as a comparative 
frameworks, theories as a normative analyses, and theories aimed at informing technology policy. (Thomas J. Misa, 
Theories of Technological Change: Parameters and Purposes', Science, Technology, and Human Values Vol. 17, No. 1, 
pp3-12, Winter 1992: 7-9) 
11 David Edgerton, "Tilting at Paper Tigers', British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 26, pp67-75,1993: 17 
12 Merrit Roe Smith, Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Smith, Merrit Roe, and Marx, Leo, (eds. ), 
Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1994, pp2- 
35: 2 
13 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, London, Routledge, 1934. Mumford identified three successive phases 
in the development of technological civilisation. Amongst other characteristics, he stated that "each phase has its own 
10 
perhaps most prominently articulated by Jacques Ellul. In his 1954 book The 
Technological Society14, Ellul claimed: 
There is an automatic growth ... of everything which concerns technique15 
... this 




autonomous with respect to economics and politics ... neither economic 
nor political evolution conditions technical progress ... the converse 
is 
actually the case ... technique elicits and conditions social, political, and 
economic change ... technique's own 
internal necessities are 
determinative. 16 
Ellul also suggested that "the structures of the modern state and its organs of government 
are subordinate to the techniques dependent on the state". 17 Another prominent advocate 
of technological determinism in the 1960s was Herbert Marcuse. In his 1964 book, One 
Dimensional Man, Marcuse argued that technology had absorbed culture, politics, and the 
economy, and that "technological rationality" now grew according to its own internal 
laws. 18 In the same period, other analysts described a moderated form of technological 
determinism. In his 1967 book, The New Industrial State, John Kenneth Galbraith 
identified a series of "technological imperatives" which, he argued, had become the 
dominant influence on economic development in advanced industrial societies. 19 
Galbraith also argued that modern technological systems required long term planning on 
the part of the "technostructure" - the various corporate bodies involved in decision- 
making processes. Galbraith argued that "the autonomy of the technostructure ... 
is a 
functional necessity of the industrial system". 20 
In 1967 the economic historian Robert Heilbroner argued that "the influence of the 
machine on social relations" could be described as a "soft determinism". 21 Whilst 
Heilbroner made clear that he recognised that technological change was a social activity 
sensitive to different economic and political conditions, he suggested that within a 
specific historical and social context - market-based capitalist societies - the growth of 
means of utilising and generating energy", and he suggested that the last neotechnic phase was closely associated with 
the development of electrical power. (Extract from Technics and Civilization in Larry A. Hickman, (ed. ), Technology 
as a Human Affair, New York, McGraw Hill, 1990, pp276-294) 
14 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, New York, Vintage, 1964 
15 Ellul used the term "technique" to cover "broad aspects of the technological order" - the social relations surrounding 
technology as well as the artifacts themselves. (Larry A. Hickman, (ed. ), Technology as a Human Affair, New York, 
McGraw Hill, 1990: 71) 
16 Emphasis added. Extract from The Technological Society in Hickman, op cit: 325,333 
17 Extract from The Technological Society in John Street, op cit: 24 
18 Extract from One Dimensional Man in Hickman, op cit: 357-367 (One Dimensional Man was published in English 
by Sphere, London, in 1968) 
19 John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (2nd Edition), London, Andr6 Deutsch, 1972: 13 
20 ibid: 400 
21 Robert L. Heilbroner, 'Do Machines Make History? ' in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds. ), Does Technology 
Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1994, pp53-65: 61. 
(Originally published in Technology and Culture, Vol. 8, pp335-345, July 1967) 
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technology, driven by the impetus of scientific research, had assumed an "'automatic' 
aspect". 22 He stated that "the technology of a society imposes a determinate pattern of 
social relations on that technology ... the prevailing 
level of technology imposes itself 
powerfully on the structural organization of the productive side of society". 
23 In a recent 
review of his 1967 paper, Heilbroner restated his belief in a "soft" technological 
determinism. 24 
Notions of technological autonomy and determinism have had a particularly powerful 
presence in the analysis of energy supply technology. David Collingridge, for example, 
whilst stressing - like Mumford - that the adoption of technologies was a matter of social 
choice, analysed electricity generation technology from an implicitly autonomous and 
determinist position. 25 Collingridge discussed the "dilemma of control", and "unwanted 
social consequences" of large-scale technologies such as nuclear power. He stated that 
"the social consequences of a technology cannot be predicted early in the life of the 
technology. By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, however, the 
technology is often so much part of the whole social and economic fabric that its control 
is extremely difficult". 26 Collingridge concluded that special decision-making processes 
were required for inflexible, long lead-time, large scale technologies such as nuclear 
power. 27 
2.2.2 Langdon Winner's Autonomous Technology 
Technological autonomy has been considered at greatest length in recent years by 
Langdon Winner. In his 1977 book, Autonomous Technology, Winner surveyed the 
history of thought concerning autonomy, or "conceptions and observations to the effect 
that technology is somehow out of control by human agency". 28 Winner himself argued 
that "far from being controlled by the desired and rational ends of human beings, 
technology in a real sense now governs its own course, speed, and destination". 29 
However, ' whilst being sympathetic to autonomist notions, he dismissed technological 
22 Heilbroner, op cit: 64 
23 ibid: 59,61 
24 Robert L. Heilbroner, Technological Determinism Revisited, in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds. ), Does 
Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1994, pp67-78: 
77-78 
25 David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology, London, Pinter, 1980; also The Management of Scale: Big 
Organisations, Big Decisions, Big Mistakes, London, Routledge, 1992 
26 Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology, op cit. 
27 ibid: 103 For energy policy, he argued, this uncertainty implied an important role for R&D as an'insurance cover' for 
maintaining diversity. 
28 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought, Cambridge 
MA, MIT Press, 1977: 15; also The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986 
29 Winner, Autonomous Technology, op cit: 16 
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determinism; indeed, he stated, "it is somnabulism (rather than determinism) that 
characterizes technological politics". 30 
In the course of his discussion of autonomy, Winner also traced the notion of 
technocracy, or "rule by scientific and elites". 31 He drew attention to a long history of 
social and political analysts, such as Bacon, Saint-Simon, and Veblen, who had favoured 
technocracy, and had in different ways suggested that "rule by technically trained experts 
is the only kind of government appropriate to a social system based on advanced science 
and technology". 32 At the same time, Winner also discussed analysts such as Galbraith, 
who - whilst identifying a tendency to technocratic rule - opposed such a development, 
and suggested means of reversing the trend. 
In later parts of Autonomous Technology, Winner developed his own "theory of 
technological politics", the central theme of which was an assertion of the autonomy of 
technology: 
Once underway, the technological reconstruction of the world tends to 
continue. The elaboration of rational artifice on a large scale requires that 
virtually everything in reach be transformed to suit the special needs of the 
technological ensemble ... More highly 
developed, rational-artificial 
structures tend to overwhelm and replace less well-adapted forms of life ... 
technical systems, once built and operating, do not respond positively to 
human guidance ... [they] 
become severed from the ends originally set for 
them and, in effect, reprogram themselves and their environments to suit 
the special conditions of their own operation ... modern technology tends 
to remove its workings from effective direction by human agency. The 
results ... closely approximate a self-generating self-sustaining technical 
evolution. 33 
Winner also conceptualised the process of technological change in terms of the 
development of "systems" or "large sociotechnical aggregates". 34 He argued that 
conventional political and economic forces had little influence on the development of 
such systems; rather, politics and economics were themselves shaped by the system: 
"political reality becomes a set of institutions and practices shaped by the domination of 
technical requirements ... the system controls or strongly influences the political 
30 ibid: 324. In a more recent paper, Winner argued that "in [autonomy's] more subtle versions, determinism is not the 
central issue at all, but rather the unintended consequences of technological change" (Langdon Winner, 'Social 
Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty', Science as Culture, Vol. 3, Pt. 3, No. 16,1993, pp427- 
452: 443) 
31 Winner, Autonomous Technology, op cit: 135. The concept of technocracy in social thought was also considered by 
Frank Fischer in Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise, Newbury Park CA, Sage 1990 
32 Winner, Autonomous Technology, op cit: 146 
33 ibid: 208,212,214,227,236. Emphasis in original. Winner referred to the "adjustment of human ends to ... available means" as "reverse adaption". (ibid: 229) 
34 ibid: 242 
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processes that ostensibly regulate its output and operating conditions". 35 Winner 
contrasted the traditional 'pluralist' model - in which technical systems are seen as 
responsive, flexible, and at the command of political institutions - with his own very 
different perspective: 
In the technological perspective megatechnical systems are seen to have 
definite operational imperatives of their own, which must be met. Society 
stands at the disposal of the systems for the satisfaction of their 
requirements. The systems themselves are anything but responsive and 
flexible. Their conditions of size, complexity and mutual interdependence 
give them a rigidity and inertia difficult to overcome. Rather than respond 
to commands generated. by political or social processes, such systems 
produce demands which society must fulfil or face unfortunate 
consequences ... Frequently, therefore, requirements of successful technological performance mean that control must be exercised over 
agencies that were formerly themselves in control. 36 
Economic influences, Winner argued, were similarly subservient. He stated that whilst 




suggests economic factors may not be the overwhelmingly decisive ones". 37 Following 
Galbraith, he stated that "the system controls markets relevant to its operations", and 
added that rather than conventional economic or political forces, it was technocratic 
planning that dominated the development of technologies. 38 The pace and direction of 
system development, Winner suggested, was determined largely by the system's own 
internal dynamics: "the system seeks a 'mission' to match its technological capabilities ... 
[it] propagates or manipulates the needs it also serves", and that it "discovers or creates 
a crisis to justify its own further expansion". 39 He went on to consider, as an example of 
these characteristics of system development, the 1970s energy crisis - an urgent topic at 
the time Autonomous Technology was written. He described the simultaneous 
"propagation of need" and "discovery of crisis" by electric power companies in the 
energy crisis as "double reverse adaptations". 40 
Winner then examined another key process of system development, that of centralisation. 
He argued that, as a consequence of "technical rationality, efficiency, and ... economies of 
scale", organisations become increasingly concentrated over time in areas of advanced 
technological performance, and added that "formerly independent systems tend to 
35 ibid: 237,243. Emphasis in original. 
36 ibid: 251-2 
37 ibid: 236 
38 ibid: 242,240 
39 ibid: 244,246,248. Emphasis in original. 
40 ibid: 250 
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coalesce to form large, more comprehensive networks". 41 As both Mumford and Ellul 
had also observed, he stated that this trend was exemplified by electricity generation and 
transmission 42 He concluded that, whilst there may be some marginal exceptions, the 
general tendency in society was towards greater technocracy, in response to "the 
technological imperative and reverse adaption as they appear to a whole society with the 
force of overwhelming necessity" 43 
Elsewhere, Winner has elaborated his "theory of technological politics", which, he stated, 
was concerned to draw attention to the "momentum of large-scale technological systems", 
and to the "response of modern societies to technological imperatives". 44 He now 
distinguished between two levels of the politicisation of artifacts: firstly, technical 
arrangements as "forms of social order", such as in the choice of design of bridges, 
buildings, and transport systems, and secondly, "inherently political technologies", such 
as nuclear power, which were more deeply politicised, to the extent that their very 
existence was predicated on "particular kinds of political relationships". 45 He argued that 
the decision to develop inherently political technologies was critical, in that thereafter, the 
presence of the technology itself was enough to sustain supportive political structures, as 
it moved beyond political control and became autonomous: 
The things we call 'technologies' are ways of building order in our world ... because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, 
economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for 
all intents and purposes once the initial commitments are made. In that 
sense technological innovations are similar to legislative acts or political 
foundings that establish a framework for public order that will endure over 
many generations ... Once artifacts 
like nuclear power plants have been 
built and put into operation, the kinds of reasoning that justify the adaption 
of social life to technical requirements pop up as spontaneously as flowers 
in the spring ... the 
initial choice about whether or not to adopt something 
is decisive in regard to its consequences 46 
Especially for inherently political technologies, Winner concluded, choices about 
technology were concurrently organisational and political choices: 
41 ibid: 252-3 
42 ibid: 253 Here, Winner quoted Ellul as stating that whilst "electrical networks may remain for some time 
independent of one another ... this situation cannot last long when ... independence gives rise to [extra] costs ... [and] practical difficulties in electrical technique. The interconnection of electrical networks is demanded by all technical 
men". (Extract from The Technological Society). 
43 ibid: 258. Emphasis in original. 
44 Langdon Winner 'Do Artifacts Have Politics? ', in Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds. ), The Social Shaping 
of Technology, op cit, pp26-38: 27 (Originally published in Daedalus, Vol. 109, pp121-136,1980) 45 ibid: 27 
46 ibid: 30,36 
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If such systems are to work effectively ... certain requirements of 
internal 
social organisation have to be fulfilled; the material possibilities that 
modern technologies make available could not be exploited otherwise ... if 
you accept nuclear power plants, you also accept a techno-scientific- 
industrial-military elite. Without these people in charge, you could not 
have nuclear power. 47 
A number of other analysts have drawn attention to the organisational demands 
associated with nuclear power. Jane Roberts et al., for example, suggested that "the 
technological characteristics of nuclear power determine the institutional structures 
necessary to sustain a programme of reactors. If the structure is not sufficiently 
centralised, powerful, and well organised, the programme will falter". 48 
2.2.3 Social Shaping Critique of Technological Autonomy and Determinism 
Technological autonomy and determinism both suggest a pattern of technological 
development largely insensitive to social context. Autonomy implies that technological 
progress is essentially independent of surrounding economic and political structures, 
whilst determinism implies that a particular technology brings with it a number of social 
consequences irrespective of social circumstances. As Smith observed, the adherents of 
such notions invest great authority in technology itself: 
The writings of Mumford, Ellul and Winner have an ironic twist: in 
speaking out against the pervasive power of technological systems... these 
critics have endowed modern technics with a degree of agency and 
influence that often goes beyond even what its most enthusiastic advocates 
claim. Thus, to the extent that they place technology at the forefront of 
social and cultural change ... 
[they] are technological determinists. 49 
Furthermore, because they are pitched at a high level of generality, technological 
autonomy and determinism tend to gloss over the detailed processes by which politics 
and technology interact. As Street pointed out, whilst autonomy seeks to identify general 
patterns in technological development, it does not discriminate between the different 
ways political systems organise their technological systems. 50 Because their concern is 
with the internal imperatives of the technological system, the proponents of autonomy 
47 ibid: 31,34 
48 Jane Roberts, et al., Privatising Electricity: The Politics of Power, London, Bellhaven Press, 1991: 44 
49 Merrit Roe Smith, Technological Determinism in American Culture', in Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds. ), 
Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1994, pp2- 
35: 34. Smith went on to distinguish between Ellul's "avowedly determinist position", and the "more nuanced and 
carefully delineated stances of Mumford and Winner"(ibid). 
50 John Street, Politics and Technology, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1992: 40 
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and determinism tend to downplay any investigation of the way in which supporting 
economic and political structures actually shape the development of technology and 
technical form. Rip and Kemp pointed to the social dynamics laying behind what may 
initially appear to be technological autonomy and determinism: 
[Technological] dynamics can have a life of their own, not because 
technological dynamics are autonomous, but because the efforts of actors 
are geared towards the goal of achieving the next 'generation' ... 
[Similarly] it makes little sense to speak of the impact of technology on 
society ... the 
invention and adoption of [technology] ... itself shaped 
by 
social and economic factors, is part of overall transformations ... one 
cannot single out ... [a] particular 
bit of technology as the cause. 51 
In response to the limitations of autonomous and determinist notions, a body of research 
has developed in recent years concerned with the social shaping of technology. 52 As 
Edge stated, social shaping approaches hold that technological change is not simply 
governed by its own "internal logic", but is rather "the product of particular economic, 
cultural, political, and organisational influences" 53 Paul N. Edwards stated that from a 
social shaping perspective, technological change should be seen as a complex social 
process involving technological products and impacts: 
Technological change ... is a social process: technologies can and do have 'social impacts', but they are simultaneously social products that embody 
power relationships and social goals and structures. Social impacts and the 
social production of artifacts in practice occur in a tightly knit cycle. 54 
Edwards also described how technological artifacts, shaped by particular social 
influences, embody prevailing economic and political values in their make-up and 
operation, and thereby promote, stabilise, and give lasting expression to such values. He 
stated that technological artifacts are "not only inserted into an organisation or a culture, 
but frequently embody particular images of how the organisation or culture functions and 
what the roles of its members should be. Once introduced ... by embodying those images, 
[they] can help institutionalize and rigidify them". 55 Edwards added that whilst 
technologies "rarely 'cause' social change in the direct sense implied by the 'impact' 
51 Arie Rip and Ren6 Kemp, Towards a Theory of Socio-Technical Change', limited circulation monograph, School of 
Philosophy and Social Science, University of Twente and MERIT. University of Limburg, May 1996: 25 
52 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds. ), The Social Shaping of Technology, Milton Keynes, Open University 
Press, 1985. Whilst the rest of this chapter concentrates on certain recent contributions to the social shaping of 
technology, as is widely acknowledged, these contributions draw on earlier work in this area. Notable here is David F. 
Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
1977 
53 David Edge, The Social Shaping of Technology', Edinburgh University, Research Centre for Social Sciences, PICT 
Working Paper No. 1,1988: 1 
54 Paul N. Edwards, 'From "Impact" to Social Process: Computers in Society and Culture'. in Handbook of Science and 
Technology Studies, edited by Sheila Jasanoff et al (eds), 1995: 258. Emphasis in original. 
55 ibid: 284 
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model, they often create pressures and possibilities to which social systems respond ... 
[they] affect society through an interactive process of social construction". 56 He 
concluded that "neither a'social impacts' nor a'social products' approach will produce an 
adequate picture of this interaction; only an image of technological change as a social 
process is likely to be robust enough to capture the flavor of how ... [technologies] work 
in society". 57 
In his 1983 book, The Culture of Technology, Arnold Pacey argued that uncovering the 
"cultural aspects of technology" required close examination of autonomous or determinist 
notions enrolled to support or oppose particular technological developments. 58 Pacey 
suggested that the use of terms such as 'technological imperative' may serve a political 
purpose, since it "reinforces the determinist impression of technical advance ... [it] 
is 
partly an expression of values". 59 He equated the use of such terms with a technocentric 
belief in technical progress, and in the interests of technologists to promote their work 60 
Pacey also criticised any view of technological progress as smoothly or linearly 
progressive, and argued that this was often based on a superficial understanding of 
events. As an example, he considered the evolution of steam engines and turbines. He 
argued that whilst the thermal efficiency of engines had greatly improved over time, this 
progress had not been linear or consistent; rather, improvements were "clustered together, 
leading to a step-wise pattern of advance rather than smoothly-continuous progress". 61 He 
emphasised that each step was characterised by "specific organizational arrangements as 
well as by new techniques", which he described as "movements in technology- 
practice" 62 He added that "there are crucial moments of recognition when a varied 
collection of different factors fit together and a new form of practice takes off". 63 
However, whilst rejecting autonomist or determinist notions, Pacey also criticised any 
view of technological change as being merely a reflection of prevailing political, 
economic, and organisational interests. He argued that both these positions was over- 
simplistic, as was indicated by the often unintended consequences of new technologies: 
56 ibid: 284 I have adapted Edwards' argument here from computers to technology in general. 
57 ibid: 284 
58 Arnold Pacey, The Culture of Technology, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983: 6 
59 ibid: 79 
60 ibid: 157 
61 ibid: 29 
62 ibid: 29. Emphasis added. 
63 ibid: 29. Pacey identified one of these key episodes in the British electricity supply industry, as occurring during the 
electric revolution of the 1920s and'30s. At this time, he stated, broad views about electrification as a form of social 
progress combined with technical improvements in power station efficiency, and provided for rapid expansion of the ESI system. 
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Technological determinism is untenable - but so is its complete opposite. 
Most inventions have been made with a specific social purpose in mind, 
but many also have an influence nobody expected or intended. The reality 
is perhaps easier to comprehend by thinking of technology-practice with 
its integral social components. Innovation may then be seen as the 
outcome of a cycle of mutual adjustments between social, cultural and 
technical factors. The cycle may begin with a technical idea, or a radical 
change in organisation, but either way, there will be interaction with the 
other factors as the innovation comes to fruition 64 
Pacey also argued that bureaucracies tended to develop a characteristically incremental 
pattern of technological change, whereas radical innovations tended to emerge from small 
firms or individuals outside of bureaucracies. 65 In the British electricity supply industry, 
he identified the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) with bureaucratic 
innovation; the CEGB, he stated, had been "very resistant to innovations marginal to its 
main interests ... In such branches of technology ... there 
has been a fairly systematic 
suppression of innovation". 66 
In recent years there has been a proliferation of research into technological change 
adopting - explicitly or implicitly -a social shaping perspective. Distinctive approaches 
have emerged, each emphasising different aspects of the complex process of 
technological change. Whilst a full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this review, 
some of the more important and relevant contributions to this area are now considered. 
2.3 Thomas Hughes' Sociotechnical Systems Approach 
2.3.1 Introduction: Technologies as Cultural Artifacts 
In his 1983 book Networks of Power, Thomas Hughes undertook a wide-ranging analysis 
of the early development of electric power systems in the USA, Britain, and Germany 67 
Hughes adopted a view of technologies as cultural artifacts which reflected the societies 
which constructed them, and he suggested that by studying the differences between 
technologies built in different places and at different times, changing social conditions 
and values could be uncovered: "variations in the basic [technological] essentials often 
reveal variations in resources, traditions, political arrangements, and economic practices 
64 ibid: 25 
65 ibid: 138 
66 ibid: 139,141 
67 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society 1880-1930, Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1983 
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from one society to another and from one time to another" 68 Rather like Winner (2.2.2), 
Hughes recognised that technologies were politicised in their design and operation, and 
that they represent and embody certain political values: 
Technologies give rise to binding nuclei for a host of dependent political 
and economic interests. Interwoven with political and economic interests 
of particular kinds, technology is far from neutral. Like other political and 
economic forces, they can be labelled as conservative or liberal - or even 
radical ... a conservative technology will maintain the existing structures 
and trends, and ... liberal ones will 
bring changes in the direction of 
societal development. 69 
Hughes also stated that because they embody the economic and political forces that 
prevailed at the time of their inception, technologies may become a legacy to outdated 
values: "because technology is often manifested in material form ... its lasting effects are 
easily observed ... surviving technology 
brings to the present the character of the past, a 
past that imposed its characteristics on the technology when it was first invented, 
developed, and introduced into use". 70 Elsewhere, he stated that "durable physical 
artifacts project into the future the socially constructed characteristics acquired in the past 
when they were designed". 71 
2.3.2 System and Context 
In the course of Networks of Power, Hughes developed a model of technological change 
in terms of the evolution of the technological system. Drawing on more general use of 
'systems theory' in the social sciences, Hughes defined his technological system as a 
network of interconnected technical and social components operating under central 
control; the elements outside the control of the system he referred to as the 
'environment'. 72 He went on to suggest that system development - and technological 
change - was an outcome of the interaction between internal and contextual dynamics: 
68 ibid: 2 
69 ibid: 319 
70 ibid: 285. This was similarly referred to, also in the context of the electricity supply systems, by Leslie Hannah. 
Hannah stated that "in the past the technical mistakes of one generation had been embodied in capital investment and 
thus bequeathed to the succeeding generation" (Leslie Hannah, Electricity Before Nationalisation, London, 
MacMillan/I'he Electricity Council, 1979: 95). 
71 Thomas P. Hughes, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems', in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. Pinch, 
(eds. ), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, 
Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987, pp5l-82: 77 
72 Hughes, Networks of Power, op cit: 5-6 Although he stated that he was reluctant to offer anything more than a 
"loosely structured model" of system development, Hughes went on to suggest that the developing system passed 
through five stages, beginning with invention, followed by technology transfer, system growth, momentum, and ending 
with the "pre-eminence of financiers" (ibid: 14-16). 
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Power systems reflect and influence the context, but they also develop an 
internal dynamic ... the history of evolving power systems requires 
attention not only to the forces at work within a given context, but to the 
internal dynamics of a developing technological system as well 73 
For Hughes, the twofold internal and contextual dynamism of the technological system 
provided explanation of the ambiguous relation between technology and wider society, in 
that technologies both instigated as well as reflected social change - as Hughes stated, 
that "electric power systems, like so much other technology, are both causes and effects 
of social change". 74 He went on to describe how internal and contextual dynamics 
together provided explanation of similarities and differences between electric power 
systems developed in different settings. The internal dynamic of electric power systems, 
he argued, operated on an international stage (the electricity supply industry developed at 
a time of international exchange of ideas, trade, and finance), and so provided an 
"international pool of technology", lending many similarities in the power systems 
developed in different places. 75 Contextual dynamics, by contrast, tended to reflect local 
economic and political interests, and as such, provided regional and national variations in 
the adoption of the international pool of technology. He concluded that "out of local 
conditions comes a technology ... with a distinctive style"76 
In various parts of Networks of Power, Hughes gave further consideration to the 
distinctiveness of internal and contextual dynamics. He argued that the internal 
dynamism of technological systems arose not from any supposed autonomy of 
technology, but rather from the activities of those individuals and organisations most 
closely involved its development. As a result of their efforts, he added, expanding 
technological systems built up a powerful momentum: 
Technological systems ... [are] not simplistically autonomous, or free from the influence of nontechnical factors ... [they do] however, have an internal drive and an increasing momentum ... [The] ongoing solution of critical problems by inventors, engineers, and entrepreneurs ... [provide] this 77 
Hughes also suggested that the internal dynamism of a particular system was associated 
with a technical core, which may, he added, carry with it unanticipated effects; whilst a 
technical core may be constructed and deployed for a particular purpose, once introduced, 
73 ibid: 2 
74 ibid: 2. Emphasis added. 
75 ibid: 405 
76 ibid: 404-5 
77 ibid: 462 
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it may find novel uses, or bring with it unforeseen consequences. He described this in 
what he identified as the technical core of electric power systems - the steam turbine: 
The technical core of the regional power system involved the widespread 
use of steam turbines in power plants, which after 1900 resulted in the 
unprecedented and unexpected spread of power systems. Station engineers 
and managers originally introduced steam turbines to replace the 
monstrously large reciprocating engines used in heavily populated areas, 
where the price of real estate was high. Turbines, however, proved to be 
more efficient than reciprocating steam engines, and they also lowered 
installation, operating, and labour costs. The largely unforeseen 
consequence of the introduction of the turbine was the sharp acceleration 
of the quest for load sufficient to fulfill the economy-of-scale potential of 
a large, efficiently loaded turbine. The turbines were, in effect, supply in 
search of demand. 78 
However, although he suggested that it could cause the system to develop in 
unanticipated ways, Hughes dismissed any deterministic action on the part of the 
technical core. He stated that whilst "a superficial analysis might present the load-seeking 
turbine as an instance of technological determinism ... a closer study will show that the 
force of technology was circumscribed by a host of nontechnological factors which, 
together with the technology, shaped the events and trends that followed the introduction 
of the turbine". 79 
Elsewhere in Networks of Power, Hughes discussed the various contextual influences, or 
"external cultural factors" which, together with internal drives, shaped the development 
of technological systems. He listed these as "entrepreneurial drive and decisions, 
economic principles, legislative constraints or supports, institutional structures, historical 
contingencies, and geographic factors". 80 As with internal dynamics, Hughes emphasised 
that none of these were determinative of technological change: "the factors do not operate 
deterministically ... 
[they] only partially shape technology through the mediating 
influence of individuals and groups"; indeed, he stated, they were overlapping and 
mutually shaping: "the factors complexly and systematically interact with technology and 
with one another ... they and the relationships among them change as a power system 
grows". sl 
Hughes went on to consider the distinctive action of some of the contextual factors in the 
case of the rapidly developing electricity supply industries of the 1920s. He argued, for 
example, that institutional or organisational structures, including ownership, were in- 
78 ibid: 363-4 
79 ibid: 364 
80 ibid: 462 
81 ibid: 405 
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part responses to the technical core of the system: "managers and financiers organised 
and reorganised utilities to facilitate the steady expansion implicit in regional power 
technology". 82 Elsewhere, he added that "the management structure reflects the particular 
economic mix of power plants in the system, and the layout of the power plant mix is 
analogous to the management structure". 83 The regulatory and legislative framework of 
power systems, he stated, reflected political and organisational interests and rivalries: 
Legislation manifests the ideological, economic, and social character of a 
culture ... a 
hostile legislature, influenced for instance by competing 
interests, either private or governmental, sometimes withheld the powers 
needed by utilities ... 
Regulations were sometimes restrictive and 
frustrated investment and growth; often they appeared to be framed in a 
utility's own best interests - and indeed they sometimes were by pliable 
legislators. 84 
Amongst the various contextual factors shaping technological development, Hughes 
particularly emphasised the importance of certain economic principles. Unlike other 
contextual influences, he stated, these exerted a similarly powerful influence across all 
capitalist societies. Especially important here, he added, were capital interest rates. 85 He 
concluded that although no single influences on the electric power system could be said 
to have been determining, two forces were so powerful that they exerted what he referred 
to as a "soft determinism". These were firstly, economic principles, and secondly, the 
gathering internal dynamism or momentum of the system itself. 86 
2.3.3 System Building and System Displacement 
In tracing the development of electric power systems, Hughes focused on the actions of 
certain key individuals, whom he referred to as system builders. 87 He was particularly 
concerned with the system builders' efforts to secure control of the system, and drive 
forward its development through the identification of any barriers to advance, and the 
targeting of effort and resources to overcome these critical problems, or "reverse- 
salients". 88 From this perspective, he interpreted the changing organisational structure of 
82 ibid: 406 
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the industry, such as its horizontal and vertical integration, as reflecting the system 
builders' success in increasing their control over the industry. 89 At the end of Networks of 
Power, Hughes suggested that electric power systems - which were made up of a 
heterogeneous mix of technical, financial, and institutional elements - should be 
described as a sociotechnical systems 90 He made clear that he understood the system to 
include everything under control of the system builders, and argued that as technologies 
developed under their guidance, they became surrounded by supportive institutional, 
legislative and financial arrangements that provided an in-built conservativeness, and 
made for incremental rather than radical changes in technology: 
Sociotechnical systems had high momentum, force, and direction because 
of their institutionally structured nature, heavy capital investments, 
supportive legislation, and the commitment of know-how and experience. 
This momentum was a conservative force, reacting against abrupt changes 
in the line of development ... rarely were radical 
inventions, technical or 
social, introduced 91 
Hughes suggested in high momentum systems, system-builders' control of their 
environment led them to assume continued stability of contextual influences, and project 
into the future the continuity of their own control. He discussed this with reference to the 
growing electric power systems of the early-twentieth century: 
Engineers and managers engaged in prediction prefer the extrapolation of 
trends to the formulation of complex scenarios based on likely interactions 
of trends and contingencies suggested by historical precedents and 
analogies. Before World War I they undoubtedly anticipated that the 
trends of the past decade or so would extend into the future. Because of 
the momentum of the electric supply industry, this was a reasonable 
assumption. Moreover, the factors affecting the growth - the context in 
which it occurred - were, by implication, projected into the future. The 
combination of growing momentum and reinforcing context was expected 
to overwhelm contingent perturbations 92 
In a later paper, Hughes gave further consideration to the expansion of the sociotechnical 
system under the system builders: 
A technological system usually has an environment consisting of 
intractable factors not under the control of the system managers ... Over time, technological systems manage increasingly to incorporate 
environment into the system, thereby eliminating sources of uncertainty, 
such as a once free market ... In a closed system ... managers ... 
[can] 
89 ibid: 407 
90 ibid: 465 
91 ibid: 465 Elsewhere, Hughes stated that "because radical innovations do not contribute to the growth of existing 
technological systems ... organizations rarely nurture a radical invention ... (they] do not become components in 
existing systems" (The Evolution of Large Technological Systems', op cit: 57-8). 
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24 
resort to bureaucracy, routinization and deskilling to eliminate uncertainty 
... Prediction by extrapolation ... then 
becomes less fanciful 93 
At certain times in the history of electric power systems, however, Hughes recognised 
that wider events, such as war, were able to usurp the system momentum, and result in 
more radical changes in technological development: 
The perturbations and lasting changes brought by catastrophes such as war 
result from changes that are strong enough to disrupt the momentum of 
systems. ... 
The fact that the exigencies of war caused the accelerated 
development of certain technological characteristics ... shows again that 
the rate and direction of technological change can be shaped by 
nontechnological factors. In other words, technology is not necessarily a 
simple extrapolation of its past, or a working out of inherent technological 
implications. 94 
At the end of Networks of Power, Hughes concluded that despite their internal dynamism 
and momentum, sociotechnical systems never became autonomous, but were always 
sensitive to changing social conditions. At any given time, therefore, major changes in 
social circumstances were capable of bringing about radical changes in the system: "it is 
difficult to change the direction of large electric power systems ... such systems are not 
autonomous ... they are evolving cultural artifacts rather than 
isolated technologies". 95 
Elsewhere, he reiterated that systems were never autonomous: 
Technological systems, even after prolonged growth and consolidation, do 
not become autonomous; they acquire momentum ... A high level of 
momentum often causes observers to assume that a technological system 
has become autonomous ... [but ] appearances of autonomy have proved deceptive. 96 
In the same paper, Hughes conceded that the model of system development introduced in 
Networks of Power was designed to apply to expanding systems, such as the electric 
power systems of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and was less well- 
suited for studying patterns in declining systems 97 In considering the postwar breakdown 
of continuity of electric power systems, Hughes showed some recognition of the limits of 
the systems approach under circumstances in which system growth falters or breaks 
down: 
93 Thomas P. Hughes, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems', in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. Pinch, 
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Since World War II changes such as the supply of oil, the rise of 
environmental protection groups, and the decreasing effectiveness of 
efficiency-raising technical devices for generating equipment have all 
challenged the electrical utility managers' assumptions of momentum and 
trajectory. These instances, in which the momentum of systems was 
broken, remind historians and sociologists to use concepts and patterns of 
evolving systems as heuristic aids and system managers to employ them 
cautiously as predictive models. Momentum, however, remains a more 
useful concept than autonomy .... The metaphor encompasses 
both 
structural factors and contingent events. 98 
In a more recent book, Hughes considered further the possibility of system decline. He 
described the powerful vested interests that developed around mature systems, and which 
presented significant barriers to the overthrow of such systems: 
Large technological systems represent powerful vested interests ... 
numerous persons develop specialized skills and acquire specialized 
knowledge appropriate for the system of which they are a part. A major 
change in the characteristics of the system or its demise would de-skill 
these people. The machines, devices and processes in the system are the 
capital, but a special kind of hardware capital with characteristics that 
might be called 'system specific'. Changes in the system also make 
hardware capital obsolete. Faced with these eventualities, the people and 
the investors in technological systems construct a bulwark of 
organizational structures, ideological commitments, and political power to 
protect themselves and the system ... This 
is a major reason that mature 
systems suffocate nascent ones. 99 
Hughes then went on to speculate on the possible causes of the displacement of mature 
systems. He suggested that the vulnerability of such systems was associated with their 
embodiment of environmental conditions prevalent at the time at which they became 
established: 
In order to bring about a substantial change in the motion and direction of 
massive systems of production, such as electric light-and-power systems, a 
counterforce of comparable magnitude becomes imperative. Changes in 
circumstances comparable to those that cause the demise of organisms 
need to occur. To counter large technological systems, forces analogous to 
those that killed off dinosaurs are needed. Like the dinosaurs, some 
technological systems have embedded in them characteristics that were 
taken on in times past, characteristics suited for past environments but not 
for the present. Because these characteristics are often embedded in the 
hardware of a technological system, they are especially long-lived. These 
anachronistic characteristics persist despite incremental changes in the 
environment that favor different characteristics. Only an overpowering 
change in environmental circumstances can kill off the new dinosaurs. 100 
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Hughes added that "the possibilities of change can be seen as a conflict between 
technological momentum and the social construction of technology". lot In examining 
precedents for systems displacement, he identified sudden economic changes such as the 
1973 oil embargo (which caused a radical change in car design), and technological 
catastrophes such as Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl (which interrupted the growth of 
nuclear power systems); he also suggested that "value changes", such as the rise of 
environmental movements, might break the momentum of large systems. He concluded 
that "the most likely cause of displacement of large, centrally controlled systems would 
seem to be a confluence of contingency, catastrophe, and conversion that would break the 
momentum and socially construct a new style of technology". 102 
Whilst he recognised the possibility of system displacement, Hughes maintained that the 
basic dynamics of system development described in Networks of Power remained valid: 
New systems, be they electronic and military or computer or industrial, 
tend to display the same patterns of growth and momentum. In the modem 
era, old systems do sometimes fade away, but even larger and more 
complex ones often displace them ... Economic principles like economies 
of scale, economies of scope, and diversity of load that ... other system builders applied primarily in the region and nation are being implemented 
by their system-building successors in an international arena. 103 
2.3.4 Criticisms of Hughes' Systems Approach 
In recent years there has been considerable criticism within technology studies of the 
systems or contextual approach used by Hughes in Networks of Power. Edge described 
the general weakness associated with contextual approaches: "discussion of each type of 
influence tends to be relatively isolated from discussion of the others ... 
[for] example, 
those concerned with the impact of organisational factors on the process of technical 
change ... [tend] to 
ignore the importance of market structures and competitive pressures, 
and vice versa". 104 
Mikael Hard argued that whilst Hughes' sociotechnical systems model had a 
commonsense character, and analytical convenience - which, he suggested, explained 
much of its popularity with researchers - it perpetuated a view of technological change 
101 ibid: 470. Social constructivism is discussed later in this chapter (2.4.1). 
102 ibid: 470-1 
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"as a self-regulating and tension-managing process". 105 Hard suggested that Hughes' 
description of an interdependent, goal oriented system was inevitably functionalist "to 
explain the relations between the capacities of electricity generators and of power lines in 
terms of direct interdependencies is straightforward, but to interpret social interaction in 
the same way can be nothing but functionalist". 106 Hard pointed out that "in Hughes' 
works, the only conscious people we find are the system builders"107, and he suggested 
that the methodological focus on the system büilder'meant that the systems approach 
tended to focus, on the resolution of problems in order to drive forward system 
development. He added that "even if various systems may clash and the builders of 
different systems may be in conflict, each well-functioning system is in itself 
harmonious". 108 As a result, he argued, systems theory was unable to deal adequately 
with conflict over technological alternatives, since any criticism of existing systems were 
seen as dysfunctions. Hard concluded that the limited perspective of systems approaches 
resulted in an analytical bias towards the exploration of conservative dynamics and away 
from more radical changes: 
The world of a sociotechnical system looks and feels like an iron cage. 
There is no place for critique and no way out ... By presenting a view of 
technology in terms of functionally arranged sociotechnical systems, we 
will support those who benefit from harmony and cooperation and 
discourage those who might benefit from conflict and opposition. We 
might be able to reveal both unexpected and unwanted aspects of 
technology, but we will remain unable to suggest an alternative vision. 109 
Similarly, Wolfgang Rudig stated that he found Hughes' notion of sociotechnical system 
development through the identification of certain key problems (what Hughes termed 
"reverse salients") rather determinist, and added that systems theory failed to give 
adequate attention to alternative possible technologies. l10 
W. Bernard Carlson argued that Hughes' emphasis on system-building was associated 
with a failure of the systems approach when applied to consumer-led as opposed to 
producer-led industries. 111 Carlson suggested that Thomas Edison and his managers - 
who were portrayed by Hughes and others as highly successful system builders - were 
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producer-oriented, and did not appreciate the demands of consumer culture. For Carlson, 
this explained why Edison was unable to repeat his success in electric power systems -a 
producer dominated industry - in his later efforts in motion pictures, an industry which 
quickly became consumer-dominated. 
Three years after the publication of Networks of Power, Hughes himself stated that "there 
are problems with the contextual approach". 112 He now indicated that he was dissatisfied 
with the use of terms such as 'internal/external' and 'core/context', and the use of a series 
of contextual influences. He stated that contextual approaches had a tendency to "resort to 
labelling the context as 'social', or to stringing out a list of analytical categories, including 
the social, political, and economic. This, however, merely substituted one set of high- 
level abstractions for another, and left too much room for misunderstanding the 
social". 113 He added that "the hard analytical categories - such as technology, science, 
politics, economics and the social - should be used sparingly, if their use leads to 
difficulty in comprehending interconnection"114, and he emphasised that sociotechnical 
systems should be seen rather as a seamless web. 
Hughes went on to explain that his rethinking on these issues arose in-part from 
consideration of the work of the system builders themselves, such as Thomas Edison. 
According to Hughes, Edison was successful in pushing forward the development of the 
electric power system precisely because he ignored any supposed divisions between 
technological, economic, and political matters. 115 As a result, he suggested replacing 
'hard' contextual factors with "overlapping soft categories". 116 He also stated that the 
problems accompanying contextual approaches were such that approaches adopting a 
more abstract terminology potentially offered a more promising way forward: 
The long-term use of analytical categories such as ... content and context 
... 
internalist and externalist ... has conditioned historians to set up discrete 
entities rather than seamless webs, particles rather than waves. One way to 
transform our cognitive mode is to avoid these traditional categories with 
their time-worn connotations, and resort to neologisms and the 
abstractions of interaction. 117 
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As Hughes alluded to, a number of approaches using more abstract concepts have 
emerged within technology studies in recent years, most notably social constructivism 
and actor-network theory. Although a comprehensive review of these two strands of 
social shaping approaches is beyond the scope of this chapter, their theoretical origins and 
main themes are now briefly considered. 
2.4 Social Constructivist and Actor Network Approaches 
2.4.1 Social Constructivism 
In a seminal paper first published in 1984, Trevor J. Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker criticised 
established ways of analysing technological development, and developed instead an 
approach based on a view of "technological artefacts as social constructs". 118 Pinch and 
Bijker applied an analytical perspective developed from the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, in an attempt to provide what they described as a "symmetrical sociological 
explanation" of technological change, "which treats successful and failed artefacts in an 
equivalent way". 119 Within this, they introduced a methodological framework in which 
technological change was explained primarily in terms of the success or failure of 
different relevant social groups to impose their preferred technological design. The 
different meanings associated with competing designs by different groups were said by 
Pinch and Bijker to lend the technology interpretative flexibility. 120 Only after one social 
group had succeeded in making its interpretation dominant, they argued, could a stable 
technological form, or closure, be achieved. They added that "a variety of closure 
mechanisms play a part in bringing about ... the stabilization of an artefact". 
121 Pinch and 
Bijker concluded with a call for further research based on this approach - what they 
referred to as the "integrated study of the social construction of facts and artefacts" 122 - 
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and indeed, their paper was the starting-point of a large body of research undertaken in 
recent years concerned with the social construction of technology. 123 
In a subsequent paper, Bijker and John Law reflected on the analytical origins of social 
constructivism. 124 They made clear that their starting point was a social shaping critique 
of technological autonomy and determinism; they stated that "technologies do not provide 
their own explanation ... there 
is no internal technical logic that drives innovation [and] 
technologically determinist explanations will not do". 125 Like Hughes, Bijker and Law 
also recognised the ambivalent role of technology in social change: 
Technology does not spring, ab initio, from some disinterested fount of 
innovation. Rather it is born of the social, the economic, and the technical 
relations that are already in place. A product of the existing structure of 
opportunities and constraints, it extends, shapes, reworks, or reproduces 
that structure in ways that are more or less unpredictable. And, in doing 
do, it distributes, or redistributes, opportunities and constraints equally or 
unequally, fairly or unfairly. 126 
In reviewing established ways of studying technological change, Bijker and Law 
suggested that the most rewarding research was often found from within the social 
history of technology, which, they stated, "at its best, locks away neither social relations 
nor the content of technology". 127 However, they added that there was a need to move 
away from the detailed case-by-case studies of the social history of technology, towards 
some degree of generalisation. Whilst they conceded that this would inevitably involve a 
trade-off - since theory necessarily involved some simplification, and an explicit or 
implicit statement of priorities - they argued that this was desirable, since it allowed for 
similarities and differences between individual case-studies to emerge, and a 
consideration to be made of the underlying pattern and dynamism of technological 
change. 128 
123 See, for example, W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. Pinch (eds. ), The Social Construction of Technological 
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Elsewhere, Bijker stated that a technological artifact was "gradually constructed or 
deconstructed in the social interactions of relevant social groups"129, and added that 
"instability is more revealing about a systems characteristics than stability". 130 Following 
on from Hughes' metaphor of the seamless web of technological development, Bijker 
stated that in the analysis of technological change, "our theoretical concepts are required 
to be as heterogeneous as the actors' activities and as seamless as the web to which the 
concepts will be applied ... our conceptual 
framework should not compel us to make any 
a priori choices as to the social or technical or scientific character of the specific patterns 
it will make visible to us". 131 
In implicit recognition of the limitations of the early constructivist model to 
accommodate social structure (as discussed below, 2.4.3), Bijker now 
introduced a 
modified form of social constructivism, including concepts such as the technological 
frame and sociotechnical ensembles. He defined the technological frame in rather vague 
terms as a "heterogeneous cognitive and social domain", built up and maintained as part 
of the stabilisation of an artifact, which provides the goals, thoughts and tools 
for action, 
but which "will constrain the freedom of members of the relevant social group". 
132 He 
also suggested that, in recognition of the fact that "the technical is socially constructed 
and the social is technically constructed", technical artifacts (and social institutions) 
should be replaced as the unit of analysis by sociotechnical ensembles. 133 He added that 
sociotechnical ensembles developed in different types of technological frames: in some 
cases there was no single dominant group or set of vested interests; in others, one group is 
dominant, whilst in a third type, two or more entrenched groups with divergent frames 
compete for dominance. In the last case, innovations that allow the amalgamation of the 
vested interests of the different groups will be sought. 134 Bijker concluded that "society is 
not determined by technology, nor is technology determined by society. Both emerge as 
two sides of the sociotechnical coin, during the construction processes of artifacts, facts, 
and relevant social groups". 135 
129 Wiebe E. Bijker, 'Do Not Despair: There is Life after Constructivism', Science, Technology, and Human Values 
, Vol. 18, 
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2.4.2 Actor-Network Theory 
Alongside social constructivism, another rich theme within technology studies in recent 
years has been the actor-network approach developed by Michel Callon and others. 136 
Callon first presented his theoretical ideas in a study of the evolution of an electric 
vehicle project in France during the 1970s. 137 Here, he criticised established sociological 
analysis of technological change, which, he argued, was unable to accommodate the ways 
in which society could be transformed by the efforts of entrepreneurs and technologists; 
he argued that in order to capture this, conventional sociological terminology had to be 
abandoned. 138 In their place, Callon presented a series of concepts with which to analyse 
processes of technological change, most notably the actor-network itself, which he stated, 
"is composed of a series of heterogeneous elements, animate and inanimate, that have 
been linked together for a certain period of time". 139 He added that the actor-network 
included all of the human and non-human entities essential for the existence of any given 
technology - scientists, consumers, manufacturing companies, and also electrons, 
catalysts, batteries etc. He argued that technological artifacts should be seen as the 
outcome of such networks: 
Technical objects must be seen as a result of the shaping of many 
associated and heterogeneous elements. They will be as durable as these 
associations, neither more nor less. Therefore we cannot describe technical 
objects without describing the actor-worlds that shape them in all their 
diversity and scope. 140 
Callon emphasised that the network was predicated on all the different elements within it, 
and that the loss of any one element would mean the dissolution of the network, and the 
technology that it supports. Describing the construction of the actor-world, he argued, 
was equivalent to describing the social construction of artifacts. He emphasised the 
importance, in the construction of the actor-world, of translation, or "the methods by 
which an actor enrols others". 141 It is through translation, Callon argued, that 
136 Other than the analysts considered here, the work of Bruno Latour has been particularly important in the 
development of actor-network theory. See, for example, B. Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and 
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technologies establish themselves in key positions or "obligatory points of passage", and 
the actor-network "accumulates materials that render it durable". 142 
Using the actor-network model, Callon explained the eventual failure of the French 
electric vehicle project as primarily a result of "resistance" of fuel cell catalysts - the 
failure of scientists to advance the performance of fuel cells meant that the anticipated 
market for the technology did not develop. 143 He argued that such an explanation would 
have been unobservable by conventional sociological analysis. He concluded that the 
fluidity of actor-networks "makes it possible to abandon the constricting framework of 
sociological analysis with its pre-established social categories and its rigid social/natural 
divide ... [it thereby] gains access to the same room to manoeuvre and the same 
freedom 
as engineers themselves employ". 144 
Callon also discussed the critical role of key individuals, referred to as "engineer- 
sociologists", in maintaining the actor-network, and suggested analysts should follow the 
activities of such individuals. 145 He went on to consider the difference between actor- 
network theory and Hughes' systems approach. Although he recognised that there were 
many similarities, such as those between engineer-sociologists and Hughes' system 
builders, Callon argued that there were also important differences, particularly concerning 
the boundaries between system and context in Hughes' approach: "the systems concept 
presupposes that a distinction can be made between the system itself and its environment 
... [but] 
how do we define the limits of a system and explain concretely the influence of 
the environment? " 146 He argued that although Hughes managed to avoid this problem by 
a "pragmatic use of theory", it was circumvented entirely in actor-network theory. He 
concluded that "by abandoning the concept of system for that of actor-network ... we are 
taking Hughes' analysis ... a step 
further". 147 
Another analyst closely associated with actor-network theory, John Law, considered the 
relative merits of constructivist and systems approaches to the analysis of technological 
change. 148 Law argued that although these have much in common, in that they both 
emphasise the social shaping of technology, they specified a different relationship 
between technology and the rest of society: 
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Social constructivism works on the assumption that the social lies behind 
and directs the growth and stabilisation of artifacts ... that the detection of 
relatively stable directing social interests offers a satisfying explanation 
for the growth of technology. By contrast, the systems approach proceeds 
on the assumption that the social is not especially privileged ... that social interests are variable, at least within certain limits. 149 
Law argued that, as Hughes' systems approach recognised, technologies may sometimes 
be a cause of social change, and not merely - as is suggested by social constructivism -a 
reflection of social interests. 150 To this extent, therefore, he stated that he favoured a 
systems rather than constructivist approach: 
In explanations of social change the social should not be privileged ... Although it may at times be an important - indeed the dominant - factor in 
the growth of the system, this is a purely contingent matter and can be 
determined only by empirical means. Other factors - natural, economic, or 
technical - may be more obdurate than the social and may resist the best 
efforts of the system builder to reshape them. 151 
Law went on to develop an actor-network approach similar to Callon's, with an emphasis 
on the "conditions and tactics of system building", and on both social and technical 
aspects of the actor-network - what he referred to as heterogeneous engineering. 152 He 
stated that whilst the actor-network approach drew greatly on Hughesian systems 
analysis, it differed from it in important ways. Firstly, it dealt with conflict in a different 
way: it viewed the environment around the network as hostile, and the elements within 
the network as susceptible to dissociation. In addition, unlike the systems approach, the 
actor-network approach addressed natural and social phenomena using the same 
analytical vocabulary, since "from the standpoint of the network those elements that are 
human or social do not necessarily differ in kind from those that are natural or 
technological". 153 Law argued that "the social elements in a system should not be given 
special explanatory status" 154, and that therefore, analysts should adopt a 'symmetrical' 
approach to the treatment of human and non-human elements of the network. Within this, 
he recognised that certain elements were more "durable", or less susceptible to 
dissociation than others, and that "the success achieved by one side or the other are a 
function of the relative strength of the components in question". 155 He added, however, 
that "this is not ... to suggest that it is always the social that is malleable and the 
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technological or the natural that is durable. It is rather to stress that the relationship 
between them is one of contingency, and that it is important to find a way of treating all 
the components in a system on equal terms". 156 
A common criticism of both actor-network and constructivist approaches is that they 
concentrate on small-scale projects, and are less suited to analysing larger-scale 
technologies. 157 One of the notable exceptions in this regard was the actor-network 
analysis by Law and Callon of a British rocket technology project. 158 In studying the 
development of such an overtly political technology, Law and Callon were forced to 
consider the role of political institutions as well as project level dynamics. In doing so, 
they attempted to deal with the interaction of macro/micro dynamics in a different way to 
the system/context division of Hughes' approach; they argued: 
It is too simple ... to say that context influences, and 
is simultaneously 
influenced by, content. What we require is a tool that makes it possible to 
describe and explain the convolution of what are usually distinguished as 
sociotechnical context and sociotechnical content. 159 
In this effort, Law and Callon introduced the concepts of global and local networks. They 
stated that the global network included government ministries, geopolitical factors, the 
interests of nation states, and international technological changes, whilst the local 
network included local institutions, such as contractors, agencies and institutes, and also 
scientific and technical expertise, and tools, equipment and papers. 160 They suggested 
that in the course of a technological project, actors attempted to mobilise the global 
network in order to obtain resources with which to build a project at a local level: 
The success and shape of ... [the] project ... depended crucially on the 
creation of two networks and on the exchange of intermediaries between 
these networks ... from the global network came a range of resources - finance, political support, technical specifications ... [that] were made 
available to the project and generated a negotiation space ... within which 
a local network might be built. 161 
They suggested that the technological project itself operated as an intermediary between 
the local and global networks, and that the success of the project depended on the degree 
to which it could establish itself as key link between the two networks: 
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The shape and fate of technological projects is a function of three 
interrelated factors: the global network, local network, and the ability of 
the project itself to impose itself as an obligatory point of passage between 
the two, providing some reward for the global from the local ... It 
is the 
degree and form of mobilization of the two networks and the way in which 
they are connected that determines both the trajectory and success of the 
project. 162 
Jane Summerton applied many concepts and methods of systems, constructivist, and 
actor-network theory in an analysis of the development of a particular electricity 
generation technology project -a district-heating project in a Swedish town. 
163 Whilst 
Summerton adopted much of the language of both systems and actor-network theory, she 
developed her own conceptual approach based on the particular features of grid-based 
technologies. 164 She suggested that these could be characterised in part technically, in 
part institutionally, as examples of grid-based multiorganisations (GBMOs): groups of 
organisations linked together by common goals, and their shared participation in the 
system. Within the GBMO, no single organisation had overall control, and the different 
organisations were drawn together in a complex interdependence. She argued that this 
meant that although committed system builders were vital to the project's success, the 
dynamics of GBMOs were therefore somewhat different from the dynamics of systems or 
actor-networks where one individual system builder or engineer-sociologist was a prime- 
mover: 
The system was not configured solely on the basis of the basis of the plans 
or schemes of the all powerful manipulatory system-builders. Instead [the] 
multiorganization was shaped to a large extent through negotiations 
among interdependent actors. 165 
Summerton suggested that the physical grid of GBMOs was paralleled by an "invisible 
grid", based on the interdependence between the different organisations involved. 166 In 
common with many other analysts drawing on social constructivism, Summerton also 
rejected any primacy of influence for 'technical' as opposed to 'social' dynamics on the 
process of technological change: 
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Amidst the flux, all the components - plants, people and permits - have to 
somehow fall into place. If they do not ... despite the best efforts of system builders, adjustments must be made. One might be tempted to assume that 
the physical artifacts are less flexible or 'malleable' ... than actors' decisions or actions. In a technological deterministic vein, this would 
mean that 'hard' physical artifacts - their design, the pace at which they are 
installed, and their positioning in the system - are harder to steer than are 
'soft' human actors ... [This] case offers evidence to the contrary. 
167 
Indeed, in the design of the actor-network, she argued, "the physical artifacts were 
essentially 'soft' while actors - such as certain customers - sometimes proved 'hard"' , 
168 
She suggested the more overtly social aspects of system building were often more 
difficult and time consuming than physical or technical aspects: "'institutional' and 
'organisational' aspects of shaping grid-based systems (such as political decision-making 
and regulatory processes) have lead times that are at least as long as the lead times of the 
physical artifacts". 169 
Summerton argued that important factors in the district heating project's eventual success 
were an assured first market, strong professional and institutional support structures for 
the technology, and the successful mobilisation and enrolment of powerful figures 
external to the project, such as energy company directors and managers, and state energy 
officials. '70 She emphasised that the assurance of a market was critical to attracting 
investment to the project, given the economics of energy technologies: "with their long 
lead times and high fixed costs, grid-based energy systems are particularly sensitive to 
competing technologies ... system builders strive to obtain monopoly rights ... to assure 
the ability to recover high investment costs". 171 
Summerton also discussed the established vested interests in energy provision - in 
particular those concerned with the dominant technological forms of electricity 
generation in Sweden in the 1980s, hydro and nuclear power - and how these were 
circumvented by making government Electricity Office officials actively involved in the 
project, in other words "'neutralising' the opposition by enlisting it". 172 Despite the 
absence of an overall system 'champion', Summerton argued that there was a marked 
compatibility of concerns among the different actors involved in the district heating 
project. She identified regulators as particularly important actors: "when regulators 
167 ibid: 95 
168 ibid: 252 
169 ibid: 256 
170 ibid: 243 
171 ibid: 252 
172 ibid: 248 
38 
readily approved system-builders plans, expanding the system went smoothly. When they 
objected, the result was a halt (or threatened halt) to further growth". 173 Summerton 
argued that the successful prosecution of the project was surprising, given the diverse and 
complex parts that had to be brought together for it to progress. She concluded that it was 
a "complex, at times fast-paced process in which technical, economic, political and 
institutional issues were ... closely intertwined". 
174 
2.4.3 Criticisms of Constructivist and Actor-Network Approaches 
Even the critics of constructivist and actor-network approaches have recognised that such 
perspectives have some analytical merit. Langdon Winner, for example, stated that 
constructivism had served as an "antidote to naive technological determinism". 175 He 
added that the research efforts of constructivists had helped to reveal the social interests 
behind technological development, and recognised that "constructivist interpretations of 
technology emphasise contingency and choice rather than forces of necessity in the 
history of technology". 176 Similarly, Williams and Russell, whilst also being critical of 
constructivism, conceded that it had provided a "much-needed refutation of autonomous 
and determinist notions concerning technology", and added that constructivist approaches 
had drawn attention to the "problematic nature of technological advance, the possibility 
of redirection at any point, [and] the plasticity of outcomes". 177 
Nevertheless, these analysts and others have been critical of a number of aspects of 
constructivism and actor network approaches. Particular concern has been expressed with 
the use of concepts from the sociology of scientific knowledge which underlie 
constructivism. Williams and Russell pointed to particular difficulties associated with the 
use of the concept of 'closure' as applied to technological change. 178 This was 
problematic, they argued, because technology operates over a much larger and more 
complex social sphere than science. In particular, they argued that "when implementation 
and use are taken into account, the range of social groups involved and affected by 
technological change expands enormously, going far beyond anything recognisable as a 
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technological community". 179 In applying such concepts, they suggested, constructivism 
therefore reduced technology to technological knowledge, "to the exclusion of its material 
manifestation, context, and effects". 180 Williams and Russell also criticised the non- 
typical choice of case-studies in the bulk of constructivist analysis. The detailed case- 
study accounts of constructivism, they suggested, tended to concentrate on the early 
stages of radical' technology projects, ignoring the greater part of technological change, 
where incremental changes "proceed in a context of already strongly-articulated social 
and economic interests". 181 They also argued that constructivists tended to 
become overly 
absorbed in the internal project dynamics, and to project the relationships found 
in the 
research laboratory far more widely than was appropriate. 
182 
Knut Sorensen and Nora Levold shared many of Williams and Russell's criticisms of 
constructivist and actor-network approaches. In particular, they argued that the use of 
concepts from the sociology of science overlooked the fact that "the social terrain on 
which scientists manoeuvre is much simpler than that of engineers", and that "technology 
usually is surrounded by a larger number of powerful economic and political actors than 
is science". 183 They also argued that because science was much less heterogeneous 
compared to technology, a more "complex concept of heterogeneity" was needed to 
capture technological change than Hughes' "seamless web". 
184 They also considered the 
difficulty in adopting the call to "follow the actors" for analysts of technological change, 
and they suggested that "in the case of science, far more, seems to be explained through 
the individual actions of scientists than in the case of technology". 185 Furthermore, they 
argued, even when successfully undertaken, a focus on engineers or technologists was 
capable of missing many of the influences on technological change. Like Williams and 
Russell, Sorensen and Levold also considered the difficulties of the use of the concept of 
"closure" in technological terms. They suggested that, in science, closure was associated 
with the successful resolution of the process of change, but that in technology some 
remaining "interpretative flexibility" may be desirable, and closure may never be 
achieved. They concluded that, given the complexity of the process of technological 
change, any one conceptual or analytical approach was necessarily limited, and a range of 
concepts and methods was appropriate: 
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The problem is that the terrain on which engineers and technological 
scientists move has been thoroughly shaped by previous actions. To 
encounter the historical processes that have brought about, for example, 
the available infrastructure of competence, skills and knowledge through 
observation of engineers/scientists, is - to put it mildly - difficult. For this 
task, a heterogeneous mix of historical, ethnographic, economic, and 
sociological competencies seems required. 186 
Winner has been a particularly outspoken critic of constructivism, which has he referred 
to as the "social determination of technology". 187 In particular, he has objected to what 
he 
considered to be an overemphasis on interpretative flexibility, and the disregard of other 
approaches which offered more politically informed and structurally 'aware analysis of 
technological change - such as the insights offered by his own concept of technological 
autonomy (2.2.2). 188 In this regard, he added, constructivism had effectively narrowed 
the conceptual bounds of research and analysis into technological change. He stated that 
"perhaps the helpful insight ... 
[constructivists] want to offer is simply that choices are 
available, that the course of technological development is not fore-ordained by outside 
forces, but is instead a product of complex social interactions. If that is the point of their 
enquiries, then constructivists are now repeating it ad nauseam. ". 189 Winner concluded 
that constructivism was unable to recognise less obvious structural influences on 
technological change: 
Although ... 
[constructivism] succeeds in finding contingency rather than 
necessity in the course of technological change ... it disregards the 
possibility that there may be dynamics evident in technological change 
behind that revealed by studying the immediate needs, interests, problems 
and solutions of specific groups and social actors. 190 
Wolfgang Rudig criticised the absence of comparative study within the most 
constructivist case-studies. Rudig described as "indefensible" the denial by constructivist 
analysts of the influence of macro-economic and political influence, "on the basis of 
studies which are usually limited to one particular case occurring in one particular 
country at one particular time". 191 He also stated that "there seems to be little ground for 
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the aggressive rejection of all so-called 'macro-structural' approaches". 192 Nevertheless, 
Rudig argued that there was room for accommodation within constructivism for a greater 
recognition of macro-structural influences, and he stated that "Pinch and Bijker's model 
of 'relevant social groups' is so general that macro groups and dynamics could 
be 
integrated". 193 
Mikael Hard argued that, although social constructivism had presented a useful 
perspective on conflict associated with innovation, this lacked a discussion of power, 
stratification, and hierarchy, and that consequently, the differing power of the various 
'relevant social groups' was underplayed: "[the] insistence on not only discussing 
engineers and capitalists but also allowing for the influence on technological change of 
various user groups and social movements is very well taken, but it must not be 
brought 
to a point where the relative power of the social groups is lost". 
194 Hard was also critical 
of the overemphasis, in constructivism, on consensus as a means of resolving conflict. 
195 
He stated that "by regarding closure as an outcome of consensus, Pinch and Bijker 
suddenly and regrettably drop their conflict perspective. Once stabilization around a 
technological solution has emerged, conflict disappears". 196 Hard argued that this aspect 
of constructivism, borne out of the import of theory from the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, was mistaken when applied to technology: 
The formation of consensus is only one of several possible closure 
mechanisms - closure through the exercise of force being another ... 
considering that social groups being affected by and involved in the 
development of technological artifacts and systems are, usually, both large 
in number and quite dissimilar, it does not seem likely that technological 
closure should always be of the consensus kind. 197 
Nevertheless, Hard argued that social constructivism was "very far removed" from 
technological determinism, or even what he saw as the functionalism of Hughes' systems 
theory (2.3.4), and he added that "its agency orientation has proved empirically useful". 
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Hughes has also recently expressed criticism of constructivism. 198 He argued that whilst 
it had "provided an invaluable corrective" to technological determinist interpretations of 
history, it shared with determinist approaches a failure to recognise the complexity of 
technological change, and like Winner, he suggested that it tended towards social 
determinism". 199 Hughes considered the limitations of both determinist and constructivist 
approaches in terms of their interpretation of the 'technical core' of systems. He stated that 
whereas technological determinists see the technical core as causing social change, 
constructivists see it as an effect of social interests. In reality, Hughes stated, the core was 
both cause and effect. 2°° He concluded that although constructivist interpretations 
corresponded more closely to the early stages of system development, and determinist 
interpretations later stages, both provided a limited way of examining technological 
change, and he stressed instead the value of his own concept of momentum: 
A technological system can be both cause and effect; it can shape or be 
shaped by society. As they grow larger and more complex, systems tend to 
be more shaping of society and less shaped by it ... The momentum of 
technological systems is a concept that can be located somewhere between 
the poles of technical determinism and social constructivism. The social 
constructivists have a key to understanding the behaviour of young 
systems; technical determinists come into their own with mature ones. 
Technological momentum, however, provides a more flexible mode of 
interpretation and one that is in accord with the history of large systems. 201 
At the same time, Hughes expressed greater satisfaction with actor-network theory, 
which, he argued, shared more essential characteristics with his technological systems 
approach. 202 
2.4.4 Micro- and Macro-Level Analysis 
A recurrent theme in criticism of constructivist and actor-network analyses of 
technological change is their perceived over-attention to micro-level project dynamics, 
and their neglect of macro-level economic and political structures. Williams and Russell, 
for example, described this neglect as "mistaken and unnecessary", and added that "we do 
not believe that institutions such as those of the state ... can be treated in the same way as 
an individual actor". 203 They suggested, for example, that this meant that Callon's actor- 
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network analysis of an electric vehicle project in France (2.4: 2) lacked sufficient 
recognition of the power of entrenched interests behind established technologies. They 
suggested that greater recognition of the role of social structure and institutional power 
was essential to understand the development and durability of technological systems: 
"analyses of broader structures are essential to understanding the context within which 
detailed interactions take place ... interactions cannot be explained in their own terms". 
204 
For Williams and Russell the neglect of structural influences within constructivism meant 
that there was exaggeration of the power and autonomy of local actors - especially 
scientists and engineers - which ironically amounted to a new form of technological 
determinism. 205 They concluded: 
An interactive model of the relation between context and action is the key 
to overcoming the separation of micro and macro approaches to 
understanding technology as a social product, with different but consistent 
forms of analysis appropriate to each, rather than an application of the 
same action concepts regardless of level. 206 
In defence of the actor-network approach, Callon et al. claimed that in adopting such a 
perspective, the distinction between macro and micro levels of analysis disappeared, 
since the same analytical terminology and methodological approach was used for all the 
influences on technological change, including individuals, organisations, and non-human 
actors. Conventional analysis, they argued, in which different analytical forms are 
adopted according to scale, tended to privilege large-scale dynamics, and thereby 
"conceal the processes by which growth occurs, and the uncertainties that are involved in 
maintaining power and size" 207 
In a review of micro and macro analyses of technological change, Thomas J. Misa 
identified an association between the choice of analytical perspective and the analyst's 
views towards technological determinism. 208 Misa stated that "those ... [analysts] 
adopting a 'macro' perspective are the ones who allow technology a causal role in 
historical change. They deploy the Machine to make history. This causal role for the 
Machine is not present and is not possible in studies adopting a 'micro' perspective" 209 
Even in disciplines sensitive to the social influences of technology, Misa argued, "those 
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studies placing technology in a causative role maintain a macro view of history, whereas 
the ones rejecting technological determinism affirm 'the importance of the 
microcosm"'. 210 He added, however, that some recent work in technological history had 
transformed the concept of technological determinism - in particular, Hughes' concept of 
'momentum'. Misa suggested that constructivist, actor-network and systems approaches 
enabled recognition of the heterogeneous nature of technology: 
Accounts such as these are not content merely to explain the 'social' by the 
'technical' (technology as a social force), or the 'technical' by the 'social' 
(technology as a social product) ... [they] shift to an interpretative framework presenting technology at once as socially constructed and 
society-shaping. They view technology as a social process 21' 
More recently, Misa stated that "in distinguishing between the macro and the micro, it is 
essential to emphasize that the issue is not merely the size of the unit of analysis". 212 He 
suggested that: 
Besides taking a larger unit of analysis, macro studies tend to abstract 
from individual case studies, to impute rationality on actor's behalfs or 
posit functionality for their actions, and to be order driven ... [by contrast] 
micro studies tend to focus solely on case studies, to refute rationality ... [and] functionality, and be disorder-respecting. 213 
He added that the evidence provided by many recent micro-level case studies had 
provided a necessary refutation of the determinism implicit in macro-level analyses of 
technological change: 
Properly understood, 'technology' is a shorthand term for the elaborate 
sociotechnical networks that span society. To invoke 'technology' on the 
macro level of analysis, is to compact into one tidy term a whole host of 
actors, machines, institutions and social relations. To expand 'technology', 
on the micro level of analysis, is to regain the complexity and messiness of 
the compacted whole. Insofar as people are necessary parts of the 
networks, to say that 'technology' causes social change is really to say that 
people - through the sociotechnical networks they create and sustain - 
cause social change. 214 
Whilst offering broad support for micro-level analyses of technological change, however, 
Misa also warned against the limitations of such a perspective: "micro studies, in the 
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attempt to demonstrate the socially constructed nature of technology, often omit comment 
on the intriguing question of whether technology has an influence on anything". 215 He 
concluded that "what we choose to study ... strongly influences whether technology 
emerges as socially constructed or as society-shaping". 216 
Donald MacKenzie rejected the micro/macro divide as a "probably false and potentially 
damaging dichotomy"217, and instead suggested that a satisfactory analysis of the process 
of technological change required analysts to "fuse and transform the kinds of concerns 
habitually divided up into 'micro' and 'macro"'. 218 MacKenzie suggested that rather than 
micro versus macro, this problem was better conceived of as the reconciliation of local 
and delocalised social research. In these terms, he suggested that neither an exclusively 
local nor non-local approach was appropriate to technology studies - since technological 
change was precisely concerned with delocalisation - the shift from local to non-local 
dynamics. 219 Similarly, Ham and Hill argued that there was no real choice to be made 
between micro and macro perspectives, and added that all social research required 
consideration of dynamics operating at different levels of aggregation: 
It is necessary to focus on different levels of analysis, namely the micro- 
level of decision-making within organisations, the middle-range analysis 
of policy formation, and macro-analysis of political systems ... It 
is the 
interaction between levels which is particularly significant and 
problematic. 220 
Sorensen and Levold argued that established approaches to the analysis of technological 
change tended to focus either on individual companies or scientists on the one hand, or on 
the national economy and government on the other - in other words, on either micro-level 
action or macro-level structure. 221 They suggested that in both of these approaches, there 
was a neglect of "very important 'intermediate' institutions and institutional arrangements 
(networks) involved in technological innovation", such as banks, venture capitalists 
research institutes, which were "neither fluid nor determined". 222 Sorensen and Levold 
asserted "the necessity of paying attention to this meso level and ... 
institutional aspects of 
technological innovation". 223 Meso-level institutions, they stated "can be seen as a visible 
215 ibid: 138 
216 ibid: 139 
217 Donald MacKenzie, "'Micro' versus'Macro' Sociologies of Science and Technology', Edinburgh University PICT 
Working Paper No. 2,1988: 9 
218 ibid: 9 
219 ibid: 3 
220 C. Ham and M. Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1984: 174 
221 Knut Sorensen and Nora Levold, Tacit Networks, Heterogeneous Engineers, and Embodied Technology', Science, 
Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 17. No. 1, pp13-35, Winter 1992: 14 
222 ibid: 14-15 
223 ibid: 21, emphasis added. 
46 
embodiment of the heterogeneous nature of technology". 224 They argued that the failure 
of both constructivist and macro-level approaches in this regard was a measure of their 
limited usefulness in analysing the process of technological change: 
To understand the process of technological innovation without 
emphasizing meso-level relationships may lead to two important and far- 
reaching mistakes, either to overstating the potential of the individual 
company (or entrepreneur, scientist or engineer) or to overstating the 
efficiency of national policies. Both these mistakes are common in the 
literature. 225 
Elsewhere, Sorensen has argued that actor-network approaches tend to downplay the role 
of the consumers of technology, or "what happens after the lab". 226 He suggested that this 
was particularly relevant to the highly politically-shaped technologies of electricity 
generation, which could be described as emerging "out of parliament rather than out of 
the laboratory". He pointed out that the dominant electricity generation technologies in 
Norway - hydro-electricity, energy conservation technologies, and combined 
heat and 
power - owed much of their 'success' to sustained support by national and 
local 
government over many years. 
Misa has also recently called for a focus on meso-level institutions and dynamics in 
analyses of technological change - what he defined as "the region conceptually 
intermediate between the macro and the micro ... [and] the institutions intermediate 
between the firm and the market or between the individual and the state". 227 Misa 
suggested that "a focus on meso-level institutions and organisations that mediate between 
the individual and the cosmos ... offers a framework for integrating the social shaping of 
technology and the technological shaping of society". 228 In recent years a number of 
approaches to the analysis of technological change have emerged which are concerned to 
address this institutional or meso level. A few of these approaches, of greatest relevance 
to the present study, are now considered. 
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2.5 Institutional Approaches 
2.5.1 Stewart Russell's Institutional Interests Approach 
Stewart Russell offered an institutional analysis of technological change in an analysis of 
the development of combined heat and power (CHP) and district heating (DH) 
technologies in Britain. 229 Russell was particularly concerned to explain the negligible 
adoption of CHP/DH in the UK, in contrast to their widespread use in many other 
European countries. He argued that understanding this pattern required a historically and 
structurally informed analysis of the British energy sector: 
An explanation of the neglect of CHP/DH requires ... a historical and 
structural analysis of its context: the energy sector and its broader social 
and economic role ... [it] must 
be situated in the organizational and 
technical development of the key institutions ... These characteristics and 
relations must in turn be linked to the specific character of the British 
economy and state. 230 
Russell analysed the fortunes of CHP/DH technology from the early-twentieth century up 
to the mid-1980s by studying the actions of various government departments, energy 
sector organisations, local authorities, expert committees, and other bodies. He argued 
that the absence of a key organisation with national responsibility for heat supply and 
conservation had meant that the development of CHP/DH in Britain was left to 
organisations for which it was a marginal activity, and that consequently, it had been 
awarded little institutional, financial, or political support. Investment in the technology 
was primarily the responsibility of local authorities, which had many other pressing 
demands for investment, and which were often subject to close financial control by 
central government. Russell pointed out that this was in stark contrast to the sustained 
institutional and economic support afforded to the dominant energy technologies in 
Britain over the same period, particularly nuclear power. 231 
Although CHP/DH technology had been marginalised in Britain throughout the century, 
Russell found that the attitudes of particular institutions to the technology were 
contingent, and had changed over time with changing circumstances. For example, the 
National Coal Board (NCB) was hostile to CHP/DH in the 1940s, but had supported its 
development in the 1960s - reflecting, he argued, a change in the NCB's perception of the 
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technology from a threat into an opportunity. 232 He also suggested that the attitude of the 
large generating boards to the technology also changed with time, and whilst they were 
never strong supporters of the technology, they were not always actively opposed to it. In 
general, he stated, an understanding of technological change in energy supply required an 
analysis of the changing interests of the different institutions involved: 
We need first a broad picture of the major objectives and programme ... [the institution] defined for itself, and its evolving relation ... with Government and with the rest of the sector. That must be combined with a 
quite detailed analysis of the different circumstances in which it was 
confronted with proposals for CHP, and of the ... challenges with which 
the technique was bound up. 233 
Russell concluded that without an institutionally and structurally informed analysis of the 
energy sector, it was impossible to account for the periodic changes experienced in the 
technologies of energy provision in Britain. 234 He also argued that it was only through an 
institutional-level analysis that it was possible to determine if the exclusion of CHP 
technology in Britain was accidental (in that a different outcome could have been realised 
without significant changes in the structure of the industry) or systematic (characteristic 
of the structure). He concluded that in the case of CHP/DH technology adoption in 
Britain, there was a mixture of both accidental and systematic exclusion: 
The option was excluded in part through the normal operation of 
institutions going about their main business, and to that extent 
unintentionally. In part it was kept out through active resistance, because 
of the challenges its introduction would represent to established interests 
in the sector and more widely, the political demands with which it was 
associated, and the economic and organizational changes its adoption 
would require. 235 
Although he found that there were some changes in the attitudes of the institutions 
towards different technological options, Russell concluded that energy technology choice 
was dominated throughout the century by a small number of producer organisations: 
Much energy politics ... [consists of] interests organised around production 
and consumption processes, and relations between these as regulated by 
the state ... Producer industries have generally sought to consolidate and 
maintain the structure of the sector in vertically integrated chains ... the dominance of producer interests has been maintained even when the state 
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has intervened ... Changes in the organization ... tended to preserve 
its 
basic relations and the dominance of the producer industries. 236 
In the light of his analysis of the adoption of CHP/DH technology, Russell went on to 
consider other approaches to the analysis of energy technology, and also more general 
forms of analysing technological change. He was critical of the implicit technological 
determinism prevalent in much analysis of energy technology: 
That conflicts of interests in the sector are often channelled through 
technical debates does not mean that facts determine policies; rather it 
underlines the need to understand how competing knowledge claims are 
constructed and deployed, and how they come to be aligned to institutional 
interests - how policies may determine the facts ... The view 
developed 
here rejects the technological determinism prevalent in energy literature, 
much of which depicts the history of energy technologies as a logical 
progression in a natural order and with increasing size as technical 
economies of scale are achieved. Rather it attempts to show the complex 
of interaction of economic, political and social forces that shape ... [the] development and adoption of technologies in particular forms and with 
particular features, and propel them along particular trajectories of 
'advance'. It implies that certain courses of action and technological 
options may be more or less systematically excluded or actively resisted 
because of the challenges they represent to established interests within the 
sector and beyond. 237 
As well as rejecting technological determinist accounts,. Russell was also critical of 
constructivist and actor-network approaches (as discussed earlier, 2.4.3). He argued that 
the prevalence of microsocial approaches in technology studies necessitated a reassertion 
of "the importance of the 'macro"', and of the need for analysis at different levels of 
aggregation, with "different concepts and methods appropriate to each". 238 He concluded: 
An understanding of broader structures and processes is necessary, both as 
a level of explanation in itself of the general characteristics of a societies 
technology, and also as an essential part of a full explanation of detailed 
actions and outcomes, providing the context which fundamentally shapes 
them ... It 
is possible to reconcile the macro and the micro without 
collapsing one into the other: to have different forms of analysis which are 
none the less consistent? 39 
Russell also drew attention to the need to consider political values and institutional 
interests laying behind 'economic forces', and the enrolling of economic justifications for 
or against particular technologies. He suggested that these interests were revealed by the 
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imposition of certain financial criteria rather than others in deciding between technology 
choices. Although he found that ostensibly economic judgements were decisive in the 
choice between alternative generation technologies, these masked underlying political 
and institutional interests. As a result, he rejected any economic determinism of 
generation technology in the British ESI: 
Economic judgements usually decided the fate of DH [district heating] 
projects, and as that viability was so often marginal, it is necessary to 
examine their fine detail to know what tipped the balance. But there was 
no single method or universal set of criteria. The terms of appraisal were 
clearly dependent on the performing institution and the precise constraints 
on it. It is not sufficient to ask whether the option was 'economic'. We 
need to ask for whom its economics were assessed, and why narrowly 
defined economic criteria were used and whether they were appropriate. 
We should consider why they were applied with such rigour and 
demanding parameters [to DH], when another option like nuclear power 
was forced through when its economics was at best dubious and at times 
recognized even by the nuclear industry as an inadequate justification by 
itself. 24c 
2.5.2 Mikael Härd's Social Conflict Approach 
As discussed earlier in the chapter (2.4.3), Mikael Hard was critical of both constructivist 
and systems approaches for suggesting that conflict was essentially detrimental to the 
process of technological change. In offering a statement of his criticisms, Hard went on to 
describe the outlines of a "conflict theory of technology", which, he argued, offered a 
complementary approach to the consensus orientation of constructivism. 241 Hard outlined 
the view of technological change upon which this conflict perspective was based: 
Technology and technological change are resources used by some groups 
to retain or rearrange social relations. This means that technology is 
formed by social groups in conflict and that technological change is never 
a socially neutral process. In this view, the application of technology is 
not, in the first place, defined as a means of using natural resources or as a 
tool for the alleviation of physical strain. Rather, it is seen as a tool for 
establishing and influencing social relations. 242 
Unlike constructivist and systems approaches, Hard drew on social theory which 
emphasised that social conflict was an essential part of technological change. From such a 
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perspective, he stated, bureaucracy could be seen to be largely inimical to innovation: "in 
a highly bureaucratized society or firm ... [or] from an unchallenged monopolist, very 
little technical change is to be expected". 243 Hard also argued that the most conducive 
organisational form for the promotion of innovation was not perfect competition, but one 
featuring uneven power distribution, and some barriers to entry: 
Highly asymmetric and stable power relations are, generally, detrimental 
to technical change ... perfect symmetry 
(or, in economic terms, perfect 
competition), is however, also disadvantageous to change. Compared to a 
society in which one group is totally dominant or an arena in which power 
is equally shared, it is more likely that technical change occurs in a society 
or an arena in which power and influence are unequally distributed 
among a relatively large number of agents ... 
Industries with moderate 
concentration or barriers to enter tend to foster a higher level of innovative 
activity. 
Hard argued that economic and social conflict perspectives on technological change were 
by no means incompatible - indeed, he stated, "because economic competition is one 
form of conflict, a social conflict approach should not be seen in opposition to economic 
explanations". 245 However, he added that economic explanations alone were unable to 
explain certain important features of technological change, such as the bias towards 
labour-saving innovations in Western technology. A social conflict approach, by contrast, 
drew attention to non-economic factors, such as labour unrest, as a motivation for change. 
By stressing the conflicts of different interest groups, he argued, this view allowed 
innovation to be seen not only as an outcome of market competition: 
The ability of a society to favor technical change is a result of conflicts 
taking place in a large number of arenas and concerning not only monetary 
gains but also property rights and the control of production processes ... as 
well as political power and authority. 246 
As well as conflict associated with labour unrest, Htrd also suggested that "technological 
change is often driven by professional 'status groups' fighting for influence and 
control". 247 This was often a result, he argued, of the asymmetries within and between 
professional groups such as engineers and managers. Hard also stated that "latent 
conflicts may become manifest when new technical opportunities appear", and that the 
introduction of new techniques may be promoted by certain professional groups, in order 
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to gain "positional advantage". 248 He concluded that the social conflict perspective was a 
useful means of revealing the ways in which "technology is applied and technological 
change is fostered by groups to preserve or alter social relations ... [and] governed 
by the 
interests and ideas of certain groups in society"? '9 
2.5.3 Donald MacKenzie's Historical Sociology of Technology 
In his 1990 book Inventing Accuracy, Donald MacKenzie presented a detailed account of 
the evolution of nuclear missile guidance technology. 250 In the course of the study, 
MacKenzie outlined his historical sociology analytical perspective on technological 
change, the aim of which, he stated, was to understand technology "as a historical product 
and social creation". 251 Like Hughes, MacKenzie was critical of narrow 'internal' 
histories of technology - he argued that analysts who adopted such an approach typically 
assumed that technology developed along 'natural' pathways in response to technical 
developments - an essentially technological determinist view. Alternatively, 
he added, 
military technology was often studied as a direct response to government policy -a 
political determinist view. Both approaches, he stated, failed to consider the complexity 
of technological change. MacKenzie was also critical of Winner's suggestion of the 
autonomy of nuclear technology; he stated that "the nuclear world ... is not the product of 
technology developing autonomously ... a technology 
is not social up to the point of 
invention and self-sustaining thereafter. Its conditions of possibility are always social". 252 
In outlining his own approach, MacKenzie stated that he aimed to view technology as 
"the product of a complex process of conflict and collaboration between a range of social 
actors including ambitious, energetic technologists, laboratories and corporations, and 
political and military leaders and the organizations they head ... [technology] 
has been a 
shaping force, but has itself been shaped". 253 He then went on to justify the need, in 
striving for a more informed analysis of technology, of both historical and sociological 
perspectives. 
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In justifying the historical analysis of the evolution of technologies, MacKenzie argued 
that case studies of the development of one particular technology project typically 
restricted their consideration of events to just a few years, and treated as constant those 
more slowly evolving forces. By freezing time' in this way, he stated, case studies tended 
to omit consideration of a "key category of political actor, the organizations within which 
such technical changes take place". 254 To avoid this, he claimed, a historical perspective 
was necessary - to unfreeze time, and view the present "not in isolation from the past but 
as a moment in a continuing process". 255 
A sociological perspective, MacKenzie stated, was clearly necessary, given the wide 
range of 'social' influences on technological change: 
Technological change is simultaneously economic, political, 
organisational, cultural, and legal change, to enumerate just some of the 
aspects of 'the social' ... Changes 
in technology go hand-in-hand with 
changes, small and large, in the preconditions of their use, in the ways 
they are used, and in the reasons for their use ... the way technology 
changes cannot be explained in isolation from the economic, political, and 
other social circumstances of that change. 256 
In addition, however, MacKenzie justified an explicitly sociological perspective as a 
response to developments in the sociology of scientific knowledge - he suggested that "if 
a sociology of scientific knowledge is possible, so should a sociology of technological 
knowledge". 257 Indeed, he added, such analysis was necessary, because of the special 
status awarded to technological knowledge and expertise: 
Along with scientific, mathematical, and medical knowledge, but no other 
areas, our society treats technological knowledge as a'hard fact' ... it is ... a vital resource of technologists (as distinct from political leaders, 
generals, or corporate executives) that in questions of weapons design they 
are the arbiters of what is feasible as distinct from the 'softer' issues of 
what is acceptable, needed, or affordable. 258 
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Whilst recognising that technologists' capacity to 'speak for the facts' constituted was a 
vital resource in their negotiations with politicians, MacKenzie stressed that this 
'hardness' was an illusion, and that, in principle at least, they were without exception open 
to challenge. 259 He declared that "there are always grounds for challenging any 
knowledge claim", and continued: 
Why some knowledge claims are challenged and some are not, and why 
some challenged succeed and some fail, thus become interesting empirical 
questions. Central to the answers ... are matters of the 
interests, goals, 
traditions, and experiences of the social groups (technological and other) 
involved ... and of the relative prestige and credibility of 
different links in 
the network of knowledge. 260 
MacKenzie emphasised that "technological knowledge ... is social through and through", 
and added that this was "an ineradicable aspect of all technological knowledge", even 
where there was no open technological controversy. 261 As a consequence, he added, 
analysts should avoid contrasting 'technical' and 'social' or 'political' reasons for the 
choice of a particular design or artifact, or explaining choices of technology in terms of 
their inherent 'technical superiority'. 262 He added: 
Technical reasons for a course of action, technical superiority, and 
technical efficiency are all vitally important; in practice, they often seem 
sufficient to determine a given outcome. But it is important, as far as 
possible, to investigate why a given technical reason was found 
compelling, when, abstractly, it could have been challenged; and to ask 
what counts as superiority and efficiency in particular circumstances. 263 
At the end of Inventing Accuracy, MacKenzie reflected on the process of change in 
missile guidance systems, and on the more general insights missile technology offered 
into technological change. He argued that his evidence undermined both technological 
and political determinist notions, and that whilst "manifestations of technological 
determinism are everywhere to be found in discussions of the arms race", they were often 
used as a resource for those who wished to justify development. 264 He pointed out that 
both the opponents and proponents of developments typically engaged in debates on 
259 ibid: 417. The 'hardness' of certain scientific and technical facts was recently reasserted by Walter G. Vincenti in 
The Technical Shaping of Technology: Real-World Constraints and Technical Logic in Edison's Electrical Lighting 
System', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, pp553-574, August 1995 
260 MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, op cit: 10-11 
261 ibid: 11 
262 ibid: 11 
263 ibid: l l 
264 ibid: 383. A number of analysts have analysed the political uses of technical expertise. See, for example, Dorothy 
Nelkin, The Political Impact of Technical Expertise', in Boyle, G., Elliott, D., and Roy, R. (eds. ), The Politics of 
Technology, London, Longman/The Open University, 1977, pp189-205. Here, Nelkin stated that "developers seek 
expertise to legitimize their plans and they use their command of technical knowledge to justify their autonomy ... the 
extent to which technical advice is accepted depends less on its validity and the competence of the expert, than on the 
extent to which it reinforces existing positions. " (ibid: 202). 
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deterministic terms - for example, in identifying a need to resist or 
follow "technological 
imperatives". He concluded that "the single most important lesson" to emerge from his 
analysis was the "fallacy of ... technological 
determinism ... technological change 
is 
social through-and-through. Take away the institutions that support technological change 
of a particular sort, and it ceases to seem 'natural' - indeed it ceases altogether". 
265 
MacKenzie then turned to a consideration of mature technologies. It was with these, he 
stated, that the notion of technological autonomy was most powerful - since "here we do 
typically find the continuous, predictable, apparently inexorable technological change ... 
the phenomenon that gives the notion of a 'natural trajectory' of technology its 
plausibility". 266 Whilst he recognised the continuity of change in mature technologies, 
MacKenzie rejected autonomous or natural trajectory notions to explain this. Rather, he 
argued, this reflected the dependency of even mature technologies on their surrounding 
institutions. Different institutional settings with different priorities gave rise to very 
different technologies - civil guidance technologies, he pointed out - developed in an 
institutional setting which emphasised reliability and economy above extreme accuracy - 
had evolved quite differently to their military counterparts. He concluded that "what 
appears to be a natural trajectory ought instead to be seen ... as an institutionalised pattern 
of predominantly incremental technological change involving, centrally, a self-fulfilling 
prophecy". 267 
Like Hughes, MacKenzie emphasised that technological continuity was maintained 
through the identification of barriers to progression, and on painstaking efforts to remove 
them -a process which gave rise to a pattern of 
incremental technological change, often 
then extrapolated into the future. 268 As he pointed out, however, such extrapolations were 
based on the assumption of continued institutional support - in particular "the existence 
of a relatively stable organisational framework within which the technological change 
265 MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy, op cit: 384. He added that his study suggested that technological change was as 
much a matter of "social engineering" as "technical engineering", and added that this social engineering took different 
forms in different situations: for developments already recognised as desirable, it amounted to a persuasion of 
possibility and practicability, in others however, it also 
involved the persuasion of desirability (ibid: 384). 
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whatever means - particularly new technology - to perpetuate 
its existence and growth. Nelson and Winter suggested 
that at any given time, firms are seen to operate on a natural trajectory common to their industry, within which they 
have scope to develop their particular strategy and competitive advantage. Changes in the trajectory occur as a response 
to changes in the socio-economic conditions under which the firm operates. Nelson and Winter referred to this as 
changes to the firms' selection environment. (see Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, 
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Economics of Industrial Innovation London, Frances Pinter, 1982 (2nd Edition), especially Chapter 1 pp3-26: 'By Way 
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takes place ... [and] the channelling of resources to support this". 
269 He then considered 
the conditions that had supported the "institutionalization" of technological change in the 
case of missile guidance technology. He identified the long-standing stability of the 
various military and technological institutions involved, and also sustained state interest 
in enhanced missile accuracy, sufficient to secure continued resource provision. He 
claimed that "if that [state] interest had not existed, the technological trajectory ... would 
have ceased". 270 
However, in addition to organizational and financial support, MacKenzie also identified a 
self-fulfilling belief at the heart of institutionalised technological change. He stated that 
"organisations are created and sustained, and resources flow, to the extent that it is 
believed that the predicted change in technology will become, or at least has a chance of 
becoming, a reality". 271 He added that, by using their expert knowledge, technologists 
attempted to maintain the "credibility of the prophecy" to politicians and policymakers. If 
the credibility of this prophecy was successfully established and maintained, he argued, it 
became essentially self-fulfilling: 
To think of a matter of technological change as a 'natural trajectory' is to 
miss everything that is interesting about it and which makes it possible: 
the interplay of interests, the flow of resources, and the credibility of 
predictions. The reason why a pattern may nevertheless appear natural ... lies in the self-fulfilling nature of the prophecy at the core of a trajectory. 
If it comes to be believed that there is only one way to advance a 
technology, then that one way has at least a chance of becoming a reality. 
The others do not, and soon their disadvantage may become 
irreversible. 272 
On a more theoretical theme, MacKenzie then went on to consider the difficulties 
confronting the articulation and analysis of the various influences on technological 
development - in particular the problematic issue of technological and social boundaries. 
He argued that his research offered support for the view that there was no analytical 
separation to be drawn between 'technology' and 'society': 
The view of technology as an external, autonomous force cannot be 
sustained ... The political, organisational, economic, and legal 
circumstances - the 'social' circumstances - of technological development, 
shaped that development from its most general patterns to its most specific 
details273 
269 ibid: 386-7 
270 ibid: 387 
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272 ibid: 39 1. MacKenzie suggested that a particular technological trajectory could be "unpicked" by comparing it to 
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At the same time, he stated, whilst technology was not an independent cause, neither was 
it a "dependent effect", called into being to serve a socially-defined need. 274 Indeed, he 
added, in certain radical cases of innovation, the 'need' was often constructed at the same 
time as, or even subsequent to, the introduction of the technology itself. MacKenzie 
concluded that no separation between technical and social influences was tenable, and he 
expressed support for actor-network and constructivist analysts who adopted the use of 
more abstract terms such as 'network' and 'system' to emphasise their interconnectedness: 
Technology ... is not above politics as an autonomous determining factor, 
nor beneath it as a dependent effect, but part of it. Furthermore, as we 
enter the black box we find that the distinction between politics and 
technology becomes harder and harder to make ... To that extent, therefore, I am wholly in sympathy with the argument that it is too weak a 
position even to see technology and politics as interacting: there is no 
categorical distinction to be made between the two. The web has no 
intrinsic seams. 275 
MacKenzie stressed, however, that "we cannot stop with that observation"; he recognised 
that boundaries between technological and other social domains were constructed and 
institutionalised. Indeed, he added, those involved in technological change actively seek 
to maintain such boundaries: "out of the seamless web, participants do construct 
relatively separate spheres of the 'technical' and 'political'. It is a distinction central to 
how they talk ... [and] central to their success or failure". 
276 He then considered the 
various ways in which this separation was maintained. In part, he stated, this was 
achieved through the division of labour, which meant that other than the 'heterogeneous' 
activities of a few system builders, technologists were largely able to get on with 
exclusively 'technical' work, and to leave 'politics' to others. 277 He also suggested that 
there was a "pervasive way of thinking about technology that lends itself to the 
maintenance of separate spheres. This involves seeing politics as intruding on technology 
either when there is no single best technical solution, or when the best solution is not 
adopted". 278 In this way, MacKenzie observed, technologists often blamed the failure of 
technological projects on political interference. On the same theme, he added: 
Perhaps the most important reason for the separation of technology and 
politics is that technologists and program managers work hard to maintain 
it. It is greatly in their interests ... for their sphere of activity to be seen as 
one of purely technical work and technical decisions. Program managers, 
274 ibid: 411-2 
275 ibid: 412-3 
276 ibid: 413 
277 ibid: 413 
278 ibid: 413 
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in particular, try to shape this work and" those decisions so that the 
separation will be maintained. 279 
MacKenzie saw this effort on the part of technology program managers as a response to 
the perceived threat of interference from the political system. By 'black boxing' their 
projects, he argued, program managers aimed to ensure that the technological process 
itself was left as an essentially 'autonomous' realm for technologists - in other words, "to 
smoothly supply the technical output that their environment demands, and thus to keep 
receiving the necessary input of resources ... without giving that environment reason to 
inquire into the details of the process". 280 He added that the desire to keep the black box 
firmly closed typically resulted in a reluctance to adopt radical technical options or 
unfamiliar project goals -a "pervasive conservatism on the part of program managers" - 
which was sometimes inappropriate to the circumstances they faced. 281 He concluded 
that "technology is shaped so as to maintain the separation between technology and 
politics"? 82 
Elsewhere, MacKenzie has given particular consideration to the role of financial and 
economic criteria in shaping technological change. A number of technology studies 
analysts - whilst giving detailed attention to various political and institutional interests - 
leave 'economic forces' aside as an independent force outside the scope of social 
influence. H&rd, for example, in his consideration of the role of social conflict, conceived 
of the "economic influence" as a parallel force operating alongside political and 
institutional interests (2.5.2). As MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman pointed out, however, 
the 'economic' influence on technological change is itself socially constructed and 
maintained: 
The social shaping of technology ... [occurs] both directly - as when the 
maintenance or creation of a desired social relation entered into the choice 
of technologies - and indirectly - as when prevailing social relations 
affected the framework of costs within which the economic calculations 
were performed ... The economic shaping of technology is, in fact, the 
social shaping of technology. 283 
279 ibid: 414 
280 ibid: 414 
281 ibid: 415 
282 ibid: 415. MacKenzie pointed out that the efforts of technologists to black-box their programs presented analytical 
problems for constructivism - in particular Pinch and Bijker's call to identify the various 'relevant social groups' 
associated with alternative technological designs, since, as he stated "technology may be shaped specifically so as to 
prevent this" (ibid: 416). 
283 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, The Social Shaping of Technology, op cit: 23,15; emphasis added. 
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In a more recent paper, MacKenzie commented on the importance, for technology studies 
analysts, of giving consideration to this 'social construction' of financial criteria applied to 
technology choices - what he referred to as ethnoaccountancy, or "the study of how 
people do their financial reckoning, irrespective of our perceptions of the adequacy of 
that reckoning". 284 He added that "the general issue of whether accounting practices 
highlight one particular class of cost, thus channelling innovation towards the reduction 
of that cost, is of considerable significance ... ethnoaccountancy 
is one aspect of the much 
larger topic we might call the construction of the economic". 285 As an example its 
importance, he suggested - like Russell - accounting practices which "highlighted" 
labour costs might act to accelerate mechanisation, whilst presenting a barrier to capital 
or energy-saving technologies. 
For MacKenzie, ethnoaccountancy was an area which had been largely neglected by 
mainstream economics and sociology. At the same time, he argued that it offered a means 
to further the convergence between recent micro-social and micro-economic analyses of 
technological change: 
Studying how people actually do the financial reckoning of technological 
change would bring together the economist's essential concern for the 
financial aspects of innovation with the sociologist's equally justified 
empiricism ... ethnoaccountancy would not 
be a marginal enterprise ... 
but 
ought to throw light on central questions such as the practical definition of 
profit and the relative rate of technological change in different historical 
and national contexts. 286 
On the convergence of the sociology and economics of technological change, MacKenzie 
went on to suggest that recent economics and sociological methods were approaching the 
same subject from opposite directions, and with different analytical strengths. Whereas 
economics was essentially concerned with the analysis of stable networks, the attention 
and methods of sociology (specifically microsocial constructivism) were oriented towards 
instability. 287 
284 Donald MacKenzie, 'Economic and Sociological Explanation of Technical Change', in Technological Change and 
Company Strategies: Economic and Sociological Perspectives , 
Rod Coombs, Paolo Saviotti, and Viv Walsh, (eds. ) 
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2.5.4 Arie Rip and Rene Kemp's Technological Regimes and Radical Innovation , 
In a review of various theories of socio-technical change, Arie Rip and Rene Kemp 
called, like Sorensen and Levold (2.4.4), for an analytical focus on the intermediate 
meso-level. 288 Rip and Kemp conceptualised the meso-level in terms of technological 
regimes, which they described as a "stabilized interdependencies ... [including] a complex 
of engineering practices ... technologies ... skills and procedures ... embedded 
in 
institutions and infrastructures". 289 They added that "regimes are intermediary between 
specific innovations ... and overall sociotechnical landscapes. They embody dynamics at 
the meso-level". 290 
For Rip and Kemp, the concept of regimes provided the basis for a theory of 
sociotehnical change in which technological novelty evolves within existing regimes 
starting at the micro-level of local practices. As this novelty spreads and becomes 
embedded, it may lead to a change of regimes, or even, in some cases, transformation of 
the wider 'sociotechnical landscape'. Rip and Kemp added that only a few particular 
innovations - such as the computer - were capable of sociotechnical landscape 
transformation. 291 They also argued that the building-up a 'constituency' for change 
within regimes at the intermediate meso-level was critical to the success or failure of 
technological innovations. In this sense, meso-level regimes acted as conduits between 
the creation of novelty at the micro level, and the establishment of higher-level 
sociotechnical landscapes. As a consequence, they argued, neither micro- nor macro-level 
analytical perspectives could properly account for technological change; rather, "[the] 
technological regime is the necessary entrance point" 292 
Rip and Kemp went on to give particular attention to the circumstances under which 
technological novelty, developed within existing regimes, could go on to transform 
regimes, and possibly landscapes. They stated that "[the] introduction of novelty has been 
studied in great detail, but ... for the question of success, however, it is the adoption of 
novelty which is decisive, not its introduction". 293 A key part of this process, they 
suggested, was the emergence of irreversibility in technological systems as they become 
288 Arie Rip and Ren6 Kemp, Towards a Theory of Socio-Technical Change', limited circulation monograph, School 
of Philosophy and Social Science, University of Twente and MERIT, University of Limburg, May 1996. Published in 
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stabilised. Rip and Kemp charted this process in terms of "the multi-layered backdrop of 
novelty and irreversibility". 294 
In a later part of their review, Rip and Kemp discussed in some detail the different 
conditions that gave rise to radical innovations. They distinguished here between "more 
or less stable situations, where the shape of technology can be explained inductively, as a 
continuation of ongoing development, and situations in flux, where predictability is much 
less". 295 They defined radical innovations as those which "challenge the existing 
paradigm or regime which ... gradually grow and see the paradigm replaced". 
296 Within 
the overall process of radical technological change, they argued, the "conditions of 
challenge and overthrow" were more interesting than the source of innovation. Indeed, 
they suggested, the technological variety on which radical changes were built were often 
already available, but that a change in selection environment - such as was caused by war 
- was necessary for their deployment. Under such circumstances, they added, actors were 
forced "against their inclination" to look for novel solutions. 297 
Rip and Kemp also argued that 'outsider' institutions were more likely to be risk-taking in 
respect of radical innovations. For established organisations, they stated, "radical 
inventions may ... endanger current activities ... and for that reason be rejected or 
delayed". 298 They added that because existing 'leaders' were "locked into the earlier 
paradigm", then "thresholds are temporarily low when paradigms change, and windows 
of opportunity may be open for new participants". 299 At the same time, they pointed out 
that broader factors were important to the development of radical technology: "radical 
innovations can often not be sustained by traditional market mechanisms and firm 
strategies ... a series of steps are necessary ... including modifications in infrastructure 
which require institutional and regulatory changes". 300 In this context, they referred to the 
important role of government in "inducing a technological regime shift" 301 
A particular aspect of radical innovation highlighted by Rip and Kemp was the transfer of 
advances in technology - particularly engineering and materials - from one regime to 
another. They stated that "innovations which are radical for a regime may themselves 
have been constructed out of incremental use of various complementary technologies" 302 
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They went on to suggest conditions favourable to the development of radical innovations, 
such as the perception of a pressing technical or market problem which could not be met 
with available technology, and the reaching of technical limits or increasing marginal 
costs with existing trajectories. In this way, they observed: 
New technologies are always introduced against the backdrop of existing 
regimes and socio-technical landscapes. They do not come into the world 
with their possibilities well defined, rather they come into existing 
systems, and their success is in some way linked to structural problems or 
even crises of that system. 303 
In surveying a range of established social and economic approaches to the analysis of 
technological change, Rip and Kemp also offered some more general comments on the 
nature of technological change. Like MacKenzie and Law, whilst adopting a social 
shaping perspective, they recognised the distinctive influence of technological dynamics 
in the wider process of social change: 
Technical change has its own dynamics, somewhat independent from firm 
strategies and actor goals in general ... what is misleading is the 
assumption that technology is infinitely malleable, and that it is malleable 
by demand ... one should speak of the co-evolution of supply (and the 
technology behind the supply) and demand. 31 
They went on to make a statement on the limits of social science enquiry into the 
complex process of technological change. In doing so, they suggested some guidelines 
for the analysis of radical changes in technology: 
Explanations of the eventual shape of technology ... have the status of 
glosses on specific case studies, informed by general sociological theories. 
Much more than this may not be possible, given the complexities of 
technological development and its co-evolution with societal 
developments ... For hierarchies in flux ... prediction on the basis of internal characteristics is impossible ... in the end, the historian's art and 
the sociologist's analysis should prevail to trace and explain formative 
movements, critical junctures, and the reasons for the emergence of 
periods of relative stability ... It 
is difficult to do more than diagnosis, but 
... 
it should be a historically informed diagnosis. 305 
Rip and Kemp concluded that "the multi-actor processes of technical and social adaption 
in which problems and conflicts are gradually overcome can be understood as a process 
of co-evolution of technology and society". 306 
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2.6 Summary and Research Design 
2.6.1 Summary and Review 
This chapter has presented a review the technology studies literature in accordance with 
what Street described as a "spirit of eclecticism" (2.1). It has been argued that, in the 
analysis of technological change that, as Sorensen and Levold stated, "a heterogeneous 
mix of historical, ethnographic, economic, and sociological competencies seems 
required" (2.4.3). This may be thought to be particularly appropriate for the British ESI 
privatisation case, which clearly involves interacting technical, economic, institutional 
and political forces. 
To the extent that they are recurrent themes in the analysis of technology, autonomous 
and determinist notions seem to capture something of the experience of technological 
change (2.2.1,2.2.2). At the very least, their persistence - especially as applied to energy 
technologies - requires some consideration in the context of the present study. Whilst 
many analysts adopting autonomous and determinist views are content to argue on the 
basis of a naYve notion of technology, a more elaborate defence of autonomous concepts 
has been offered in recent years by Langdon Winner (2.2.2). Winner argued that once the 
development of 'inherently political technologies' such as nuclear power was underway, 
they became essentially autonomous: technical criteria became dominant over economics 
and politics, and they became institutionally and financially self-supporting. Whilst he 
explored the autonomous thesis at some length, Winner retained a perspective on 
technological change - featuring high-level generalisations and presumptions of intent - 
that, as Misa pointed out (2.4.4), is characteristic of analysts holding similar such views, 
such as Ellul, Galbraith and Mumford. As many critics of autonomy and determinism 
have observed (2.2.3) such a perspective is an inherently limited basis for the 
examination of the social process of technological change, and it is evident that to be of 
real value to a detailed case-study analysis, any approach must be based on socially- 
shaped perspective. Nevertheless, Winner's suggested autonomy of nuclear power offers 
a clear thesis for the general direction of technological progress, and this will be returned 
to for consideration in the context of the present case in Chapter 7. 
A range of concepts and models adopting a socially-shaped view of technology were 
considered in the rest of the chapter. Many of these offer similar insights and 
observations on the process of change. Arnold Pacey's technology-practice approach 
(2.2.3) highlighted the close association of technical and organisational form, the 
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irregular pace of change, and the existence of critical periods during which changes in 
technological and social form progress rapidly together. Like MacKenzie and others, 
Pacey considered the political and institutional use of technological expertise, particularly 
way in which the use of terms such as 'technological imperative' can serve technocratic 
interests. Pacey also identified (again in common with many others) the close association 
between bureaucratic authority - such as that of the Central Electricity Generating Board 
- and conservative and incremental change. In all of this, Pacey's analysis is of 
considerable relevance to the British ESI case studied here. 
Thomas Hughes provided an empirically and conceptually rich account of the early 
development of electricity supply technologies (2.3). Although he made only a "loosely 
structured" use of theory, Hughes' sociotechnical systems model offers a number of 
valuable insights into the process of technological change. In common with others (see 
especially the comments of Paul N. Edwards in 2.2.3), Hughes drew attention to the role 
of technology as an embodiment of prevailing economic, institutional, and political values 
(2.3.1). In this area, Hughes showed sympathy with Winner's view of the inherent 
politicisation of technological artefacts. However, where Winner went on to make 
'stronger' claims concerning the autonomy of technology, Hughes instead characterised 
the influence of sociotechnical systems in terms of a socially constructed and maintained 
momentum (2.3.2). He also repeatedly emphasised that even in the most powerful 
systems, this momentum was capable of being overturned by sudden changes in 
environmental circumstances (2.3.3). 
A number of analysts have pointed to weaknesses associated with Hughes' systems 
approach (2.3.4). In part, these criticisms are associated with the difficulties associated 
with the demarcation of the 'system' from its 'environment' (2.3.3). This was highlighted, 
for example, by Michel Callon, in distinguishing the systems approach from his own 
actor-network model (2.4.1). The separation and categorisation of influences in the 
analysis of technology is unavoidably problematic: if too strictly applied, it results in a 
functionalist and determinist perspective; Mikael Hard has been the most outspoken critic 
of Hughes in this regard (2.3.4). Hughes himself, in his later work, recognised the 
problems of separating system and environment, and called for a "seamless web" view of 
technology and social relations (2.3.3). At the same time, however - Bijker and Law 
pointed out (2.4.1) - the identification and characterisation of distinctive influences on 
technological change is an essential and unavoidable part of the analytical process, and in 
the gaining of insight into an otherwise incomprehensible process. In this respect, much 
of the analytical strength of Networks of Power - such as Hughes' observations 
concerning technology as both a cause and effect of social change, and also on the 
similarities and differences between systems developed in different regions - is 
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predicated on the demarcation of the sociotechnical system and its environment, and 
between internal and contextual influences on change. This is confirmed by the absence 
of similar such insights arising from constructivist and actor-network approaches. 
Similarly, Hughes' insight on the unanticipated consequences of technological 
development is based on his identification of a technical core of sociotechnical systems, 
and his suggestion that this may carry with it unpredictable consequences, particularly 
when transferred to novel environments (2.3.2). In addition, as MacKenzie pointed out, it 
is undeniable that very real and observable divisions between technological and other 
social spheres are constructed and maintained (2.5.4). For the present study, I have 
judged that the analytical strength of concepts developed in Networks of Power, such as 
momentum, the technical core, and contextual influences on change, is sufficient to 
justify their cautious use. Again, I return to these issues in Chapter 7. 
Another common criticism of the systems approach - its focus on system building and 
particularly on the perspective of the system builder (2.3.4) - is more problematic for the 
present study. For Hughes' analysis of the development of early electric power systems - 
which was characterised by progressive expansion and centralisation - it may be thought 
of as appropriate. As critics such as Misa and Rudig argued, however, such a perspective 
tends to interpret the process of change exclusively in terms of the development or 
retardation of the system and the efforts and intentions of the system-builder, and fails to 
give adequate attention to alternative technological possibilities (2.3.4). In his later work, 
Hughes himself recognised the difficulties of applying his model to declining or radically 
reconstructed systems (2.3.3). For the present case - characterised by radical institutional 
reorganisation and dramatic changes in technological form - the assumption of a central 
control and direction of the system is inappropriate. Indeed, as Summerton suggested, a 
mature network industry may be better characterised in terms of mutual 
interdependencies between a number of different powerful groups and individuals (2.4.2). 
I therefore chose to avoid a system building perspective here. 
As even their critics have acknowledged constructivist and actor-network approaches 
provide useful insights into the process of technological change. In particular, both offer 
powerful refutations of autonomous and determinist notions (2.4.3). Social 
constructivism focuses attention on how competing technological designs act as 
representatives of particular values and interest groups, and how the eventual emergence 
of a dominant design represents the triumph of certain groups and interests over others. In 
introducing the constructivist approach, Bijker and others emphasised the 
interconnectedness of technical and social change (2.4.1). However, by seeing the process 
of change as primarily a response to the preferences of different social interest groups, 
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constructivism tends to underplay the influence of technical dynamics themselves in the 
innovation process, resulting in what Winner described as "social determinism" (2.4.3). 
Actor-network theory, by contrast, places technical factors at the centre of analysis, and 
as Callon suggested, it is a valuable counter to the limitations of conventional 
sociological treatment of technological change (2.4.2). In particular, actor-network theory 
forces recognition of the influence of technical elements in the process of change, and on 
the interdependency of 'technical' and 'social' elements. Nevertheless, both constructivist 
and actor-network approaches offer limited analytical perspectives. As both Williams and 
Russell, and Sorensen and Levold, pointed out (2.4.3), such approaches tend to 
exaggerate the influence of microsocial actors, and focus on observable actions, rather 
than less obvious structural and institutional aspects of change. Sorensen added that 
micro-level approaches focusing on 'the laboratory' are inappropriate to the energy sector, 
where technology choices are greatly influenced by the institutional interests of large 
generators and government (2.4.3). Both constructivism and actor-network theory also 
share the weakness of Hughes' systems approach in viewing the process of change almost 
exclusively from the perspective of those trying to establish particular technological 
projects - whether known as relevant social groups, engineer sociologists, or 
heterogeneous engineers. Again, in this aspect Summerton's emphasis of the 
interdependency of organisations in the case of grid-based technologies is of more 
relevance for the present study (2.4.2). 
Law and Callon's concept of local and global networks goes some way to overcome the 
failure of the actor-network approach to discriminate between influences at different 
levels of aggregation and the relative power of different interests (2.4.2). (Bijker's 
attempts to graft structural elements onto the constructivist perspective (2.4.1) have been 
less successful in this regard. ) Nevertheless, to the extent that they emphasise action and 
choice rather than structure and inertia, both constructivist and actor-network approaches 
are less appropriate than systems theory as applied to mature industries featuring 
entrenched institutional power. These weaknesses are of particular importance to the 
present study of radical changes affecting a mature industry -a process greatly 
influenced by established organisational interests. I therefore chose not to adopt a 
constructivist or actor-network approach for the basis of this study, although they will be 
returned to for consideration in the context of the present case in Chapter 7. 
In response to the perceived shortcomings of both micro- and macro-level perspectives on 
technological change, a number of analysts, such as Sorensen and Levold, and Misa, have 
recently argued that emphasis be given to the intermediate meso-level (2.4.4). As Stewart 
Russell's study of combined heat and power technology demonstrated (2.5.1), a detailed 
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consideration of institutional interests is an essential part of understanding technological 
change in the British energy sector, and it is a focus that I have attempted to maintain 
throughout the present study. Russell argued that although institutional affiliations to 
particular technologies were contingent and variable with time, the general direction of 
change in the British energy technology had reflected a consolidation of the dominance of 
producer-organisations. The continued validity of these observations in the course of ESI 
privatisation will be considered in Chapter 7. 
For Mikael Hard, the consensus-orientation of both systems and constructivist approaches 
required, in response, an emphasis on the importance of social conflict in the process of 
technological change (2.5.2). To the degree to which it involved the confrontation of 
opposing interests, the privatisation of the British ESI is well suited to HArd's explicit 
focus on conflict. Particularly pertinent aspects of HArd's approach for the present case 
are his suggestion that technological change is most encouraged where power is unevenly 
distributed, and where there are moderate barriers to entry. (Like others, he argued that 
monopoly power was associated with incremental and conservative innovation. ) In 
addition, Hard suggested that technological change could enable latent conflict between 
institutions or professional groups to become manifest. Although these are valuable and 
relevant points for the present case, an exclusive interpretation of technological change in 
terms of social conflict provides a limited and one-sided perspective. In particular, despite 
HArd's arguments to the contrary (2.5.2), such a focus would tend to underplay 
competitive market forces in technology development and choice. I have therefore used 
HArd's ideas here as an adjunct to other approaches, such as Hughes' systems approach, 
which Hard rightly identified as weak in its treatment of conflict. 
Donald MacKenzie's historical sociology approach (2.5.3), although designed for the 
analysis of the development of a military technology, offers a number of valuable insights 
for the present case. (The suitability of MacKenzie's approach here reflects the high 
degree of politicisation of both energy and military technologies. ) In his 'soft' use of 
theory, and in the richness of his empirical investigations and analytical insights, 
MacKenzie's approach bears some similarity with that of Hughes. Although he studied a 
contemporary technology, MacKenzie, like Hughes, stressed the importance of a 
historical perspective in order to understand the changing pattern of organisational 
interests involved in technological change. However, MacKenzie went further than 
Hughes in exploring the institutional use of technical knowledge and expertise, and in 
stressing the need for analysts to test the validity of technical knowledge claims. 
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MacKenzie also made a more powerful rejection of autonomous and determinist notions 
than Hughes, and where Hughes discussed the action of the technical core and the 
internal momentum of well-established technological systems, MacKenzie instead 
emphasised the dependence of such systems on supportive institutional and financial 
conditions. In addition, he explored the apparent autonomy of mature systems in terms of 
an institutionalised self-fulfilling prophecy. He suggested that technologists were closely 
involved with constructing and maintaining the credibility of such a prophecy, both in 
terms of carrying-out appropriately restricted research and development work, and also in 
their use of technical knowledge and expertise in promoting their own interests. 
Whilst he rejected determinist and autonomous notions, and expressed sympathy with the 
'seamlessness' of actor-network and constructivist approaches, MacKenzie - unlike many 
other social shaping analysts - also made explicit recognition of the distinctiveness of 
technological dynamics and institutions. In-part, he found explanation of the 
distinctiveness of technological and political dynamics in terms of the vested interests on 
the part of technological programme managers - observing that "technology is shaped so 
as maintain the separation between technology and politics". In all of this, MacKenzie's 
approach is of considerable value to the present case. In analysing recent changes to the 
British ESI have therefore attempted to maintain both historical and sociological 
perspectives throughout. In Chapter 7, some more specific aspects of MacKenzie's 
analysis are considered further. 
MacKenzie also emphasised the need to adopt a socially-constructed view of economic 
and financial influences on technological change. In the literature review presented above 
- and in the presentation of the British ESI case in subsequent chapters - there has been 
no separate consideration of the economics of technological change. Rather, I felt that for 
the present study, it has been more appropriate to discuss economic factors alongside 
technological, institutional and political influences, within an overall social shaping of 
technology perspective. 307 
307 For a more economic/financial examinations of British ESI privatisation, see George Yarrow, 'Privatization, 
Restructuring, and Regulatory Reform in Electricity Supply' in Bishop M., Kay J., Mayer C., (eds. ), Privatization and 
Economic Performance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp62-88. Given the wide range of possible social 
science approaches to the ESI privatisation case, it was clearly necessary to restrict the range of research questions to 
those pertinent to a technology studies perspective. For more general treatments of ESI privatisation, see Surrey, J. 
(ed. ), The British Electricity Experiment: Privatisation: The Record, The Issues, The Lessons, London, Earthscan, 1996; 
MacKerron, G. and Pearson P., (eds. ) The UK Energy Experience: a Model or a Warning?, London, Imperial College 
Press, 1996; Henney, A., A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, London, 
EEE Ltd, 1994 
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As MacKenzie and Wajcman emphasised, from a technology studies perspective, it is 
important to recognise that "the economic shaping of technology is, in fact, the social 
shaping of technology" (2.5.3). Similarly, Stewart Russell, although he conceded that 
financial/accounting criteria played a powerful role in technology choice, rejected any 
straightforward economic determinism, adding that "there was no single method or 
universal set of criteria. The terms of appraisal were clearly dependent on the performing 
institution and the precise constraints on it" (2.5.1). MacKenzie went on to propose the 
detailed analysis of "financial reckoning", or ethnoaccountancy, as a means of revealing 
the institutional, cultural, and political interests 308 As will be discussed in later chapters, 
the reorganisation of the British ESI ahead of privatisation was associated with a radical 
change in the financial appraisal of generation technology. Whilst this process is 
discussed throughout the ESI case, as presented in Chapters 4,5, and 6, it is returned to 
for separate consideration in Chapter 7 (7.5.3). 
Like a number of other analysts, Arie Rip and Rene Kemp offered a perspective on 
technological change focussed on the intermediate meso-level. In their case, this was 
conceived in terms of socio-technical regimes (2.5.4). Rip and Kemp's emphasis on the 
importance of intermediate-level dynamics and institutions for the successful deployment 
of micro-level novelty has been implicitly followed in the analysis of the ESI case 
presented here. Furthermore, like Rip and Kemp, I have felt that in cases of radical 
technological change (of which the present case is an example), it is the deployment of 
technology, or the "conditions of challenge and overthrow", which is of more interest 
than the source of novelty itself (2.5.4). The focus in what follows has therefore been 
primarily on the deployment of different forms of generation technology within the 
particular setting of the British ESI. I have also followed Rip and Kemp's guidelines for 
the analysis of technological change in periods of flux, and I have accepted their cautions 
on the inevitable limitations on social science inquiry in such circumstances. More 
specific aspects of Rip and Kemp's characterisation of radical innovation are returned to 
in Chapter 7 (7.5.4), for consideration in the context of the British ESI privatisation 
process. 
308 A number of independent analysts argued that during the early-1980s, the CEGB presented its accounts in a form favourable to nuclear power. See J. W. Jeffery, 'Dubious Economic Advice: The 'decision' on Sizewell 'B", Energy 
Policy, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp516-523, October 1988 
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2.6.2 Research Design 
The research methodology adopted here developed from two basic concerns: firstly, the 
underlying analytical issues concerning the role of technology as agent and effect of 
socio-economic change, and secondly, the most appropriate means of approaching these 
concerns in the British ESI privatisation case. In practice, the research method emerged 
from the iterative interaction between my reading of the themes and concepts of the 
technology studies literature, as presented in this chapter, and my early investigations of 
the case. The eventual form of the research was settled only after a period of flux in 
which various possible approaches and methodologies were considered. 
My early reading of the technology studies literature was concentrated on those analysts - 
such as Winner, Hughes and Russell - who had given particular attention to electricity 
generation technology. At the same time, I was also guided by a desire to address generic 
technology studies issues, such as technological autonomy and determinism, and the 
distinctiveness and conceptual 'separability' of technology as a force for socio-economic 
change. In addition, I was concerned to capture the way technology was implicated as 
both cause and effect in the reconstruction of the British ESI upon privatisation, and how 
various influences, each with distinctive origins and characteristics, had come together to 
shape the process of technological change in the industry. 
Given my underlying concern to address the role of technology in the broader process of 
socio-economic transformation, I was drawn from the outset to those analysts - such as 
Hughes and MacKenzie - who seemed to offer ä sufficiently broad conceptual framework 
with which to consider this question. In particular, I felt that Hughes' system/context 
model offered a means with which to consider the interaction of techno-economic 
dynamism with changing organisational and legislative context in the British ESI case. 
As my reading of the technology studies literature continued, however, I became 
increasingly aware of criticisms of the contextual approach, and of the debate between 
constructivist/actor-network and contextual/structuralist theorists (as reviewed in 2.3.4, 
and 2.4.3, above). Emerging from these two 'schools' of technology studies - 
contextualism and constructivism - two distinctive research methods seemed to suggest 
themselves for the present case: firstly, in the actor-network tradition, a predominantly 
micro-level study of one or two individual generation technology projects; or secondly, in 
the structural/contextual tradition, an institutional/sectoral analysis of the political process 
of privatisation, and the role of generation technology within this. 
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Whilst my underlying theoretical concerns led me to favour the latter, sectoral analysis, I 
was also aware of the possibility of using a project-level study as a more accessible and 
achievable means of addressing broader issues. I therefore carried out research on two 
contrasting generation technology projects - the Dounreay PFR, and the Wilton CCGT 
plant - which together seemed to embody the stark differences in generation technology 
associated with the move from nationalised to privatised ESI. 
In the course of this research (involving both on-site interviews and 
published/unpublished literature), I became aware of the limitations of an exclusively 
project-level approach. At both Dounreay and Wilton, I felt that, whilst project-level 
study gained access to particular technical, economic and institutional issues, it failed to 
capture other, underlying legislative and structural factors that related to the success or 
failure of particular forms of generation technology. Echoing Williams and Russell's 
criticisms of constructivism (2.4.3), I found that micro-social perspectives could not, on 
their own, provide a fully satisfactory explanation of the causes of change. Rather, I felt 
that many of the important changes were located somewhere within the political process 
of privatisation, and that the analysis of these changes required a wider sectoral and 
institutional focus. 
In searching for an appropriate method with which to capture these dynamics (since my 
direct access to the individuals and institutions involved would clearly be restricted), I 
became aware of the resources' offered by parliamentary papers, particularly House of 
Commons debates (Hansard), and the written and oral evidence submitted to various 
parliamentary Select Committee inquiries. The next stage of my research therefore 
consisted of a library-based review of official papers related to ESI, with a particular 
focus on the role of generation technology in the wider privatisation process. At the same 
time I carried out a review of other including industry/academic and technical/policy 
literature related to ESI privatisation. I also undertook a small number of additional 
personal interviews, to address themes where I felt that the official and published 
literature was weak. 
In parallel with this heterogeneous fieldwork, I also continued to refine a heterogeneous 
analytical perspective. In particular, my research confirmed that the changes in generation 
technology in the British ESI associated with privatisation were an outcome of the 
interaction of 'top-down' changes in the organisational and legislative context of the 
industry, with 'bottom-up' developments in the technology and economics of generation. 
In addition, these dynamics were mediated at the intermediate meso-level by distinctive 
institutional interests. In searching for analytical insight into this complex pattern of 
influences, I returned to those analysts - such as Hughes Land MacKenzie - who, whilst 
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rejecting technological autonomy and determinism, recognised the analytical separability 
of influences on change, and the distinctive character of techno-economic dynamism 
alongside broader socio-economic context. 
In summary, my research design emerged from the practical application of a range of 
technology studies, concepts and methods to the particular case of British ESI 
privatisation. The result of this process was the employment of an essentially contextual 
rather than constructivist analytical framework. This choice reflected the complexity of 
causal factors in the ESI case - in particular, the interaction of bottom-up and top-down 
forces, mediated at he meso-level. It also related to my broad underlying concern with the 
role of technology in socio-economic transformation. At the same time, it was clear that 
the different approaches each had particular strengths and weaknesses, and ý that as 
MacKenzie stated, "no single approach or framework has a monopoly on insight" (2.5.3). 
I therefore felt that the British ESI case could be used to 'test' the different theories, to the 
extent that it offers supporting or undermining evidence. 
Although the context for electricity generation technologies has changed considerably 
with privatisation, I felt that any understanding of the recent transformation of the 
industry required, as a starting point, a recognition of the fact that, as Sorensen and 
Levold stated, "the terrain ... has 
been thoroughly shaped by previous actions" (2.4.4). I 
have therefore found greatest sympathy with those analysts, such as Hughes and 
MacKenzie, who chose to adopt a broad-based historically informed social shaping 
perspective. 
Neither Hughes nor MacKenzie made an extensive statement of their research method, 
but both suggested desirable elements of such an approach. Hughes, for example, 
highlighted the value of both inter-regional and inter-temporal comparison, arguing that 
"variations in the basic essentials often reveal variations in resources, traditions, political 
arrangements, and economic practices from one society to another and from one time to 
another". 309 Similarly, MacKenzie emphasised the importance of cross-national 
comparison: "a straightforward, though not failsafe, way of grasping the role of the social 
in technical change is to see how different societies develop the same technology". 310 
MacKenzie also suggested the value, in uncovering social shaping, of comparing rival 
technical forms. 311 
309 Thomas Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society 1880-1930, Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1983: 2 
310 Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance, Cambridge MA, 
MIT Press, 1990: 5 
311 MacKenzie stated that "unpicking the'technological trajectory' of increasing missile accuracy, and comparing it to 
the other major form of change in inertial technology, together provide one window on the nature of technological 
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In the present study, rather than considering international comparisons of changes in 
generation technology, I have focused on the analysis of competing technical forms in the 
British ESI before, during, and after the privatisation process. In other words, I have 
concentrated on inter-temporal comparison and the analysis of rival technical forms as 
means of uncovering the social shaping of technology. The omission of international 
comparison - whilst inevitably restricting insight into the peculiarities or commonalities 
of the British case312 - was a choice in part based on practical limits on what was 
achievable, but also on the unparalleled and highly contingent nature of British ESI 
privatisation, which meant that the process of change in the industry was inevitably a 
response to peculiarly 'local' circumstances. A focus on the main rival technical forms of 
electricity generation in the British ESI - as they shared similar changes to their 
economic, institutional, and political environments - therefore offered an appropriate 
means of analysing the social shaping of technology. This focus was encouraged by the 
presence of three major forms of large-scale electricity generation technology - coal-fired 
steam turbines, nuclear power, and combined-cycle gas turbines - each having distinctive 
histories, economic properties, and institutional and political affiliations. 
The parliamentary papers provided a rich resource for a historical analysis of the changes 
affecting the industry as they unfolded, and gave otherwise unobtainable access to the 
most powerful industrial and political figures involved. By comparison, first-person 
interviews inevitably involved a retrospective retelling of events. In certain areas, 
however, such as the development and implementation of particular technologies, the 
parliamentary material was less strong, and I have relied here to a greater extent on my 
personally-conducted interviews and a range of specialist literature. Together these 
provided the opportunity to gain access to particular perspectives on change within the 
industry, such as specific company interests (as far as these were made available to me), 
and also to ask specific questions on issues that were not covered satisfactorily in the 
parliamentary committee inquiries. They also allowed me to focus in some detail on 
particular technological projects, in order to examine the working-out, in particular 
settings, of the various forces involved in ESI privatisation. 
change" (ibid: 392). At the same time, he conceded that "opening the 'black box' of technology in this way is no easy 
matter", and he added that it required from the analyst a detailed understanding of the technical field, and access to data 
of a kind difficult to obtain without in-depth interviewing of those involved (ibid: 11). 
312 A comparative analysis of liberalisation and privatisation in a number of European ESIs is offered by Add Midttun, 
(ed. ), European Electricity Systems in Transition: A Comparative Analysis of Policy and Regulation in Western 
Europe, Oxford, Elsevier Science Ltd., 1997 
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In presenting the British ESI case, in Chapters 3 to 6, I have an essentially narrative 
approach, rather than an exposition of a particular theoretical position. I have therefore 
restricted my analytical observations in these chapters to a consideration, at the end of 
each chapter, of the various technical, economic, institutional and political influences on 
changes in generation technology. Following this, in Chapter 7, the theoretical concepts 
and models explored in the present chapter are returned to for, reflection in the context of 




IN THE BRITISH ESI BEFORE PRIVATISATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the evolution of electricity generation technology within the British 
ESI, from its emergence in the late-nineteenth century, up to the period just before 
privatisation in the mid-1980s. Within the overall thesis, this review serves to place into 
context the more recent changes to the industry associated with privatisation. Indeed, 
rather than attempting a comprehensive history of the industry, I have highlighted certain 
developments which were to prove significant in the privatisation process. Particular 
attention has been given to episodes of significant changes in the technology of 
generation, such as the emergence of nuclear power in the postwar period. At the same 
time, consideration has also been given to the changing organisational form of the 
industry, and on the relationship between technology and organisation. In undertaking 
this, a range of official and parliamentary papers have been used to examine policy 
rationales, and political and industry debate at different points in the ESI's history. I have 
also drawn on a number of established histories of the industry. 
I have adopted a basically chronological ordering of the chapter. Section 3.2 reviews 
development of generation technology in the British ESI before nationalisation in 1945. 
Section 3.3 reviews generation technology from postwar nationalisation up to the 1960s. 
Section 3.4 considers the period after 1970 up to the mid-1980s. Although it played only 
a very minor role in electricity generation in Britain before privatisation, gas turbine 
technology was central to the subsequent changes affecting the industry. Section 3.5 
therefore reviews the development of gas turbine generation technology ahead of 
privatisation, both internationally, and in the British ESI context. Finally, Section 3.6 is a 
summary of the development of electricity generation technology in Britain, and a 
consideration of the various influences involved. 
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3.2 Generation Technology in the ESI before Nationalisation 
3.2.1 Generation Technology in the early ESI 
Unlike almost all previous innovations, electricity underwent systematic scientific study 
for many years before it was commercially developed. 1 However, despite its inherently 
superior transmissibility and transformability as compared to other forms of powere, the 
early steps towards the commercialisation of electricity were hesitant and uncertain. 3 The 
first commercial generators were not introduced until the 1870s, for small-scale localised 
applications such as mining. The early generators were driven by established 
reciprocating steam engines. This was always something of a compromise, since 
conventional reciprocating engines ran at slow speeds, whereas to work most efficiently, 
electrical generators needed to be rotated at high speed. This was partly overcome by 
using drivebelts to multiply the speed of engine rotation, but drivebelts took up 
considerable space, and they could not be controlled accurately enough to prevent power 
surges and dips .4 
In the late-nineteenth century, the technical and economic feasibility of large-scale 
electricity supply was greatly improved by the simultaneous introduction of two 
technologies - the' steam turbine, and high voltage alternating current transmission. 5 The 
first practical steam turbine was introduced in 1884, by Charles Parsons of Newcastle. 6 
Parsons also developed his own generator, and according to David Landes, "the two 
together ... made possible an efficient, 
large-scale electrical power industry" .7 The key 
technical feature of Parsons' turbogenerator was the feeding of high pressure steam into a 
series of turbine blade sets arranged along a single axis, coupled directly to the generator. 
This design offered a highly efficient means of transforming the thermal energy of steam 
into rotational motion, and the fast speed of rotation it provided was well-suited to 
electrical generators. 8 The first steam turbines in a public electricity utility were installed 
1 In this respect the ESI represents a fundamental change in the industrial economy for many observers. Lord Hinton, 
for example, claimed that "the scientific age may be said to have begun with electricity" (Lord Hinton of Bankside, 
Heavy Current Electricity in the UK: History and Development, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1979: 5) 
2 David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe 
from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969: 282 
3 Leslie Hannah, Electricity Before Nationalisation: A Study of the Electricity Supply Industry in Britain to 1948, 
London, MacMillan, 1979: 1-2 
4 Bob Gordon, One Hundred Years of Electricity Supply 1881-1981, Hove, South Eastern Electricity Board, 1981: 39 
5 I. C. R. Byatt, The British Electrical Industry 1875-1914: The Economic Returns to a New Technology, Oxford, 
Clarenden Press, 1979: 108 
6 R. A. S. Hennessey, The Electric Revolution, Newcastle, Oriel Press, 1971: 106 
7 Landes, op cit: 278-9 
81linton, op cit: 20; B. Bowers, A History of Electric Light and Power, Stevenage, Peter Peregrinus, 1982: 166 
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in Newcastle in 1890. As licensing, agreements were struck with overseas electrical 
manufacturers, larger turbine-based power stations followed across Europe and the USA. 9 
Although they were inherently efficient, the earliest steam turbines offered no significant 
economic advantages over high speed reciprocating engines specifically designed for 
electricity generation, which had become standard in Britain by the 1890s. High speed 
reciprocating engines, however, were difficult to build in large sizes (above around 
200kW), and more powerful reciprocating engines could only operate at much slower 
speeds, requiring the use of large generators for efficient conversion. The great advantage 
of turbines was to allow the use of much smaller generators, and as the demand, for 
electricity grew in the early-twentieth century, the turbine came into its own as a capital- 
saving technology. '0 
A recurring theme in accounts of the early British ESI is the relative backwardness of the 
electricity supply infrastructure in Britain as compared to her major industrial 
competitors. Landes stated that "in the early decades of electric power, [Britain] was 
notorious for the diversity of her system of generation and the smallness of her central 
stations". tl The relative underdevelopment of the early British ESI requires attention to 
what Henry Self and Elizabeth Watson referred to as "the particular constitutional and 
economic situation... when the electricity supply first came into existence". 12 By the time 
electricity became a commercial prospect, Britain was already an urbanised industrial 
society, and thus potentially a large market for electricity. Yet, as Byatt pointed out, there 
were particular economic, institutional and political circumstances in Britain which made 
electricity less attractive than elsewhere, and which inhibited the relative growth of the 
British ESI. 13 Politically, the ESI emerged at a time of strong municipal authority power 
in Britain, as was manifest in the earliest legislation to address the industry. The 1882 
Electric Lighting Act was closely modelled on earlier legislation for public service 
industries. It granted franchises to local suppliers for a fixed period, after which time the 
local authority was able to buy-out the franchise. 14 The Act reflected both municipal 
9 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society 1880-1930, Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1983: 211,235,454 
10 Byatt stated that the cost of foundations and buildings for power stations using turbines was about half that for 
stations of similar output using reciprocating engines (Byatt, op cit: 110-111). 
11 Landes, op cit: 434-5 
12 Self, Sir Albert Henry, and Elizabeth M. Watson, Electricity Supply in Great Britain: Its Development and 
Organisation, London, Allen and Unwin, 1952: 12 
13 Britain had a well established industrial and urban infrastructure: gas lighting was relatively cheap, steam railways 
were well-developed, and the British economy was dominated by coal mining and cotton textiles - established industries which were slow to adopt electricity. (Byatt, op cit: 1-2) 
14 Byatt, op cit: 197 
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authority influence, and also Liberal Government attempts to prevent the creation of 
powerful local monopolies, and their view of electrical lighting as a public good-15 
Many observers argued that the 1882 Act greatly inhibited both private and public 
investment in the early electricity supply and electrical manufacturing industries in 
Britain. 16 However, Byatt rejected any simplistic 'legislative determinism' to explain the 
backwardness of electricity supply in Britain. He argued that legislation should be seen 
within its social and political context - in the case of the 1882 Act, "as part of an attempt 
to regulate natural monopolies in the public interest, in an economic atmosphere still 
dominated by 'laissez-faire' views". 17 Similarly, Thomas Hughes stated that Britain's 
early ESI "accorded nicely with prevailing British political values and the regulatory 
legislation that expressed them ... [and] reflected the traditional high value in British 
politics for the power of local government". 18 
As Hennessey pointed out, the 1882 Act also reflected the prevailing state of generation 
and transmission technology -- small-scale direct current distribution from local power 
stations was the only feasible system for electricity supply when the Act was introduced. 
Within a few years, however, this was transformed by the introduction of steam turbines 
and alternating current transmission. Together, these offered significant economies of 
scale which could only be captured by larger franchise areas. Hennessey described this as 
the "technological stroke that cut the ground from beneath the 1882-8 system, simply by 
destroying its technical rationale". 19 However, rather than a case of technological 
determinism - as Hennessey seems to suggest - it was the interaction of regulatory, 
economic, and technical dynamics at this time that created difficulties for the 1882 Act, 
and held back the development of the British ESI. Self and Watson concluded that 
"legislation in itself was not alone responsible for the unsatisfactory position which had 
developed. Technical advances in transmission had by then made it possible to give an 
economic supply over considerable distances" 20 
15 Hennessey op cit: 33. Self and Watson stated that "from the provisions of the Act and from the practice followed in 
its interpretation it can clearly be seen that electricity supply was regarded from the first as a public service, within the 
political limits then accepted" (op cit: 10). 
16 Self and Watson, for example, argued that the Act "had a stultifying effect on the new industry, which resulted in 
seriously impeding normal development until the restriction on private financial enterprise was removed" (Self and 
Watson, op cit: 10) 
17 Byatt, op cit: 197 
18 Thomas P. Hughes, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems' in W. E. Bijker, T. P. Hughes, and T. Pinch, 
(eds. ), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, 
Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1987, pp5l-82: 79 
19 Hennessey, op cit: 34-5 
20 op cit: 51 
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The first decade of the twentieth century saw A the emergence of an established 
technological form for electricity generation which was to endure throughout the century. 
Bowers claimed that, such was the ESI's subsequent technological continuity, "since 1903 
the history of power station development has been one of improvement in details and 
increases in size rather than radical changes in principles". 21 By 1910, steam turbines 
represented four-fifths of all new plant capacity installed in Britain. 22 At the same time, 
however, the British ESI remained relatively small-scale, and was still characterised by 
divided ownership. By this time, Hinton argued, "the ultimate form of the electricity 
supply system was ... held back not by technological limitations 
but by policies 
(supported by legislation) that were often narrow, selfish, and shortsighted". 23 
Before 1914, the British electrical plant manufacturing industry was also much less 
concentrated than elsewhere. Internationally, four major plant manufacturing companies 
emerged in the early-twentieth century: General Electric and Westinghouse of the USA, 
and Siemens and AEG of Germany. All had British subsidiaries, and all were major 
importers of electrical equipment into Britain. As a result, Byatt argued, a strong 
indigenous electrical engineering industry in Britain was no longer needed. 24 
3.2.2 The Interwar Years 
The First World War was to act as a catalyst for change in the British ESI. During the 
war, control of the industry was passed to the Ministry of Munitions. Generation plant 
and production capacity increased greatly under the massive expansion of weapons 
production, and according to Self and Watson, "the actual prosecution of the war effort 
itself revealed the inherent weakness of the electricity supply industry". 25 Hughes argued 
that the First World War "cleared away the political, economic, and other non- 
technological factors that prevented or retarded the utilization of existing technologies ... 
[it] broke a conservative crust that had restrained adjustments in course and velocity". 26 
He added that at this time, "the political forces that were brought to bear more than 
matched the internal dynamic of the system" 27 
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Towards the end of the war, a number of parliamentary committees began investigating 
the problems of electricity supply in Britain. A Coal Conservation Sub-Committee Report 
concluded that the existing system of electrical power supply was "technically wrong and 
commercially uneconomic", whilst a Ministry of Reconstruction Committee report called 
for "a single unified system, organized and conducted upon commercial lines". 28 The 
outcome of this series of reports was the Electricity Supply Act of 1919. This allowed for 
the establishment of District Boards, to be responsible for the coordination and 
development of electricity supply. On a national scale, the Act appointed five Electricity 
Commissioners, responsible for promoting and regulating the supply of electricity, and 
the designation of electricity districts. Introduced by the Liberal Government under Lloyd 
George, the 1919 Act was enabling rather than enforcing - it relied on voluntary action 
on behalf of the utilities and private suppliers, and persuasion by the Commissioners. 29 In 
the event, its intentions were largely frustrated and there was little reform of 
consequence. 
The inaugural meeting of the World Power Conference in London in 1924 presented 
embarrassing evidence of the relative inefficiency of the British ESI. 30 It reported that 
there were almost 600 separate electricity supply undertakings in Britain, over half of 
which were owned by local authorities. 31 In analysing the causes of this pattern, Hannah 
stated that "the technocratic tradition of cooperation which had proved such a strength in 
Germany had failed to develop in ... [a British ESI] deeply divided against itself by 
historical and political, as well as local and personal, factors" 32 Similarly, in accounting 
for the much more advanced ESI in Germany, Landes referred to German proficiency in 
electrical engineering, and the "technological rationality" of her industrial enterprise. 33 In 
his comparison of different ESI's at this time, Hughes stated that "London's electrical 
supply was disordered and small scale ... [whilst] the Chicago and Berlin utilities were 
acquiring franchises that were coextensive with technological limits". 34 He concluded 
that in London, "the proponents of local government authority, of municipal socialism, 
and of private enterprise confronted one another in a pluralistic debate, that from the 
point of view of the forces of technological change produced a stalemate". 35 
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In 1924 the government appointed a small committee headed by Lord Weir to consider 
the "national problem" of electricity supply. The Weir Report argued that "cheap and 
abundant energy could be made widely available by reform of the ESI". 36 It went on to 
discuss a number of different possible structures for the industry, from wholesale 
nationalisation of generation, . transmission, and distribution, to nationalisation of 
transmission alone. A wholly market-based structure was dismissed as "inadequate and 
unstable"; wholesale nationalisation was also rejected, on the grounds that "it might lead 
to stereotyped practice, check development and progress ... remove 
incentive 
... and tend 
to bureaucratic administration". 37 Instead, the report recommended that a national Central 
Electricity Board (CEB) be established, to be responsible for buying electricity from 
selected power stations, and for selling electricity to authorised distributors at cost prices. 
At the same time, the report added that the ownership of power stations should remain in 
private hands, so as to "preserve ... the incentive of private enterprise". 
38 Technically, the 
report stated, power output should be concentrated in a small number of large power 
stations, with the minimum necessary standby plant -a system that could only be 
achieved with the interconnection of stations. It therefore called for the construction of a 
high voltage transmission'gridiron'. 39 
The Government accepted all of the main recommendations of the Weir report. The 
Electricity (Supply) Act of 1926 established the Central Electricity Board and instigated 
the construction of the national transmission grid. 40 Self and Watson described the 
establishment of the CEB as a "critical turning point" in the history of the British ESI 41 
For the first time, the industry had a body with power to shape its development on a 
national scale. The national grid became operational for most of the country by 1934.42 
Under the supervision of the CEB, the grid promoted reform of the ESI to an extent not 
envisaged by its proponents in the 1920s. As frequency and voltage were standardised, 
the technical advances found in the best power stations were more widely applied, and 
the amount of spare plant was greatly reduced 43 Although originally intended to 
facilitate the regional integration of electricity supply, the grid increasingly became a 
national network. In 1938 a national control centre was established in London, and the 
CEB reported that the grid was being regularly operated as a single nationwide integrated 
system . 
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There was great complementarity between developments in generation and transmission 
technology at this time. High voltage transmission technology meant that the bulk 
transfer of electricity over hundreds of miles became economical, and in turn, this 
stimulated the development of larger and more remote power stations. 45 Coal-fired steam 
turbines were the only form of large scale generation technology. According to Hannah, 
"the essence of inter-war progress in electricity was improvement and economy rather 
than fundamental innovation, but the effect of such steady progress on efficiency could 
none the less be large". 46 Improvements provided for thermal efficiency gains in the best 
steam turbine plant from around 20% in the mid-1920s, to just under 30% a decade 
later. 47 
As production costs fell, new, markets opened up, and demand for electricity grew 
rapidly. The more diverse use of electric power in domestic, transport, and industry 
applications greatly, improved the supply system usage, or 'load factor' 48 By the end of 
the 1930s the ESI had been transformed by new technology, market growth, and 
rationalisation. 49 In analysing this period, Hughes argued that the ESI built up 
considerable momentum, as the industry's increasingly institutionalised and coordinated 
research and development efforts were directed at incremental improvements to 
established technological forms. 50 He also suggested that the technology and institutions 
of electricity supply evolved in harmony, as "the growth of organisations ... added to the 
momentum of [the] technology ... [institutions] with expert knowledge of, and vested 
interest in, the technology became committed to its growth" S1 Elsewhere, he stated: 
The high momentum systems of the interwar years gave the appearance of 
autonomous technology ... an inner dynamic seemed to drive the course of development ... Such systems appeared to be closed ones, not subject to influence from external factors or from the environment. These systems 
dwarfed the forces of the environment not yet absorbed by them. 52 
Despite the rationalisation of the British ESI during the 1930s, there was continuing 
pressure for further reform. Critics of the existing structure of the industry saw the 
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remaining local diversity as a check on further efficiency gains, and according to Hannah, 
there was a rising tide of opinion which favoured the takeover of power stations by the 
CEB. 53 Hinton, for example, referred to the "motley collection" of private companies, 
consultants, and municipalities who were responsible for the design and construction of 
generating plant at this time. 54 
3.3 Generation Technology in the Nationalised ESI 
3.3.1 Postwar Nationalisation 
ýý 
The Second World War brought about an unprecedented degree of central planning in the 
British ESI. In 1942 the industry came under government control, alongside other key 
industries, under the newly formed Ministry of Fuel and Power. 55 Throughout the war the 
grid was operated as a single national network. At the same time, immediate wartime 
demands resulted in cut-backs in new station investment, and repairs and maintenance to 
existing plant. 56 
The postwar Labour Government was committed to nationalisation of all key industries. 
The nationalisation of the ESI was deferred until after coal industry nationalisation and 
the setting up of the National Coal Board. The King's Speech of November 1947 
announced the introduction of legislation to nationalise the ESI "as a further part of the 
concerted plan for the co-ordination of the fuel and power industries". 57 In the debate that 
followed, Clement Attlee stated that he saw ESI nationalisation as completing the part- 
finished work of the 1926 Act; he stated that the Government was "taking a further step 
to complete the integration for the provision of fuel, heat' and light". 58 The Government 
made clear that it saw ESI nationalisation as the best organisational form for the 
exploitation of the economic potential of electricity generation and supply technologies. 59 
Douglas Jay stated that "we can only get technical progress and proper reorganisation if 
we integrate the present innumerable units of all sorts and sizes and ownerships into one 
organisation under government control". 60 Herbert Morrison, the chief architect of the 
postwar nationalisation programme, stated that "in electricity, public ownership is ... a 
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question of practical commonsense ... it is ... the most simple, the most straightforward 
and complete case for public ownership". 61 
However, many Conservative MPs saw the ESI as a less suitable case for nationalisation 
than others, such as the coal industry - where there had been a long history of 
acrimonious industrial disputes - and doubted that ESI nationalisation could offer any 
additional benefits that could not be gained under continued private ownership. The 
Conservative Party leader, Winston Churchill, stated that his party would "meet the 
proposals for [ESI] nationalisation ... with strenuous and uncompromising opposition", 
and added that public ownership would "thrust the clumsy butter-fingers of the state into 
... intricate apparatus". 
62 Harold MacMillan also argued that the state should not interfere 
in the direction and operation of particular industries. 63 Another Conservative MP 
opposing the Electricity Bill, argued that it "takes away from the consumer that vital 
safeguard of competition". M 
Within the industry itself, there was considerable support for nationalisation. Self and 
Watson, for example, argued that given conditions at the end of the war "the case for 
national co-ordination ... [could] hardly be denied"65; they added that "the only real 
controversy was the form and terms of nationalisation ... the main principle had been 
widely accepted by "most progressive bodies of thought". 66 According to Hannah, 
nationalisation "struck a responsive chord" within the ESI, with its long tradition of 
public service; he added that "electrical engineers had by this time formed an influential 
professional community with their own technocratic support for greater central 
control". 67 
The 1947 Electricity Act created the British Electricity Authority (BEA), to be responsible 
for electricity generation and transmission in England, Wales, and the south of Scotland. 
The BEA took over ownership of all power stations from private and municipal owners; 
it inherited over three hundred generating stations - under forty of which accounted for 
more than half of all electricity generated. 68 It was also given controlling authority over 
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the 14 newly-created Area Distribution Boards. 69 The BEA and Area Boards were vested 
in April 1948. Reflecting its commitment to greater worker participation in state owned 
corporations, the Government appointed Lord Citrine, a former trades union leader, as 
inaugural Chairman of the BEA. 
Rising postwar demand, combined with wartime cutbacks in investment, meant that the 
BEA immediately faced a chronic capacity crisis. Electricity supply failed during winter 
peak demand for many years in the 1940s and 1950s. 70 Priority was given to the early 
construction of new capacity, and in an attempt to speed-up construction times, the 
Government issued an Order restricting the approval of new electricity turbine units to 
30MW or 60MW sets with prescribed steam conditions. 71 The Order prevented the 
adoption of bigger, more advanced plant designs, and Hinton claimed that there was 
"nothing more damaging" in the history of restrictive legislation affecting the industry. 72 
The restrictions remained in place for four years between 1947 and 1951. Even after it 
was revoked, however, the BEA was cautious in adopting more advanced generation 
technology; Hannah referred to "entrenched conservatism in generation plant design" in 
the postwar period. 73 
At the same time as the capacity shortages, the BEA also faced a fuel crisis. In the severe 
winters of the early-1950s, National Coal Board supplies proved inadequate, and high 
cost coal imports had to be brought in. Under apparently long-term fuel supply 
difficulties, the Ministry of Fuel and Power and BEA began to seek out alternative fuels, 
and plans were developed to construct oil-fired steam turbine power stations. By 1956, 
the BEA was planning to build 17 oil-fired power plants. 74 During this period, some 
research work was undertaken into gas turbines, but, according to Self and Watson, they 
were not considered economically viable. 75 
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3.3.2 The Introduction of Nuclear Power 
The origins of the British civil nuclear programme lie in the British independent atomic 
bomb project which started in the mid-1940s. Many of the early decisions regarding 
nuclear power were made in secret between a few senior politicians and research 
scientists, and little was announced publicly before the mid-1950s76 The first proposals 
for a programme of nuclear power were presented by nuclear research scientists based at 
the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell in Oxfordshire in the late-1940s. 77 
According to Margaret Gowing, these "offered the possibility" that the cost of nuclear 
power would be lower than coal-fired stations by a considerable margin. 78 
In these early years priority was given to proving the workability of nuclear technology, 
over and above any economic considerations; Valentine stated that "the British nuclear 
power from its beginnings ... 
[was] exempt from the normal constraints of commerce and 
industry". 79 Gowing stated that such was the technical uncertainty at this stage, it was 
thought that there was little point to consider costs before the technology was shown to 
work. 80 In this uncertain environment there was scope for optimism. Gowing reported 
that "the people within the project ... had their 
feet firmly on the ground", and she added 
that, as research work progressed, insiders came to recognise that cheap nuclear power 
was unlikely. By contrast, she claimed, the project's political masters saw nuclear power 
technology as a means of recapturing national prestige. This optimism was reflected in 
media reporting of the technology - according to Hannah, "Britain's nuclear pioneers 
were heralded in the press as guarantors of a cheap energy future". 81 
In March 1953 the recently installed Conservative Government approved the construction 
of the first sizeable nuclear power plant, Calder Hall, near Windscale. 82 The design of the 
plant was optimised for plutonium production for use in atomic bombs rather than 
providing electricity. Gowing stated that, in the British nuclear power programme, "the 
76 The early development of nuclear power in Britain is described in detail by Margaret Gowing, in Britain and Atomic 
Energy 1939-45, London, Macmillan, 1964, and (assisted by Lorna Arnold) in Independence and Deterrence: Britain 
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Croom Helm, 1980 
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intertwining of military needs and power considerations was apparent from the outset". 83 
MacKenzie and Wajcman argued that the development of nuclear power was "directly 
military in inspiration", and added that "state interests closely shaped reactor design, at 
least in the early years of nuclear energy". 84 
Within government, the early responsibility for the nuclear power programme lay with 
the Ministry of Supply. In 1954, reflecting the special status of nuclear power, the 
government created the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA). According to Williams, the 
AEA was granted, from the outset, an unusual degree of autonomy. He added that when 
Bill to create the AEA was presented to parliament, a number of MPs expressed their 
opposition to the AEA's creation, and that with the loss of Government control, there was 
a dangerous potential for a "new form of technocracy" to emerge. 85 By contrast to the 
central role awarded to the AEA, the BEA had little involvement in the early civil nuclear 
programme. 86 
By the mid-1950s nuclear power was seen by government as having a central role in the 
diversification of the'ESI away from coal-fired generation and dependency on the NCB 
as fuel supplier. In July 1954 the Minister of Fuel and Power, Geoffrey Lloyd, told 
Parliament that in expanding the ESI, the Government intended to "give pride of place to 
atomic development". 87 The first British nuclear power programme was announced in a 
White Paper published in February 1955. The White Paper stated: 
Nuclear energy is the energy of the future ... The exact lines of future development in nuclear energy are uncertain, but this must not deter us 
from moving on with its practical application wherever it appears 
promising ... [It] now appears practicable on a commercial scale at a time 
when the country's great and growing demand for energy, and especially 
electric power, is placing an increasing strain on our supplies of coal. 88 
The White Paper went on to outline a provisional programme of 12 reactors to be built 
between 1955 and 1965, with a total capacity of 1.5GW to 2GW. These Magnox reactors 
(so known because of their magnesium oxide fuel cladding) were based on the Calder 
Hall design. They were to be commissioned and operated by the Central Electricity 
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Authority (formerly the BEA)89 under expert advice from the AEA. The Government 
claimed that, allowing for an (unspecified) credit for plutonium produced by the reactors, 
the cost of nuclear power would be "about the same as the probable future cost of coal- 
fired power stations" 90 The White Paper concluded: 
The development of nuclear power has reached a stage where it is vital 
that we should apply it commercially with all speed if we are to keep our 
position as a leading industrial nation ... whatever the 
immediate 
uncertainties, nuclear energy will in time be capable of producing power 
economically. 91 
In parliament, Lloyd stated that "the successful use of atomic energy on a commercial 
basis is of crucial importance to the future of the national economy" 92 The House of 
Commons unanimously approved of the government's proposed programme. 93 A 
succession of MPs paid tribute to the brilliance of British nuclear scientists, and declared 
that nuclear power was the answer to the nation's fuel shortage problem. 
3.3.3 The Creation of the CEGB 
The Conservative Government returned to power in 1951 was dissatisfied with the 
structure and performance of the nationalised ESI it had inherited. In 1954 the Ministry of 
Fuel and Power set up a committee to investigate the industry, headed by Sir Edwin 
Herbert. 94 The Herbert Committee report, published in 1955, criticised the CEA's 
management of power plant technology, and in particular the long-lead times required for 
plant construction 95 The report also described the CEA's provision for research and 
development as "inadequate"; it argued that the CEA was overly dependent on plant 
manufacturers for technical improvements to plant, and suggested that "in such a 
technical industry science should be represented at the highest level of management" 96 
The Herbert Committee also considered the early nuclear power programme. It found that 
the CEA had committed itself to a programme of nuclear power without knowing the 
details of the technology, but argued that this investment was justified on the basis of 
89 In 1954 the Electricity Reorganisation (Scotland) Act transferred the BEA's Scottish assets to a newly created South 
of Scotland Electricity Board. The British Electricity Authority then became the Central Electricity Authority (CEA). 
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potential fuel savings. It added that "nuclear power has arrived in time to meet the 
country's growing demand for power". 97 However, the Committee stated that the CEA 
should gain greater knowledge of nuclear power, so as to lessen its dependence on the 
AEA, and it recommended that the nuclear power should be given a higher profile within 
the industry's organisation, since "a new approach is required for the solution of the 
diverse and novel technical problems which are bound to arise in nuclear power 
engineering". 98 
The Committee recommended that the ESI be reorganised with the creation of a Central 
Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), to be responsible for generation, transmission and 
bulk supply. In addition, it recommended that a reconstituted Central. Authority be 
formed, with powerful supervisory responsibilities, including the approval of the CEGB's 
tariff setting, development programmes, and capital and research budgets. Membership of 
the Central Authority, it argued, should not be open to members of the CEGB or Area 
Boards. Separating out the executive and supervisory functions of generation and 
transmission in this way, the Committee argued, would allow for "much firmer and closer 
supervision" of the industry. 99 The Committee also recommended greater delegation to 
the regions and divisions of the CEGB than in the CEA, and also greater freedom for the 
Area Boards. 
The return of the Conservative Government in 1955 made reorganisation of the ESI 
inevitable. The Government outlined their proposals for reform in a White Paper 
published in November 1956.100 Whilst they agreed with Herbert Committee's proposals 
for the creation of the CEGB, and also the granting of greater autonomy to the Area 
Boards, the Government rejected the Committee's plans for a powerful Central Authority. 
It was argued that "this would confer on that body great power over the industry with 
little corresponding responsibility", and that it would operate against the development of 
"initiative, and responsibility" within the Area Boards. 101 Instead, the Government 
proposed to set up an Electricity Council, made up of representatives of the CEGB and 
Area Boards, as well as independent representatives. The Council was to have an 
essentially advisory role. 102 
97 ibid. 131 
98 ibid: 135 
99 ibid: 54 
100 Ministry of Fuel and Power, Proposals for the Reorganisation of the Electricity Supply Industry, Reports, 
Vo1. XXVI, Cmnd 27,1956 
101 ibid: 3 
102 ibid: 3 
90 
The restructuring of the ESI in late-1956 coincided with the Suez Crisis, during which 
Britain appeared to be facing- an urgent fuel supply, shortage. In Parliament, the 
Government came under pressure to announce an early expansion of the nuclear power 
programme. The second reading of the Bill to create the CEGB took place in December 
1956 at the height of the Suez Crisis. '03 The debate was dominated by fuel scarcity 
concerns, and the potential of nuclear power to offer a secure source of supply. Although 
he made no direct reference to the Suez Crisis, the Minister for Fuel and Power, Geoffrey 
Lloyd, made clear that the Government's proposals for ESI restructuring were in part a 
response to the need for an expanded programme of nuclear power: 
At this time of all times ... there is a particular, reason for looking critically 
at [the ESI] ... There 
is now added to the task of generation and the 
responsibility for the entire industry the nuclear power programme ... The Government are anxious to move as fast and as far as we practically can in 
this matter ... If we are to obtain all the 
benefits of nuclear power ... 
it is 
... important to speed up the operation of the ... [ESI] machine. 
104 
Lloyd criticised the lead times for plant construction under the CEA, and stated that "if 
we are to speed up the nuclear power programme, which our circumstances require, this 
time must be abridged". 105 He argued that this could only be achieved under a specialist 
body with control of generation and transmission. Lloyd discussed doubling or trebling 
the initial nuclear programme, and more speculatively suggested "if we expand as fast as 
we want and as I hope we shall, we shall soon begin to reach a point when there is not 
enough baseload for the number of atomic energy stations". 106 He praised the "brilliant 
success" of the AEA, and the high public esteem in which it was held, and indicated that 
he would select the CEGB chairman from "those who have led the way in the 
development of atomic energy". 107 
For the opposition, James Callaghan criticised the Government's proposed structure for 
the industry as being too weak in the centre, and argued that the Electricity Council 
should be granted more power, along the lines of the Herbert Committee proposals. 108 
However, Callaghan agreed that "to an increasing extent the organisation [of the ESI], 
particularly the generating side, must be built around ... [the nuclear] programme". 109 
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Parliamentary debate on the Government's proposals was dominated by the Suez Crisis 
and the consequent, ý need for ' expansion of the nuclear power programme. Former 
scientists and engineers were highly prominent in the debate, and a number of non- 
technically educated MPs willingly deferred to the views of their scientific peers. The 
former physicist Sir Ian Horobin reminisced about the "certainties and the comparative 
simplicities of nuclear physics" compared to intractable political problems, and 
emphasised that nuclear power was "something under our own control". 110 Horobin 
added that "the main function of the [proposed] Generating Board ... is to be a nuclear 
energy producer", and that "the whole fuel policy" and "the whole investment policy" of 
the country should be built around nuclear power. I lt Several MPs urged the Government 
to announce expansion of the nuclear power programme; one MP stated that the Minister 
"is not likely to be criticised in this House or in the country for going too far in the 
direction of expanding this programme". 112 
In March 1957 Geoffrey Lloyd announced to a strongly approving House of Commons, 
that "in the light of technical progress", the nuclear power programme would be trebled in 
size, to a target operational capacity of 5-6 GW by 1965.113 Although there was no direct 
mention of the Suez Crisis in the statement, it was stated that nuclear power expansion 
was aimed at reducing the cost of fuel imports. Hannah described the Government's 
decision as -"a technological lifebelt offering protection from the consequences of 
Suez". 114 
The Electricity Bill received Royal Assent in July 1957; it abolished the CEA, created the 
CEGB and Electricity Council, and granted operating independence to the 12 Area 
Distribution Boards. The CEGB was given a statutory responsibility to "develop and 
maintain an efficient, coordinated and economical system of supply of electricity"., 15 The 
new structure for the British ESI became operational in April 1958; it was to endure 
essentially unchanged for over thirty years, until the changes associated with 
privatisation. 
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3.3.4 Generation Technology in the late-1950s and early-1960s 
At the beginning of 1957 nuclear power occupied a central role in the British ESI's plans 
for future generation technology development. Within just a few months, however, the 
case for expansion of the nuclear programme was being reconsidered. Fears for the 
security of oil imports receded quickly after the Suez crisis, and coal shortages also 
reduced as National Coal Board output reached record levels, at a time when other uses of 
coal fell. Contrary to postwar forecasts, there was a sharp decline in coal demand from 
the mid-1950s onwards, as its domestic and industrial markets shrank; consumption 
reached a peak in 1956. From the late-1950s onwards, measures were taken to restrict 
both coal imports and further investment in oil-fired plant. At the same time the CEGB 
was put under pressure from government to take a higher level of NCB coal output. 
Under these measures coal output stabilised at around 200mt p. a. until 1963, but fell 
steadily again thereafter. 116 
During the mid-1950s there were considerable gains in the average performance of coal- 
fired steam turbine plant. Materials shortages eased, and advances in alloys and welding 
techniques allowed for higher steam temperatures and pressures, and economies-of-scale 
savings were also made as the standard size of power stations rose to 120MW by 1958.117 
Williams argued that there was a failure on the part of Government to anticipate the gains 
in conventional generation technology: 
By 1957 the economics of nuclear power had already begun to worsen 
relative to conventional power, and this deterioration continued thereafter 
... 
it should really have been better appreciated that the nuclear stations 
were probably going to meet a more severe challenge from conventional 
plant than had been allowed for in 1955.118 
In the late-1950s a series of delays were announced in the rate of expansion of the British 
nuclear programme. In April 1957 the Ministry of Fuel and Power announced the 
deferment of the expanded nuclear programme targets by one year. 119 In its first annual 
report, the CEGB announced a further deferment. 120 The following year, the CEGB 
stated that it has been "evident for some time that costs of electricity from nuclear stations 
currently being built would be greater than those of electricity from coal burning 
stations", partly because of increased nuclear costs, but mainly due to reductions in the 
116 Ministry of Power, Fuel Policy, Cmnd 2798,1965: 5-6 
117 Forrest, op cit: 8 
118 Williams, op cit: 19,72 
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cost of conventional stations. 121 A third delay was announced by the Ministry of Power in 
June 1960. The new aim was to reach around 5GW nuclear capacity by 1968. The 
Ministry stated that "since 1957 coal supply has become plentiful and oil supply 
prospects have also improved", and that consequently, "the need for a sharp increase in 
nuclear power has passed". 122 However, the Government claimed that, although the 
earliest Magnox plants were more expensive than anticipated, the costs of the more recent 
plants were coming down, and nuclear power was likely to be cheaper than conventional 
power by around 1970. 
Throughout the postwar period there was little financial scrutiny of investment in 
generation plant. The nationalised corporations were statutorily required to do no more 
than break even from year to year, and there was no financial assessment of returns to the 
BEA's plant construction programme. Under the 1957 Electricity Act the CEGB was 
broadly charged with providing a "economical system of supply", but within this 
individual investment projects received little assessment. In April 1961, a Treasury White 
Paper on the Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries set out 
new ground-rules for higher financial returns. 123 Under these arrangements optional 
expenditure, such as the choice of generating technique, was in theory required to make a 
10% rate of return on investment. However, some decisions on 'optional' expenditure, 
justified on grounds of political expediency or technical advance were exempted from 
such appraisal. As a result the investment appraisal procedures for generation technology 
- nuclear and conventional - remained undemanding. 
124 
In 1963 the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries carried out an inquiry on the 
ESI. 125 The Committee concluded that "the structure of the industry is sound, and ... 
criticism should be confined to its performance". 126 It pointed to "impressive reductions 
in the capital cost of coal-fired generation". 127 The Committee also stated that "despite 
the absence of a technical check, the present arrangements for examining the very large 
capital expenditure of the Generating Board appear to be satisfactory", but added that 
some consideration should be given to "the adequacy of professional scrutiny" in the 
industry. 128 The Committee reported that the Herbert Committee's call in 1956 for 
121 Central Electricity Generating Board, Report and Accounts 1959-60, (Reports Vol. XIlI), IIC 316,1959-60: 16 
122 Ministry of Power, The Nuclear Power Programme, Cmnd 1083,1960. In 1963 the CEGB provided capital cost 
figures to the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries of £140/kW for the first two Magnox plant, compared to 
£37/kW for recent coal plant (HC 236,1962-63: 117) 
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i 
expansion of the generator's research effort had been met by the CEGB. 129 At the same 
time criticisms were made "of under-forecasting of demand and poor standards of supply 
security provided the CEGB. The Committee also criticised the absence of real 
competition and the price-rings operating in the plant manufacturing industry. 130 
In the first half of the 1960s electricity demand rose sharply. By this time it was clear that 
nuclear power technology had limited scope for expansion. Instead, the CEGB embarked 
on a massive expansion of coal- and oil-fired steam turbine power stations. In 1958 the 
industry standardised on 500MW steam turbine sets, and by 1963 over thirty such sets 
had been ordered. 131 The size of the new power stations was such that the CEGB also 
undertook construction of a new 400kV "supergrid". According to Hannah; the rush of 
plant orders overstrained both the plant manufacturers capabilities and the CEGB's 
capacity to coordinate contractors. Plant construction was split between eight boiler- 
makers and five turbogenerator manufacturers, each working on different designs, and 
there were numerous design faults and construction delays. Typically, the new power 
stations took more than five years to commission. 132 The supply system remained under 
pressure, and there were further winter breakdowns of supply in the early-1960s. 
3.3.5 The Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor Programme 
In 1964 the Conservative Government published a White paper announcing plans for a 
second generation of nuclear reactors. 133 The Government reported that nine Magnox 
plants were now completed or under construction, with a total capacity of just under 
5GW. The Government claimed that "although these stations will produce power at a 
higher cost than was originally planned, the generation of nuclear power, from a technical 
standpoint, has achieved all that was expected of it',. 134 
The White Paper went on to discuss the various designs under consideration for the next 
phase of nuclear power construction in Britain. By this time a number of very different 
designs to Magnox had been developed overseas, including the American 'Boiling Water 
Reactor' and the Canadian 'Heavy Water Reactor'. The Government stated that whilst 
different designs were still under consideration, the CEGB would be offering first tenders 
129ibid: 177 
130 ibid: 163 
131 Cmnd 6388,1975-76: 11 
132 Hannah, op cit: 250-3 
133 Ministry of Power, The Second Nuclear Power Programme, Cmnd 2235,1964 
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for the AEA-designed Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR). It added that a programme 
of around 5GW of new nuclear plant was planned for the early-1970s. The White Paper 
concluded that "nuclear power is likely to have an economic place in the British 
electricity supply system by the early 1970 ... thereafter, it will become cheaper than 
conventional power for the generation of base load". 135 
The AGR design was very much a product of the AEA; no other body - including the 
CEGB - was closely involved in its development. It was essentially an upgraded Magnox 
design, employing enriched uranium fuel and higher operating temperatures, with the 
intention of producing a reactor that was cost-competitive with fossil fuels. According to 
Williams, the AEA encountered far greater technical problems than it had expected in its 
development of the AGR. He added, however, that the AEA had built up a "technological 
momentum" behind the AGR which made the choice of alternative designs difficult. 136 
He also suggested that the design embedded the particular circumstances and "technical 
philosophy" of the British nuclear programme, which made any direct comparisons with 
overseas nuclear reactor designs inherently difficult. 137 
In May 1965 Frederick Lee, Minister for Power for the new Labour Government under 
Harold Wilson, announced that the AGR had been chosen for the next round of nuclear 
plant orders. Lee stated that the CEGB and AEA had informed him that the AGR "shows 
clear economic and technical advantages over the alternative systems and has good 
potential for further development. It will also generate base load power more cheaply 
than a contemporary coal-fired station". 138 By the mid-1960s there was some scepticism 
among MPs about claims for the benefits of nuclear power, and Lee's statement was met 
by repeated requests for more detailed and costed information regarding the proposed 
programme. Alf Roberts, for example, stated that "costing in the atomic energy industry 
is far from satisfactory". 139 Lee dismissed these concerns; he referred to the AGR as "our 
great success", and added that he was "quite sure we have hit the jackpot with this ... here 
we have the greatest breakthrough of all time". 140 
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In two Fuel Policy White Papers published in 1965 and 1967, the Labour Government 
reaffirmed its support of an expanded nuclear power programme. 141 The 1965 White 
Paper stated that nuclear power "should give cheaper base-load electricity than future 
coal fired stations ... [it] 
is likely to become fully competitive with conventional electricity 
generation". 142 The 1967 White-Paper stated that "a regular sequence of new nuclear 
stations is desirable if the full development potential of this new technology is to be 
realised ... nuclear stations will predominate 
in new capacity planned for the coming 
years". 143 
Four AGR stations were ordered by the CEGB between 1966 and 1969, from three 
different manufacturing consortia, each offering different designs; another plant was 
ordered by the SSEB. All quickly ran into chronic construction delays and technical 
difficulties - three of the CEGB's plants were not declared commercial until the late- 
1980s. Richard Eden and Nigel Evans offered three reasons for the problems of the AGR 
programme: the premature move from prototype to commercial scale, insufficient design 
work being completed before the start of construction, and the awarding to contracts to 
weak manufacturing consortia. 144 They concluded that the Government had chosen the 
AGR design on primarily political grounds: "there can be little doubt that political 
considerations had an impact on the decision, with the British AGR design clearly 
favoured by the Labour administration of the day". tas 
3.4 Generation Technology in the ESI after 1970 
3.4.1 Introduction: The Breakdown of Continuity 
Throughout the twentieth century, up to the late-1960s, the ESI had experienced 
essentially unbroken economic and technological continuity. Steadily rising demand for 
electric power had been met by well established technologies, notably coal-fired steam 
turbines, which had been progressively improved in specification and scale. Gordon 
MacKerron pointed out that "the rapid expansion of the electricity industry that took 
141 The Labour Government of the mid- and late-1960s under Harold Wilson was overtly technocentric in outlook. Wilson himself famously referred to the "white heat of the technological revolution" driving forwards economic change 
at this time. 
142 Ministry of Power, Fuel policy, Cmnd 2798,1965: 23,27 
143 Ministry of Power, Fuel Policy, Cmnd 3438,1967: 17-18 
144 Richard Eden and Nigel Evans, Electricity Supply in the UK, Aldershot, Gower, 1986: 13. Similarly, in his analysis 
of the "disastrous" decision to progress with the AGR programme, Alex Henney stated that AEA figures for AGR 
performance, given in 1965, were "baseless", and taken from just one years experience from the pilot plant. (Alex Kenney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, London, EEE Ltd, 1994: 131) 
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place from the early-1900s was achieved in conditions of continuously declining cost ... 
that endured until the 1970s". 146 MacKerron identified four main causes of falling cost: 
economies of scale, the development of the ESI network, better generation technology 
efficiency - due mainly to higher steam temperatures and pressures - and lower fossil 
fuel prices, arising from the opening up of new deposits and improved extraction 
technology. As Hannah described, in the late-1960s the continuity of these trends seemed 
assured: 
From the beginnings of the electricity supply industry in the 1880s up to 
the mid-1960s, the industry's decision makers had lived in conditions of 
unusually stable expectations. Managers and engineers had then known 
that improved steam conditions, and larger scale in generation would lead 
to continually falling costs. Even nuclear power was seen in the 1950s as 
little more than the logical extrapolation of these basic rules of the 
industry's existence. 147 
After the 1957 Electricity Act, the economic and technological continuity of the industry 
was paralleled by organisational continuity. By 1970 the institutional strength of the 
CEGB and AEA was such that they seemed capable of directing the future of the ESI 
almost at will. Valentine argued that "in the years 1965-70 the AEA, CEGB and 
[manufacturing] consortia all showed a breathtaking conviction in their own abilities, 
supported by an unshakeable faith in the inevitability of increasing electricity 
demand". 148 Henney suggested that the institutional strength of the CEGB was such that 
it was able to develop long term plans for the development of generation technology 
largely on the basis of its own technocentric preferences: 
By the 1970s the boards of the nationalised industries were dominated by 
managers who had spent their careers in the industries, and often had a 
technical background. They developed an engineering rather than a 
commercial culture, which resulted in costly attempts to push forward 
technological frontiers ... The 
CEGB became an 'enclosed order' with a 
closed mindset ... the headquarters was a managerial bureaucracy that 
suppressed dissent, particularly about generation options. 149 
In a speech to the Institution of Electrical and Electronics Technician Engineers in 1970, 
the then Chairman of the CEGB, Sir Stanley Brown, looked forward confidently to The 
Next 25 Years in the Electricity Supply Industry. 150 Brown anticipated continuation of the 
historic growth of the British ESI: he predicted that by 1995, the industry would have 
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trebled in size. He added that this huge growth required the industry to "operate at the 
forward edge of technological development". 151 He went on to consider the generation 
technology options in the years ahead. Within this, nuclear power assumed clear 
dominance. As compared to fossil fuel generation, Brown argued, nuclear power was a 
young technology with great potential for improvement: 
Nuclear energy ... with its very low 
fuel cost - even if at the moment at a 
relatively high capital cost and complexity - is firmly destined to be the 
fuel of the future. Increasingly fossil fuels will be only used on lower load' 
factor plant ... with oil, coal and natural gas competing 
for second place 
according to price and availability. 152 
In the event, over the following years, the seemingly impregnable authority of the CEGB 
- and its preferred generation technology options - were to be increasingly challenged 
and eventually overturned. Hannah stated that "all [the] assumptions, built up over more 
than six decades of experience, proved false". 153 In the early-1970s, the ending of 
continuity for the industry was most dramatically marked by the energy crisis. 
3.4.2 The 1970s 'Energy Crisis' 
Between 1973/74 the Arab-Israeli war precipitated an OPEC oil embargo, which resulted 
in a four-fold increase in oil prices (see Figure 8, Appendix 1). 154 This first oil shock had 
a profound effect on energy policy throughout the industrial world; in Western Europe 
and the USA, security of supply concerns again became dominant. Although Britain was 
less import-dependent for her electricity fuel than many other industrial nations, the oil- 
shock led to a reemphasis within the ESI on coal-fired and nuclear power generation 
technologies. 155 
From 1974 onwards, the newly-formed Department of Energy was the focus for devising 
and implementing Government policy response to the energy crisis. The Chief Scientist at 
the Department of Energy during these years was Walter Marshall, an esteemed nuclear 
scientist and Deputy Director of the AEA. In July 1975, Sir Jack Rampton, Permanent 
Under Secretary of State at the Department of Energy, declared that "the days of cheap 
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fuel are over"; the technology of choice in the new energy situation, Rampton argued, 
would be nuclear power. 156 
In 1976 the leading industrial, political, trades union and academic figures in the energy 
industries came together at a National Energy Conference in London. 157 A number of 
speakers warned against over-reaction to apparent supply shortages in the wake of the oil- 
shock. A small number of MPs, notably John Biffen, Frank Hooley and Enoch Powell, 
argued for a non-interventionist market-based approach to the energy sector. 158 Their 
views, however, were in a minority amongst the conference delegates, and were clearly 
not shared by the incumbent Labour Government. Indeed, the conference was dominated 
by fears for energy shortages and security of supply concerns, and a series of speakers 
argued that the energy crisis demanded expansion of the coal and nuclear industries. 
In the same year the Department of Energy published the first in an occasional series of 
surveys of energy technologies, Energy Research and Development in the United 
Kingdom. 159 The review was written, as subsequent such reports, by the Energy 
Technology Support Unit (ETSU), a nominally independent part of the AEA, based at the 
Authority's Harwell site in Oxfordshire. The review adopted an overtly technocentric 
approach; in his forward to the report, Walter Marshall declared that "this paper must be 
primarily concerned with research and development. Therefore, the document does not 
include an analysis of the non-technological factors which influence the implementation 
of advances in technology". 160 ETSU went on to outline their recommendations for a 
national energy R&D strategy in response to the energy crisis. In devising this, the 
underlying assumption was the perceived shortage of fossil fuels - North Sea oil and gas 
was seen as offering only a short or medium term "breathing space", as reserves would 
begin to run out at around the turn of the century. 161 In this context, ETSU concluded that 
"nuclear energy assumes increasing importance on almost any view of the future". 162 
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The Labour Government outlined its own energy policy in 1977.163 The Secretary of 
State for Energy, Tony Benn, outlined a concept of a firmly Government-led energy 
policy, with an emphasis on universal access to cheap energy. The review went on to 
describe the two main elements of the Government's supply side policies for the energy 
industries. Firstly, the expansion of the British coal industry along the lines of The Plan 
for Coal, a tripartite agreement between the Government, National Coal Board and 
National Union of Mineworkers. Secondly, "ensuring access to nuclear technology", 
since "the optimum solution is likely to include a substantial nuclear contribution". 164 
The next Department of Energy/ETSU review of Energy Technologies for the UK, 
published in 1979, again predicted a future dependency on nuclear power for the British 
ESI, and concluded that "on an orthodox view of the future it is expected that coal-fired 
plant will lose its base-load role to nuclear power in the long-term". 165 
3.4.3 Generation Technology in the 1970s 
In responding to the energy crisis, the British ESI faced a number of more local 
challenges. The historic growth in electricity demand was ended as the use of North Sea 
natural gas expanded, and as a result, the ESI faced overcapacity for the first time in its 
history. At the same time both coal-fired and nuclear power plants were facing chronic 
technical and economic difficulties. 
The established means of technical progress for coal-fired steam turbine power stations - 
scale economies and improvements in steam conditions - were offering diminishing 
returns by the early-1970s. Steel alloys reached thermal limits of around 560°C, beyond 
which increasing problems of material failure were experienced. Although developments 
continued in advanced alloys for turbine blades and steam tubing, and also improved 
cooling methods, their extra costs now often outweighed the small efficiency gains they 
provided. All across the industrial world, the average thermal efficiency of steam turbine 
plant levelled-off at just under 35%. 166 In considering this development, Flavin and 
Lennsen stated that "the advances in [steam turbine] technology ... stemmed from a 
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surprisingly narrow frontier of advances", and added that "by the 1960s, this bag of tricks 
was nearly empty". 167 
In addition - as a number of parliamentary committees reported - the 
CEGB's fossil fuel 
plant construction programme was plagued by problems of industrial relations, low 
productivity, and poor plant design. 168 Together, these difficulties were responsible for 
huge construction delays and cost increases, and the availability of the 500MW turbine 
sets was 'greatly restricted. 169 Nevertheless, the CEGB continued to build bigger units: 
660MW turbines were adopted after 1970, and sixteen such units were ordered in the 
early-1970s. 170 
At the same time the British nuclear power programme was also facing chronic design 
problems and cost increases. 171 Henney stated that "the problems of building the AGRs 
threw the British nuclear programme into disarray, and the 1970s were a period of claim, 
counterclaim, indecision, [and] confusion". 172 Alternatives to the AGR design were 
considered by Government in the mid-1970s - in particular, the steam-generating heavy 
water reactor (SGHWR), which had been under development by the AEA as an 
alternative to the AGR since the late-1960s, and also the American-designed pressurised 
water reactor (PWR). 
In July 1974, following a series of detailed inquiries and debates concerning the relative 
merits of different reactor designs173, the Labour Government announced that the 
SGHWR had been chosen for construction. 174 An initial programme of 4GW was 
planned, but it quickly became clear that the SGHWR was inadequately developed from 
prototype, and would prove considerably more expensive than either the AGR or PWR, 
Within a short period of time the Government had decided to reconsider its choice of 
plant, design. Although the PWR now had the support of many nuclear engineers in 
Britain, most notably the Department of Energy's Chief Scientist, Walter Marshall, it was 
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opposed by others, including the Energy Secretary, Tony Benn, on safety and 
development cost grounds. In January 1978 the Government announced that the CEGB 
and SSEB would be sanctioned to build two more AGRs, whilst at the same time the 
AEA was authorised to undertake preparatory work on a future PWR. 175 
The 1970s also witnessed growing public opposition to nuclear power. As Williams 
pointed out, 'until this time, the British nuclear power programme had developed in an 
essentially "private world" of government and insider organisations. By the mid-1970s, 
however, this had been overtaken by a "distinctly public politics". 176 The opening up of 
debate on the future of nuclear power was most marked by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution 1976 report on Nuclear Power and the Environment. 177 For the 
first time in an official report, safety and pollution concerns regarding radioactive 
materials were given prominence, and the case against any nuclear power programme 
was discussed. 178 
3.4.4 The Plowden Report 
In response its chronic problems, the Labour Government of the late-1960s and 1970s 
resolved to restructure the ESI. The first attempt at reform was made as early as July 
1970, when the Minister of Power, Roy Mason, announced his intention to reorganise the 
industry along the lines of the 1956 Herbert Committee's proposals. 179 The proposed Bill 
was lost with the dissolution of parliament later in 1970, but the pressure for reform 
continued into the 1970s. In evidence to the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries' 
inquiry in 1973, the then Chairman of the Electricity Council stated that "if one were 
starting up afresh, I would certainly not advise you to set up ... [the industry] in its present 
shape". 180 The select committee reported that divisions in the industry were frustrating 
efforts to improve performance. After 1974 the reinstalled Labour government set up a 
committee headed by Lord Plowden (who had been inaugural chairman of the AEA in the 
1950s) to investigate The Structure of the ESI in England and Wales. 181 
The Plowden Report, published in 1976, stated that the most frequent criticism it heard 
was the inadequacy of central direction and control, and concluded that "the basic 
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weakness of the industry's structure is slow and cumbersome central policy-making 
caused by divided responsibilities and a rigid statutory framework". 182 The Committee 
considered a number of possible alternative structures for the industry, such as the 
setting-up of a number of integrated regional power boards, or the breaking-up of the 
CEGB into two competing generating companies. The case for regional power boards 
was rejected because of the problems involved with inter-trading between boards: the 
Committee argued that the distribution of generation plant in Britain was such that some 
boards would be in too strong a position with respect to others. It was also argued that the 
central role played by the CEGB in power plant design and manufacture in the British 
ESI meant that a change to regional boards would present problems for the construction 
of new plant, since British manufacturers would be unable to take on responsibility for 
coordinating the design and construction of power plant technology. The report 
continued: 
The creation of power boards would not remove the need for a central 
approach to major design questions and would only complicate the process 
of taking the necessary decisions ... in countries where the investment 
plans of the electricity supply undertakings, are only informally 
coordinated, the technical strength of the plant makers, relative to the 
undertakings, is far greater than in England or Wales. 183 
On splitting-up the CEGB, whilst the Committee conceded that this would "encourage 
competition of ideas on the generating side", it argued that this would "not address the 
industry's real weaknesses", but rather, would "perpetuate the existing division of 
responsibility and lack of central direction, and, indeed, make it worse on the generating 
side, where there is a special need for central decisions". 184 Within this, the perceived 
demands of nuclear power were clearly central to the Committee's reasoning: 
The CEGB's single organisation for power station design and construction 
must be preserved ... the country can no longer afford to try two different 
approaches to major strategic choices such as a new reactor type ... the electricity industry [should continue] to speak with one voice to match the 
increased concentration in the nuclear design ... there are many crucial areas where the industry must act as a whole according to a single national 
strategy. lss 
The Committee therefore recommended unification of the industry under a single 
statutory board which would take over the functions of the CEGB, Area Boards, and 
Electricity Council. The report concluded that it was now appropriate for the industry to 
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return to a more centralised structure, such as was introduced upon nationalisation in 
1947. 
The Government announced plans for reorganisation of the industry in a subsequent 
White Paper, published in April, 1978.186 The Government reported that there was "a 
strong current of opinion among both management and unions in the industry in 
favour of 
a change from the present fragmented structure to a unified organisation". 
187 It proposed 
establishing a single body, the Electricity Corporation, to have responsibility 
for the 
industry as a whole, on the basis that "a stronger centre is needed to deal with the major 
strategic decisions facing the industry". 188 Just as in 1970, however, the Labour 
Government's wider difficulties prevented it implementing its proposed reforms of the 
industry; the Electricity Bill failed to proceed before the 1979 dissolution of parliament. 
3.4.5 Generation Technology in the 1980s 
The Conservative Party victory in the May 1979 General Election, under Margaret 
Thatcher, broke the postwar political consensus that had supported corporatism. During 
the long unbroken period in office that followed, Conservative Government would 
eventually transform the economic and organisational environment of the British ESI. 
However, in the first two Thatcher-led administrations (1979-83 and 1983-87) there was 
little reform of the industry of any real significance. 
In the wake of the second oil-shock, during which the price of oil again rose suddenly 
(Appendix 1, Figure 8), and the widespread industrial unrest of the 'Winter of Discontent', 
the new Government quickly made clear its support for the continued expansion of 
nuclear power. In December 1979 the Energy Secretary, David Howell, gave consent for 
two second-generation AGR plants initially approved under the last Labour Government, 
with the promise of a first PWR power station order to follow on. Howell stated that 
"there must be continuing nuclear power station orders if our long term energy supplies 
are to be secured and current industrial difficulties are to be resolved". 189 He also 
described as a "reasonable prospect" the CEGB's stated desire for a 15GW nuclear 
186 Department of Energy, Reorganisation of the ES/, Cmnd 7134,1978. The Select Committee on Nationalised 
Industries also undertook an investigation into the industry at this time; the select committee reported that "the 
overwhelming view of witnesses was that reorganisation of the ESI is urgently needed". (Reorganising the Electricity 
Supply industry; Prelegislative Hearings, HC 636,1977-78: xxix). 
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programme over the following ten years, through the ordering of one new PWR plant 
every year for a decade from 1982 onwards. 190 
At the same time Government support for the British coal industry also continued, and 
there was no real attempt to challenge the monopoly status of the National Coal Board as 
coal supplier to the CEGB. Indeed, in October 1979; the Government oversaw the signing 
of a'Joint Understanding', under which the CEGB agreed to take 75mt p. a. of NCB coal 
for the following five years. 191 The agreement also effectively ensured the continued 
dominance of coal-fired steam turbine technology in the British ESI. 
If the new Government's actual management of the ESI was little different than its 
predecessor, in its policy statements at least, a very different approach was outlined, 
stressing the role of competitive market forces. This was most clearly announced in a 
speech in June 1982 by the then Energy Secretary, Nigel Lawson. 192 Lawson stated that 
he did "not see the Government's task as being to try to plan the future shape of energy 
production and consumption ... [but] rather to set a 
framework which will ensure that the 
market operates in the energy sector with a minimum of distortion". 193 In general, 
Lawson declared, the aim was to regard fossil fuels as internationally tradeable 
commodities, and to base investment in generating technologies on commercial criteria 
rather than security-of-supply considerations. Within this, however, Lawson argued that 
"electricity poses special problems": given the restrictions on electricity importability and 
substitutability, diversity was of particular importance, and he argued that this meant that 
"nuclear power is critical both to diversification and to reducing costs". 194 
In 1982 the Government appointed Walter Marshall, former Chief Scientist at the 
Department of Energy, now Director of the AEA, as the new Chairman of the CEGB. 
Marshall was well known as a highly forceful advocate of PWR technology. 195 The first 
PWR, Sizewell B, was submitted to public inquiry in 1983. For Marshall and the CEGB 
it was only the first of a series of ten similar plants. The need for a large PWR series, 
however - particularly at a time when electricity demand was falling - had already been 
questioned by the Energy Select Committee. 196 The Committee -suggested that the 
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CEGB's economic case for the - PWR programme was dependent on a few highly 
questionable assumptions and projections concerning the relative cost of coal and nuclear 
plant. 197 
Other influential bodies were also questioning the decisionmaking of the CEGB by the 
this time. In 1981 the Monopolies and Merger's Commission had criticised the Board's 
performance in plant construction, consistent over-estimation of demand, and over- 
investment in capacity. 198 It also pointed to "serious weaknesses" in the CEGB's 
investment appraisal procedures, and concluded that "a large programme of investment in 
nuclear power stations ... 
is proposed on the basis of investment appraisals which are 
seriously defective and liable to mislead". 199 Although the MMC inquiry did not address 
the overall structure of the'ESI or the wider energy sector, it suggested that "where 
nationalised industries, each having a virtual monopoly, deal with each other ... the 
purchaser may not resist the seller's demands as vigorously as it ought, since it can pass 
on its costs to its customers". 200 
Whilst it was reluctant to engage in any substantial restructuring, the first Thatcher 
Government did introduce a series of measures aimed at the liberalisation of utilities. In 
the case of the ESI, these measures were included as part of the 1983 Energy Act. The 
Act aimed to encourage independent generation by abolishing the CEGB's statutory 
monopoly on generation in England and Wales, and allowing private generators access to 
the CEGB and Area Board's transmission and distribution networks. In practice, however, 
no significant private generation emerged. 
In reviewing the failure to encourage independent generation at this time, Elizabeth 
Hammond et al. concluded that because the CEGB had retained control of the 
transmission, grid, it continued to exert "effective control of price and entry 
conditions". 201 Similarly, George Yarrow stated that the Act had failed to provide any 
regulatory mechanism so as to ensure that new entry to generation was made easier. 
Indeed, he added, it had allowed the CEGB to engage in predatory pricing in order to 
deter new entry. 202 Hammond et al. concluded that "the advantages of incumbency ... 
acted to frustrate the objectives of liberalization", and suggested that "the creation of a 
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market in electricity may therefore only be feasible if a more fundamental restructuring of 
the ESI is implemented". 203 
The defeat of the National Union of Miners in the 1984/85 coal industry strike meant that 
a major obstacle to more radical restructuring of the ESI had been removed. Although 
there were no immediate changes in the dominant position of the NCB/British Coal as 
supplier to the CEGB after the strike, Mike Parker and John Surrey identified a marked 
asymmetry in Government treatment of the coal and nuclear industries from 1985 
onwards, involving a steady withdrawal of R&D funds to British Coal. They also argued 
that "strong downward pressure" was exerted on British Coal's spending and investment - 
and indeed, the British coal industry underwent rapid rationalisation in the second half of 
the 1980s. Nevertheless, in the face of technical, economic and political restrictions on 
coal imports, the CEGB remained overwhelmingly dependent on indigenous coal, and in 
1986 it agreed to a revised Joint Understanding for 75mt p. a. of NCB coal for the 
following five years. 204 
Although it was subject to increasing criticism by the mid-1980s, the CEGB - alongside 
the AEA - remained in an institutionally commanding position in the ESI. The British 
nuclear industry was confident about its ability to progress with the proposed PWR 
programme; in 1985 Valentine remarked: 
One of the most striking aspects of nuclear power is the strength of the 
consensus that supports it. This consensus embraces all the parliamentary 
parties, all the major unions except the mineworkers', and the entire 
institutional and power structure ... [the] nuclear momentum seems to be bent on attempting to secure its own future. 205 
In May 1985 the CEGB's Managing Director, John Baker, argued that even if it was not 
needed on demand grounds, CEGB investment in PWR technology was economically 
justified as replacement for existing plant. 206 Baker claimed that nuclear power "was by 
far the cheapest generating cost on the system"207; he continued: 
Nuclear stations ... in particular PWR stations ... make substantial cost savings by displacing the use of higher cost fuels ... It therefore pays the electricity consumer handsomely for the CEGB to install PWR plant in 
anticipation of need and demand in order to reduce the costs of electricity 
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generation ... It is apparent that, 
for a'wide range of backgrounds, nuclear 
power is a good investment. 208 
Baker forecasted a looming capacity crisis in the English and Welsh ESI in the 1990s and 
beyond, as the large amount of plant commissioned in the 1960s was retired. He argued 
that this required the CEGB to build as soon as possible a "small family of PWRs", with 
subsequent further orders for coal-fired steam turbine and nuclear power plant. In the 
longer term, he outlined a "moderate" expansion of nuclear power over the next 35 years, 
so that by 2020, nuclear represented around 40% of total plant capacity, around the same 
share as coal-fired steam turbine plant. 209ý 
In 1986 the Institute of Energy produced a review of future energy supplies and the 
potential of different electricity generation technologies. 210 The report, concluded that 
much of the new plant needed in the UK ESI "should be nuclear", but that given the 
strength of public opposition to nuclear power in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, the 
choice lay instead between coal- or oil-fired steam turbine plant. 211 The Institute's report 
also made an attack on the Government's advocacy of market-based energy policy. It 
argued that since 1979, the Conservative Government had "virtually removed the little 
that remained of policy coordination" in the energy. sector. 212 The Institute argued: 
It is not possible to leave policy decisions to the market as though energy 
were a matter of taste or personal preference, mainly because the longer 
term technical and commercial factors at work are too complex for the lay 
observer within the market to evaluate correctly ... [there is] a need for 
policy integration at the national level, for which government takes 
responsibility". 213 
In February 1987 the Department of Energy published another in the occasional series of 
ETSU reviews of energy research and development. 214 Even though oil and gas prices 
were falling rapidly in the course of their investigation (see Appendix 1, Figure 8), ETSU 
expressed support for the existing pattern of research spending in the ESI, which was 
overwhelmingly dominated by nuclear power technology. 215 ETSU claimed that there 
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were "high returns" to investment in AGR plant technology, and described spending on 
PWR plant development as "highly cost effective"; it added that PWR technology had 
"the potential to make a very substantial contribution to central electricity supply". 216 The 
report concluded that "in general, the results obtained for RD&D [research, development 
and demonstration] in the electricity production technologies indicate that it is both cost- 
effective and timely". 217 
In their Annual Report for 1986/87, published in mid-1987, the CEGB stated that 
following the recent approval of planning permission for Sizewell B PWR, they would be 
making applications for a further PWR, Hinkley Point C, and also two coal-fired steam 
turbine plants, at Fawley and West Burton. 218 The Board argued that the industry was 
now at a turning-point, with a return to demand growth and new capacity construction, 
after a decade of static demand and little new plant activity, and that as a result, ten new 
PWR and coal-fired stations would be needed by the year 2000.219 
In retrospect the British ESI now stood at a much more radical turning point, and was 
about to enter circumstances beyond that which the CEGB might have thought possible. 
Before considering these changes further, however, it is first necessary to review the 
history of gas turbine generation technology - on both an international scale, and also its 
rather neglected position in the British ESI. 
3.5 The Development of Gas Turbine Generation Technology 
3.5.1 Introduction: Gas Turbines and Steam Turbines 
In basic operation, the gas turbine is an essentially similar technology to the steam turbine 
- in both cases, hot, pressurised gas is passed through rotating turbine blades in order to 
power an electricity generator. Beyond this, however, there are significant technical and 
economic differences between the two - differences which, in part, explains their very 
different fortunes as electricity generation technologies during the twentieth century. 
In a modern coal-fired steam turbine power plant, pulverised coal is mixed in a boiler 
with air, and then burnt to raise pressurised steam at around 560°C (Appendix 2, Figure 
1). The range of temperatures and pressures experienced within steam turbines can be 
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withstood by normal steel alloys - an important factor in the economics of such plant. In 
a gas turbine power plant, by contrast, compressed air is mixed with gaseous or distillate 
fuel and burnt under very high pressure; the hot combustion gases (at well over 1000°C) 
are then fed directly across the gas turbine. 
Because they are exposed to much higher temperatures and pressures, the components of 
gas turbines - notably the turbine blades themselves - are required to be far stronger than 
their steam turbine equivalents. In addition, the fuel used in gas turbines is required to be 
much 'cleaner' than in steam turbines, so as to avoid causing damage to the blade 
materials. The limits on material tolerance to high temperatures and pressures, and the 
absence of an appropriate (and affordable) fuel has greatly restricted the performance and 
use of gas turbines for much of the century. 
In a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT), the hot exhaust gases from one or more gas 
turbines are fed into a boiler, or 'heat recovery steam generator', so as to raise steam for 
feeding into a steam turbine (Appendix 2, Figure 2). The use of gas and steam turbines 
together in this way makes the CCGT power plant, in principle, a highly efficient form of 
electricity generation technology. In practice, however, CCGT technology gained little 
use around the world up to the 1980s, and made no contribution whatsoever in the 
nationalised British ESI. Indeed, the British plant manufacturing industry played only a 
marginal role in the development of gas turbine/CCGT power plant technology. This 
section, therefore - unlike the preceding ones - considers technological development on 
an international rather than national stage. Subsection 3.4.2 considers the. early 
development of gas turbine and CCGT technology; subsection 3.4.3 reviews the 
commercialisation of CCGT plant in the 1980s. Finally, subsection 3.4.4 returns to a 
focus on the British ESI, and considers the marginal position of gas turbine/CCGT 
technology in the industry before privatisation. 
3.5.2 The early development of Gas Turbine Technology 
Although they only ever had a very minor role in power generation up to the 1980s, gas 
turbines have a long history of development and use. Edward Constant II traced the 
origins of modern gas turbines back to the late-eighteenth century. 220 The 
commercialisation of steam turbines at the end of the nineteenth century (as described in 
3.2.1) gave some impetus to the development of gas turbines for electricity generation, 
and a variety of gas turbine engines were introduced in the early twentieth century in 
220 E. W. Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1980: 89 
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Europe and the USA - the most successful of which was developed in France. 221 General 
Electric investigated gas turbines in the early-twentieth century, but by the 1920s, they 
concluded that, such were their technical problems - in particular material intolerance to 
high temperatures, and grossly inefficient compression (in the early days compressors 
consumed more power than was supplied by the turbine) - that there was no 'practical 
possibility of an efficient gas turbine. 222 
Greater knowledge of aerodynamics in the inter-war years gradually allowed for more 
efficient compression, and by 1935-36, gas turbines powerful enough to run a small 
generator were successfully constructed. 223 The first commercial gas turbine generator 
was built in 1939 by Brown Boveri of Switzerland, and a number of other manufacturers 
developed similar designs in the 1940s. 224 All were modelled on, steam, turbine 
technology. The incoming fuel and air were mixed together in large boiler-like 
combustion chambers; after combustion, a valve was opened to allow the combustion 
gasses to be expelled at high pressure across a turbine. This was an inherently inefficient 
design, and gas turbines were unable to match the rapid improvements steam turbine 
technology during the interwar years (3.2.2). 
The development of the turbojet in the late-1930s and early-1940s - by Frank Whittle in 
England, and around the same time by von Ohain, Wagner, and Schelp in Germany - 
marked a radical turning point in the development of gas turbines. 225 Turbojets were far 
smaller, lighter and more efficient than earlier gas turbine designs. In turbojets, incoming 
air is continually fed into a compressor, and then mixed with fuel in small combustors; 
the combustion gases are then continually driven across a turbine at high pressure. This 
design provided far greater airflow and power-to-size ratio than had hitherto been 
possible. From the 1940s onwards, gas turbine development took two distinct pathways - 
technically advanced aero engines, and larger, more robust, 'industrial' gas turbines for 
power generation. 226 
Combined cycle power plants also have a long history in power engineering. Horlock 
traced the history of combined cycle plants to the early part of the twentieth century. 227 
General Electric built several combined mercury/steam cycle plants before 1950. 
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Although these achieved high thermal efficiency, substantial additional costs were 
involved with the mercury cycle, ' and Horlock concluded that "while ý magnificent 
engineering achievements ... [they] proved to 
be uneconomic in comparison with the 
developing conventional steam plants, which were gaining in efficiency as steam 
pressures and temperatures increased". 228 The first modern designs of CCGT plant were 
developed by Seippel and Bereuter whilst working for Brown Boveri in the 1950s229 
However, natural gas was rare at this time, and in order to be competitive with steam 
turbines, it was widely accepted that gas turbines needed to be adapted to run on other, 
cheaper, fuels. Experiments were accordingly carried out on a wide range of candidates. 
At the same time, investigations were conducted on a variety of gas turbine plant design 
variations, using reheating and intercooling. In retrospect, Tyler concluded, these tended 
to detract from the potential of 'simple' gas turbines, and neither low-grade fuels nor 
complex cycles proved successful. 230 Gas turbines remained too small and too expensive 
to run for CCGT plant to be considered a serious rival to coal-fired steam turbine 
technology for large-scale generation. 
Although industrial gas turbines found little application in the postwar period, the use of 
turbojets expanded dramatically, and turbojet technology underwent rapid improvements 
under the huge research programmes of the major aero-engine manufacturers - notably 
General Electric and Pratt and Witney in the USA, and Rolls-Royce in the UK - financed 
by secure long-term government defence contracts. 231 
Efforts to improve turbojet efficiency concentrated on increasing the maximum cycle 
temperature and raising the compression ratio. Maximum cycle temperature gains were 
achieved by improving blade materials and cooling techniques. According to Armstrong, 
the use of improved metal alloy turbine blades provided for average increases in the 
maximum cycle temperature of around 10°C per year after the war up to 1960.232 When 
air-cooling of turbojet turbine blades was first introduced in the 1960s, it provided a 
further sudden jump in maximum cycle temperature of 100°C, and subsequent 
developments in cooling techniques enabled further average increases of around 20°C 
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each year thereafter. 233 In a thirty year period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, gas 
turbine compression ratios rose threefold, maximum cycle temperatures rose from 750°C 
to 1150°C, and open cycle efficiencies from about 20% to over 30%. 234 
All of these improvements, however, were concerned exclusively with aero-engines. The 
massive research efforts of the turbojet manufacturers concentrated on technical 
refinements which did not serve the more robust demands of industrial gas turbine 
engines. Turbojets were ill-suited to power generation - they were too small, and were 
not designed for sustained continuous use. Even General Electric - who alone amongst 
the major manufacturers made both industrial and aero gas turbines - operated them as 
separate businesses serving different markets. At the same time, the research efforts of 
the large electrical manufacturers and utilities were concentrated - with considerable 
success - on steam turbine technology. 
In the late-1950s and early-1960s large natural gas reserves were the discovered in the 
USA, Western Europe and the Middle East. In Europe, the largest discovery was the huge 
Dutch Groningen field, discovered in 1959. Greater availability meant that for the first 
time natural gas became a viable fuel for electricity generation. In the 1960s small 
'aeroderivative' gas turbine engines, based on turbojet designs, were' installed in 
considerable number by electrical utilities across the world, including the CEGB in 
Britain (this is discussed later in the chapter, 3.5.4). Although their running (i. e. fuel) 
costs were much higher than large coal-fired or oil-fired steam turbines, small gas turbine 
plant could be built relatively quickly. In addition, the response time of these engines - 
the time needed to achieve full power from start-up - was much quicker than for large 
conventional plant, so that they were generally used intermittently to meet peak loads, or 
kept as reserve plant. 235 At the same time, the abundancy of natural gas was now such 
that it was burnt in steam turbines instead of coal or oil. By 1973 natural gas fuelled 10% 
of all electricity generated in OECD countries, virtually all using conventional steam 
turbine plant. 236 
European and American manufacturers also installed a considerable number of small 
CCGT plant in the 1960s, often in combined heat and power (CHP) applications. Using 
one or more high efficiency aeroderivative gas turbine engines (in the 10-25MW range), 
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combined cycle plant efficiencies of over 40% were possible. The largest CCGT plant in 
Europe at this time was a 75MW Brown Boveri plant, using two 25MW gas turbine units, 
at Korneuburg in Austria, commissioned in 1961. In the, USA, a similarly-sized 
CCGT/CHP plant was built by General Electric in Texas for the chemical company 
Dow. 237 
By 1970 Wood highlighted a "trend to higher industrial ratings" among gas turbine 
manufacturers, such as recently introduced Westinghouse (58Mal) and Stal-Laval 
(70Mal) machines. 238 Wood predicted that "current delays in the delivery of large 
nuclear and fossil steam plant ... will no 
doubt ensure a continued demand for gas 
turbines ... 
in particular, base-load use in combination of the gas turbine with heat 
recovery". 239 Similarly, in 1973 Pfenninger argued that "combined cycle plants are an 
economically interesting proposition", and reported "growing interest" in larger CCGT 
plant for power generation, with a substantial number of recent orders in Europe for plant 
over 100MW. 240 He discussed, for example, the recently ordered Geertruidenberg power 
station in the Netherlands, a 120MW plant which had an overall thermal efficiency of 
44%. 24t 
The 1973/74 oil-shock greatly curtailed the use of natural gas for electricity generation 
across the globe. Even though the price of natural gas rose far less than that of oil in the 
immediate aftermath of the OPEC embargo (see Appendix 1, Figure 8), it was now 
considered by western governments to be a scarce fuel with poor supply security. In 1975 
an EEC Directive prohibited the use of natural gas as a fuel for new power plants in the 
absence of exceptional technical or economic circumstances. 242 In the USA, the 1978 
Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act imposed restrictions on the use of natural gas for 
electricity generation, other than for meeting peak demand, or when alternative sources 
were unavailable. 243 CCGT plant construction ground to a near halt from the mid-1970s - 
only one utility CCGT plant was built in the USA between 1979 and 1986.244 
Despite its prohibition for electricity generation, the research efforts of turbojet 
manufacturers ensured that aeroderivative gas turbine technology improvements 
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continued. The prospects of gas turbine technology were reviewed by an Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers conference in London in 1976.245 The conference heard a wide 
range of views concerning'the potential contribution of gas turbines to electricity 
generation. A number of speakers emphasised that, in the wake of the oil-shock, a 
cheaper alternative fuel to natural gas would have to be found before any significant 
progress could be made. For example, Armstrong suggested that "the use of gas turbines 
might be greatly extended if a satisfactory capacity for using low-grade fuels could be 
established ... This 
is especially true for base-load power generation, where the use of 
cheap fuel is vital to the economics". 246 Similar concerns prompted Tyler to suggest that 
"it might be expected that increased fuel costs :.. will tend to reduce the proportion of gas 
turbine capacity that is economic". 247 
At the same time, a number of conference delegates reported a continuing trend towards 
larger gas turbine units, designed specifically for electricity generation, and which were 
beginning to incorporate advanced design features from aeroderivative engines. Spinks 
reported that five manufacturers were now offering heavy duty gas turbines in the 
100MW class, and he added that "the 1000MW gas turbine power station, involving ten 
or less units, is therefore now possible". 248 Shorthouse stated that CCGT plants 
incorporating 100MW gas turbine units could achieve combined thermal efficiencies of 
48%. He also suggested that environmental concerns would increasingly favour, gas 
turbines in power generation, arguing that "where environmental restrictions and energy 
conservation measures are ever more stringently applied, the development of gas/steam 
combined cycles will inevitably progress". 249 
Tellingly, the most positive view of the prospects of gas turbines for power generation at 
the conference was offered by an overseas speaker, T. E. Thoren of the Swedish 
equipment manufacturer, Stal-Laval. 250 Thoren described "second generation" 100MW 
gas turbines, developed by Stal Laval and others in Europe and the USA, which 
employed advanced cooling techniques derived from turbojet engines. He pointed to the 
much greater efficiencies these enabled, compared to steam turbine plant: "combined 
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Mech. E. Conference Publications 1976-I, London, 4-5th February, 1976, pp65-74: 70 
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cycle plants are now offered on the market with net plant efficiencies in excess of 47%, 
and 50% is probably within future reach, A modern steam station seldom achieves more 
than 40% net efficiency". 251 Unlike other speakers at the conference, Thoren also argued 
that gas turbine plant economics were "surprisingly insensitive" to fuel price increases. 
Thoren then considered in turn the use of gas turbines for peak, intermediate, and base- 
load power generation. He argued that existing 'open-cycle' gas turbine units were already 
cost-effective for peak load use - where fuel cost was of little importance, and that 
existing CCGT plant was cost-competitive for intermediate ('mid-merit') use. Only for 
base-load use, he argued, were gas turbine fuel costs prohibitively expensive. 252 Thoren 
concluded that the development of the gas turbine was such that it was now set to gain far 
greater use in electricity generation: 
Fifteen years ago gas turbines were fairly expensive, rather unreliable 
power sources, most often put on standby or reserve duty. Over the years 
we have observed or participated in the evolution of the gas turbine, 
turning it into a reliable, relatively inexpensive, highly economical type of 
plant ... 
No immediate obstacles seem to slow down gas turbine 
development while steam turbine technology is fairly mature and benefits 
little from increased cycle temperatures or pressures ... Gas turbine plants 
will play a significant role in the new energy situation. 253 
Thoren's views were not widely shared, however - particularly in Britain. By the time of 
a 1979 Institute of Mechanical Engineers conference on Power from Coal, several large 
gas-fired CCGT plants were established in Europe (having a total output of over 
100MW), but in Britain opinion on CCGT technology was still dominated by fuel 
scarcity concerns for natural gas (given renewed urgency after the second oil shock of 
1978-79). The dominant view at the conference was that the contribution of CCGT 
technology to the British ESI was dependent on its adaption for coal gasification. 254 
3.5.3 The Development of CCGT Technology in the 1980s 
The seeds for gas turbine/CCGT expansion in the 1980s and 1990s were sown, in part, by 
the legislative framework for energy policy constructed in the mid- and late-1970s, in 
response to fuel scarcity concerns. In the USA a number of significant measures were 
introduced as part of the 1978 National Energy Act. In an attempt to encourage the 
251 ibid: 81 
252 ibid: 81 
253 ibid: 81 
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development of new reserves, the Natural Gas Policy Act initiated the deregulation of the 
US gas industry, by partly removing price controls on gas trading. 255 In combination with 
the Fuel Use Act, which restricted the burning of gas for power generation, the Natural 
Gas Policy Act led to greater supply and reduced demand for natural gas in the US -a 
'gas bubble' - which lasted throughout the 1980s. Another important piece of legislation 
enacted in 1978 was the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), which required 
US public utilities to buy some of their power from independent producers who used 
more efficient forms of generation256 This greatly encouraged independent producers to 
invest in small cogeneration plant using CCGTs, and by 1985,4.6 GW of CCGT plant 
had been installed in the US ESI. 257 
At the same time as the prospects for gas turbine technology were improving, the 
traditionally dominant electricity generation technologies were experiencing chronic 
difficulties. After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, US electricity utilities became 
increasingly concerned with the technical and economic risks involved with'nuclear 
power, and US regulators imposed tougher regulations on the nuclear industry, including 
restrictions on the ability of utilities to cross-subsidise nuclear plant construction from 
other revenue. 258 Regulators were also aggressively restricting coal-fired power plant 
emissions by this time. 259 
As Williams and Larson pointed out, in the early-1980s - for the first time since the 
nineteenth century - power plant construction and operation in the US became a risky 
financial undertaking. Under combined threats from uncertain demand, environmental 
restrictions, rising capital costs, and a regulatory system which increasingly favoured 
independent power producers, US utilities sought to minimise investment risks, and were 
reluctant to expose themselves to the long lead times and upfront costs of large power 
plant. Between 1974 and 1985,93 nuclear and 41 coal-fired plants were cancelled. 260 In 
such circumstances, small gas turbines - whose economics were largely scale insensitive, 
and which were capable of meeting tougher environmental and safety regulations - 
clearly presented a least-risk investment option. 
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In 1984 Witton stated that "events in the last decade have made the industrial gas turbine 
an attractive power source for. a range of industrial applications,. .. [it is] a strong 
contender for new and refitted plant of all sizes and types". 261 He went on to' report 
growing interest in gas turbines at annual conferences dealing with electricity plant, such 
as those of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). Looking ahead, 
Witton argued that before the end of the decade, the application of established 
aeroderivative technology was capable of adding significant further improvements to 
industrial gas turbine performance. He pointed out that "few of the means being studied 
for this are entirely new, although the materials technology and analytical and 
experimental support for them incorporate considerable technical advances". 262 
In the course of the 1980s, natural gas supplies increased substantially all across the 
world, and it became- clear that the scarcity of supply forecasts of the . 1970s were 
misplaced. Following the second 'oil-shock' of the late-1970s and early-1980s, new non- 
OPEC oil and gas resources were developed, and at the same time the dependency of 
Western economies on oil and gas was itself reduced. By the mid-1980s, OPEC was 
increasingly divided, and unable to restrict oil and gas production amongst its member 
states. Under reduced demand and increased supply, oil and gas prices collapsed in 1986, 
and remained at low levels for the rest of the decade and into the 1990s (see Appendix 1, 
Figure 8). 
This sustained fall in natural gas prices, together with new discoveries, transformed the 
economic prospects for gas-fired generation technology. In the light of increased 
availability, the restrictions on the use of natural gas for power generation introduced by 
the US Fuel Use Act were partially lifted in 1987.263 US electricity supply companies 
were swift to take advantage of cheaper gas and supply industry deregulation, and this, in 
turn, further encouraged the development of new gas reserves. Similar changes followed 
in Europe and elsewhere. 
A number of analysts have considered the radical change in the availability and cost of 
natural gas during the 1980s. Anne V. Roland stated that the restrictive legislation on gas 
use imposed by the US Government of the 1970s was "enacted in response to a mistaken 
belief that ... gas supplies were rapidly dwindling and needed to be preserved", and she 
concluded that "government regulation of natural gas production and use inevitably leads 
to serious market distortions ... prices determined in a free market seem to be the most 
261 John Witton, 'Gas Turbines - Present and Future', Process Engineering, August 1984, pp 18-21: 18 262 ibid: 21 
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attractive option". 264 Similarly, Peter Odell described the restrictions on the use of natural 
gas in Western Europe in the 1970s as "anti-gas expansion policies based on 
misconceived notions of the scale of the indigenous resource base"265, and stated that a 
"self-justifying limitation was imposed on the prospects for gas ... 
in a system which 
virtually eliminated a competitive approach to markets". 266 Odell also argued that 
European energy utilities gave inadequate attention to research work which sought to 
expand the market opportunities for gas, and that, in particular, "the gas industry's 
research facilities ... [were] 
little concerned with work to improve the thermal efficiency 
of gas-fuelled combined cycle power plants". 267 
I 
In an analysis of the failures of fossil fuel resource forecasts of the 1970s, Hans-Holger 
Rogner pointed to the failure of most energy models to take into account the effect of 
technical progress in the recovery and use of fossil fuels. 268 Rogner stated that "the 
omission of innovation and new, technologies explains, at least partly, the poor track 
record of conventional energy studies". 269 He added that "accounting for technical 
progress in long-term energy scenarios has a considerable impact on the future prospects 
for the West European energy system". 270 According to Rogner, technological 
improvements in gas exploration and recovery substantially increased known reserves, 
and advances in the technology of use of natural gas were now transforming its market 
prospects. In particular, he argued, given the problems facing other generation 
technologies, CCGT technology was capable of dramatically changing the position of gas 
as an electricity fuel: 
The myth of the 1970s had it that natural gas is a scarce resource, and kept in the ground, would be worth more than in the market place ... Technology ... could be the vehicle to overcome these myths, turn 
submarginal resources into economically recoverable reserves, and thus 
pave the way for natural gas to become a globally dominating fuel. 271 
By the mid-1980s, encouraged by an expanding market and cheaper fuel prices, a small 
number of major international manufacturers were spending heavily on industrial gas 
turbine development. All were developing advanced industrial gas turbine units of around 
100MW to 150MW, specifically for use in medium sized CCGT plant. The first of these 
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engines, such as General Electric's Frame 9E, and Brown Boveri's 13E turbines units, 
appeared in 1986 and 1987.272 Brown Boveri installed a prototype 13E 140MW gas 
turbine at Hemweg in Amsterdam in 1987, as an add-on to an existing 500MW steam 
turbine. 273 By August 1987 Power in Europe reported that the first-half of 1987 had seen 
the revitalisation of natural gas as an electricity fuel in Europe. 274 
3.5.4 Gas Turbine Deployment in the Nationalised ESI 
In the early-1960s, after many years of struggling to meet demand, the British ESI was 
still facing chronic capacity shortages (3.3: 1). After breakdowns in supply in the severe 
winters of 1961-62 and 1962-3, the CEGB decided to install 720MW of gas turbine plant 
capacity at ten power stations across the country. 275 This investment - based on the use 
of small aeroderivative 50MW and 70MW engines - represented the first significant use 
of gas turbine generation technology in Britain. 276 The CEGB stated that gas turbine 
plant was chosen as the only option that would be available by the winter of 1964-65, and 
also because it could also be brought up to full load very quickly. 277 
In 1963, as part of its inquiry into The Electricity Supply Industry, the Select Committee 
on Nationalised Industries investigated the CEGB's adoption of gas turbine plant. 
278 The 
CEGB Chairman Lord Hinton told the select committee that the cost of fuel meant that 
gas turbines were only economic at load factors of under 2%, and stated that the CEGB 
had been "reluctant" to invest in them. 279 The select committee obtained figures which 
showed that gas-turbines power plants cost 40% less to build than coal-fired plants, but 
that their running costs were around three times higher. The committee concluded that 
"the use of gas-turbines by the generating board must be limited by the development of 
large power stations linked to an integrated grid system". 280 Indeed, as was discussed 
272 Eric Jeffs, 'Nuclear Delays Expected to Speed Comb Cycle Growth', Gas Turbine World, July-August 1986, pp24- 
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earlier in the chapter, the CEGB's principal response to the 1960s capacity crisis was a 
massive programme of new 500MW coal-fired steam turbine sets (3.3.4). 
In the two Fuel Policy White Papers of the 1960s, gas turbine generation technology was 
mentioned only briefly - and only as a low capital, high running-cost technology, suited 
strictly for emergency and peak load use. 281 In August 1965 natural gas was -first 
discovered in the North Sea. "The 1967 White Paper referred to this as "a major event in 
the evolution of. Britain's energy supplies". 282 Before this Britain had relied for its gas on 
relatively expensive 'town-gas' produced from coal or oil, and also some limited 
importing of liquified natural gas from the Middle-East. By 1967 a national gas pipeline 
transmission system was under construction, but natural gas was still not expected to 
make a significant contribution to electricity generation. Rather, the Fuel Policy White 
Papers restated the Government's view that nuclear power would occupy a central 
position in the future development of generation technology (3.3.4). 
Nevertheless, the prospect of substantial UK gas reserves, together with the ongoing 
international development of gas turbine technology, now attracted some interest within 
the British ESI. In 1970, the then Chairman of the CEGB, Sir Stanley Brown, considered 
future generation technology options. 283 Although Brown was firmly committed to a 
dominant role for nuclear power (3.4.1), he also expressed some interest in CCGT 
technology, describing it as "currently quite promising", and a "very real possibility" for 
near-future mid-cycle plant. 284 Brown went on 
fo consider the use of a 160MW CCGT 
plant, with a 120MW steam turbine and 40MW gas turbine, such as that now offered by 
Brown Boveri285; he stated: 
The attraction of such a cycle is enhanced by the rapid evolution of gas 
turbine technology in the direction of greater unit outputs and lower 
specific fuel consumptions. The economic incentive of such a plant rests 
partly upon its comparatively low first cost which, despite high running 
costs, can render it attractive - partly on account of the possibility of 
deploying it in comparatively small sizes and therefore, perhaps, more 
closely to the load than is possible with major stations ... Overall, CCGT 
may save sufficient capital cost to make it economic at annual load factors 
of over 30 per cent at present day ... [fuel] prices. 
286 
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In the event, the 1970s oil-shocks ended any immediate prospects for the introduction 
CCGT technology in the British ESI. The price of natural gas - although it increased less 
dramatically than that of oil (Appendix 1, Figure 8) - was closely linked to the 
international oil market. - The British response to the energy crisis reflected 
the 
international consensus was that natural gas was a scarce 'premium fuel', suited only for 
particular uses, such as domestic heating and cooking. The dominant view of the British 
government and large energy producers was of the overriding importance of coal-fired 
and nuclear power generation technology (3.4.2). The 1976 Energy Act implemented the 
1975 EEC Directive restricting the use of natural gas in power stations, and the use of 
natural gas for electricity generation in Britain remained strictly in terms of small 
'peak- 
lopping' and standby plant. 
The 1976 Department of Energy survey of Energy Research and Development in the 
United Kingdom presented, for the first time, a comparative analysis of the various 
technological options for electricity generation. 287 The review, written on the basis of 
technical assessments by the AEA's Energy Technology Support Unit (3.4.2), gave by far 
its greatest consideration to nuclear power technologies. In its consideration of fossil fuel 
combustion technologies, the review conceded that "no research is being carried out at 
present ... on alternative methods" other 
than coal-fired steam turbines. 288 Gas turbines 
were not given any specific mention in the report. 
In its 1977 Energy Policy Review, the Labour Government stated that gas prices should 
be set at a level sufficiently high so as not to encourage the wasteful use of "this precious 
resource". 289 At times the review appeared to reflect a Government opinion of natural gas 
as an unwelcome threat to coal and nuclear expansion: consideration was given to the 
possibility of delaying gas pipeline construction, so as to avoid increasing the total level 
of gas supplied to Britain, which, it was argued, would "accentuate short term problems 
for coal and electricity ". 290 The review concluded that "since gas is regarded as a 
premium fuel, it is perhaps unlikely that its consumption will increase significantly". 291 
In a speech delivered in 1978, the then Chairman of the CEGB, Glyn England, reviewed 
the CEGB's fifteen years of experience of using small aeroderivative gas turbines. 292 By 
this time the CEGB had 2.2GW of gas turbine capacity installed in 148 small aeroengine 
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units, with a further 1.4GW under construction-- providing a total of 5.5% of system 
capacity. 293 Although he recognised their low capital cost, England pointed to the low 
efficiency and high running costs of gas turbines, and he stated that the CEGB had 
experienced poor reliability with their use. England recognised that "the last decade has 
seen major developments in gas turbines", but he associated the relevance of these 
developments for the CEGB solely in terms of the possible adaption of CCGT plant for 
use with coal gasification technologies -a configuration, he concluded, which was "not 
able to gain any advantage" over conventional steam turbines. Given the prohibition of 
using natural gas, England dismissed any role for CCGT plants in the CEGB system: 
Many electricity, supply utilities, in an attempt to improve the efficiency of 
the gas turbine, have installed combined cycle plant. The CEGB has not 
done so, because the combined cycle is uneconomic with the distillate fuel 
we would have to use. 294 
As well as CEGB, the British Gas Corporation was a powerful opponent to the use of gas 
for electricity generation in the 1970s, even in highly efficient combined heat and power 
plants. Having a statutory monopoly, they would only supply gas for what they 
considered appropriate applications, and to ensure this, under their supply contracts, they 
were permitted to inspect industrial premises. British Gas were known to have declined a 
number of fuel contracts for proposed industrial CHP plants in the 1970s. 295 
The 1979, Department of Energy/ETSU review of Energy Technologies for the UK 
reiterated the view that gas turbines were of only marginal importance as a future 
electricity generation technology. The review stated that above 10-15MW, gas turbines 
were more expensive than conventional steam turbines. It was also argued that, since 
"supplies of gas are likely to decline sharply, perhaps around the turn of the century or a 
little longer", gas turbine technology was of little significance for the long-term 
development of the British ESI. 296 
In the early- and mid-1980s the British ESI - and government- remained firmly 
committed to nuclear power and steam turbine technology for providing all its large-scale 
power generation, in terms of both present production, and its future investment plans. In 
the Institute of Energy 1986 review of future energy supply and generation technology 
293 Because of their low load factors (typically under 1%), gas turbine plant remained insignificant in terms of fuel 
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(3.4.5), reference was made to the "renewed interest" in combined cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) technology. 297 The report argued, however, that the thermal efficiency gains 
offered by CCGT plant could only be gained at the cost of increased capital costs. This 
conclusion was based on the extra costs involved in adapting, CCGT -plant for coal 
gasification - despite the falling cost of natural gas, the report gave no consideration to 
natural gas fuelled CCGT. plant. 298 Indeed, the report referred to natural gas as "a 
premium fuel not normally to be used in quantity for electricity generation". 299 
The Sizewell B Public Inquiry, which heard evidence for over two years in the mid- 
1980s, also gave little consideration to developments in CCGT technology - although all 
of the evidence to the inquiry was submitted before the collapse in oil and gas prices in 
1986.300 In reviewing potential new generation technologies, the inquiry chairman, Sir 
Frank Layfield, reported that the CEGB's opinion that, although CCGT plant offered 
lower construction costs, and "potentially higher" overall efficiency than a comparative 
coal-fired steam turbine plant, it remained unattractive investment because of the high 
price of gas. 301 By the time the report was published at the beginning of 1987, gas prices 
had collapsed. 
In early-1987 the Department of Energy / Energy Technology Support Unit published 
another in their occasional reviews of Energy Technologies for the UK. 302 The 1987 
review was the first under the Thatcher-led Conservative government's of the 1980s, and 
it took place in a very different political climate than its predecessors. Whereas similar 
Department of Energy / ETSU reviews of the 1970s had focused largely on the 'technical' 
potential of different forms of generation technology the new emphasis, as the 
introduction to the review stated, was on a more "market view" of technology assessment. 
By 1987 oil and natural gas prices had fallen dramatically, CCGT technology undergoing 
rapid development, and the 'cogeneration boom' in the USA was well under way (as 
discussed in 3.5.3). Nevertheless, natural gas was only briefly mentioned as a potential 
electricity fuel in the 1987 Energy Technologies for the UK. Indeed, in a consideration 
of deployable large-scale electricity generating technologies, only coal-fired technology 
was considered as an alternative to nuclear power. 
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The supporting background technical papers to the review, written by the AEA's Energy 
Technology Support Unit (ETSU), were sanguine about the pattern of UK energy 
research and development investment (3.4.5). In its detailed review of electricity 
production technologies, ETSU stated that "because of their higher fuel costs, gas 
turbines have low load factors ... The 
installed capacity ... 
is significant at just over 3GW, 
but there are no RD&D requirements for these mainly aero-engine based, low load factor 
machines". 303 ETSU made no mention of CCGT technology in its discussion of 
"electricity production" technologies, but combined cycle plant was considered in a later 
section of the report as an "electricity utilisation technology" - in terms of industrial CHP 
applications. Here, ETSU emphasised the importance of coal gasification technologies for 
the exploitation of combined cycle technology in the British ESI. It added that gas turbine 
CHP required little government support other than the sponsoring of demonstration plant: 
"CHP technologies ... are generally well-established, and 
little R&D as such is 
undertaken". 304 In considering the relative under-investment in CCGT/CHP technology 
in the Britain as compared to many other European countries and the USA, ETSU argued 
that investment had been held back by short-termism in the private sector. 
The CEGB's Annual Report for 1986/87, published in July 1987, made little mention of 
CCGT technology. 305 In its discussion of future generation technologies, the report again 
concentrated largely on coal-fired steam turbines and PWR nuclear power. CCGT 
technology was discussed solely in terms of its adaption for use with coal gasification or 
fluidised bed technologies, stating that "design studies of these options are in 
progress". 306 At a joint Electricity Council/CEGB press conference to announce their 
annual reports in August 1987, the CEGB Chairman Lord Marshall argued that the 
prospects for competition in generation after ESI privatisation would be limited by the 
price and availability of natural gas. 307 
303 Department of Energy/ Energy Technology Support Unit, Background Papers Relevant to the 1986 Appraisal of 
UK Energy Research, Development and Demonstration, ETSU R-43, London, HMSO, February 1987: B91, B93 
304 ibid: E96 
305 CEGB Annual Report and Accounts, London, CEGB, July 1987 
306 ibid: 28,31 
307 'ESI is Ripe for Privatisation', Electronics and Power, August 1987, pp486-487 
126 
3.6 Summary and Review 
3.6.1 Generation Technology and the Development of the ESI 
The early development of British ESI - and the early technical form of electricity 
generation - whilst it was made possible by scientific advance, appears to have been 
shaped primarily by local political interests, enshrined in restrictive legislation. Small- 
scale DC electricity generation technology fitted well into the British tradition of locally- 
provided public services. As both Hennessey and Self and Watson argued, however, it 
was the interaction of the industry's early regulatory and organisational framework, with 
techno-economic changes in generation and transmission, that created problems for the 
early British ESI (3.2.1). 11 
At the beginning of the twentieth century a dominant technological form for electricity 
supply emerged, based on coal-fired steam turbine generation and high-voltage AC 
transmission. The most economically efficient use of these technologies involved large 
turbine units serving large interconnected supply areas, and, in this way, they rendered 
archaic much of the early regulatory and organisational framework of the industry. 
Before 1914, however, the expansion of, the technological infrastructure of electricity 
generation was frustrated by outdated and restrictive legislation. Both Hannah and Landes 
described the relative backwardness of the early British ESI in terms of a failure to 
develop a "technocratic tradition" (3.2.1). 
The First World War made the case for reorganisation of the ESI a priority for national 
government. Hughes described the effect of the war as breaking a "conservative crust" 
that had hitherto frustrated the rationalisation of the industry (3.2.2). In Britain, however, 
reform was hesitant and ineffective until the mid-1920s. The Weir Report argued that the 
provision of cheap, abundant, electricity would only be possible with the concentration of 
generation on a small number of large steam turbine stations (3.2.2). The 1926 Electricity 
Act introduced the national management of the British ESI under the Central Electricity 
Board, - and also initiated the construction of the national transmission grid. After 1926, 
municipal authority influence on the, industry waned, and generation and transmission 
technology advanced rapidly in efficiency and scale. A 'virtuous circle'- of falling 
production costs and growing market demand meant that electricity diffused through the 
economy. At the same time, under predominantly Conservative Government, the private 
ownership of generation plant was preserved. 
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The national grid embodied in technical form the case for centralisation and 
rationalisation of the industry, and it greatly accelerated the wider adoption of advanced 
generation techniques. As Hughes pointed out, in a conducive political and regulatory 
context, the ESI during the interwar period could be said to have developed in accordance 
with the techno-economic potential of generation and transmission technology (3.2.2). 
Hughes also characterised the changes in this period in terms of the building-up of vested 
interests, growing momentum, and the co-evolution of institutional and technical forms 
(3.2.2). Coal-fired steam turbines were the only significant form of electricity generation 
technology at this time. Within this, technological developments involved the 
introduction of progressively larger turbine units, and higher steam temperature and 
pressure. Considerable improvements in the thermal efficiency of plants was achieved. 
Postwar nationalisation of the ESI in 1947 was underpinned by a belief - within both the 
Labour Government and the industry itself - that centralised control under public 
ownership was the most appropriate organisational form for realising the potential of 
large-scale generation and transmission technologies. Herbert Morrison referred to ESI 
nationalisation as an act of "commonsense" (3.3.1). As Hannah identified, it was also a 
fulfilment of the technocratic tendencies that had built-up in the industry by this time. 
However, the public ownership of generation plant never commanded universal support, 
and nationalisation was opposed in parliament by Conservative MPs, who - echoing the 
views of the 1925 Weir Report - called for the retention of competition in generation 
(3.3.1). 
For many years after nationalisation, the choice of generation technology type and size 
was determined largely by the pressing concern of government and the BEA simply to 
meet demand under chronic plant capacity and fuel supply shortages. In the mid-1950s 
these concerns prompted politically-led diversification into oil-fired steam turbine and 
nuclear power technology (3.3.1; 3.3.2). Both nuclear and oil-fired plant were a more 
expensive form of generation than coal-fired plant at the time they were introduced, and 
both were forced on a reluctant BEA by government. 
The structural changes to the ESI introduced in the mid-1950s were a response to the 
continuing postwar capacity crisis, and the perceived technological backwardness of the 
BEA. Beyond this, however, debate on the most appropriate organisational structure of 
the industry was dominated by the perceived need to accommodate a large programme of 
nuclear power. Parliamentary debate on the proposed reforms to the ESI in 1956-57 took 
place in the midst of the Suez Crisis, and was overshadowed by fuel supply security fears, 
and a concomitant desire to build the industry around the nuclear programme (3.3.3). 
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In such a context, the CEGB was created precisely so as to give a technological lead to 
the industry, and to rapidly progress the development of nuclear power - as demonstrated 
by the government's choice of, a nuclear scientist, Christopher Hinton, to head it. In 
rejecting the Herbert Committee's proposals for a powerful supervisory Central 
Authority, the government had left the CEGB largely unchecked in its ability 
implementing its preferred strategy for generation technology (3.3.3). Together with the 
Atomic Energy Authority, the CEGB provided a secure and stable organisational 
environment for the British nuclear power programme right up to the late-1980s. 
From the late-1950s until the late-1980s, the British ESI can be described as corporatist - 
in that institutional and political interests became the dominant influence on the 
development of generation technology. 308 Within this, the most powerful corporate 
bodies were the government, CEGB, NCB/NUM and the AEA. The 1963' Select 
Committee on Nationalised Industries inquiry on the ESI (3.3.4) echoed the concerns of 
the Herbert Committee concerning the absence of a "technical check" or "adequate 
professional scrutiny" regarding the CEGB's investment programmes, but in the absence 
of stringent financial controls, an emphasis on technical quality and refinement, rather 
than economic criteria such as rates of return, became dominant. 
By 1970 the 'CEGB's Chairman Stanley Brown was in a position to outline with 
confidence the nuclear power-centred future of the ESI over the next quarter-century 
(3.4.1). Brown's predictions were based on a number of technical, economic, political and 
organisational assumptions: the continuity of demand increases, 'escalating fossil fuel 
scarcity and prices, reductions in the cost of nuclear technology, and above all, continuity 
of the institutional power of the CEGB itself. In reality, the industry experienced the 
progressive breakdown of technical, economic, and political continuity after 1970. The 
oil-price shocks and the development of North Sea oil and gas meant that the economic 
environment of the ESI became much more uncertain in the 1970s. For around a decade, 
however, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the oil-shocks reinforced corporate 
decisionmaking in the industry, in a similar fashion to the reaction to the Suez crisis in 
the mid-1950s (3.4.2). 
The energy policy debate of the 1970s was conducted on essentially technocentric terms, 
and was dominated by the government's attempt to construct a long-term strategy for fuel 
and technology choice. Policy debate was dominated by discussion of competing 
308 In their analysis of the industry at this time, Jane Roberts et al. took Schmitter's definition of corporatism as a 
"system of interest group intermediation", characterised by powerful 'insider' interests. Applying this to the British ESI, 
they identified the insider groups as central government, the generating and distribution boards, the coal industry, plant 
construction industry, nuclear industry, and trades unions. (Jane Roberts, et al., Privatising Electricity: The Politics of Power, London, Bellhaven Press, 1991: 39. ) 
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technological options - notably the choice of nuclear reactor design - and technological 
expertise again commanded great authority. The technology-led response to the energy 
crisis was personified by Walter Marshall, Chief Scientist at the Department of Energy 
during these years. In the Department's 1976 Review of Energy R&D, Marshall asserted 
that there was no need to consider "non-technological factors" in the analysis. of 
competing technical forms (3.4.2). 
The Plowden Committee Report of 1976 advanced a number of technical arguments for 
the re-integration of the ESI along the lines of the 1947 Act (3.4.4). Like the Herbert 
report twenty years earlier, the Plowden report proposals were heavily conditioned by the 
committee's assumption of the central role of nuclear power in the industry's future. The 
report rejected of any splitting-up of the CEGB on the basis that "the country can no 
longer afford to try two different approaches to major strategic choices such as a new 
reactor type", and stressed the importance that "the electricity industry continues to speak 
with one voice to match the increased concentration in the nuclear design" (3.4.4). 
The 1979 General Election marked the end of the political consensus that had supported 
corporatism since 1945. Thereafter, a long unbroken period in office enabled 
Conservative government to impose its wider policies of liberalisation and privatisation 
on the ESI, although its initial efforts were cautious, and failed to overcome entrenched 
interests in the industry. Even after its statutory supply monopoly was ended by the 1983 
Energy Act, the CEGB continued to exert effective monopoly authority in electricity 
generation. At the same time, large-scale coal-fired and nuclear power generation 
technology continued to wholly dominate the British ESI (3.4.5). 
The Institute of Energy 1986 review of energy policy amounted to a manifesto for a 
return to a corporatist, technology-led, energy policy (3.4.5). The Institute was highly 
critical of the Conservative government's aim of introducing market-based 
decisionmaking into the energy industries. The presupposition of the report's authors - 
like numerous other similar reports issued in the 1970s and early-1980s - was that 
investment in electricity generation technologies should be decided by technical experts 
alone, on the basis of their superior understanding of the "complex technical and 
commercial factors" involved. 
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3.6.2 Steam Turbine Technology in the ESI before Privatisation 
Coal-fired steam turbine technology emerged as the dominant technical form for 
electricity generation around the turn of the century; it remained unchallenged as such 
throughout the twentieth century into the 1980s. Together with high voltage transmission, 
coal-fired steam turbines were able to provide low-cost electricity in bulk. By doing so, 
these technologies greatly stimulated demand and the development of new applications 
for electric power, and made possible the electrification of society in the interwar period. 
They also transformed the most economically efficient organisational and legislative 
arrangements for the ESI. 
Throughout the twentieth century up to the 1960s, sustained improvements were made in 
the performance of coal-fired steam turbine technology. Incremental developments in 
turbine materials and cooling techniques allowed for higher steam temperatures and 
pressures, and at the same time progressively larger turbine units provided for increased 
economies of scale. During the interwar period the national grid greatly encouraged the 
wider adoption of the engineering standards of the most technically advanced plants. 
After the Second World War, the immediate emphasis was on meeting demand by 
building small, technically modest plant, but from the mid-1950s onwards, the CEGB 
adopted very large turbine unit sizes. By the late-1960s, however, the rate of 
improvement in steam turbine technology was slowing down as limits on material 
performance were reached (3.4.2). 
From the late-1950s onwards the long-term technological interest of the CEGB lay with 
nuclear power, as reflected, for example, in Stanley Brown's predictions for the future 
development of the industry in 1970 (3.4.1), and the very similar forecast by John Baker 
in 1985 (3.4.5). Coal-fired steam turbine technology - although it dominated generation 
in terms of capacity installed - attracted relatively little R&D effort as compared to 
nuclear power; it was seen as a mature technology of relevance only in the short and 
medium term. Nevertheless, protected by powerful vested interests, and in the absence of 
any serious rivals, fossil fuel-fired steam turbine technology continued to dominate the 
industry in terms of electricity generated. 
During this period the ESI was used by successive governments to provide a protected 
market for the British coal industry, as the CEGB was required to use indigenous coal. 
The defeat of the NUM in the 1984/85 miner's strike resulted in the disempowerment of a 
powerful institutional support for coal-fired generation. Nevertheless, the first two 
Conservative governments of the 1980s were unwilling to impose radical change on the 
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industry, and indeed, they oversaw the signing of successive Joint Understandings 
between the CEGB and NCB, which ensured that coal-fired steam technology continued 
to dominate electricity generation up to the late-1980s (3.4.4). 
3.6.3 Nuclear Power Technology in the ESI before Privatisation 
Civil nuclear power was essentially an offspring of military nuclear technology, and as 
such, its institutional, economic, and political context was quite different from fossil-fuel 
generation technology. From its outset, the British nuclear power programme was driven 
by political interests over and above economic considerations. In announcing the first 
nuclear programme in 1955, the Government expressed its faith that "whatever the 
immediate uncertainties, nuclear energy will in time be capable of producing power 
economically" (3.3.2). Nuclear power also commanded uniquely strong institutional 
support, in the form of the Atomic Energy Authority and CEGB. From the mid-1950s, the 
development of nuclear power technology lay primarily with the AEA, a body which was 
granted from its creation, as Williams described "a rather special autonomy" (3.3.2). The 
reorganisation of the ESI in the mid-1950s was conducted largely in terms of the 
perceived needs of nuclear technology (3.3.3), and the CEGB was purposely created to be 
a pro-nuclear generator. Both the CEGB and AEA were overtly technocentric in outlook 
- their emphasis'was on the solution of technical problems over and above of any 
economic considerations. 309 
The decision to proceed with the AGR programme in the 1960s was, according to 
Williams, a consequence of the "technological momentum" that had been built up behind 
the technology by the AEA. He suggested that, by this time, the British nuclear 
programme had become institutionally committed to a reactor design conceived in British 
post-war circumstances -a design that proved impossible to make commercial (3.3.4). 
By the mid-1960s, however, previously unheard scepticism was emerging from 
backbench MPs and the CEGB regarding the cost of nuclear power. In the 1970s the 
momentum behind the nuclear programme was further eroded, as the technical problems 
involved with the AGR design, and also with the short-lived SGHWR, became 
increasingly apparent (3.4.3). Nevertheless, both the government and the industry itself 
remained convinced about the necessity of a large nuclear programme, and their attention 
was focused largely on issues such as the choice of reactor type. 
309 In their analysis of technocentrism in the British ESI at this time, Roberts et at. argued that "those holding such a 
view will tend to look kindly on nuclear power, admiring the scientific and technological achievement it embodies, 
while believing that the application of further technology will be able to ameliorate its associated problems, such as 
those of decommissioning and waste management" (Roberts et at., op cit: 103). 
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Despite their declared intention to operate a market-based energy policy, the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s, from the outset, made special exemptions for 
nuclear power. Up to the mid-1980s, the CEGB and government justified their support of 
nuclear power in part on economic grounds. ' This was evident, for example, in Nigel 
Lawson's 1982 speech (3.4.4), and also in the CEGB's evidence to the Sizewell B public 
inquiry, as summarised in John Baker's 1985 speech. Here, Baker claimed that nuclear 
power was "was by far the cheapest generating cost on the system" (3: 4.5). Whilst 
criticism of the CEGB intensified in the 1980s, in a context of continued government 
support, there was nothing to seriously challenge the CEGB's proposed programme of 
investment in 'PWRs. Elsewhere, however, nuclear power programmes were stalling 
under increasingly tough legislative demands andmore competitive economic conditions. 
The Institute of Energy argued that these problems were' a reflection, not of any inherent 
technical and economic problems associated with nuclear power technology, but rather 
political opposition and restrictive legislation (3.4.4). The Institute called for a return to 
unchallenged technocentric authority in the ESI. Their implicit assumption (shared with 
many critics of the nuclear programme) was that the British nuclear power programme 
was predicated on a technocentric government-led energy policy framework. 
In an analysis of the evolution of electricity generation technologies in the twentieth 
century, Gordon MacKerron argued that for a period of around thirty years, from the 
introduction of nuclear power in the mid-1950s, up to the mid-1980s, innovation in 
generation was driven by technology-push rather than demand-pull. 310 MacKerron 
pointed out that the introduction of nuclear power in the 1950s marked a radical change 
in type for electricity generation technology: by contrast to the primarily economic 
incentives that had driven forwards the development of coal-fired steam turbine 
technology in the interwar period, nuclear power was driven by 'technology-push'. Unlike 
fossil fuel generation technology, nuclear was complex and inflexible, and the normal 
pattern of falling costs in the course of technological development, associated with 
learning and economies of scale, were outweighed by design complexities, and 
progressively more stringent safety criteria. MacKerron also considered the breakdown of 
technology-push dominance in the 1980s (see also 3.5.3). In the course of the 1980s, he 
pointed out, many governments became increasingly keen to cut public expenditure, and 
as fossil fuel prices fell rapidly and reserves increased, long-term energy policymaking 
310 Gordon MacKerron, 'Innovation in Energy Supply: The Case of Electricity'. Unpublished draft prepared for 
inclusion in Handbook of Industrial Innovation, by M. Dodgson and R. Rothwell (eds. ), Cheltenham, Elgar, 1994. 
Assessing the relative contributions of 'demand-pull' and'technology-push' to technological change has been a 
recurring theme in technology policy studies since the 1960s. See, for example, R. Coombs, P. Saviotti, and V. Walsh, 
Economics and Technological Change , Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1987: 96-103,206-7 
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went out of fashion. R&D expenditure was reduced, and became more tightly focused on 
more incremental, less radical, technologies. 
3.6.4 Gas Turbine Technology in the ESI before Privatisation 
For most of the twentieth century, gas turbine generation technology was of little interest 
to electrical plant equipment manufacturers and electricity utilities. Early gas turbine 
engines, designed along similar lines to steam turbines, were inherently inefficient. A 
radical change in gas turbine design came about with the invention of the turbojet in the 
late-1930s (3.5.2). However, whilst turbojet designs progressed rapidly in the postwar 
period, the massive research efforts of the turbojet manufacturers were ill-suited to the 
more robust and larger-scale needs of electricity production. During these years the 
research and development efforts of the electrical manufacturers and utilities were 
concentrated - with considerable success - on improving steam turbine technology. In the 
British ESI, the interests of the CEGB and the British plant manufacturers lay firmly with 
large nuclear and coal-fired plants. Whilst the CEGB installed a number of small 
aeroderivative gas turbines for peak load and standby use in the early-1960s, as the 
CEGB Chairman Lord Hinton told the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, 
these were a "reluctant" investment, made only in response to pressing capacity shortages 
(3.5.4). For- much of the postwar period, industrial gas turbines remained an under- 
developed and marginalised technology. 
After the mid-1960s, the discovery of large reserves meant that the use of natural gas for 
electricity generation grew rapidly around the world. Whilst much of this growth 
involved the use of conventional steam turbine plant, it also included small aeroderivative 
gas turbines for peak or standby plant, and also some use of small and medium sized 
CCGT plants. Although CCGT units were under 100MW at this time, they were already 
more thermally efficient than conventional steam turbine plant - particularly in industrial 
CHP uses (3.5.2). "In the late-1960s and early-1970s the prospects for CCGT technology 
appeared reasonably good. In 1970 Wood, for example, predicted "continued demand" 
for CCGT plant, given the chronic problems facing nuclear and coal-fired generation 
technology (3.5.2). After the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in the mid-1960s, 
there is some evidence that the CEGB was considering the installation of medium-sized 
CCGT plants for mid-merit use - although CCGT technology was not expected to make a 
major impact on the dominant position of coal-fired and nuclear power plant. In 1970 the 
then Chairman of the CEGB, Sir Stanley Brown, referred to the "quite promising" 
prospects for such plant (3.5.4). 
134 
In the event, following the first oil shock, the use of natural gas for electricity generation 
became prohibited by statute, other than in exceptional circumstances. It was also 
opposed by the powerful 'corporate' bodies in the British ESI, including the CEGB and 
British Gas. Indeed, there is evidence that the development of natural gas reserves was 
actively resisted at this time, and the price of gas kept artificially high, so as to protect the 
market for coal and nuclear power (3.5.4). The Government's 1977 Energy Policy 
Review, for example, reacted with hostility to the possible expansion of natural gas 
production and supply - seeing it as a threat to the established technologies of energy 
provision. In the extensive series of reviews of energy technologies in the 1970s, gas 
turbine and CCGT plant were scarcely considered, and where they were mentioned, it 
was only in terms of small industrial CHP applications, or their possible adaption for coal 
gasification (3.5.4). Throughout this period, up to the late-1980s, gas turbine generation 
technology remained institutionally marginalised and under-developed in the British ESI. 
The mid-1970s Institution of Mechanical Engineers conference on the status and 
prospects of gas turbines reflected the prevalent view that the restrictions on natural gas 
supply meant that an alternative fuel would have to be developed before gas turbines 
could gain greater use in power generation. However, the conference also reported the 
development, by a number of American and European manufacturers, of a new 
generation of larger industrial gas turbines which incorporated advanced technical 
features originally developed for aero-engines (5.2.2). One of the engineers involved in 
the development of these engines, T. E. Thoren of Stal-Laval, argued that modern CCGT 
plant already offered the cheapest for of generation for peak and intermediate use, and 
would "play a significant role in the new energy situation" (3.5.2). 
The development of turbojet technology continued apace during the 1970s, in part in 
response to greater pressure for fuel efficiency. In his analysis of the commercial 
development of gas turbine technology, Jim Watson emphasised the importance of the 
"technological flexibility" of gas turbines - in terms of their application in both aerospace 
and industrial markets. 311 The aero-engine market for gas turbines, Watson pointed out - 
driven largely by military defence contracts - sustained its technological development 
during long periods in which the industrial market remained small. 
The commercialisation of CCGT technology in the 1980s was realised on an international 
stage in response to factors which were essentially unrelated to events in the British ESI. 
Much of the important technological developments in the early-1980s took place, 
311 Jim Watson, The Technology that Drove the Dash for Gas', Power Engineering Journal, February 1997, ppl 1- 
19: 16 
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ironically, as a response to restrictions on the use of gas imposed by the legislature of the 
late-1970s. Within a protective legislative and regulatory framework, a significant market 
developed for small-scale CCGT/CHP plant in the US in the early-1980s (3.5.3). 
In response to the increased viability of gas-fired generation after the collapse in gas 
prices in 1986, a new generation of larger industrial gas turbines were introduced. Before 
this time, the market for industrial gas turbines had been insufficient to warrant the 
adaption of established aero-engine technology for use in power generation. By the mid- 
1980s, however, the improving prospects for gas-fired generation were encouraging the 
transfer to power turbines of a number of established aero-engine techniques. After 1986 
CCGT technology became a central concern of a few major international plant 
manufacturers, and also gained the interest of a number of more deregulated and flexible 
utilities and independent power companies. Thereafter, a virtuous circle of growing 
market sales, and the expansion of dedicated research effort, provided for further rapid 
improvements in CCGT technology performance and competitiveness. 
In the British ESI, however, CCGT technology remained underdeveloped and 
institutionally marginalised in the mid-1980s. Opinion in the industry displayed a mixture 
of scepticism and ignorance. Among the vast amount of analysis and opinion submitted 
to the Public Inquiry on the Sizewell B PWR plant, there was very little attention drawn 
to gas turbine technology - although, in mitigation, this was all voiced before the 1986 
fall in gas prices, and reflected the then dominant presumption that underpinned much 
energy policymaking, that gas and oil prices would inevitably rise steadily in the future 
(3.5.4). In their 1986 review of energy technology, the Institute of Energy dismissed any 
significant role for CCGT in the British ESI on the basis that it was only feasible if 
adapted for use with coal gasification technology (3.5.4). 
In the early- and mid-1980s, when liberalisation of the British ESI was first discussed, 
CCGT was not a commercial option for electricity generation. In contemporary analyses 
of the possible impact of greater competition in the ESI, such as one by the present author 
in 1987, the possible use of CCGT technology for large generating plant was not 
considered. Rather, it was thought that the adoption of private sector financial criteria by 
the British ESI would lead to a switch in favoured generation technology from nuclear 
power to coal-fired steam turbines using imported coal: "the implications of a higher 
required rate of return ... has been highlighted by the Government's proposed privatisation 
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of the ESI ... [this] would result in a switch from nuclear-based, to imported-coal 
expansion of the electricity sector". 312 
rk, ta eII 
In their 1987 review of Energy Technologies for the UK, neither the Department of 
Energy nor the Energy Technology Support Unit made any acknowledgement of 
international developments in natural gas availability and CCGT technology. Indeed, in 
their supporting technical papers for the review, ETSU expressed their approval of a 
pattern of R&D spending overwhelmingly dominated by nuclear power technology, and 
suggested that there were "no RD&D requirements" for gas turbine plant (3.5.4). By 
classifying CCGT/CHP as an "electricity utilisation" rather than an "electricity 
production" technology, ETSU was able to rationalise the neglect of gas turbine 
technology in the British ESI within the wider context of the gross imbalance in 
investment between electricity production and use technologies - an imbalance that had 
characterised energy supply in Britain for decades. In this way, the marginalisation of 
CCGT technology in Britain could be presumed to be simply a consequence of the 
different investment conditions of public and private industries. The gulf between public 
and private sector investment criteria was to have profound consequences for the British 
ESI in the privatisation process from 1987 onwards. 
312 Mark Winskel, Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Cash-Flow Discounting: The Case of the British Energy 
Sector, unpublished M. Sc. dissertation, Imperial College of Science Technology and Medicine, University of London, October 1987: 69-70 
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CHAPTER 4: 
NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY AND ESI PRIVATISATION 
4.1 Introduction 
In reviewing the British privatisation programme of the 1980s, Dennis Swann argued that 
the Government's policies were "substantially inspired by considerations of political 
ideology". 1 As Roberts et al. pointed out, however, the actual implementation of the 
British privatisation programme was often dominated by pragmatism and expedience, 
with an "overriding objective ... to accomplish the sales quickly" .2 
In the case of the ESI, 
these ideological and pragmatic motivations were mixed together - with what proved to 
be awkward results. 
Electricity is an awkward market good. The natural monopoly in the network 
transmission and distribution infrastructure, non-storability of AC - combined with 
varying demand patterns, and the high capital cost of plant, mean that free market 
competitive forces cannot by themselves provide secure supplies, and some regulation 
and co-ordination by the state is always necessary. 
3 Although electricity generation, 
unlike transmission and supply, is not generally considered to be a natural monopoly, 
there are considerable technical and economic constraints on its trade. Non-storability 
means that supply and demand must balance at all times, even though demand varies 
diurnally and annually, sometimes unpredictably. In addition, generation plant is capital 
intensive, requires long lead-times, and cannot be switched on and off immediately. In 
economic terms: "there is no market price mechanism by which demand can match 
supply on operational timescales. "4. Vickers and Yarrow express this as a basic mismatch 
between technical and economic imperatives: "fully decentralised market transactions 
cannot meet the technological need for continuous market equilibrium". 5 As was 
described in Chapter 3, the history of the British ESI throughout the twentieth century up 
into the 1980s is one of progressive centralisation of control, at least in-part in response 
1 Dennis Swann, The Retreat of the State: Deregulation and Privatisation in the UK and the US, Memel Hempstead, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988: 316 
2 Jane Roberts, et al., Privatising Electricity: The Politics of Power, London, Belihaven Press, 1991: 26. They went on 
to suggest that the objectives of privatisation were: to free industry from the financial constraints of the public sector, 
financing the PSBR, promoting popular capitalism, and improving productive and allocative efficiency (ibid: 24-26) 
3J Vickers and G Yarrow, The British Electricity Experiment', Economic Policy, Vol. 6, pp187.232,1991: 190 
4 Imperial College evidence to the Energy Select Committee, HC 307,1987-88, Vol II: 313 
5 Vickers and Yarrow, op cit: 190 
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to these technical imperatives. The construction of a competitive market in electricity was 
therefore to some extent an attempt by a, government ideologically committed to 
economic liberalisation to impose its policy wishes in the face of technical constraints. 
The focus of this chapter is the interaction of nuclear power generation technology with 
the British ESI privatisation process. At the same time, some consideration is given to 
more general aspects of privatisation, particularly the Government's measures to 
restructure the industry so as to introduce greater competition in generation. The chapter 
is divided into four main sections: Section 4.2 reviews the early debate on ESI 
privatisation and the Government's 1988 White Paper proposals; Section 4.3 reviews the 
passage of the Electricity Bill from 1988 to 1991; Section 4.3 considers the changes 
affecting nuclear power in the period after 1991; Section 4.5 offers a consideration of the 
interaction of the privatisation process with nuclear power technology research and 
development (R&D), particularly the fast reactor research programme. Finally, Section 
4.6 provides a summary of the chapter, and a more analytical reflection of the issues 
raised. 
4.2 Nuclear Power Technology and the ESI Privatisation Process 
4.2.1 Policy Formulation 
In June 1987 the Conservative Party was returned for a third successive term, with twin 
commitments to privatise the ESI, and secure the future of nuclear power. 6 Those utilities 
already privatised, notably British Telecom and British Gas, had been sold off as 
unreconstructed neo-monopolies, and were attracting substantial criticism by this time for 
their perceived profiteering.? There was considerable pressure on the Government to 
introduce competition from the outset in the case of electricity supply privatisation. 
In July 1987 the new Energy Secretary, Cecil Parkinson, stated in Parliament that the 
Government "recognise the need to introduce competition into the electricity supply 
industry", and he indicated that he was prepared to undertake radical restructuring of the 
industry. 8 Such restructuring would be essentially unprecedented; Power in Europe 
pointed out that "there is very little competition within the electricity supply industry 
anywhere in the world ... In Europe the municipal origins of the industry remain very 
6 In its 1987 General Election manifesto, the Government stated that it remained committed to "developing abundant low-cost supplies of nuclear electricity" (The Next Moves Foward, London, Conservative Party, May 1987). 
7 British Gas was referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1987. 
8 HC Debates, Vol. 119,1987-88, c689 
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influential on present day practices". 9 In November 1987 Parkinson told Parliament that 
"a monolithic [ESI] without competition would be a handicap to the country ..., I believe 
that there is plenty of scope for competition in generation, and we are working on 
proposals that will produce more competition". 10 
In 1987'the CEGB remained exclusively committed to nuclear power and coal-fired 
steam turbine technology for large generation plant. In January 1987 Sir Frank Layfield's 
report on the Sizewell B public inquiry recommended approval of the CEGB's planning 
application, on the basis that the PWR reactor was "likely to be the least cost choice for 
generation plant". 11 The Government granted planning approval for the plant in March. 
Shortly later the CEGB submitted an application for a second PWR, Hinkley Point C, and 
stated that other sites were under investigation for further similar plants. A CEGB 
pamphlet published in August 1987 declared that "almost the whole requirement for new 
capacity in the period up to the end of the century will have to be met by some 
combination of PWR and new coal-fired plant ... The PWR, new coal-fired plant and the 
AGR represent the main options for meeting capacity shortfalls in the next decade or 
so", 12 
The joint CEGB/Electricity Council memorandum to the Energy Select Committee's 
inquiry on ESI privatisation, submitted in early-1988, expressed confidence about the 
CEGB's proposed investment in coal-fired and nuclear plant; the memo stated that "there 
are developments in PWR and fast reactor technology, and in clean efficient coal burning 
systems, which should enhance the advantages of large plant ... economies of scale that 
can be achieved by large plant remain significant and valuable". 13 Under questioning by 
the Energy Committee in February 1988, the CEGB Chairman, Lord Marshall, remained 
confident about the prospects for nuclear power after privatisation; he told the Committee 
that "the benefits of nuclear power will survive that change". 14 He added that, in his view, 
nuclear power stations should be run by private companies after privatisation, without 
any subsidy from government. 
Between the 1987 General Election and the publication of the Government's White Paper 
proposals for privatisation, a wide range of opinion was aired on the future structure of 
9 Power in Europe, No. 11, August 20th 1987 
10 HC Debates, Vol. 121,1987-88, c634 
I1 Department of Energy, Sizewell B Public Inquiries, (Sir Frank Layfield), London, HMSO, January 1987 
12 Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, London, EEE 
Ltd, 1994: 36-37; the document referred to is Meeting Demand: Options for Future Generating Policy, London, CEGB, 
August 1987. 
13 House of Commons Energy Committee, The Structure, Regulation, and Economic Consequences of Electricity 
Supply in the Private Sector, HC 307,1987-88, Vol 11.3 
14 ibid, Vol III: 11 
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the ESI. In general, established interests in the industry argued for little change to its 
structure, whilst independent companies and analysts called for substantial restructuring. 
For many observers it was in generation in particular - which made up around three- 
quarters of the final cost of electricity - that the greatest potential benefits of competition 
were to be found. Proponents of liberalisation focused on two particular changes: firstly, 
the splitting-up of the CEGB into a number of competing generators, and secondly, the 
separation of ownership of the transmission grid from the generation plant. 
In a paper published in March 1987, Alex Henney, an independent analyst of the 
industry, and a former member of the London Electricity Board, argued that restructuring 
of the ESI ahead of flotation was essential. 15 Henney suggested that the fossil-fuel 
generating plants of the CEGB and SSEB should be distributed between ten competing 
generating companies. 16 He also stated that in order to give the privatised distribution 
companies greater bargaining power with the generators, and become a "countervailing 
force", the grid should be transferred to their mutual ownership. 17 A number of other 
analysts offered similar proposals for the liberalisation and restructuring of the industry 
ahead of privatisation. Andrew Holmes et al. warned that without any breaking-up of the 
CEGB, there would be no changes to the established pattern of generation technology: 
A privatised ESI based on an 'all-in-one' sale will do nothing to make the 
ESI more commercially minded, or to force it to open up to new 
technologies like combined heat and power/district heating or combined 
cycle generation, both of which technologies it views with disdain. A 
national electricity company will ... almost certainly push ahead with 
centrally conceived capacity plans based on large power stations. 18 
On the other side of the debate, a number of individuals and organisations argued against 
any major changes to the industry, and questioned the benefits of any proposed 
restructuring. John Lyons, president of the Electricity Supply Trades Union Council 
(ESTUC), argued that ESI privatisation offered "only disadvantages, compared with the 
arrangements which have served us up to now", and added that "a vital and successful 
industry is being privatised for purely political reasons". 19 Lyons claimed that the 
15 Alex Henney, Privatise Power: Restructuring The Electricity Supply Industry, Policy Study No. 83 London, Centre 
for Policy Studies, March 1987. Henney claimed that under the CEGB the choice of generation technology was dictated 
"not by commercial considerations but by the political interplay of vested interests" (ibid: 7). 
16 ibid: 9 
17 ibid: 9 
18 Andrew Holmes, John Chesshire, and Steve Thomas, Power on the Market: Strategies for Privatising the UK 
Electricity Industry, London, FT Business Information, 1987: 7. Similar views were also expressed by Allen Sykes and 
Colin Robinson, in Current Choices: Good and Bad Ways to Privatise Electricity, Policy Study No. 87, Centre for 
Policy Studies, London, October 1987; 
19 'John Lyons' CEGB Entity Arguments Dismissed', Electrical Review, Vol. 220, No. 22,16th-29th September 1987, 
p9-11; see also John Lyons, 'Privatising Electricity Supply Cannot Be Justified', Energy Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp149- 
154, April 1989. In 1987-88 Lyons submitted similar arguments to the Department of Energy and also the Energy 
Select Committee. 
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integrated ownership of generation and transmission was essential to enable the most 
efficient use of the nation's generation plant in a 'merit order'. He added that in a 
competitive structure for electricity generation, without any guaranteed market for new 
power plant, there was a threat of future capacity shortages: "the most serious impact of 
breaking up the CEGB will be felt when it comes to the construction of new stations ... 
capital is not forthcoming in circumstances of insufficient certainty". 20 
The most powerful opponent of any radical restructuring of the industry was the CEGB, 
particularly its Chairman, Lord Marshall. Marshall had been reappointed CEGB 
Chairman for a second five year term in 1987. From mid-1987 onwards, a series of (often 
leaked) reports emerged from the CEGB, arguing that any restructuring of the ESI would 
threaten the technical and economic benefits offered by the present integration of 
generation and transmission. These views, closely associated with Lord Marshall himself, 
were voiced in parliament by Labour's Energy Spokesman, John Prescott. In November 
1987 Prescott quoted Marshall's view, taken from a leaked CEGB document, that 
"breaking up the integrated power system [would] result in the loss of the benefit of 
economy of scale, seriously prejudice the security of supply, and increase prices". 21 
In evidence to the Energy Select Committee in February 1988, just days ahead of the 
publication of the White Paper, Marshall argued that the CEGB should be sold off in its 
present structure, and he gave a number of technical and economic reasons for opposing 
both the splitting-up of the CEGB, and the separation of ownership of transmission from 
generation. He told the Committee that "because electricity is not storable, and the grid 
does not operate as a simple pipeline, then transmission and generation should be 
integrated". 22 He also claimed that the British grid had been designed from the outset to 
integrate supply on a national basis, and was therefore ill-suited to a system of regional 
generators, as was found, for example, in West Germany: "the generating company needs 
to be integrated in the UK because that is the way the grid developed ... 
in other countries 
regional ownership led to regional grid structures". 23 Marshall also argued that the 
running of power plants in an efficient merit order was dependent on integrated national 
ownership of generation, and suggested that disintegration carried a threat to security of 
supply. In an attempt to lend authority to his views, Marshall repeatedly referred to the 
inside-knowledge of the CEGB, telling the Select Committee, for example, that "those 
who run the grid know most". 24 
20'John Lyons' CEGB Entity Arguments Dismissed', op cit: 9 
21 HC Debates, Vol. 121,1987-88, c637 
22 HC 307,1987-88, op cit, Vol III: 9 
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The CEGB and ESTUC case against ESI restructuring was challenged by other expert 
opinion. Robert Peddie, for example, a former CEGB member, stated that there were no 
technical problems with splitting-up generation and transmission, and he added that 
"continuity of technical expertise does not depend on continuity of ownership". 25 In 
September 1987, Electrical Review published a point-by-point rejection of John Lyons' 
technical and economic arguments against restructuring of the industry, by an anonymous 
group of electrical engineers and investment analysts. 26 The Electricity Council - which 
had been in the shadow of the CEGB ever since its creation in 1957 - was also known to 
be in favour of ESI liberalisation. In early evidence to the Energy Select Committee, Sir 
Philip Jones, Chairman of the Electricity Council, stated that "it is essential that the 
privatised industry be market-driven, and not technology-driven". 27 
The technical arguments over the future structure of the industry were repeatedly raised 
in parliament. In December 1987 John Prescott echoed Lord Marshall's claims that there 
were technical reasons why transmission and generation should not be separated. In 
response, Cecil Parkinson stated that whilst this was the CEGB's view, "there is a strong 
body of opinion that argues that transmission should be separated from generation if one 
is to encourage competition in generation". 28 In a later parliamentary question on the 
same issue, Tam Dalyell suggested that the breaking-up of the CEGB risked the security 
of power supply, and he asked "why do the Government think they know better than Lord 
Marshall? " Parkinson replied that "the Government think they know better than Lord 
Marshall because, although he is a learned a powerful figure in the industry, he is only 
one voice. There are many other people in the industry who know just as much ... as 
he 
does and who do not agree with him". 29 
4.2.2 The White Paper Proposals 
In February 1988 the Government published its proposals for the restructuring of the ESI 
ahead of privatisation in twin White Papers - one for England and Wales, and one for 
Scotland. 30 The White Paper for England and Wales began by making a number of 
25 Robert Peddie, 'Who Should Own the Grid? ', Electrical Review, Vol. 220, No. 21,2-15 September 1987, ppl6-17: 17 26'John Lyons' CEGB Entity Arguments Dismissed', Electrical Review, Vol. 220, No. 22,16-29 September 1987, p9-11 27 HC 307,1987-88, op cit, Vol 11: 19 
28 HC Debates, Vol. 124.1987-88, c762 
29 HC Debates, Vol. 133,1987-88, c3,9th May 1988 
30 Department of Energy, Privatising Electricity: The Government's Proposals for the Privatisation of the Electricity 
Supply Industry in England and Wales, Cmnd 322, February 1988; Industry Department for Scotland, Privatisation of 
the Scottish Electricity Industry, Cmnd 327, February 1988 
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critical references to the existing structure of the industry. It stated that this gave the 
CEGB "too much influence in power station investment decisions", and added that there 
was correspondingly "too little say to the Area Boards whose customers have to meet the 
costs". 31 It asserted that "there is no reason why there should not be competing power 
stations, supplying the Area Boards through the grid, and the Government believes it is 
not in the interests of customers to be supplied by a monopoly producer". 32 
The Government's proposals had the following main features: 
- The generation assets of the CEGB were to be divided between two 
privatised generating companies (known later as National Power and 
PowerGen), with respectively 70% and 30% of the Board's generation 
assets.. The larger company was to contain all the CEGB's nuclear plant. 
The privatised generators were not to be placed under any statutory 
obligation to supply. 
- The 12 Area Distribution Boards of England and Wales were to be 
privatised as independent distribution and supply companies (known later 
as Regional Electricity Companies, or RECs). These were to be allowed 
limited rights to generate, up to a capacity limit (set later at around 15% of 
total demand within their franchise area), in order to prevent them 
becoming vertically-integrated regional monopolies. 33 
- Ownership of the national transmission grid was to be transferred from 
the CEGB to a newly-created transmission company (known later as the 
National Grid Company), which was to be jointly-owned by the twelve 
RECs. Electricity trading through the grid was to take place on a more 
transparent contractual basis, so as to facilitate access to the grid and 
distribution lines for independent generators. 
- The RECs were to be required to contract for a specified minimum 
proportion of their electricity supply from non-fossil fuel sources, mainly 
nuclear power (this became known as the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, or 
NFFO). 
- The two Scottish electricity boards were to be privatised, without 
substantial restructuring, as two independent vertically-integrated 
generation and supply companies, known later as Scottish Power and 
Scottish Hydro-Electric. The Scottish nuclear assets were to be jointly- 
owned by Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric, under a new 
holding company. 34 
-A Director General of Electricity Supply was to be appointed. The 
Director General was to have statutory responsibilities for the regulation 
31 Cmnd 322,1988, op cit: 4 
32 ibid: 4 
33 It was later decided that there was to be a progressive loss of REC local monopoly within their area supply 
franchises. For the largest electricity users (annual consumption above 1MW), this would apply from April 1990; for 
medium users (1MW to 100kW p. a. ) from April 1994; for small users and the domestic market (under 100KW p. a. ) 
from April 1998. (The decision to liberalise supply in this way was announced on the 29th September 1989. ) 
34 This less radical plan for Scotland reflected chronic over-capacity in the Scottish ESI, and the high proportion of 
overall capacity made up by nuclear power plant (over 50%). Given the Government's desire to secure the future of 
nuclear power, this meant that there was little scope for competition and new entry in generation in Scotland. 
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of electricity supply, the promotion of competition, and for ensuring fair 
access to the transmission grid and distribution lines. (The ESI regulatory 
body was later given the title of the Office of Electricity Regulation, or 
OFFER. ). 
The White Paper stated that "the Government's proposals will end the effective monopoly 
in generation and give more influence to the distribution companies and their 
customers". 35 The Government made clear that they were "determined to remove barriers 
to full and effective competition", and they claimed that under the new arrangements for 
the industry, "the distribution companies will have a very strong incentive to contract 
with the most efficient generating companies. Real competition in generation will 
develop". 36 The -Government anticipated significant changes in generation after 
privatisation: "the prospect is for a more diverse and competitive electricity industry, with 
new types of power station, better equipped to meet the demands of customers". 37 It 
concluded that "decisions about investment in power stations will be driven by the 
distribution companies and so will reflect the needs of customers". 38 In presenting the 
White Paper to Parliament, Parkinson reiterated his view that there was "substantial room 
for competition in the electricity industry" 39 
The White Paper' proposals were recognised as a radical break with established 
organisational and regulatory practices, both in the British ESI and elsewhere. The key 
features of the proposals were, firstly, the breaking-up of the CEGB, and secondly, the 
loss of generator ownership of the grid. In announcing these measures, the Government 
had rejected the CEGB's technical and economic case against restructuring of the 
industry. Henney stated that after the White Paper was published, "the CEGB was in a 
trauma of disbelief and shock that it was about to be broken up, and confusion as it was 
reorganised" 40 In parliamentary debate on the White Paper, Parkinson himself stated that 
he "did not expect the CEGB to welcome the reorganisation". 41 The transfer of the grid to 
the RECs represented a significant change in the balance of power in the ESI, as Sir 
Philip Jones made clear in evidence to the Energy Select Committee shortly after the 
White Paper was published; Jones stated that the proposals "transferred power from the 
production side to the retailing side. That is a long overdue and desired structure for the 
35 Cmnd 322,1988, op cit: 2-3 
36 ibid: 14,10 
37 ibid: 11 
38 ibid: 16 
39 HC Debates, Vol. 128,1987-88, c456 
40 Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, op cit: 73 41 1; C Debates, Vol. 129,1987-88, c54 
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industry ... the distribution 
PLCs have the incentive to go out and get the cheapest source 
of electricity" 42 
4.2.3 Provisions for Nuclear Power 
From the time ESI privatisation was first suggested, it was widely recognised that 
selling-off the nuclear power stations - with their poor reliability record, and uncertain 
waste treatment and decommissioning costs - would present particular difficulties. It was 
also clear that the high capital cost of nuclear power technology meant that the 
progression of the CEGB's proposed PWR series would be very difficult in a privatised 
ESI. A number of independent analysts had argued early on that the British nuclear plants 
were not commercially viable, and should be withheld from privatisation. In May 1987 
Andrew Holmes, the editor of Power Europe (later known as Power in Europe), argued 
that in the particular circumstances of the British ESI, nuclear power was unsaleable, and 
he concluded that "the only possible route is to leave the nuclear industry, at least in its 
present operations, in state hands" 43 Similarly, in a paper published in March 1987, 
Henney concluded that nuclear power "might well have to remain in public ownership for 
the present", and that in particular, the age of the oldest (Magnox) stations made them 
"clearly unsaleable". 44 
Other analysts argued that although nuclear power technology was privatisable, the 
protective measures needed to secure its sale would effectively stifle any possible benefits 
of privatisation. Colin Robinson and Allen Sykes argued that if it was not to be 
sufficiently opened up to competition, the entire ESI should remain in public hands; they 
stated that "privatisation is a necessary part of liberalisation ... but it is by no means 
sufficient" 45 In the evidence submitted to the Energy Select Committee in early-1988 
(before publication of the White Paper), a number independent analysts suggested that for 
real competition to emerge in generation after privatisation, the CEGB's generating assets 
should be divided among several competing companies. Robinson and Sykes, for 
42 HC 307,1987-88, op cit, Vol 111: 291 (The Electricity Council was left with no role under the Governments 
proposals, and was subsequently disbanded. )
43 Power Europe, No. 1,28th May 1987, p2. Very similar views were expressed by A. Holmes, J. Chesshire, and S. 
Thomas in Power on the Market: Strategies for Privatising the UK Electricity Industry, FT Business Information, 
London, 1987. Here, the authors stated that "Britain has the oldest commercial reactor stock in the world; much of it is 
simply unsaleable" (ibid: 7). 
44 Alex Henney, Privatise Power: Restructuring The Electricity Supply Industry, Policy Study No. 83 London, Centre 
for Policy Studies, March 1987: 39 
45 HC 307,1987-88, op cit, Vol. 11: 230 
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example, called for "five or six" generators 46 Similarly, Robert Peddie suggested a five 
company structure. 47 , ,. 
In his memorandum to the Committee, Dieter Helm, of the London Business School and 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, argued that the future of nuclear power in a privatised ESI 
could only be secured by direct Government intervention: 
The nuclear commitment and its implementation will have a profound 
effect on the performance of the privatised ESI. Unless the Government is 
prepared to finance the nuclear investment programme directly - buying 
the security/diversity of supply in the marketplace - it will prove 
inconsistent with competition 48 
The Government itself recognised, from the outset, that selling the nuclear power plants 
would be problematic, particularly given its parallel commitment to introduce 
competition in generation. In November 1987, when questioned in Parliament about the 
difficulties of reconciling privatisation with the continuation of the nuclear power 
programme, Cecil Parkinson stated that "fitting those two commitments together is one of 
the problems on which we are working and which we are achieving success". 49 
The White Paper proposals included specific measures aimed at securing the future of 
nuclear power under private ownership, notably the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (4.2.2). 50 
The Government justified these measures on the basis of the contribution made by 
nuclear power to diversity and security of supply; the White Paper stated that "too much 
reliance on fossil fuels would increase the electricity industry's exposure to future price 
shocks of the kind witnessed in the last 15 years", and maintained that "there remains a 
vital strategic need for the significant non-fossil-fuelled contribution that can only be 
made by nuclear power" 51 
As well as necessitating the introduction of specific mechanisms for market protection, 
however, the Government's desire to secure the future of nuclear power had greatly 
shaped the chosen structure for the entire generation sector. As Parkinson told the Energy 
Committee shortly after the White Paper was published, the proposed two-generator 
structure reflected a decision by Government that the successful privatisation of nuclear 
plant required that they not make up the majority assets of any one company: 
46 ibid: 231 
47 ibid: 216 
48 ibid: 205 
49 HC Debates, Vol. 121,1987-88, c637 
50 In March 1988 Parkinson stated that the NFFO would be set at a level so as to ensure that the amount of electricity 
generated from nuclear plant would remain "fairly constant" (HC Debates, Vol. 129, c56). 
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We were advised that from a marketability point of view, if nuclear were 
too big a component of any company, it might be difficult to market it ... 
The Government has a very strong commitment to maintaining a nuclear 
programme... that commitment ... has had a very substantial 
impact on the 
chosen structure ... 
We came to the conclusion that a more diverse 
structure would cause more problems than it would create opportunities. 52 
The larger of the two generator companies, National Power, was therefore created to be 
of such size that it could contain all the CEGB's nuclear plant, whilst still having 
predominantly fossil fuel plant assets; it was also to inherit responsibility for the CEGB's 
proposed PWR plant (and the proposed coal-fired plant). National Power was widely seen 
as the privatised successor to the CEGB, and, indeed, Lord Marshall was appointed its 
Chairman Designate shortly after the publication of the White Paper.. 
Even before the publication of the' White Paper, Marshall had discussed various options 
for the structure of generating companies with members of the Energy Select Committee. 
Whilst he made clear his preference for the retention of a single integrated generation and 
transmission company, Marshall indicated he was not wholly opposed to the two 
generator option - indeed, he referred to it as his own idea. 53 In later evidence, after the 
White Paper was published, Marshall told the select committee that although it was not 
his preferred structure for the industry, the two generator structure was better than a more 
divided one, since only a very large company could properly capture the economies of 
scale offered by nuclear power. 54 
In later evidence to the Energy Committee after the White Paper was published, a number 
of independent analysts suggested that, whilst they would act to limit competition in 
generation, the Government's proposals would prove insufficient to guarantee the 
successful privatisation of nuclear power plant. Andrew Holmes, for example, made clear 
his view of the inadequacies of the Government's chosen structure: 
The provisions made in the white paper are not enough to offset the 
disadvantages to ... [National Power] as a saleable company, because 
nuclear power is always going to be risky ... The fact is that politically, in this country as in so many others, nuclear power's life hangs by a thread. It 
depends partly on the continuation of Mrs. Thatcher's Government, and I 
say that meaning Mrs. Thatcher personally, not the Conservative party, 
because her successor may not have her commitment to nuclear power ... For an investor that represents an unacceptable risk ... I feel that nuclear 
power will only survive in the public sector... The only way forward is for 
52 HC 307,1987-88, op cit, Vol 111: 72 
53 ibid: 4 
54 ibid: 272 
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the Government to back away from the idea of selling the nuclear 
industry. 55 
Dieter Helm stated that since private investors would not invest in nuclear power, to be 
successfully privatised, it would have to be "embedded" in regulations, and he added that 
"one of the problems ahead for the Government is whether or not it can actually sell the 
CEGB". 56 Alex Henney argued that the "one can sell almost anything provided the terms 
are made right by taking sufficient risks off the purchasers ... but at the end of the day it's 
not really worth doing". 57 Similarly, Allen Sykes predicted that since the Government 
would have to "ring-fence" nuclear power, there was no logic in privatising it. 58 Holmes 
concluded, prophetically, that "this is the hardest privatisation and the nuclear part is the 
hardest part to privatise ... if something has to give it has to be nuclear power". 59 
Lord Marshall was questioned by the Energy Committee after the publication of the 
White Paper about the difficulties facing nuclear power in the private sector. Despite the 
concerns of independent analysts, Marshall maintained his confidence about the prospects 
for nuclear power, stating that he saw "excellent opportunities to build the small family of 
PWRs which have always been a part of the CEGB's programme. I do not see 
privatisation as a threat to that". 60 In their final report, the select committee expressed 
"great concern" about the costs of nuclear power, and on the distortions effect of nuclear 
power on the whole ESI; it commented that "the nuclear tail seems to be wagging the ESI 
dog". 61 
4.3 The Passage of the Electricity Bill 
4.3.1 Debate on the Future of Nuclear Power 
After the publication of the White Paper, Department of Energy officials began work on 
the parliamentary bill which would specify the detailed regulatory and legislative 
framework of the ESI after privatisation. During this period there was continued 
speculation about the prospects for nuclear power. At the same time the nuclear industry 
itself continued to defended its record under nationalisation, and argued the case for its 
55 ibid. 186-7 
56 ibid: 180 
57 ibid: 188 
58 ibid 189 
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continued expansion after privatisation. In an article published in May 1988, for example, 
Professor Peter Jones, the AEA's Chief Economic Advisor, argued: 
There have been significant economic gains ... investment in civil nuclear development has fully justified itself ... The economic gains ... stem not 
only from direct reductions in electricity generating costs but also from 
reduced environmental damage, reduced costs for fossil fuels, energy 
supply security and the general stimulus to the economy ... nuclear appears to have more than paid for itself and the costs of its development, and 
there is promise of more to come. 62 
In early-November 1988 the Energy Secretary Cecil Parkinson indicated that the 
Government were encountering difficulties with the privatisation of nuclear power plants 
when he stated in Parliament that "the question of nuclear economics is extremely hard to 
settle". 63 The Electricity Bill was published later in the same month. It upheld all of the 
White Paper proposals, and - as was widely anticipated - it contained significant 
additional concessions to nuclear power, notably the imposition of a Fossil Fuel Levy. 
The levy was a charge to be imposed on all electricity bills, in order, the Government 
stated, to recoup the extra costs incurred by the RECs in meeting the Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation. 64 The Levy was a tacit recognition by Government of the extra cost of 
nuclear power as compared to fossil fuel generation. 65 The Bill also announced the 
authorisation of up to £2.5bn of Government grants and loans to National Power, for 
nuclear fuel waste management and plant decommissioning costs. 66 
During the second commons reading of the Electricity Bill in December 1988, the Energy 
Secretary Cecil Parkinson again defended the Government's commitment to nuclear 
power on diversity grounds. He stated that "the original case for nuclear power remains 
strong ... 
No major new alternatives to nuclear power have yet been discovered". 67 He 
also argued that nuclear power offered an insurance against the likelihood of increased 
fossil fuel prices, adding that "we can all be reasonably certain that ... [fossil fuel prices] 
will be a great deal higher than they are now". 68 At the same time, Parkinson made more 
explicit than before that the diversity offered by nuclear was valued by Government as a 
safeguard against the threat of the NUM and foreign oil suppliers: 
62 Professor Peter Jones, The Benefits of Nuclear Power', Atom, No. 379, May 1988, ppl2-17: 12,17 
63 HC Debates, Vol. 140,1987-88, c5 
64 Parliamentary Bills, Electricity Bill, Bill 4,1988-89,30th November 1988. (The levy is introduced in Clause 31 of 
the Bill. ) 
65 David Owen MP recognised the historic break that the introduction of the Levy represented; he stated that "[no-one] 
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We need a nuclear component in our electricity supply. Security of 
supplies demand diversity ... If we had not 
had nuclear power in 1985, Mr 
Scargill would have won ... If there had been no nuclear power 
during the 
oil price explosion, the lights would have gone out ... We believe that 
maintaining a strong nuclear industry is a vital part of diversity. 69 
Parkinson also defended the introduction of the Fossil Fuel Levy, which was criticised by 
Labour's Energy Spokesman, Tony Blair, as a "nuclear tax" 70 Parkinson claimed that 
"the consumer will pay no increased costs", as a result of the imposition of the levy, but 
rather that it would "simply identify costs which had previously remained hidden"; he 
added that the Government was "prepared to expose those figures and argue the case for 
diversity". 71 At the same time, Parkinson made a surprisingly direct attack on the CEGB's 
record in generation. He stated that "there has been insufficient pressure on costs, 
efficiency or prices" in the nationalised ESI 72 He also stated that "had Lord Marshall 
retained the obligation to supply ... the four PWRs would 
have been built and ... whatever 
the cost, the customer would have paid for them". 73 
During the same debate, other long-standing parliamentary' supporters of nuclear power, 
such as Trevor Skeet and Michael Clark, argued that the nuclear plant should be placed in 
a separate company and retained in public ownership. Clark warned that the "cost-plus" 
operational basis of the nuclear industry was incompatible with privatisation. 74 
Between January and March of 1989, the Energy Bill passed through its parliamentary 
Standing Committee stage. 75 In the course of Standing Committee scrutiny, further 
details about the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation and the Fossil, Fuel Levy emerged: 
Parkinson stated that the NFFO would be set at a level which would allow the operation 
of four PWRS76. Michael Spicer, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, stated that the 
Levy would be set at around 10% of electricity bills in its first year, in order to fund 
National Power's PWR programme?? It was also in Standing Committee that Tony Blair 
69 ibid, c674 
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exposed, in embarrassing detail, the rationale behind the NFFO and the Levy - the 
uneconomic status of nuclear power - and also drew attention to the difficulties 
associated with the Levy should nuclear prices escalate. Nevertheless, the Government 
majority on the Committee was such that the Bill passed through this stage essentially 
unchanged. 
In late-1988 and 1989 a series of leaks emerged from the CEGB's National Power 
Division which indicated that National Power was concerned about the competitive 
disadvantages they would face in the privatised ESI, as a result of their responsibilities 
for nuclear power. At the beginning of March 1989, Power in Europe published the 
details of a leaked letter from National Power's Chief Executive, John Baker, to the 
Department of Energy 78 In the letter, Baker outlined the difficulties National Power was 
having in agreeing contracts for nuclear fuel waste treatment with British Nuclear Fuels 
Limited (BNFL) - the British nuclear industry's monopoly fuel handler. Baker also 
expressed concern about the effect on the competitive position of National Power of the 
long-term financial provisions required for nuclear power station decommissioning. 
Baker was reported as stating that "National Power is being sent out into a highly 
competitive world, and any such restrictions will reduce its ability to compete against 
PowerGen and the other electricity generators". He concluded: 
The problems of nuclear power are very intractable and something will 
have to give ... We see a very real risk that ... we ... [will] run out of time trying to find a coherent nuclear package that enables the successful 
privatisation of National-Power to take place. 79 
In April 1989 a series of proposed amendments to the Electricity Bill were considered in 
the House of Commons. Amongst these was a clause by the pro-nuclear power MP 
Trevor Skeet, suggesting that the nuclear power stations be retained in public ownership. 
Skeet suggested that "the flotation of National Power could be jeopardised by the nuclear 
element unless funds and guarantees are lavished on the company to eliminate risk". 80 
In debate on Skeet's proposed clause, Tony Blair argued that "there is a contradiction 
written into the Bill between the idea of privatisation and the reality of the special ring- 
fence to be built around nuclear power"81, and claimed that under private sector 
investment criteria, nuclear power was "wildly uncompetitive" with fossil fuel power 
78 Power in Europe, No. 44,2nd March 1989, pp1-3 
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stations. 82 Several other MPs criticised the Government's provisions for nuclear power at 
this time. Alan W. Williams, for example, stated that "nuclear power is the Achilles' heel 
of the Bill ... There is the danger that National Power... may be unmarketable". 
83 
In response, the Energy Secretary Cecil Parkinson reiterated the Government's position 
that nuclear power was vital to the diversity and security of electricity supply, and 
maintained that the Government would carry through its policy commitments; he stated 
that "we were elected on a promise to privatise and a promise to maintain a nuclear 
programme. We are determined to honour both those promises". 84 At the same time, 
Parkinson also made some revealing comments about the Government's attempts to 
privatise nuclear power' plant; he stated that "for the first time, as a result of our 
proposals, the public is being told what nuclear costs are". 85 He went on to make an 
outspoken - and unprecedented - attack on the British nuclear power programme under 
nationalisation: 
[The] cost-plus basis is the basis on which the public has had to pay for 
nuclear from day one. The nuclear programme has been imposed on the 
country by successive governments ... In future, it will have to justify its 
existence ... The history of the British nuclear programme ... is littered with appallingly wrong and bad decisions ... There was a total lack of financial discipline and management. 86 
Parkinson argued that if the British ESI remained under public ownership, "CEGB policy 
... to 
build four PWRs initially, with another five by 2003 ... would have gone through". 
87 
He stated that, by contrast, privatisation would bring about a transformation in the 
rationale for investment in generation technology, and for the first time make generators 
financially accountable for their investment decisions: "in the future the generating 
companies will be able to build power stations only if they can find a customer for the 
electricity. In the past, because they had the obligation to supply, they decided on the 
technology, the site, and the size". 88 
More leaks from the CEGB/National Power - and their financial advisors, Lazard 
Brothers - followed in May and June 1989. These detailed the poor performance and 
technical problems associated with AGR nuclear plant, rising cost provisions for waste 
treatment and decommissioning, and deteriorating relations between the CEGB and 
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BNFL. Other evidence of the high cost of nuclear power was also emerging by this time. 
An Energy Select Committee inquiry on BNFL's Annual Report and Accounts revealed 
that BNFL's assessment of its nuclear plant decommissioning liabilities had risen 
elevenfold in the past year, from around £440m to over £4.6bn. 89 In June 1989 Lord 
Marshall stated that the cost of the first phase of decommissioning at Berkeley Magnox 
power station was now estimated to be £200m, rather than the £30m previously quoted by 
the CEGB. 90 The increase, Marshall made clear, arose from the inclusion of activities 
previously ignored in CEGB decommissioning cost estimates 91 
At the beginning of July 1989, Power in Europe suggested that the Treasury considered 
that the problems of privatising nuclear power could jeopardise the entire sale of the ESI, 
and reported that it was putting pressure on the Department of Energy to exempt the 
nuclear stations from privatisation 92 The report added that "opinion among UK financial 
analysts and fund managers is more or less unanimous in regarding the government's 
nuclear proposals as unworkable". 93 By the middle of July, Power in Europe was 
reporting "intense speculation" that the Treasury was increasing its pressure on the 
Department of Energy to withdraw nuclear plant from privatisation. 
4.3.2 The Withdrawal of Nuclear Plant from Privatisation 
On the 24th of July 1989, ' immediately preceding the final Commons reading of the 
Electricity Bill, Cecil Parkinson announced the withdrawal from privatisation of the 
Magnox nuclear power stations, the oldest British nuclear plant. Parkinson told the 
Commons that, because "it has recently become clear that the cost of reprocessing and 
waste treatment of spent Magnox fuel will be a great deal higher than has been charged in 
electricity prices and provided for in the accounts of the CEGB and SSEB ... It has been 
decided that both the assets and liabilities relating to Magnox stations ... should remain 
under Government control" 94 
Parkinson argued that the Magnox stations had presented special problems for 
privatisation: they were particularly fuel intensive, and therefore subject to much higher 
89 House of Commons Energy Committee, British Nuclear Fuels plc: Report and Accounts 1987-88, HC 50,1988- 
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waste management and decommissioning costs than more recent nuclear plant. In 
addition, they were nearing the end of their working lives, and he stated that it would 
have been unreasonable to expect the ESI's new private owners to pay for "cleaning up 
the costs of technology of more than thirty years ago" 95 Parkinson stressed that the 
Government could not have anticipated the difficulties faced in attempting the 
privatisation of the Magnox plants since "only when we set about the process of 
privatisation were [the] facts forced out ... Privatisation does not create the costs; 
it 
simply reveals them". 96 He maintained that the other, more modern, nuclear power 
stations would be sold off as planned: 
The AGR stations will be privatised ... we have good reason to believe that 
the AGRs will have a long and successful future in the private sector ... the 
nuclear past should stay where it is and the nuclear future should move 
into the private sector. 97 
The Labour Party Energy Spokesman, Tony Blair, suggested that since nuclear power 
had greatly shaped the Government's designs for the privatised ESI, the decision to 
withdraw the Magnox plants had removed "the entire justification for the form that 
privatisation has taken" 98 Blair added that the apparent escalation in the cost of nuclear 
power was a reflection of the changed interests of the CEGB's successor, National Power: 
"where it used to be in the interests of the electricity board to tell us that nuclear power 
was cheap, it is now, short-term at least, in its interest to tell us that it is expensive, so that 
it can get more guarantees and more subsidies from the Government" 99 The 
Conservative MP Peter Hardy suggested that even after the Magnox plants' withdrawal, 
"National Power will not be a successful flotation", and that a further concession - the 
complete withdrawal from privatisation of all nuclear power plants - would be necessary 
at a later stage. 100 Blair agreed, and suggested that this was not done simply because the 
Government recognised that such a step would have jeopardised the whole Electricity 
Bill-101 
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96 ibid: c753,759 
97 ibid: c750,752. The Magnox withdrawal statement was Parkinson's last as Energy Secretary - he was replaced 
within hours by John Wakeham as part of a Cabinet reshuffle. The Electricity Bill received Royal Assent just a few 
days later, on the 27th of July 1989. 
98 ibid: c748 
99 ibid: c771. Similarly, the analyst Andrew Holmes referred to the "political game" being played by National Power at 
this time, as it sought to secure cast-iron guarantees from government regarding nuclear power generation and plant 
construction after privatisation; Holmes described this as a "wonderful irony after all the years of propaganda about the 
cheapness and controllability of nuclear costs" (Power in Europe, No. 54,20th July 1989). 
100 HC Debates, Vol. 157,1988-89, c779 
101 ibid: c772 
155 
Even before Parkinson's statement, the suggested withdrawal of the Magnox nuclear 
plants alone was dismissed as inadequate by independent analysts. Andrew Holmes, 
editor of Power in Europe, argued that given their disastrous economic record, "the idea 
that AGRs are noticeably more attractive to private investors than Magnoxes is hard to 
take seriously". 102 Holmes added that "the exclusion of the Magnoxes has done nothing 
to solve the problems of the AGRs". 103 He concluded that it was remarkable that the 
Government had not anticipated the difficulties associated with attempting to privatise 
nuclear power plant, since "the issues ... 
have been clear enough from the outset to all but 
those who refused to see them ... 
Despite Parkinson's oblique remarks about new 
information, they are the same now as they were on Day One". 104 
Over the following months, as the detailed contractual and legislative terms of 
privatisation were developed, there was continued speculation about the position of the 
remaining nuclear plants. By mid-September, the Government was reported to be 
considering the withdrawal of AGR plants from privatisation. 105 In a speech to nuclear 
power workers in October 1989, Lord Marshall stated that National Power's accounting 
provision for the Magnox fuel cycle (waste treatment and decommissioning) had risen 
from £2.8bn to £6.8bn106 The bulk of the increase, Marshall made clear, arose from 
increases in BNFL charges for fuel handling. On the same basis, Andrew Holmes 
estimated that the total bill for Magnox and AGR station decommissioning was around 
£l5bn - around the same as the estimated total proceeds from ESI privatisation. At the 
end of October a presentation by Wakeham to the Cabinet was leaked, in which the 
Energy Secretary stated that the cost of nuclear power in the private sector was at least 
double that from coal-fired generation. 107 
On the 9th of November 1989 John Wakeham announced the withdrawal from 
privatisation of the AGR plants, and also Sizewell B PWR. Wakeham stated that despite 
its continued support for nuclear power, the Government was not prepared to meet the 
demands of the proposed operators of nuclear plant in the private sector: 
Unprecedented guarantees were being sought. I am not willing to 
underwrite the private sector in this way ... the Government have concluded that the English Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors and Sizewell B 
should remain, along with the Magnox stations, in a Government-owned 
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company. This company will inherit all the nuclear related assets ... [of] 
the CEGB. 108 
Wakeham also announced that the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation would be set at a level 
which could be satisfied without the construction of any new nuclear power stations 
beyond the completion of Sizewell B- in effect, cancelling the proposed PWR 
programme. He added that no new nuclear power stations would be sanctioned for 
construction before a review of nuclear power scheduled for 1994. His statement was 
immediately followed by a similar one by the Secretary of State for Scotland, Malcolm 
Rifkind. 109 
Wakeham explained that the decision to withdraw the remaining nuclear plants was 
forced on Government because the prospect of privatisation had revealed hitherto 
unknown costs. He stated that "the costs of nuclear power remained hidden throughout 
nationalisation, and it was only the preparations for privatisation that brought them to 
light". 110 He 
, 
also stated that the commercialisation of combined cycle gas turbine 
technology, by providing an alternative source of diversity of supply, and also an 
alternative means of, reducing pollution, had undermined the strategic importance of 
nuclear power: "there are already a number of projects based on combined-cycle gas 
turbine technology, which of course lead to lower carbon dioxide emissions". 111 
Wakeham rejected the demands from some MPs that his announcement required the 
restructuring of the generator companies ahead of flotation, stating that "we have no 
intention of changing the allocation of assets at this stage ... it would [not] be in the 
interests of the consumer or of the privatisation". 112 
4.3.3 Analysis of the Withdrawal of Nuclear Power 
More details about the events leading up to the Government's decision to withdraw 
nuclear power from privatisation emerged in evidence to the Energy Select Committee in 
December 1989.113 Here, John Wakeham explained that the "unprecedented guarantees" 
referred to in his November Commons statement were being sought by National Power, 
108 HC Debates, 1988-89, Vol. 159, cl 172 The new company was later known as Nuclear Electric. 
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in response to its own reassessment of the cost of nuclear power. Wakeham stated that the 
Government's hand had been effectively forced after receipt of a letter on the 11th of 
October from National Power, which gave - apparently for the first time -a specific price 
of nuclear electricity in the private sector. He told the Committee the price confirmed that 
nuclear power was clearly uncompetitive with fossil fuel generation: "[it] was a price 
which ... [reflected] the 
City's perception of the financial risks of going into nuclear, as a 
result of which they wanted very high rates of interest, very short payback terms, and a 
Government guarantee". 114 He argued that rather than a change in intrinsic costs, "by far 
the biggest item" in the price increases affecting nuclear power was the changed 
accounting practices associated with privatisation: "the overwhelming bulk of the 
increase ... is because a different view was taken ... of the same set of costs". 
115 As a 
result, he added, "there was no one date ... that 
[nuclear power] changed from being 
economic to uneconomic", and pointed out that "if the CEGB had gone on for another 25 
years ... the whole thing would 
have gone along happily without any great drama". 116 He 
concluded that the unattractiveness of nuclear to private investors arose from a 
combination of "engineering assessment and the accounting treatment". 117 
Wakeham also revealed that, ironically, it was National Power's plans for new PWR 
plants, inherited from the CEGB, that had prompted the reassessment of the costs of 
nuclear costs. He stated that "the cost of financing the capital building programme of 
National Power caused the financial pressures on nuclear and exposed their costs". 118 The 
Energy Committee suggested that the withdrawal of the nuclear plants meant that the 
generator companies should now be reorganised ahead of privatisation, by breaking-up 
the National Power and PowerGen duopoly into more competing companies, so as to 
increase competition in generation. Wakeham replied that this was now impossible, given 
the tight time schedule for flotation. At the same time, however, he conceded that the 
privatised structure for the ESI that was being introduced was less than optimal: "I would 
readily confess that if I were starting from scratch, I would not have decided to split the 
CEGB fossil stations into two companies". 119 
Other evidence submitted to the Energy Select Committee at this time confirmed that 
National Power's reassessment of the price of nuclear electricity was the result a change 
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from cost-plus to fixed-price contracts between the CEGB/National Power and BNFL. 
The cost-plus contractual basis that the ESI had operated on under nationalisation meant 
that any cost increases could be easily passed on from contractors to the CEGB, and, via 
the Bulk Supply Tariff, to the Area Boards, and ultimately to the electricity consumer. 
Under the Government's proposals for liberalisation, RECs would in future be given 
freedom of choice of generator company. This meant that cost increases could no longer 
be automatically passed on through the supply chain, and from 1988 onwards the various 
organisations in the industry renegotiated their dealings on the basis of fixed-price 
contracts. In order to avoid exposing themselves to risk - at a time when increasingly 
tough worldwide radiological protection standards were leading to increases in fuel waste 
management costs - BNFL had massively increased their prices for fuel handling to the 
CEGB, as they changed to fixed-price contracts. Decommissioning costs - always highly 
speculative - were also increasing in the face of more stringent standards, and also from 
early experience at Berkeley Magnox power station, the first nuclear plant to be 
decommissioned in Britain. 120 
The Government's decisions to remove nuclear power plants from the assets of National 
Power, and to cancel the proposed PWR series, presented particular difficulties for Lord 
Marshall, who had been the industry's most prominent proponent of PWR generation 
technology. In December 1989 Marshall resigned as CEGB Chairman, and Chairman 
Designate of National Power; in announcing his resignation, he was reported as stating: 
The government asked me to become chairman of National Power because 
the company was to build and operate nuclear stations. That is no longer 
the case. The new government policy means that Britain will now be 
building a single PWR, perhaps the only one of its kind. That is not a 
nuclear policy I feel able to advocate or defend. 121 
Shortly before his resignation, at the end of November 1989, Marshall gave a fuller 
reaction to the withdrawal of nuclear power from privatisation in a speech to the British 
Nuclear Energy Society. 122 Here, he argued that, in formulating its proposals for the ESI, 
the Government had made a clear choice against the long term benefits offered by nuclear 
power technology: 
The plain fact of the matter is that we are going to have a new electricity industry which is driven by short-term market considerations and fierce 
competition, and you cannot introduce new nuclear power into that 
environment, because the benefits of nuclear power, assuming we get the 
technology right, accumulate over half a century ... It is my belief that the 
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government was faced with a stark choice between the long-term benefits 
of nuclear power and the short-term benefits of privatising the industry in 
this particular form. They chose privatisation. 123 
Marshall also made critical references to a long history of political interference in the 
British nuclear power programme. He stated that "I do not like this form of electricity 
privatisation, but the broad story of nuclear power in this country is the most powerful 
argument in favour of privatisation that I have ever seen". 124 In the CEGB's last-ever 
Annual Report, published at the end of 1989, Marshall described the Government's 
decision to cancel the proposed PWR programme after Sizewell B as "a tragedy for civil 
nuclear power in the UK and a personal disappointment too large to describe". 125 
In mid-1990 the Energy Select Committee carried out a more detailed report on The Cost 
of Nuclear Power. 126 The inquiry gave the select committee the opportunity to question 
Lord Marshall about the various technical and economic reasons for the increases in 
nuclear power costs. In answering the committee's questions, Marshall repeatedly 
distinguished between Magnox and more recent nuclear technology. He claimed to have 
conceded as early as 1988 that Magnox plant (which, he pointed out, was developed 
before his time as CEGB Chairman) was more expensive than coal plant. He maintained 
that, by contrast, AGRs and PWRs remained cost-competitive, and he defended the 
CEGB's investment in these technologies. Marshall again argued that the withdrawal of 
the AGR plants from privatisation, and the cancellation of the PWR programme, was a 
reflection, not of the economic failure of nuclear technology, but of weaknesses in the 
Government's privatisation proposals: 
The competitive structure that the Government has set up favours gas 
turbines, small plant, and disfavours nuclear power and coal plant ... The institutional structure that we are going to have in the future makes it 
extremely difficult indeed for any generator to build any large plant ... I believe that when the Government chose this structure for the electricity 
industry ... they were creating an 
institutional structure which would make 
it impossible to pursue new nuclear power. 127 
Marshall now claimed to have recognised the threat presented by the Government's 
proposals soon after publication of the White Paper. In particular, he stated that he 
recognised that the ending of the generator's obligation to supply "might well lead to the 
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end of new nuclear power in this country". 128 He added that if the Government had 
chosen to maintain the generator's obligation to supply after privatisation, the PWR 
programme could have progressed successfully, alongside investment in combined cycle 
gas turbine plants. 
In the course of its inquiry, the Energy Select Committee uncovered further details of 
National Power's dramatic reassessment of the cost of nuclear power in 1989. In evidence 
submitted to the Hinkley Point C public inquiry in 1989, the CEGB's National Power 
Division had estimated the unit cost of electricity from the proposed PWR plant to be 
3p/kWh. By stark contrast, in its letter to the Department of Energy in October 1989, 
National Power estimated the cost of power from a PWR in a privatised ESI to be 
6.2p/kWh. 129 Under questioning by the Energy Select Committee, the Chief Executive of 
National Power, John Baker, "stated that this doubling of cost arose from the different 
investment criteria under public and private ownership. Unlike Lord Marshall, Baker 
added that he did not see any institutional arrangements for the privatised ESI under 
which nuclear plant could compete on cost grounds with combined cycle gas turbine 
technology: 
If the question is, whether there was any way in which the PWR could 
have been made price competitive with contemporary combined cycle gas 
turbine plant, then the answer is no in all circumstances. That would ... 
also be true for large coal-fired plant in my judgement. 130 
The Energy Committee also questioned senior Department of Energy officials over their 
failure to anticipate the very different financial conditions between public and private 
ownership. John Guinness, Deputy Secretary at the Department of Energy's Atomic 
Energy Division, argued that assessing the cost of nuclear power in a privatised ESI 
presented a Catch-22 problem, in that the institutional and regulatory framework of the 
industry had to be in place before a detailed assessment of the cost of nuclear could be 
made. Guinness stated that "it was only by going out and having discussions with all their 
advisors that I think National Power came up with their particular proposals". 131 Like 
Wakeham, Guinness referred to the importance of the commercialisation of gas turbine 
technology - in offering an alternative form of supply diversity - in the withdrawal of 
nuclear plant. 132 
128 ibid 
129 ibid: 9 
130 ibid: 11 The independent analyst Gordon MacKerron, of Sussex University, told the Committee that even wind 
power was now marginally more economic than nuclear (ibid: 127). 
131 ibid: 38 
132 ibid: 38 
161 
The Committee also heard evidence from representatives of investment advisors involved 
in ESI privatisation, who were also widely thought to be implicated in the Government's 
embarrassing policy reversal. Kleinwort Benson, the Department of Energy's investment 
analysts, claimed that they had consistently stuck by their initial advice to Government 
made in 1987, that there was no inherent reason why nuclear could not be privatised. 
David Clementi of Kleinwort Benson told the Committee that "we believe that our advice 
was generally accepted by the Government that it was possible to float the companies". 133 
He argued that this required that the cost of nuclear power be "quantifiable ... sustainable 
... and supportable". 
134 Ultimately, Clementi argued, the withdrawal decision was a 
matter of political choice - the Government had chosen not to "pay the price" for 
privatising nuclear, by their refusal to meet National Power's demands for market 
guarantees. 135 Referring to Lord Marshall's comments that nuclear power could have 
prospered under privatised ownership with a continued generator obligation to supply, 
Clementi argued that what was really necessary to maintain the nuclear programme - and 
what the CEGB/National Power were in reality requesting - was the continuation of a 
monopoly in generation, so that costs could continue to be passed on. 136 
By contrast, Alexander Johnston and Duncan Clegg, of Lazard Brothers, the investment 
advisors to CEGB/National Power, told the Committee that their advice had always been 
that privatising nuclear plant would be very problematic, due to the "unlimited liabilities 
arising from spent fuel management, from decommissioning, and from fuel disposal"; 
they added that "most of the risks were unquantifiable in our view". 137 Clearly, whilst the 
Department of Energy had been receiving assurances from Kleinwort Benson that nuclear 
power technology was privatisable, Lazard Brothers' advice to National Power had 
instead stressed the financial risks involved. 
As part of their investigations of nuclear power costs and risks, the Energy Committee 
also sought independent financial advice from UBS Phillips and Drew. In their 
submission to the Committee, UBS emphasised the huge differences in accounting 
practices between the CEGB and private companies. They pointed out that as late as 
1989, in evidence to the Hinkley Point C public enquiry, the CEGB was using a 5% 
discount rate, whilst, in the same year, they adopted a 10% rate in submissions to the 
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Department of Energy. UBS suggested that, realistically, a rate of around 17-24% was 
needed to properly reflect the financial risks involved in nuclear power. 138 Another 
accounting difference they highlighted was in the amortisation period, or asset life, of 
generating plant. The CEGB adopted a 40 year amortisation period for all power stations 
in their accounts -'the designated working life of CEGB plant. By contrast, private 
investors used periods of, at most, half of this. National Power only came to adopt a 20 
year amortisation period as part of their preparations for privatisation. Under questioning 
by the select committee, Dr J. Wilson, of UBS Phillips and Drew, argued that "the whole 
ethos of the CEGB was to build bigger and better stations, they were supporting the coal 
industry and providing a diversity of supply essentially". 139 Wilson concluded that the 
CEGB was unable to come to terms with the radical change in financial environment that 
was being brought about by ESI liberalisation and privatisation; he stated that they "never 
adopted an approach that was as rigorous as the City demanded". 140 
In reviewing the highly embarrassing withdrawal of nuclear plants from privatisation, a 
number of analysts have considered why the Government had not foreseen earlier the 
scale of the difficulties involved with their proposals. Both Henney and Roberts et al. 
suggested that the Government was keen to transfer the nuclear power programme to 
private ownership because of the vast capital expenditure required to meet a looming 
capacity shortage-141 Roberts et al. added, however, that this was insufficient on its own 
to explain why the Government invested so much "political capital" in pursuit of an 
ultimately lost cause. 142 They argued that this required reference to two additional factors 
- the powerful vested interests associated with the British nuclear industry, and also the 
"technocentric world view" exhibited by Government, and especially by Margaret 
Thatcher herself. They stated that whilst all Prime Ministers in the postwar period could 
be described as technocentric in their support for nuclear power, it was a particularly 
strong character trait of Mrs Thatcher: 
The first Prime Minister to be a trained scientist, her belief in the 
beneficence of the onward march of science was as great as her belief in 
the virtues of the free market. The attempted privatisation of the nuclear 
power stations was to expose the potential for conflict between these two 
creeds ... [However] the Prime Minister's dual commitments, to financial liberalisation and to nuclear power were so firmly held by her that ... their mutual incompatibility was not acknowledged. 143 
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Similarly, Henney suggested that "for Mrs Thatcher support for nuclear power almost 
became a tenet of being 'one of us'. She regarded ... [it] as a means of combating the 
industrial power of the miners, and a technology of the future". 144 If anything, Lord 
Marshall's personal support of nuclear power technology exceeded Mrs Thatcher's; 
Henney stated that Marshall was "obsessed with building PWRs", which he saw as the 
answer to the chronic technical difficulties of the British nuclear power programme. 145 
The ESI privatisation process proceeded relatively smoothly after 1989. In February 1990 
John Wakeham issued regulatory licences for electricity generation, transmission and 
supply. '46 The licences specified a price control formula for electricity suppliers, and set 
the Fossil Fuel Levy at 10.6% in its first year. National Power, Powergen, The National 
Grid Company, and the Regional Electricity Companies were vested at the end of March 
1990. Despite further uncertainty associated with Margaret Thatcher's resignation in 
November 1990, and the Gulf War in early-1991, the RECs were floated in December 
1990, and National Power and Powergen at the end of March 1991. 
4.4 Nuclear Power Technology after ESI Privatisation 
After their withdrawal from privatisation in 1989, the British nuclear power plant were 
placed in a protected economic and organisational environment. In England and Wales, 
the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation provided Nuclear Electric a guaranteed market until 1998, 
and the fossil fuel levy provided it with an income of over £lbn p. a. - equivalent to a 
subsidy of around 3p/kWh subsidy for nuclear power. 147 The Scottish Nuclear Energy 
Agreement, which extends to 2005, allows Scottish Nuclear to sell all its output to 
Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro Electric on a take-or-pay basis. '48 
Holmes pointed out that, given that a future Government or Prime Minister might not share her views (the Labour Party 
was still committed to renationalisation of the ESI at this time), this was not a basis for the successful flotation of 
nuclear power (4.2.3). 
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From 1990 onwards Nuclear Electric's electricity output rose steadily. The availability of 
the AGR power stations improved dramatically, as outages at existing AGR plants were 
greatly reduced, and the more recent AGR plant (Heysham II and Torness) proved more 
reliable than their predecessors. At the same time, Nuclear Electric (NE) adopted much 
more commercial management and accounting practices than the CEGB, and the 
company underwent substantial rationalisation. By the mid-1990s, staffing levels at NE 
were less than half of those at the company's creation in 1989. At the same time, those 
areas which were the cause of greatest difficulty during the preparations for the 
privatisation of National Power - notably fuel waste processing and plant 
decommissioning costs - were given far more engineering and financial scrutiny than 
hitherto. Fixed-price contracts were established with BNFL, and the closure of three of 
the oldest Magnox stations enabled NE to gain fuller experience of the decommissioning 
process. 
At the same time as these technical and economic gains were being made, the political 
context of the British nuclear industry remained highly uncertain, pending the 
Government review announced by John Wakeham in 1989, and scheduled for 1994 
(4.3.2). In May 1994, Tim Eggar, Minister of State for Energy at the Department of Trade 
and Industry, announced the terms of the Nuclear Review. Eggar also invited the industry 
to make the commercial case for new nuclear power plant. 
Nuclear Electric published its submission to the Minister in June 1994. Here, NE called 
for the division of its assets into two companies, one of which - holding all the 
'privatisable' risks and liabilities - should be sold off. NE also argued the case for the 
resumption of the PWR plant series, through the construction of a new station, Sizewell 
0.149 In their submission to the review, Scottish Nuclear also asked to be privatised, in 
order to have "the same freedom" as the privatised generators. Scottish Nuclear was also 
anticipating the construction of a new nuclear plant, Hunterston C. 
In the run-up to the review, Nuclear Electric, Scottish Nuclear, the AEA, and the nuclear 
industry's lobbying groups such as the British Nuclear Industry Forum, attempted to re- 
establish the reputation of nuclear power in Britain, and argued the case for new nuclear 
plant. This campaign was reflected in industry journals, such as the AEA's Atom, and also 
in a sustained advertising in the national press. 150 In an article published in April 1995, 
Dr Robert Hawley, Chief Executive of Nuclear Electric, argued that "in just four years 
Nuclear Electric has improved beyond all belief ... The nuclear assets of the nation have 
149 Roger Dettmer, 'A New Deal for Nuclear? ', IEE Review, September 1994, pp213-216 
150 See, for example, Catriona Lyons, 'Pushing for Privatisation, Atom, No. 435, August/September 1994, ppl4-15, and Nuclear Electric's advertisement'Nuclear Electric Racing Ahead', published widely in mid-1994. 
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never worked as well as they do today". 151 Hawley estimated that, as a result of improved 
engineering knowledge economic management, Nuclear Electric decommissioning costs 
were now as low as £2.7bn. 152 He went on to argue, on strategic and environmental 
grounds, that the Government "implement a definite future for the industry", by 
subsidising the construction of a new PWR series. 153 He concluded that "the time has 
never been better for firm and determined Government action ... to recognise the vital and 
strategic role that nuclear power needs to play in the future UK energy scene". 154 
The outcome of the Government's review was eventually published in May 1995.155 The 
report confirmed that the performance of the nuclear industry had improved dramatically 
since 1989 - output from all of Nuclear Electric's nuclear stations had increased from 
36.9TWh to 54.1TWh, and their market share in England and Wales now stood at a 
record high of 28% of all electricity produced (see Appendix 1). 156 The review attributed 
this transformation to a combination of technical and economic factors. Firstly, the 
reliability and performance of the AGR power stations in particular had greatly improved 
in the 1990s - total output from Nuclear Electric's AGRs had risen by more than 50%, 
and from 1989/90 to 1994/95 unit costs had almost halved, from 5.2p/kWh to 2.7p/kWh 
(according Nuclear Electric figures). Secondly, Sizewell B PWR had been completed on 
time and to the budget agreed to in 1991, and was commissioned in September 1995.157 
Finally, the waste processing and decommissioning costs of nuclear power generation 
could be estimated with considerably more certainty than in 1989, and recent experience 
in Britain (at the three Magnox stations already closed) and overseas indicated that the 
early stages of nuclear plant decommissioning were less expensive than had previously 
been thought. 158 
Given the transformation of the nuclear industry since 1989, the review announced the 
Government's intention to privatise, together in a single company, the seven AGR nuclear 
power stations belonging to Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear, and also Sizewell 
PWR. 159 (The new company was known later as British Energy). The flotation was 
151 Dr Robert Hawley, The Nuclear Review', Power Engineering Journal, April 1995, pp 61-68: 62-68 
152 ibid: 63 In 1993 the National Audit Office had estimated the total decommissioning cost of British nuclear plant to 
be around £18bn. (The Cost of Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, HC 692,1992-93) 
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155 Department of Trade and Industry, The Prospects for Nuclear Power: Conclusions of the Government's Nuclear 
Review, Cmnd 2860,1995 
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157 ibid: 14 According to Nuclear Electric, Sizewell B would provide electricity at a lifetime cost of 2.9p/kWh, when 
calculated using a 8% discount rate over 40 years; this rose to 3.7p/kWh with the use of a 15% discount rate (ibid: 14). 
158 The total cost of decommissioning British Energy's nuclear plants was now estimated to be £8.5bn (ibid: 13). 
159 The Government justified this structure for privatisation in evidence to the Trade and Industry Committee's 1995 
inquiry on Aspects of the ESI (HC 481,1994-95). The DTI stated that they had been advised that a unified company 
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scheduled to take place in mid-1996. The Government accepted that the six Magnox 
stations still operating remained unsaleable, and they were therefore to remain in public 
ownership under a new company, known later as Magnox Electric. British Energy was to 
inherit the power contract between Nuclear Electric and the RECs established after 1989, 
that ran to March 1998. The Government also announced that a'segregated fund' was to 
be set-up, in order to meet British Energy's decommissioning costs. The fund was to be 
made up from contributions by British Energy from their revenue on sales. 
The review also announced its intention that the nuclear part of the NFFO and Fossil Fuel 
Levy would end with privatisation. (Renewable energy technologies were to continue to 
be subsidised under a greatly reduced NFFO until 1998). The Government argued that 
they could find "no convincing arguments" in favour of extending the NFFO or the Levy 
beyond the flotation of British Energy in 1996.160 However, although it was prepared to 
grant Nuclear Electric's wish to be privatised, the Government stated that it was not 
prepared to subsidise the construction of new nuclear plant, which it argued was a 
commercial matter for private generators. 
In Parliamentary debate on the review and the planned flotation of British Energy, whilst 
some MPs complained about the privileged position enjoyed by Nuclear Electric since 
1989 - especially as compared to British Coal - there was general agreement that the 
nuclear power industry had greatly improved its technical and commercial 
performance. 161 
At the end of 1995, British Energy announced that it would not be proceeding with the 
early construction of any new PWR plants. BE later claimed that this decision was taken 
on commercial grounds because of the uncertainty in long-term electricity prices, and 
also because the Nuclear Review had "made it abundantly clear" that no Government 
funds would be provided for the construction of new nuclear plant. 162 It was widely 
believed, however, that this decision was forced on British Energy, because - in an echo 
of events in 1989 - the prospect of new nuclear plant construction was discouraging 
private investor interest in nuclear power. The Financial Times reported at the time that, 
despite the improvements made by Nuclear Electric/British Energy, nuclear power 
Electricity Regulation, and a number of independent ESI analysts, argued that the UK's nuclear assets should be divided 
between two similarly-sized companies, in order to introduce more competition into generation. 
160 ibid: 64. Indeed, under EU competition rules, the Levy and the NFFO were only permitted as temporary 
"transitional relief'. The Government later announced that the nuclear levy was to continue, in reduced form, until 
1998, in order, it was stated, to recover Nuclear Electric arrears from previous unclaimed levy payments. 
161 See'Nuclear Review Debate', HC Debates Vol. 259,1994-95, c 563-578,9th May 1995, and'Debate on Nuclear 
Power Industry Privatisation', HCD Vol. 260,1994-95, c 394-444,17th May 1995. 
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generation remained far more expensive than that using fossil fuel. 163 BE's decision was 
reported as marking the death-knell of the British nuclear power programme. 164 
In February 1996, a few months before the proposed flotation of British Energy, the 
Trade and Industry Committee published the results of its own inquiry into Nuclear 
Privatisation. 165 In their memorandum to the Committee, the Government's financial 
advisors on the privatisation, Barclays de Zoete Wedd, stated that "the overall 
performance of the nuclear generators is now much better", and added that "investors are 
also generally more familiar with the ... sector". 
166 Under questioning by the committee, 
Dr Lynda Rose of Barclays de Zoete Wedd confirmed that: 
A number of things have changed [since 1989] ... all the stations are 
performing better ... and that 
is really a 'great change to the management of 
the company. The other major change is ... the [establishment of the] 
electricity market ... which we were all struggling to come to terms with in 
1990.167 
Nevertheless, the select committee also found that the prospects for new nuclear plant 
remained very poor. In his evidence to the committee, John Reynolds, of independent 
advisors James Capel and Co. told the Committee that in the absence of incentives, such 
as would be provided by a 'Carbon Tax', "it is not commercially viable to build new 
nuclear stations in the UK at this time". 168 Reynolds added that nuclear industry waste 
management costs still presented a considerable risk to private investors. In its report 
conclusions, the Trade and Industry Committee stated that, whilst it agreed with the 
Government that nuclear power plant decommissioning costs appeared to be lower than 
earlier estimates, British Energy's liabilities were still very uncertain. On an undiscounted 
basis, they were estimated to be £14.6bn. 169 In his evidence to the committee, however, 
Dr John Robb, Chairman Designate of British Energy, pointed out that even after 
privatisation, the Government would remain the ultimate guarantor for much of BE's risks 
and liabilities. 170 
163 David Lascelles, 'Plug Pulled on More Nuclear Power', Financial Times, 12th December 1995, p9 
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In the event, British Energy was successfully floated in mid-1996, but there remained no 
prospect of any new nuclear plant being developed in the British ESI. 
4.5 Fast Reactor Generation Technology and ESI Privatisation 
4.5.1 The Fast Reactor Programme in the Nationalised ESI 
The great technical advantage of fast reactors over conventional (thermal) nuclear 
reactors is their ability to 'breed' fuel - that is, to produce more secondary plutonium fuel 
than the primary plutonium they consume. The primary motivation behind the initial 
development of fast breeder technology in Britain and elsewhere was perceived 
worldwide uranium shortages in the late-1940s and early-1950s. A secondary advantage 
of fast reactors, in the context of the British ESI, was their ability to use the waste 
plutonium produced by Magnox reactors for their primary fuel 171 
As Margaret Gowing described - even more than was the case for conventional nuclear 
technology - the emphasis in the early fast reactor research programme was on technical 
rather than economic criteria: 
The only point on which there was general agreement ... [was] on the 
ultimate and overriding importance of breeder reactors ... Enthusiasm for the fast reactor in the early days derived from its inherent scientific 
promise, and from the shortage of proved reserves of uranium ... There 
was as yet no point in working out any costs, however provisional, 
because it was not certain whether such a reactor could be successfully 
built-172 
Christopher Hinton, who was later to become inaugural CEGB chairman, was closely 
involved in the initial work on fast reactors. According to Gowing, Hinton's concern for 
the adequacy of uranium supplies led him to the opinion that fast breeder research should 
have first priority in the British nuclear power programme. 173 
In a personal interview conducted in 1994, Alistair Cruickshank, Special Projects 
Manager at the AEA, reflected on the rationale behind the development of fast reactor 
technology in Britain: 
171 Roger Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Politics 1953-1978, London, Croom Helm, 1980: 43 
172 Margaret Gowing, assisted by Loma Arnold, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945- 
52: Volume 2, Policy Execution, London, Macmillan, 1974: 266-267 
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The economic projections for the mid-1950s, and for a long period after, 
into the 1970s ... projected an almost exponential increase in demand for 
electricity, coupled with a demise in the availability of oil, coal and 
uranium, coincident with a vast increase in uranium prices ... The 
motivation, therefore, for fast reactors, was to use the 98.3 per cent of 
uranium which is not really available for fuel in thermal reactors, giving us 
a guaranteed power supply for thousands of years. 174 
The established view of the British nuclear industry was that, after a transitionary period 
of twenty-five to thirty years - during which conventional reactors would provide 
Britain's nuclear electricity - the long term future of nuclear power lay with fast reactor 
technology. Gowing stated that "fast breeder reactors were, from the outset, the main goal 
of the nuclear power programme". 175 
After some debate within the AEA, Dounreay airfield on the remote northern coast of 
Scotland was chosen as the main site for Britain's fast reactor development. The AEA 
began construction of a small experimental reactor, the Dounreay Fast Reactor (DFR) in 
1955.176 The DFR started operation in 1959. It soon encountered problems common to all 
fast reactors, associated with the very high energy density at the reactor core, requiring 
the use of 'primary' and 'secondary' liquid sodium coolant circuits (see Appendix 2, 
Figure 4). As a reactor coolant, liquid sodium becomes irradiated, and as it reacts 
volatilely with air and water, numerous special engineering provisions are required to 
ensure it remains isolated. The added engineering demands of fast reactors mean that they 
are inevitably a more expensive way of generating electricity than conventional nuclear 
reactors. Although this was quickly appreciated by those closely involved in the British 
fast reactor programme, research into the technology was sustained by the belief that 
massive worldwide escalation of nuclear power would deplete uranium reserves and 
increase prices, so that power from fast reactors would eventually become cheaper than 
that from thermal reactors. 
In his 1970 look-ahead to The Next 25 Years in the Electricity Supply Industry, the CEGB 
Chairman, Sir Stanley Brown stated that "the general consensus of world opinion, from 
which we do not dissent, is ... that the fast breeder reactor will take over ... The ability of 
the fast reactor to build more fissile material than it consumes is likely to be a very 
important factor of fuel economy in the longer term". 177 Brown went on to discuss the 
174 Personal interview, Dounreay, 17th March 1994 
175 Gowing, op cit: 270 
176 Williams, op cit: 43 
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"probable evolution of the fast reactor as a commercial ' proposition for use in the 
1980s". 178 
In 1966 the Labour government under Harold Wilson approved construction of a 250MW 
Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR) at Dounreay, as an "essential intermediate step" towards a 
1000MW commercial station by 1978.179 The Dounreay PFR plant was the dominant 
electricity generation technology research project in the British ESI from the mid-1960s 
up to the late-1980s. It began operating in 1974, in the midst of the energy crisis, during 
which energy policy was dominated by renewed fears of fuel supply shortages in the 
wake of the first oil shock (see 3.4.2) Within this climate, a massive expansion of nuclear 
power was thought necessary, so that fresh impetus was given to fast reactor development 
in the UK and elsewhere. 180 The 1976 ETSU survey of Energy Research and 
Development in the United Kingdom report stated that "world supplies of reasonably 
priced uranium could well be seriously restricted before 1990", and stated as a result, "the 
fast reactor needs to be proved ... within the next 
decade". 181 
From the late-1960s the AEA had urged the government to progress with the construction 
of a commercial fast reactor plant, and developed plans for a 1250MW Commercial 
Demonstration Fast Reactor. The House of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology reported in favour of the construction of a commercial fast reactor in 
1976.182 
Over the next decade, however, the economic and political context of fast reactor 
development changed profoundly. The prospect of uranium shortages disappeared, as 
known reserves increased with further exploration, and at the same time, conventional 
nuclear power programmes failed to expand on anything like the scale anticipated. 
Alistair Cruickshank described the changed circumstances affecting the fast reactor 
programme over these years: 
From the mid-1970s onwards, the economic projections were beginning to 
look a bit sick, what was projected to happen wasn't happening. The time 
when fast reactors would be required was moving backwards all the time 
.. Every single one of ... [the] projections was proved wrong ... The demand increases just haven't happened ... [and] uranium scarcity was not 
nearly as much as was thought ... The price of uranium rather than going 
178 ibid: 17 
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up, is now in real terms around one-fortieth of the price when Dounreay 
[PFR] was projected. 183 ,Lr. 
Nevertheless, political support for the British, nuclear power programme remained 
unbroken under the Thatcher Governments of the 1980s (3.4.5), and debate over whether 
or not to proceed with a commercial fast reactor also continued. In 1980, for example, 
Sweet suggested that "because such large resources have been committed to the fast 
breeder over the last 25 years, there must be a presumption that the decision will be in 
favour of proceeding". 184 The Energy Select Committee reviewed the fast reactor 
programme in 1984.185 It reported that £2.4bn (at 1982/83 prices) had been spent on fast 
reactor research since 1955, at an annual rate, since 1963, of around £100m, but added 
that despite this, there was no immediate prospect of a commercial fast reactor. The then 
Chairman of the AEA told the Committee that another 25 or 30 years of development 
work, and another £1.3bn, would be needed before commercialisation. In the same year 
the UK entered a collaborative agreement with France and West Germany to build three 
commercial fast reactors. 186 
In their background technical papers to the Department of Energy's 1986 Appraisal of UK 
Energy Research, Development and Demonstration, the AEA's Energy Technology 
Support Unit (ETSU) concluded that "the fast reactor has the potential to become the 
major supplier of electricity in the UK by 2020-2030". 187 ETSU anticipated that the first 
commercial fast reactor plants would be commissioned in the first decade of the next 
century, with "series orders" from 2011 onwards. The cost of development of the first 
plant was estimated by ETSU to be around £lbn. In the mid-1980s, expenditure on fast 
reactor research, development, and demonstration continued at around £100m p. a. Whilst 
it recognised that estimated returns varied over a wide range, according to certain 
technical and economic assumptions, ETSU described this level of investment as 
"timely". 188 
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4.5.2 ESI Privatisation and the Fast Reactor Programme 
Amongst the wealth of evidence submitted to the Energy Select Committee in late-1987 
and early-1988 as part of its inquiry into ESI privatisation, there was little detailed 
discussion of the future of the fast reactor programme. Under questioning by the select 
committee, the Chairman of the Electricity Council, Sir Philip Jones, defended the 
dominance of the fast reactor technology in industry research spending on generation 
technology, on the basis that "it is important on a national basis to keep abreast of fast- 
breeder technology ... in other areas you can keep abreast or 
do the development for 
smaller amounts of money". 189 
It was clear, however, that the Government's determination to introduce competition into 
generation after ESI privatisation (4.2.1), would present difficulties for continuation of 
the fast reactor programme. In his evidence to the Energy Committee in February 1988, a 
few days before the publication of the White Paper on ESI privatisation, the CEGB 
Chairman Lord Marshall stated that "a privatised CEGB without the obligation to supply 
would have no interest in fast reactors". 190 In later evidence to the committee he added 
that privatisation presented "difficulties with longer term research". 191 
Despite Marshall's concern, the Government would offer no pledges of their continued 
support for R&D programmes after privatisation - including that of the fast reactor. In 
March 1988, Michael Spicer, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy, in reply 
to a written question in the Commons, stated that "after privatisation, it will be a matter 
for the industry to decide how much it should spend on thefast reactor". 192 In May 1988 
a review of the fast reactor programme by the Cabinet Office's Advisory Council on 
Science and Technology suggested that the fast reactor programme - as a technological 
rather than a scientific project - should be financed entirely by the ESI, rather than by 
government-193 
In July 1988, the Department of Energy announced that it would cease funding the 
Dounreay PFR plant after 1994, and that fast reactor funding would be reduced to a 
189 House of Commons Energy Committee, The Structure, Regulation, and Economic Consequences of Electricity 
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"core" programme of £lOm p. a., to be concentrated on the development, in collaboration 
with France and West Germany, of a commercial size European Fast Reactor (EFR). 194 
In March 1989, Power in Europe reported that the fast reactor was suffering "death by 
market forces", and added that "whilst public opposition can make things very difficult 
for a technology, rejection in the market place ... can be a much more deadly weapon". 
195 
The Government's decision to withdraw funding for the Dounreay Prototype Fast Reactor 
was investigated by the Energy Select Committee in mid-1990.196 The committee heard 
contrasting opinion over the Government's decision - within the ESI, it was referred to as 
an "unwise reduction in the UK's participation in a promising technology", whilst 
opponents argued that even the continued funding of the EFR project was a waste of 
public money. 197 The independent energy analyst Walter Patterson -a well-known critic 
of the British nuclear industry - referred to the "appalling costs" of the PFR, and spoke of 
the "obsessive pursuit of the fast reactor in the UK over the past 30 years". 198 
In its memorandum to the committee, National Power argued that the difficulties facing 
the development of fast reactor technology were a consequence of the Government's 
removal of the generator's statutory obligation to supply: 
CEGB ... support 
for [the] development of Fast Reactor technology ... 
has 
been driven by strategic considerations of fuel diversity and the long-term 
economics of electricity generation, flowing from the CEGB's statutory 
duties ... The successors to the 
CEGB no longer have the obligation to 
consider, or plan for long-term diversity or security of primary sources for 
electricity generation. 199 
National Power added that they would still be prepared to join the rest of the industry in 
supporting fast reactor technology development - but only on the basis of being able to 
"pass-through" any costs incurred by doing so. 200 
In his evidence to the select committee, John Collier, Chairman of the AEA, and newly- 
appointed inaugural Chairman of Nuclear Electric, defended the nuclear industry's 
spending on fast reactor R&D as "excellent value for money". 201 Nevertheless, Collier 
conceded that the capital cost of fast reactor plant was 20% higher than conventional 
194 HC Debates, 21 July 1988, c1288 The contracts for the EFR project were signed in February 1989. 
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nuclear plant. 202 He added that, given the competitive pressures now being imposed on 
the privatised generators, "it is up to the Government ... to take the major load in terms of 
.... a 
funding programme". 203 
In its final report, the Energy Committee concluded that since there was no early prospect 
for the commercialisation of fast reactors, further substantial research investment could 
not justified, and that therefore, there was no reason to dissent from the Government's 
decision to withdraw funding for the Dounreay PFR plant: 
It is clear that because of the very long timescale involved, the newly 
privatised electricity supply industry is not likely to make a significant 
contribution until the development of fast reactors is very much more 
advanced... An extremely large rise in uranium prices would be necessary 
to make fast reactors economic with PWRs ... On the Government's own forecasts the need might not arise until 2120 [sic]. 204 
The Committee reported that since 1954, the UK had spent over £4bn on fast reactor 
research, and that even in the late-1980s, it had still accounted for over half of the 
Department of Energy's total R&D expenditure. 205 The report added that the ending of 
the main part of this programme without any clear return pointed to general deficiencies 
in public R&D investment: "the story of the UK's fast reactor programme shows the 
necessity of keeping all major R&D projects under close and continuous review". 206 
After the decision to withdraw funding for the Dounreay PFR, the European Fast Reactor 
(EFR) became the mainstay of fast reactor research in Britain. In September 1989, Tony 
Broomfield, Director, of the AEA fast reactor programme, stated that the British research 
effort was a key part of the collaborative European R&D effort in support of the EFR 
design. 207 In October 1989 the EFR project was described by two senior British nuclear 
scientists as "unchallenged as the route by which uranium can be the main contribution to 
the non renewable energy resources of the world ... The EFR project bridges the 
remaining gap in bringing the fast reactor system to commercial maturity in Europe". 208 
However, as discussed in Section 4.3 above, the attempted privatisation of conventional 
nuclear plant in 1989 revealed them to be grossly uncompetitive with fossil fuel plant in a 
privatised ESI. Given the extra costs of fast reactor generation over and above 
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conventional nuclear technology, this clearly meant that there was no foreseeable 
prospect for the commercialisation of fast reactors. In November 1992 the Government 
announced that it would cease funding R&D work in support of the EFR. The statement 
was described as "effectively putting an end to fast reactor R&D in the UK". 209 
4.5.3 The Nuclear Industry Perspective 
Interviewed in early-1994, just as the Prototype Fast Reactor plant was being closed 
down, Alistair Cruickshank, Special Projects Manager at AEA Dounreay, defended the 
record of the British fast reactor programme. Cruickshank made clear that he saw the 
PFR as a technical success confounded by changing economic and political 
circumstances: 
The operation was a success but the patient died. We proved the 
technology, we proved the materials, we developed high performance 
steam generating units, we increased the burn-up of fuel ... which is a big 
economic advantage ... we've done everything we were asked to do, 
essentially. 
Cruickshank traced the demise of the fast reactor programme to the inaccuracy of 
uranium price forecasts (as quoted in 4.5.1 above). On the basis of similar long-term 
projections, however, he maintained that fast reactors would eventually prove 
commercially viable: "at current projections it will be around 2050-2100 before it will be 
necessary, probably, due to run-down in the alternatives, and greater demand". He 
identified institutional and political errors for the demise of the PFR, and the wider 
British nuclear power programme: "we did stupid things, like insisting on a system of 
tendering for designs instead of going for series manufacture". He claimed that under 
different political circumstances, nuclear power was economically viable: 
Nuclear power pays in other countries, it depends on social things. We had 
political reasons in our country why nuclear looked worse than it was. We 
were doing things for political reasons rather than rational reasons. but I 
don't think there's any real reason why [nuclear power] can't be popular 
and cheap. 
In common with Lord Marshall (see 4.3.3 above), Cruickshank saw the ending of the fast 
reactor research programme as evidence, not of the uncompetitiveness of the technology, 
but rather of the absence of provision for long term R&D in the Government's proposals 
209 'UK government pulls out of EFR.. ', Atom, Vol. 425, p2, November/December 1992 
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for ESI privatisation, and the absence of an overall framework for energy policy. Political 
short-termism, he claimed, had resulted in the dominance of economic short-termism: 
Governments tend to take short term views geared to the next General 
Election ... they don't take a 
long term view. We've got a bad attitude 
generally to the development of science and technology - we don't spend 
nearly as much on R&D as competitor countries do ... I don't think you can leave everything to the free market, because ... [it] doesn't operate in the long term interests of the general population, but in the short and medium 
term interests of its shareholders. 
Cruickshank suggested that the Government's ideological commitment to privatisation 
was applied in an ill-considered way to the ESI. Whilst conceding that "the power 
industry was a bit over-fat and needed leaning down", he stated that "we've been 
privatising beyond logic to some extent ... It's 
become political dogma rather than 
common sense". Like other critics of privatisation, he argued that the Government should 
play a leading role in energy policy and maintaining R&D investment in the sector: 
We ... have no coherent energy policy ... [it has] to be centrally run in 
some way by Government. I can't see the private energy producers doing it 
... there's very little energy R&D going on 
in this country at the moment. 
An integrated energy policy would include fossil fuels and nuclear. You 
can't put all your eggs in one basket, or dissipate your resources too 
quickly. 
Cruickshank argued that "we should have kept our toes in the water with the European 
Fast Reactor, even if we shut down the PFR". He also stated that the thermal reactor 
programme should have been continued, in order "to meet the requirements for energy 
and keep the industry moving ... If you opt out of the technology and you need it in 50 
years time you're going to ... have to buy in the technology". Cruickshank maintained that 
"in the longer term we are going to need fast reactors ... it is essentially now a proven 
technology... The day will come when we will require the 98% of uranium that we can't 
use now ... due to run-down in the alternatives, and greater demand ... it's difficult to see 
that nuclear power will not be required, given the way we live". 
Others involved in the fast reactor programme also to defended its record, and called for 
its continued funding. Brian Eyre, the Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive of AEA, 
stated that he remained "convinced that fast reactors are essential to realising the full 
potential of nuclear power and to meeting the energy needs of the 21st century". 210 
Similarly, in a review of the fast reactor research programme in 1994, Tony Broomfield, 
the Business Director of AEA Technology, stated that "the original raison d'etre for the 
210 'UK government pulls out of EFR... ', Atom, Vol. 425, p2, November/December 1992 
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fast reactor remains ... The nuclear 
industry ... is convinced that the fast reactor 
is the 
system of the future and that the day will come when fast reactors are deployed 
commercially" . 
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4.6 Summary and Review 
4.6.1 Nuclear Power Technology and ESI Privatisation 
The ESI privatisation process from 1987 onwards brought about the radical restructuring 
of the economic and institutional context for electricity generation technology. From the 
start of the ESI privatisation process after the 1987 General Election, the Energy 
Secretary Cecil Parkinson made clear the Government's determination to liberalise as 
well as privatise the ESI (4.2.1). Parkinson also made clear early on that he was prepared 
to confront CEGB's opposition to liberalisation. In early debate on the future form of the 
industry, the CEGB and ESTUC invoked a number of supposed technical imperatives to 
defend the integration of generation and transmission and the monopoly ownership of 
generation plant. In outlining their case, the CEGB repeated many earlier arguments, 
espoused, for example, by Herbert and Plowden Committees, but with the added kudos of 
insider technical authority (4.2.1). After 1987, however, the CEGB's views were no 
longer bolstered by Government support, and a range of independent expert opinion came 
forward to challenge the Board's technical arguments (4.2.1). Parkinson also made clear 
that the opinion of the CEGB Chairman no longer carried significantly greater weight 
than other voices (4.2.1). 
The Government proposals for ESI privatisation announced in the February 1988 White 
Paper represented a radical break in established policies towards the ESI, both in the UK 
and elsewhere (4.2.2). In terms of generation technology, the key proposals for the 
liberalisation of the industry were the transfer of grid ownership to the RECs, and the 
splitting-up of the CEGB and the removal of its statutory obligation to supply. At the 
same time, the proposals for generation included a number of measures designed to 
secure the privatisation of nuclear power, and the continuity of the nuclear programme in 
the privatised ESI. The most significant of. these was the limited extent of the division of 
the CEGB, and the retention of a large generator with sufficient market control to drive 
forward the nuclear programme (4.2.3). 
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At the beginning of the ESI privatisation process, the Government and the nuclear 
industry continued to make the case for the nuclear programme on cost grounds. In their 
1987 manifesto, the Conservative party stated their commitment to develop "abundant 
low-cost supplies of nuclear electricity" (4.2.1). As late as May 1988 Professor Peter 
Jones, the AEA's Chief Economic Advisor, claimed that "investment in civil nuclear 
development has fully justified itself" (4.3.1). Whilst the 1988 White Paper expressed 
continued support for the nuclear programme, however, it made no claims for the cost- 
competitiveness of nuclear electricity, and instead defended the nuclear programme on 
diversity and security of supply grounds alone (4.2.3). In increasingly difficult 
circumstances in late-1988 and early-1989, the Government's support for nuclear power - 
and their exposition of the 'diversity case' - became more overtly politicised. During the 
second reading of the Bill in December 1988, Cecil Parkinson invoked the historic threats 
of "Mr Scargill" and "oil price explosion" in this regard. By the late-1980s, however, both 
the NUM and OPEC were institutionally weak, and largely irrelevant to the ESI's future. 
A number of analysts quickly recognised that the Government's provisions for nuclear 
power unveiled in the White Paper would not prove sufficient to secure its flotation 
(4.2.4). The proposals meant that, although nuclear electricity would enjoy a protected 
share of the electricity market (through the NFFO), there was no mechanism by which the 
extra costs of nuclear power could continue to be passed on without difficulty. The need 
for such a mechanism became apparent in 1988, resulting in the introduction of the Fossil 
Fuel Levy in the Electricity Bill in November 1988. Whilst they provided a protected 
market and continuing subsidy, however, the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation and the Levy 
also made embarrassingly transparent the extra costs of nuclear power as compared to 
fossil-fuel plant. The Levy was a powerful recognition by Government of the extra costs 
of nuclear electricity, and finally made the economic case for nuclear power untenable. 
For a brief period in mid-1988 after the publication of the White Paper, the 
CEGB/National Power remained publicly committed to its proposed PWR programme 
(4.3.1). From late-1988 onwards, however, the CEGB's National Power Division was 
expressing its concern to the Department of Energy about being ultimately financially 
accountable for nuclear power in a privatised ESI, and a series of leaked reports and 
letters emerged that suggested that nuclear power would be grossly uncompetitive in a 
privatised ESI (4.3.2). As Tony Blair pointed out, whereas for decades the CEGB's 
concern had been to promote the supposed benefits of nuclear power, it had now become 
in the institutional interests of National Power to emphasise the risks and extra costs of 
nuclear technology, in order to secure the maximum guarantees and subsidies from the 
Government (4.3.3). In John Baker, this volte-face was personified. Whilst CEGB 
Managing Director in the early- and mid-1980s, Baker was a prominent proponent of 
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nuclear power. In 1985 he stated that nuclear power "was by far the cheapest generating 
cost on the system", and claimed that the CEGB's proposed series of PWRs would 
"reduce the costs of electricity generation" (3.7.2). In 1988 and 1989, however, as the 
Chief Executive of National Power, Baker's leaked letters to the Department of Energy 
portrayed a very different picture of the economics of nuclear power. In March 1989 he 
was reported as describing National Power's responsibility for nuclear power as a 
"restriction ... [which] will reduce its ability to compete against PowerGen and the other 
electricity generators", and also that "the problems of nuclear power are very intractable" 
(4.3.2). Whilst Baker's dramatic change of mind in part reflected the radically different 
economic environment for nuclear technology in 1989 as compared to 1985, it also 
reflected the changed institutional interests of National Power as compared to the CEGB. 
The suggested withdrawal of nuclear plant from privatisation was extensively debated in 
Parliament in April 1989, but despite the warnings of MPs from all parties, the Energy 
Secretary Cecil Parkinson insisted that the Government should press ahead with nuclear 
privatisation. At the same time, Parkinson acknowledged that nuclear costs were higher 
than previously thought, and that the public had never been told the true cost of nuclear 
power. He also made scathing criticisms of the British nuclear power programme (4.3.2). 
At any earlier time such comments by an Energy Secretary would have been 
inconceivable, and their statement reflected Parkinson's growing frustration at the 
unanticipated consequences of ESI liberalisation. Parkinson's widely anticipated 
Commons announcement, in July 1989, of the withdrawal of Magnox plant was 
immediately recognised by a number of MPs and industry analysts as an inadequate half- 
way retreat (4.3.2) 
John Wakeham's announcement of the withdrawal of AGR plants from privatisation was 
again widely anticipated - although the Government's cancellation of the PWR 
programme after the completion of Sizewell B caused some surprise in the industry. The 
evidence submitted to Energy Select Committee in 1990 confirmed that the immediate 
cause of the huge nuclear power cost increases in 1989 were the switch from cost-plus to 
fixed price contracts between National Power and BNFL (4.3.3). However, Wakeham's 
(and others') distinction between the underlying cost and actual price of nuclear 
electricity was rather spurious, given that, on any terms, nuclear power had been revealed 
to be grossly uncompetitive compared to fossil fuel generation technologies. 
The cancellation of the PWR programme was made easier by the fact that, by mid-1989, 
it had become clear that gas turbine generation technology was offering an alternative 
means of supply diversity, as Wakeham indicated in his November statement on the 
withdrawal of nuclear plant (4.3.3). However, as compared to the private sector's 
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rejection of the liabilities and risks associated with nuclear power, the emergence of 
CCGT technology probably had only a marginal influence. Indeed, if the cost escalation 
of nuclear power had not risen to the extent that it was threatening the entire ESI 
privatisation process, the PWR series would probably have progressed in parallel with the 
gas turbine plant development, as Lord Marshall had suggested. Rather, the most 
significant role for CCGT technology in the withdrawal of nuclear plant was probably 
that of providing an ex-post rationale for Government. 
In evidence to the Energy Select Committee shortly after the publication of the White 
Paper, although Lord Marshall argued forcefully for the retention of a monopoly 
generator with control of the grid after privatisation, he appeared reasonably content with 
the Government's proposals. Under questioning by the Committee, Marshall stated that he 
did "not see privatisation as a threat ... [to the] ... excellent opportunities to build the small 
family of PWRs" (4.2.3). After the withdrawal of nuclear power from privatisation, 
however, he presented a rather different account of his views. In evidence to the Select 
Committee in 1990, he claimed that he had quickly recognised the threat presented by the 
Government's proposals to the PWR programme, stating that he "thought that it might 
well lead to the end of new nuclear power in this country" (4.3.3). 
4.6.2 Nuclear Power Technology after ESI Privatisation 
Following its withdrawal from privatisation, the British nuclear power industry developed 
in a quite different economic, regulatory, and organisational environment to the rest of 
the ESI. The mechanisms for market protection and subsidy of nuclear power, originally 
introduced in order to secure the privatisation of the nuclear plants, remained in force 
after their retention in public ownership, and provided a privileged framework within 
which the nuclear industry could improve its performance. Nevertheless, even the nuclear 
industry faced very different demands after 1989 compared to those within which it had 
developed in under nationalisation. Although it continued to enjoy market guarantees and 
subsidies, nuclear power was placed under much greater commercial pressures than ever 
before. The extra cost of nuclear power, which, as Wakeham conceded, had "remained 
hidden" throughout nationalisation, was now transparent - painfully so for those in the 
industry. It was also evident that the continued protection of nuclear power was only 
temporary. In effect, Nuclear Electric was placed on a probationary period pending the 
Government's Nuclear Review. The Government also made clear that the case for any 
new nuclear plant after Sizewell B would need to made essentially on economic grounds. 
181 
Given these pressures and incentives, Nuclear Electric was able to greatly improve the 
technical economic performance of the British nuclear power plants. The much greater 
availability of AGR plant achieved after 1989 was somewhat due to fortuitous timing on 
the part of Nuclear Electric. A number of AGRs finally became available for commercial 
operation in 1988 and 1989. Although wholly overshadowed by other events, the CEGB 
had reported improved performance from its nuclear plants in the late-1980s, and some of 
the technical gains would have been achieved irrespective of privatisation. At the same 
time, Nuclear Electric operated the industry on much more commercial basis than at any 
time under nationalisation (4.4). Under pressure 'by comparison' with the rest of the ESI, 
the nuclear industry was run on contractual and management terms that reflected those 
now governing the privatised generators. 
Although it was greatly disempowered and marginalised after its withdrawal from 
privatisation, the nuclear industry remained largely institutionally intact, and it retained 
some influence, as was confirmed by the re-emergence of the British nuclear industry 
lobby ahead of the Government's Nuclear Review (4.4). By 1995, assured by the much 
more commercial running of the industry, the fixed-price contracts now established for 
waste-processing, and the greater provision for decommissioning costs, the Government 
was able to propose the privatisation of the AGRs and PWR plants. However, the 
Government offered no support for the construction of new nuclear plant, and the newly- 
created British Energy was forced to drop its tentative plans for new nuclear plants before 
it was successfully sold-off in 1996. 
The successful completion of the privatisation of British Energy in 1996 was testament to 
the changed technical, economic, and organisational conditions of the British nuclear 
industry in 1996 as compared to 1989. It also confirmed the view that the withdrawal of 
nuclear power from privatisation in 1989 was a contingent rather than an inevitable event. 
Rather than revealing, in a technological (or economic) determinist fashion, the inherent 
incompatibility of private ownership and nuclear power technology, the changes to 
nuclear power during this period were an outcome of particular technical, economic, and 
institutional dynamics, steered by particular political choices on the part of the 
Government. 
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4.6.3 The Fast Reactor Programme and ESI Privatisation 
More than any other technology,, the fast reactor reflected the technocentrism of the 
powerful corporate institutions of the ESI under nationalisation. The case for fast reactor 
development was never made on economic grounds - other than highly speculative long- 
term fuel projections. Rather, the fast reactor research programme was driven from the 
outset by technical potential - and on this basis became, as Gowing stated "the main goal 
of the nuclear power programme" (4.5.1). 
As late as the mid-1980s, the fast reactor research programme was still by far the biggest 
research programme in the British ESI. In 1986 the Energy Technology Support Unit 
defended this dominance, and predicted that "the fast reactor has the potential to become 
the major supplier of electricity in the UK by 2020-2030" (4.5.2). It was also defended 
by Sir Philip Jones, Chairman of the Electricity Council, in his early evidence to the 
Energy Select Committee in 1988, on the overtly technocentric grounds that fast reactor 
technology required greater investment than other areas, in order to "keep abreast of the 
technology" (4.5.2) . 
Nevertheless, it was quickly recognised that without Government intervention, ESI 
privatisation was likely to bring about the end of the fast reactor programme. Following 
the Government's withdrawal of funding for the Dounreay PFR in July 1988, the Energy 
Select Committee's inquiry on the fast reactor reported that, even on Government 
forecasts, fast reactor technology might not become commercial for around 150 years - 
several generations beyond the investment horizons of any private investor (4.5.2). 
By the mid-1990s, the institutionalised technocentrism that had driven forwards the 
British nuclear programme, from its postwar inception up to the mid-1980s, remained 
audible only in the protests of a few disenfranchised voices, such as those of the AEA's 
Alistair Cruickshank. Cruickshank, like others involved in the fast reactor programme, 
associated the demise of the British fast reactor programme with economic and political 
short-termism, and effectively argued for a return to the government-led energy 
policymaking of the 1970s (4.5.3). However, whilst nuclear engineers still argued the 
case for nuclear technology on technical grounds, the rest of the ES! was no longer 
responsive to such arguments. In the new economic, institutional and regulatory 
framework for electricity generation, the most authoritative voices were private sector 




GAS TURBINE TECHNOLOGY AND ESI PRIVATISATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the role of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology in the 
period during and after privatisation. Although gas turbine technology had no significant 
role in the British ESI under nationalisation (3.5.4), it proved to be central to the changes 
affecting the industry during and after privatisation. As will be explored in this chapter, 
the causes of this transformation were a complex mix of interacting technical, economic, 
institutional and political forces. 
As was discussed in Section 3.5, the development of CCGT technology took place 
outside of the British ESI, in an institutional and regulatory environment quite different to 
those determining generation technology choice in Britain. Section 5.2 analyses the 
continued development of CCGT technology in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Section 
5.3 returns to the British ESI, and considers the reasons for the adoption of CCGT 
technology during and after the privatisation process. Section 5.4 presents particular 
perspectives on the adoption of CCGT technology in the Britain, based on a small 
number of personally-conducted interviews. Finally, Section 5.5 is a summary and more 
analytical consideration of the causes and effects of CCGT technology in this period. 
5.2 CCGT Technology in the late-1980s and 1990s 
The market prospects of gas turbine/CCGT technology was transformed in the 1980s 
(3.5.3) - to the extent that by 1988 Williams and Larson reported that "a revolution is 
under way in electricity generating technology. It may soon radically transform the power 
industry in both industrial and developing countries". 1 They added that this revolution 
"involves not an exotic new technology, but rather the upgrading of the familiar but little- 
used gas turbine". 2 
1 Robert H. Williams and Eric D. Larson, 'Aeroderivative Turbines for Stationary Power', Annual Review of Energy, 
Vol. 13, pp429-489,1988: 429 
2 ibid: 429 Williams and Larson claimed that, at 1986 gas prices, a modern 20OMW CCGT power plant could produce 
power at 3/5ths of the cost of that from a large coal-fired steam turbine plant (ibid: 448). 
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Between the late-1980s and the early-1990s, the use of gas turbine generation technology 
expanded rapidly in the US ESI, so that by 1990, it was capturing two-thirds of all power 
plant orders .3 In 1989 
Smock stated that a new "gas turbine boom" was taking place in 
the US power industry, as a rush of orders were placed, including a number of larger- 
sized CCGT/CHP schemes .4 He added that 
"gas turbines are expected to be the dominant 
form of new utility and independent capacity ordered in the 1990s". 5 In the same year, 
Andrews also stated that plant manufacturers were reporting an increasing number of 
orders for larger CCGT stations. 6 In 1989, General Electric began installing its larger, 
more efficient 'Frame F' series industrial turbines, rated at over 200MW 
7 At the same 
time other plant manufacturers, such as ABB, Siemens and Westinghouse/Mitsubishi, 
were introducing similarly advanced larger-scale gas turbine units. 
The thermal stability of turbine blade materials had, for many years, been the principal 
limiting factor on gas turbine efficiency. 8 In the late-1980s, a number of established aero- 
engine turbine blade technologies, such as directional solidification, oxide dispersion, and 
single crystal bladeing, were adapted for use in industrial gas turbines. 9 Directional 
solidification, for example, was a 20 year old technology first applied to industrial gas 
turbines in General Electric's 'F' series engines. 10 Other technologies introduced at this 
time were the introduction of air-cooling of turbine blades, and thermal barrier coatings. I I 
Haywood stated that improved turbine materials and cooling technologies had together 
produced "very significant improvements in gas turbine performance". 12 By 1990 the 
newest nickel-based superalloy turbine blades were capable of withstanding temperatures 
of up to 1300°C, compared to around 900°C twenty years earlier. 13 Horlock stated that "it 
has been the increase in the gas turbine maximum temperature ... that has enabled the ... 
3 R. Smock, 'Gas Turbine, Combined Cycle Orders Continue', Power Engineering, May 1991, pp17-22: 17 
4 R. Smock, 'Gas Turbines Dominate New Capacity Ordering', Power Engineering, August 1989, pp23-28: 23 
5 ibid: 23 
6 David Andrews, 'Joining Forces', International Power Generation, March 1988, ppl9-22: 21. General Electric had 
recently announced a 190MW CCGT/CHP plant at Big Spring, Texas and Westinghouse had stated they would build 
two 300MW CCGT/CHP plants for Intercontinental Energy, an independent US power producer. 
7 R. Smock, 1989, op cit, pp23-28: 27-28 
8 Haigh pointed out that "temperature limits have usually been the governing factor on turbine development, and major 
advances can usually be tied to improvements in blade technology". (I T. Haigh , 'Lighter fuel: The Gas Turbine 
Comes of Age', IEE Review, Vol. 37, No. 3,21 March 1991, pp97-102: 100) 
9 M. Valenti, 'Combined-Cycle Plants: Burning Cleaner and Saving Fuel', Mechanical Engineering, September 1991, 
pp46-50: 50. 
10 Smock, 1989, op cit: 28. Similarly, single-crystal blades were first used in aero-engines in 1982. (Chris W. Maude 
and Andrew T. Kirchner, Gas Turbine Developments, London, IEA Coal Research, September 1995) 
11 Haigh, op cit: 100; P. J. Alberry, B. J. Davidson, and M. Corey, 'Advanced Gas Turbine Power Generation', in 
Energy for the 21st Century, I. Mech. E. Seminar 1996-3, London, pp27-30: 28 
12 R. Haywood, 'New Technologies in Power Generation', Rolls-Royce Magazine, No. 62, September 1994, ppl1.14: 11 
13 MPS Review, 'Gas expands into European power', unnamed staff report, Modern Power Systems, February 1991, 
pp27-29: 27 
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combined plant to become increasingly competitive with conventional high pressure 
steam plant". 14 
As well as these 'conventional' improvements in gas turbine technology, by the late- 
1980s, computer modelling was also allowing for significant additional improvements in 
the overall design of CCGT plant. Alberry et al., for example, highlighted the reduction 
in heat recovery losses by the use of three separate steam circuits operating at different 
pressures, with reheating between high, and intermediate and low pressure stages. They 
stated that "in the few years since natural gas became available for use in power 
generation, there have been spectacular improvements both to the gas turbines themselves 
and to the way in which the gas turbine is integrated with the steam plant in a combined 
cycle". 15 Together, these improvements provided for an increase in CCGT plant 
efficiencies from 47% in the mid-1980s to over 55% a decade later - an increase that 
brought with it significant fuel cost savings. 16 
As Haywood pointed out, "advances in the industrial gas turbine have largely followed 
developments in the aero-engine business where the intense competition - and massive 
market - ensures an investment in research and 
development which is probably 
unparalleled elsewhere". 17 The transfer of aero-engine technologies to the larger-scale 
and more robust demands of industrial-engines involved significant additional costs in 
scaling-up and adaption. Up to the late-1980s, these costs of conversion were prohibitive. 
Industrial gas turbine R&D did not benefit from the high-turnover and mass-production 
of turbojets, nor the support of state-funded military sales contracts. Rather, the 
development of CCGT technology had to be borne by sales on industrial turbines alone. 
Only after 1986, when natural gas became cheaper and more widely available, did the 
market for gas-fired generation provide sufficient financial incentive for the conversion 
of established turbojet technologies. The introduction of these technologies, by providing 
significant gains in the competitiveness of industrial gas turbines, led in-turn to further 
growth in sales revenue from the power generation market, and by the early-1990s, all the 
major international plant manufacturers had substantial research programmes dedicated to 
the further technological development of CCGT plant for electricity generation. 
14 J. H. Horlock, Combined Power Plants: Including Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) Plants, Oxford, Pergamon 
Press, 1992: 269-70. At the same time, Horlock pointed out, the reliability of industrial gas turbines was also 
substantially improved, from under 80% availability in the mid-1970s, to over 95% availability by the late-1980s 
(ibid: 27). 
15 P. J. Alberry, B. J. Davidson, and M. Corey, 'Advanced Gas Turbine Power Generation', in Energy for the 21st 
Century, I. Mech. E. Seminar 1996-3, London, pp27-32: 27 
16 Haywood, op cit: 11-12 
17 Haywood, op cit: 1 l 
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Nevertheless, as Maude and Kirchner emphasised, that the worldwide interest in gas 
turbines for power generation was still predicated on the availability and affordability of 
natural gas: 
In the early years the industrial gas turbine was expected to produce cheap 
energy from low grade fuels ... The widespread availability of natural gas has turned the tide ... The emphasis on the use of gas turbines for utility 
power generation is very much based on the ready availability of natural 
gas in many areas of the world. 18 
Many industry observers and power plant industry insiders argued that cheap gas prices 
could not be maintained beyond the short-term, so that CCGT technology had to be 
adapted for coal gasification. Smock, for example, stated in 1989 that: "the long term 
viability of gas turbines depends on the availability of coal as a fuel. "19 Similarly, 
Johnson predicted that rising gas prices in the second half of the 1990s would lead to a 
return to coal plant orders. 20 In the event a combination of further discoveries, supply 
industry deregulation, and the construction of international supply pipelines provided for 
continued cheap gas prices into the mid-1990s. 
Advances to CCGT technology also continued apace in the mid-1990s. These included 
the incorporation of further techniques from aero-engines, such as steam cooling of 
turbine blades and the development of transonic compressors, as well as innovations 
developed purely for industrial gas turbines, such as sequential combustion. 21 In 1995 
General Electric unveiled its 'H' series'of gas turbine engines, the basis of a 480MW 
CCGT plant, capable of 60% thermal efficiency. These engines incorporated many 
aeroderivative technologies and components, such as single crystal and directionally 
solidified gas turbine blades, and an advanced aeroderivative compressor. 22 Further 
improvements in the performance of gas turbines were expected to continue during the 
rest of the 1990s. Horlock concluded that "the competitive advantages of CCGT plants 
are now widely recognised ... 
[it] is here to stay as a major producer of electrical power. It 
may well become the dominant one by the twenty-first century". 23 
18 C. W. Maude and A. T. Kirchner, Gas Turbine Developments, London, IEA Coal Research, September 1995: 72. 
Similarly Smock stated that "much of the popularity of gas-turbines based capacity stems from the low price of natural 
gas relative to coal. " (1989, op cit: 24) 
19 Smock, 1989, op cit: 27 
20 op cit: 116 
21 Alberry, et al., op cit 
22 M. Valenti, 'Breaking the Thermal Efficiency Barrier', Mechanical Engineering, July 1995, pp86-89 
23 Horlock, op cit: xiii-xiv 
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5.3 Gas Turbine Technology and ESI Privatisation 
5.3.1 Awareness of CCGT Technology ahead of Privatisation 
In 1987, as debate on the privatisation of the ESI got under way, the CEGB remained 
firmly committed to coal-fired and nuclear power technology for all new large-scale 
generation plant (4.2.1). The CEGB's Annual Report for 1987/88, published in August 
1988, concentrated on plans for additional PWR and coal-fired steam turbine plant. 
However, the Report also stated that "the Board has been in discussion with gas 
producers and plant manufacturers on the possibilities of generating electricity from 
combined cycle plant involving both gas and steam turbines". 24 It went on to explain that 
"this initiative arose because of the prospects of lower gas prices and improved 
technology in this field, making the economics of this plant more attractive". 25 
Among the vast amount of evidence submitted to the Energy Select Committee inquiry 
into ESI privatisation in early-1988, there was little discussion of gas turbine 
technology. 26 Even where they were mentioned, CCGTs were referred to as being of 
marginal importance, suited only for small and medium-sized plant, or for industrial 
CHP. The Electricity Council/CEGB memorandum to the Energy Committee claimed 
that nuclear power and coal-fired plant would continue to be the dominant choices for 
new generation plant after privatisation (4.2.1). At the same time, the memo also stated 
that "depending on the future prices ... CCGT has attractive potential", but added that it 
would probably be of more relevance for RECs interested in small generation/CHP 
projects 27 
Under questioning from the Energy Select Committee in February 1988, shortly before 
publication of the White Paper proposals for privatisation, the Chairman of the Electricity 
Council, Sir Philip Jones, stated that although the prospects for CCGT plant were 
improving, they would play only a marginal role in the ESI after privatisation: 
I would certainly think that a combined cycle plant would become 
increasingly attractive, but again I would not wish to encourage the 
thought that it is going to make a significant contribution ... Inevitably much of the capacity which would be required will come from the large 
generating service. 28 
24 Annual Report and Accounts 1987-88, London, CEGB, August 1988: 27 
25 ibid: 27 
26 House of Commons Energy Committee, The Structure, Regulation, and Economic Consequences of Electricity 
Supply in the Private Sector, HC 307,1987-88 
27 ibid, Vol. 11: 3
28 ibid, Vol 111: 32 Jones also stressed that the prospects for gas turbine technology were dependent on the availability 
and price of natural gas. 
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In his evidence to the Energy Committee in February, the Chairman of the CEGB, Lord 
Marshall, was questioned by MPs on fuel and technology choice in generation after 
privatisation. In his replies, Marshall stressed the continued importance of nuclear power 
and coal-fired generation technology, and mentioned gas turbine technology only in 
terms of its use for cogeneration. Even here, Marshall emphasised, the prospects for 
CCGT investment were highly dependent on the availability of cheap gas29 Towards the 
end of its inquiry, the Energy Select Committee heard some evidence that the prospects 
for CCGT technology were improving. In June, John Baker, Managing Director of the 
CEGB, stated that the CEGB was now "looking actively at combined cycle gas turbines 
... watch this space". 
30 
The Area Board's also tended to downplay any significant role for gas turbines after 
privatisation. In their memorandum to the Select Committee, for example, Southern 
Electric stated that they did "not believe that there are any future known [technological] 
developments of sufficient weight as to affect the optimum structure of the ESI ... 
[including] CHP, combined cycles, and small generation projects". 31 Other Boards 
expressed some interest in CCGT technology, notably Eastern Electricity, the largest 
Area Board. In their memorandum to the select committee in early 1988, Eastern stated 
that "there are several locations where we might accommodate [CCGT] plants of up to 
360MW". They added, however, that "for large conventional power stations, pulverised 
[coal] fuel technology should continue to dominate in the medium term". 32 
Similarly, under select committee questioning, Wynford Evans, Chairman of the South 
West Electricity Board, stated that he was "sure we are going to find some significant 
opportunities for natural gas generation". 33 However, Evans also made it clear that he 
thought that natural gas would continue to play a marginal role as an electricity fuel after 
privatisation, and added that he "would expect coal to be the dominant factor". 34 In their 
memorandum to the Committee, Yorkshire Electricity suggested that CCGT technology 
could make a significant impact on the ESI after privatisation, provided that liberalisation 
of the industry went far enough: 
There are a number of recent developments in generation which, given the 
right environment, could develop to considerable advantage, including 
combined cycle and single shaft gas turbine plant ... In order for these and 
29 ibid, Vol. 111: 11 
30 ibid, Vol. III: 276 
31 ibid, Vol. 11: 67 
32 ibid, Vol 11: 23-24 
33 ibid, Vol 111: 60 
34 ibid, Vol. 111: 60 
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CHP power systems to develop there is a need for a real competitive 
environment for generation. 35 
ESI insiders were not alone in their views that CCGT technology would make little 
impact after privatisation. Among the evidence presented by independent analysts to the 
Energy Select Committee in 1988, and in wider discussion on the industry, there was 
little attention drawn to the potential of CCGT technology. In general, industry observers 
saw little prospect for a move away from nuclear and coal plant. In April 1988, for 
example, Power in Europe stated that such were the advantages of the CEGB's 
established large plant, that there were no prospects for significant competition to 
National Power and PowerGen for at least the first five years after privatisation. 36 In the 
same month, the Financial Times reported growing interest in independent power 
projects using CCGT technology, but stated that "the bulk of Britain's electricity will still 
come from the present stations" 37 
There were some exceptions to the general downplaying of the potential impact of CCGT 
plant. In his recommendations for the future structure of the ESI published in March 
1987, Alex Henney referred to the greater diversity and willingness to develop new types 
of generation technology in more competitive systems - notably in the US. 38 At a 
Electricity Consumers Council conference on Privatising Electricity in October 1987, 
Nigel Evans suggested that a decentralised ESI would favour the quicker returns on 
investment offered by CCGT technology above other generation options. 39 At the 
Financial Times World Electricity Conference in November 1987, Mans Lonnroth 
strikingly compared the ESIs in many countries to the pre-Reformation Catholic church - 
too "hung-up" on cathedrals, and ripe for radical change. He added that CCGT 
technology was a likely catalyst for such change 40 
In an article published in March 1988, David Andrews of the Association of Independent 
Electricity Producers suggested that the reluctance of the CEGB to exploit the potential of 
CCGT/CHP plant had led to the building-up of a latent demand for such technology in 
Britain -a demand which could be unleashed by privatisation. 41 Andrews argued that "in 
35 ibid, Vol 11: 75 
36 Power in Europe, April 1988 
37 Maurice Samuelson, 'Private Players Plan for the Power Game', Financial Times, 29th April 1988, pl0 
38 Alex Henney, Privatise Power: Restructuring The Electricity Supply Industry, Policy Study No. 83 London, Centre 
for Policy Studies, March 1987: 8 
39 Privatising Electricity -A Chance for Change?, London, Electricity Consumers Council, 5th October 1987. 
Reported in Energy Policy, Vol. 16, No. 1, February 1988, p88 (Evans also argued that unless the CEGB was sold off as 
a monopoly, nuclear would be incompatible with privatisation. ) 
40 Conference report on the Financial Times World Electricity conference, London, 16-17th November 1987, by 
Francis McGowan, Energy Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2, April 1988: 198 
41 Andrews, David'Joining Forces', International Power Generation, March 1988, ppl9-22 
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the UK progress on the use of combined cycle plant has been slow because of the attitude 
of the CEGB. This was based on a commitment to the 'big is beautiful' electricity-only 
condensing steam cycle power station". 42 He concluded that if privatisation provided 
sufficient liberalisation of the industry, a major change in the choice of generation 
technology may be about to take place: 
It looks as though a breakthrough in the development of, combined cycle 
plants in the UK may be about to occur ... The advantages of combined 
cycle plants using gas turbine engines seems to be irresistible. The 
outstanding question is whether the combination of low capital cost and 
high efficiency offered by relatively small combined cycle plants carry 
sufficient weight to overcome the inevitable inertia of those with vested 
interests in conventional 'big' power generation ... If privatisation really does enable competition to occur in power generation, then the growth of 
combined cycle plants may prove to be unstoppable 43 
Early parliamentary debate on privatisation reflected the consensus view that there would 
be few opportunities for challenging the dominant institutions - and technologies - of 
generation in the post-privatised period. At the same time, however, there were a small 
number of MPs who argued that CCGT technology could have a significant impact on the 
industry. Most notable amongst these was Peter Rost, a member of the Energy Select 
Committee, and a longstanding supporter of independent generation. As early as 
December 1987, Rost stated that Area Board Chairmen were claiming that they could 
self-generate more cheaply than taking their power from the CEGB. 44 In March 1988, 
during parliamentary debate on the White Paper, Rost stated that "competition is already 
happening", and reported that offers from private generators to the Area Boards were 
coming forward. He added that plant manufacturers were "waiting to market its CCGT in 
this country, but the CEGB was not interested 45 In an article published in October 1988, 
Rost argued that "new technologies have been neglected" in the nationalised ESI 46 He 
was highly critical of the development of the industry after nationalisation, and claimed 
that a more competitive ESI would have provided "greater diversity and security of 
supply, as well as lower cost power, from using more gas turbine generation". 47 He 
predicted that after privatisation, "new independent producers will want to prove more 
efficient generation such as combined cycle gas turbines". 48 
42 ibid: 22 
43 ibid: 22 
44 HC Debates, 1987-88, Vol. 124, c758 
45 }IC Debates, 1987-88, Vol. 129, c107-8. At the same time John Hannam, another prominent supporter of ESI 
liberalisation. was critical of the CEGB's commitment to established generation technology, and their neglect of 
CCGTs (ibid, c72-3). 
46 Peter Rost, Towards a Competitive Market-Related Energy Policy'. Energy Policy, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp450-452, 
October 1988 
47 ibid: 451 
48 ibid: 452 
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During the second commons reading of the Electricity Bill in December 1988, Labour's 
Energy Spokesman, Tony Blair, argued that there would be very little scope for 
independent generation in the privatised ESI. 49 Blair's dismissal of the possible impact of 
independent generation was rejected by Peter Rost at this time; Rost estimated 10GW of 
new capacity could develop in the following five years, "from new independent producers 
putting up power stations that the CEGB has preferred to ignore". 50 Rost stated that a 
number of schemes were already active, but that commercial sensitivity restricted details 
of these. Similarly, John Hannam predicted that CCGT plant "will flourish in the new 
arena". 51 The Energy Secretary Cecil Parkinson stated that around 20 major independent 
power projects were now "in the pipeline". 52 
The evidence submitted to the Hinkley Point C public inquiry in 1989 also provided an 
expression of CEGB opinion towards generation technology options in the run-up to 
privatisation. 53 The inquiry inspector, Michael Barnes, requested that the CEGB provide 
evidence of cost comparisons of the proposed PWR with alternative generation 
technologies. The CEGB presented comparative figures for PWR, coal-fired steam 
turbine, and small gas turbine plants - but did not -include a CCGT plant in their 
analysis. 54 Whilst it recognised that there was "considerable interest" in CCGT plant, the 
CEGB justified its omission from their cost comparisons on a number of grounds: 
uncertainty in gas prices, the complex contractual details involved with gas-fired plant, 
and on the much shorter working lives of CCGT plant as compared to nuclear plant. 
Despite this, on the basis of independent information on CCGT costs, Michael Barnes 
concluded that "it appears likely that combined cycle gas turbines would enjoy an 
economic advantage over both PWRs and coal-fired plant, certainly using discount rates 
of 7% and above". 55 
At the same time as preparations were being made for ESI privatisation, the gas supply 
industry was undergoing significant liberalisation. By the late 1980s British Gas, which 
had been privatised without restructuring in 1986, was coming under increasing criticism 
concerning its perceived monopolistic behaviour. In 1987 the Director General of Fair 
Trading referred British Gas to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The MMC 
49 HC Debates Vol. 143 1988-89, c682. Blair reported the views of the Association of Independent Electricity 
Producers that 4GW of independent power plant was "the upper range" of possible entry after privatisation -just 6-7% 
of total system capacity. 
50 ibid, c721 
51 ibid, 016 
52 ibid, c672 
53 Department of Energy, Hinkley Point C Public Inquiries, (Michael Barnes QC) London, liMSO, 1990 
54 ibid, Ch29, p786, pg29.15 
55 ibid, Ch29, p856, pg29.138 
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report, published in October 1988, found "extensive discrimination" by British Gas in gas 
pricing and supply, and stated that it operated "against the public interest by deterring 
new entry". 56 In March 1990 the Director General of Fair Trading agreed terms with 
British Gas for the liberalisation of the industry, involving the offering by BG of 
reasonable charges for the use of the transmission pipeline, and the separation of BG's 
supply and transportation businesses. In November 1989 British Gas published; for the 
first time, a price schedule for gas supplies to industrial users. 57 
5.3.2 The Introduction of CCGT Technology during Privatisation 
Growing concern about environmental pollution in the late-1980s, especially acid rain 
and global warming, meant that pollution abatement legislation became an urgent 
political issue in Europe. In June 1988, after several years of discussion, the EC issued 
the Large Combustion Plants Directive (LCP Directive), which committed all EC 
member countries to progressive reductions in their sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. 58 
Coal-fired electricity generation was a major cause of SO2 emissions, and for the UK 
ESI, the Directive required reductions in SO2 emission levels of 11 % by 1993,40% by 
1998, and 60% by 2000 (relative to 1990 levels). 59 
The established means of reducing ESI emissions of sulphur dioxide was the retrofitting 
of flue-gas desulphurisation (FGD) equipment to existing coal-fired plant. 60 For the 
British ESI it was initially thought that meeting the LCP Directive targets would require 
the fitting of FGD equipment to around 12GW of coal-fired power plant capacity. 61 It 
was quickly appreciated, however, that burning natural gas -a much cleaner fuel than 
coal - offered an alternative means of meeting the LCP Directive emission levels. The 
prospects for CCGT technology in the British ESI developed rapidly in the second half of 
1988, after the passing of the LCP Directive. 
After the publication of the White Paper on ESI privatisation made clear the 
Government's intention of liberalising the ESI (4.2.2), a number schemes for independent 
power stations were developed. In May 1988 Cecil Parkinson gave approval to the first 
56 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Gas, Cmnd 500, October 1988 
57 Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, London, EEE 
Ltd, 1994: 221 
58 88/609/EEC. The LCP Directive also restricted nitrogen oxides and dust particulate emissions. 59 House of Commons Energy Committee, The Flue Gas Desulphurisation Programme, HC 371,1989-90: ix 
60 The German ESI, for example, confronted with public and political pressure regarding acid rain several years before 
the UK, had installed FGD to 90% of its coal-fired power stations. 
61 HC 371,1989-90, op cit: x 
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gas-fired plant scheme, a 1000Mal CCGT plant proposed for Barking Reach in Essex by 
a consortium of plant manufacturers and civil engineers known as Thames Power. 62 
Initially, however, most of the independent power plant schemes were based on the 
recommissioning of former CEGB power stations as coal-fired steam turbine plant. 63 One 
of the first of these schemes was based on a former CEGB coal-fired steam turbine power 
station at Roosecote, near Barrow-in-Furness, in Cumbria. Roosecote was bought by 
Cumbria (later Lakeland) Power, a small consortium led by Neil Bryson, with the 
intention of recommissioning it using coal from Bryson's own private mines. 
The LCP Directive requirement that all recommissioned coal-fired plant had to be fitted 
with desulphurisation equipment added significantly to the capital and running costs of 
such plant. It also affected the relative cost of independent versus National 
Power/PowerGen generation. The Directive targets meant that National Power and 
PowerGen were only required to fit desulphurisation technology to a small number of 
their plant - and were given several years in which to do so. By contrast, all new or 
recommissioned coal-fired power plants were required to install FGD equipment before 
starting operation. After the LCP Directive was passed the competitiveness of Roosecote 
and similar independent schemes - already marginal given National Power/PowerGen's 
scale economies and continued market strength - became very questionable. Lakeland 
Power subsequently developed alternative proposals for Roosecote based on CCGT 
technology, using natural gas supplied by British Gas from their nearby Morecambe Bay 
field. A number of other independent CCGT plant proposals were developed at the same 
time. East Midlands Electricity, whose Chairman, John Harris, was known to be keen to 
enter generation as a counter to the market strength of the CEGB/National Power, 
developed plans for a 350MW CCGT power station at Corby in Northamptonshire. At the 
end of 1988 Enron Corporation, an independent US gas company, developed proposals 
for the construction of a large CCGT/CHP plant on ICI land at Teeside. 64 
In August 1988 the CEGB announced that they were investigating four sites for the 
construction of 30OMW CCGT plants. 65 At the beginning of 1989 National Power and 
PowerGen began operating as two separate companies; both quickly developed expanded 
62 Maurice Samuelson, 'Gas Power Station Approved', Financial Times, 11th May 1988, p8. Although the EEC 
Directive restricting the use of natural gas in electricity generation was still in force in the late-1980s, the British 
government, as part of its efforts to promote competition in generation, was attempting to secure its revocation. In the 
meantime, the Government stressed the flexibility of the Directive - it permitted national government's to permit 
construction of gas-fired power stations where there were "strong technical or economic reasons" for doing so. The 
Directive was finally revoked in October 1990. (Power in Europe, No. 44,2nd March 1989: 10.11) 
63 In an attempt to avoid being broken-up upon privatisation, the CEGB had sold a number of its old coal-fired steam 
turbine plant in 1987, so as to encourage a limited degree of independent generation to develop. (Power in Europe, 
No. 61,26th October 1989: 8) 
64 The development of the Roosecote and Teeside plants is discussed in more detail in Section 5.4. 
65 Power in Europe, No. 32, Ist September 1988: 3 
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plans for CCGT plant. In April 1989 National Power applied to the Secretary of State for 
consent to build two CCGT power stations, at Killingholme (1020MW) and Little 
Barford (680MW); in May, PowerGen applied for consent to build two CCGT plants at 
Killingholme (c1000MW) and Rye House (680MW). 66 Both were also said to be 
investigating other possible sites for further plants. 67 The last-ever CEGB Annual Report, 
for 1988-89, reported that National Power had PowerGen's plans for developing CCGT 
plant had arisen because of the "current preference for smaller-sized units with short lead 
times and the lowest capital costs" 68 
At the beginning of September 1988, Power in Europe suggested that "the lowly gas- 
turbine appears poised for take-off", and reported that "CCGT plants have suddenly 
become flavour of the month", with plant proposals now emerging "from all sides of the 
industry". 69 Karl Schneider reported that, by February 1989, British Gas had received 
enquiries for around 8GW of gas-fired plant capacity from independent companies. 70 
Schneider argued that CCGT technology enjoyed great economic advantages: "with 
industrial interest rates at about 15 per cent, the lower capital cost and short pay-back 
period make gas-fired stations almost irresistible". 71 He concluded that "if market forces 
have their way, [CCGT] stations could dominate new generation capacity for the 
foreseeable future". 72 In March 1989 Power in Europe referred to an "increasing number 
of paper power stations", but it expressed scepticism about the likelihood of many of the 
proposed plants being built. 73 The article quoted a City investment analyst as stating that 
he "did not expect generation to form a significant part of the public electricity supply 
business in the immediate post privatisation period. Such activities will take several years 
to develop"74 
By the end of 1989 plans for a total of around 20 gas turbine generation projects had been 
submitted. A survey of new generating plant carried out by Power in Europe in May 
1990 there were at least ten CCGT power stations that were likely to go ahead, with 
numerous other more speculative proposals 75 In April 1990 the Financial Times reported 
that "gas is making a dramatic comeback as the favoured fuel for electricity generation", 
66 CEGB, Annual Report and Accounts 1988/89, London, CEGB, December 1989: 15 
67 ibid: 15 
68 ibid: 3 
69 Power in Europe, No. 32,1st September 1988: 2-4 
70 Karl Schneider, The Heat of the Moment', Electrical Review, Vol. 222, No. 4,22nd February - 7th March 1989, 
pp31-32 
71 ibid: 31 
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73 Power in Europe, No. 45,16th March 1989: 4-5 
74 ibid: 12. Concerns about the early "paper power stations" centred on the problems of securing a guaranteed long-term 
market for the output from the proposed plants, which was essential to raise the necessary capital for construction. 
75 ibid, No. 73,10th May 1990 
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and reported that 10GW of CCGT plant schemes were now proposed for the British 
ESI76 Nevertheless, in September 1990, it also reported that "many in the industry view 
this tumult of activity sceptically". 77 
At an Institution of Mechanical Engineers conference in October 1990, Mr N. White of 
A. D. Little Ltd., stated that an unprecedented "dash-for-gas" was now under way, in 
Britain 78 White argued that even without environmental concerns prompted by the LCP 
Directive, there would have been an increase in the use of CCGT technology in the 
British ESI after privatisation, because of the low capital cost and short lead time of such 
plant. He concluded that the dash-for-gas was being driven by a "combination of 
technological developments and lower energy prices, coupled with a recognition that the 
resource base is very substantial, and recent concerns over pollution". 79 
In March 1991, Ian T. Haigh of Ewbank Preece Ltd. stated that "some profound changes 
are overcoming the technology of electricity generation ... and the traditional dominance 
of the venerable steam turbine is now under serious threat". 80 Haigh also emphasised the 
importance in this of the availability of cheap gas, but he concluded that the ESI's sudden 
preference for CCGT technology was an outcome of a "combination of environmental, 
economic and technical factors". 81 The first full Annual Report from the Office of 
Electricity Regulation, published in May 1991, stated that four generation licenses had 
been issued to independent generators in 1990, with another "dozen or so" applications 
under discussion. 82 
5.3.3 Select Committee Analysis of the Dash-for-Gas 
In June 1990, as vesting of the new ESI companies was taking place, the Energy Select 
Committee published a report on The Flue Gas Desulphurisation Programme. 83 The 
Committee's investigations revealed that CCGT technology was now enjoying a clear 
cost advantage for new generating plant, and that it was also considered cost competitive 
with existing coal-fired plant, taking into account the extra costs of fitting and running 
76 Maurice Samuelson, 'A Dramatic Comeback', Financial Times, 20th April 1990, FT Survey of the Gas Industry, p9 
77 David Thomas, Pioneers Under Siege', Financial Times, 6th September 1990, p25 
78 N. White, "The Future for Natural Gas in European Power Generation', paper presented to IMechE, pp5-21,12th 
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80 Ian T. Haigh, 'Lighter fuel: The Gas Turbine Comes of Age', IEE Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp97-102,21 nd March 
1991: 97 
81 ibid: 97 
82 Office of Electricity Regulation, Annual Report 1990, HC 355,1990-91, May 1991, p5 
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desulphurisation equipment. For new CCGT versus new coal-fired plant, the cost 
difference was overwhelming - both National Power and PowerGen told the select 
committee that natural gas prices would have to double before the cost of electricity from 
new CCGT plant reached levels similar to that from new coal plant with desulphurisation 
fitted. Mr. P. Chester, the Technical Executive Director of National Power, told the Select 
Committee that National Power had "looked at all the technical options", and were "quite 
clear that combined cycle gas turbines are the most economic". 84 
At the same time, National Power and PowerGen both also suggested that new CCGT 
plant provided cheaper electricity than that from their existing coal-fired plant, when the 
extra costs of desulphurisation were added-on. Since natural gas produces no sulphur 
dioxide, this meant that the LCP Directive limits on sulphur dioxide emissions could be 
met more cheaply by building new CCGT plant, rather than retrofitting desulphurisation 
equipment to existing coal plant. In his evidence to the Energy Committee, Dr. Jim Skea 
of Sussex University agreed that the extra cost desulphurisation placed on coal-fired plant 
was "sufficient to tip the balance in favour of building CCGT ahead of capacity need". 85 
Under questioning by the select committee, both National Power and PowerGen 
attempted to downplay the radical nature of their change in preference for new generation 
technology, and suggested that it was a part of the natural progression of the ESI that 
would have occurred irrespective of privatisation. The Chief Executive of PowerGen, Ed 
Wallis, claimed that the 4-5GW of CCGT plant which PowerGen was now estimated to 
be planning to build was, in large part, replacement for old steam turbine plant which 
would have closed and needed replacing anyway. Wallis stated that PowerGen were not 
"burning gas as a consequence of being private companies", but that "the CEGB would 
have burned it when it became available anyway. It did not because it was not 
available". 86 He also spoke of PowerGen's pursuit of "a balanced strategy" of plant 
investment, and that PowerGen did "not wish to be overexposed in terms of price, 
reliability or quality to any one of three strategic fuels" - coal, oil, and natural gas. 87 
Other evidence to the Energy Committee at this time suggested a more radical turnaround 
in the industry's generation technology preferences. Mr C. Wilcock of the Department of 
84 ibid, Vol. II: 5 In the course of the Energy Committee's inquiry on The Cost of Nuclear Power, also published in June 
1990, the independent analyst Gordon MacKerron of Sussex University stated that "any private investor would 
certainly wish to go for combined cycle gas in preference to coal". (House of Commons Energy Committee, The Cost 
of Nuclear Power, HC 205,1989-90, Vol. 11: 127) 
85 HC 371,1989-90, Vol. 11: 55-56. Dr Skea estimated that the unit cost of electricity from existing coal-fired plant was 
2.0p/kWh, which increased to 2.6p/kWh with desulphurisation equipment fitted, compared to an estimated unit cost 
from new CCGT plant of 2.2p/kWh. 
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Energy recognised that "over the last few months with increasing acceleration ... 
it has 
become evident that combined cycle gas turbine plants ... are the choice of both National 
Power and PowerGen, as well as of the independent generators". 88 Wilcock rejected the 
suggestion from a member of the Energy Committee that the government should 
intervene in this - stating that as far as possible, fuel choice should be a commercial 
matter for the generators. 
In February 1991, British Gas imposed a 35% rise in natural gas prices for new 
'interruptable' industrial contracts - the fuel contract used by most of the independent 
CCGT projects. In announcing the increase, BG stated that was concerned that it would 
be unable to meet the rapidly escalating demand for gas for CCGT schemes. In mid-1991, 
shortly after the flotation of National Power and PowerGen, the Energy Select Committee 
undertook an inquiry into Clean Coal Technology and the Coal Market after 1993.89 The 
evidence presented to the select committee during its inquiry suggested that CCGT 
technology was still clearly the cheapest option for new generation plant, but that 
following the gas price increase, its competitiveness with existing coal plant was now 
questionable. 90 The select committee stated that National Power's Commercial Director 
had indicated that the higher price of gas meant that it was now no longer economic to 
replace existing coal-fired plant with new CCGT plant, unless the coal-fired plant was 
required to have desulphurisation equipment fitted 91 
There were eight CCGT power plants firmly committed by this time. All were based on 
imported gas turbines, manufactured by General Electric, ABB, Westinghouse and 
Siemens. Four were being built by National Power and PowerGen, the others by 
independent consortia involving a number of RECs. PowerGen had just awarded the 
contract for their second CCGT power station, at Rye House, to Siemens. In his evidence 
to the select committee, PowerGen's Commercial Director, Dr. Alf Roberts, stated that 
"as far as combined cycle plant is concerned, British manufacturers have unfortunately 
not been able so far to play a role in competing for it". 92 Those British manufacturers that 
were able to provide CCGT plant did so under licence from foreign manufacturers - John 
Brown Engineering, for example, was a licensee of General Electric gas turbines. 
The dash-for-gas was attracting growing opposition by this time, particularly, as would 
be expected, from the coal industry, but also from some independent observers of the 
88 ibid: 24 
89 HC 208,1990-91, published in July 1991. 
90 
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ESI. In his submission to the inquiry, the energy analyst Walt Patterson argued that the 
enthusiasm for gas-fired generation in England and Wales - and the absence elsewhere of 
a dash for gas on a similar scale - was an indication of particular distortions within the 
British ESI. Patterson concluded that the British dash-for-gas was "something of an 
anomaly", and was the result of "short-term thinking". 93 Similarly, Mr B. Parkin, the 
Assistant Head of Research at the NUM, argued that the dash-for-gas was a consequence 
of short-term opportunism on the part of the privatised generators. Parkin stated that the 
introduction of CCGT technology into the British ESI should not be seen as "some kind 
of technical evidence of a brave new world of power generation and the liberalisation of 
energy markets", but rather, "as an expedient, as an alternative to flue gas 
desulphurisation" 94 I 
In its report conclusions, the Energy Committee expressed concern, especially in a 
context of higher gas prices, that almost all of the independent CCGT plant being built 
was intended to be used continuously - i. e. to meet baseload demand. 95 In their evidence 
to the Committee, the coal industry consultants, Gerard McCloskey and Guy Doyle, 
suggested that the marginal cost of existing coal-fired plant maybe lower than for new 
CCGT plant, and that existing plant should therefore be used as baseload plant ahead of 
gas-fired plant. 96 McCloskey and Doyle also argued that the economics of CCGT plant 
were very sensitive to fuel price escalation. 
The Energy Committee concluded that the dash-for-gas was being driven by a 
combination of ESI restructuring associated with privatisation - which had proven to be a 
stimulant for investment in new generating plant - together with essentially unconnected 
changes in the availability and price of natural gas. The Committee stated that "what has 
changed is not just privatisation, but the increasing availability of gas, abolition of the EC 
Directive, reduced gas production and transportation costs, and a progressive saturation 
of the higher value outlets for gas". 97 
Despite the higher price of gas, the dash-for-gas continued throughout 1991. In the year 
as a whole, the Office of Electricity Regulation issued nine generation licences to 
independent consortia, for the construction of over 5GW of CCGT plant 98 By the time 
the Energy Select Committee's report on the Consequences of Electricity Privatisation 
93 ibid: 43 
94 ibid: 139-40 
95 The economic profile of gas-fired plant - low capital cost but high running (fuel) cost - meant that it was considered 
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was published in February 1992, the scale of the dash-for-gas was clear 99 The select 
committee found that, including National Power and PowerGen schemes as well as those 
of the independents, contracts had now been signed for over 17GW of new power plant 
based on CCGT technology. 100 
In his evidence to the' Energy, Committee at this time, Professor Colin Robinson 
commended the dash-for-gas as a demonstration of the technological and economic 
liberalisation of the industry, compared to the "technological backwardness" of the 
nationalised ESl. '°' Robinson stated that the dash-for-gas "could have occurred under 
continued state ownership, but it would almost certainly not have happened at such 
speed". 102 However, he pointed out that the introduction of CCGT technology arose not 
from a conscious act of Government, but rather from the coincidence of British ESI 
privatisation with international developments in the availability of natural gas and gas 
turbine technology, which together greatly reduced the barriers to entry in generation. 
Without this, he claimed, the post-privatised character of the ESI would have been very 
different: "it is a sobering thought that if improved CCGT technology had not been 
available :.. there might have been no new entrants whatsoever to power generation in 
Britain". 103 Furthermore, Robinson pointed out, in a context of international reductions in 
fossil fuel prices and advances in generation technology, it was unclear to what extent 
privatisation itself was responsible for the generation cost reductions that had been 
achieved in Britain. 
The inquiry made evident that there was now a substantial body of opinion - from inside 
the ESI as well as among independent analysts - that the increases in the price of natural 
gas had made electricity from new CCGTs more expensive than from existing coal plant. 
For example, John Harris, Chairman of East Midlands Electricity - one of the pioneers of 
the dash-for-gas - stated that gas prices were now such that "virtually no project can 
stand the test of economic purchasing", and he concluded that "the move in gas prices 
puts a question mark against any future combined cycle gas project within the UK". 104 
This view was also expressed by the large generators; in their memorandum to the Energy 
Committee, PowerGen stated that "even with FGD and dearer British coal, existing plant 
are competitive with new CCGTs". los Similarly, the Chief Executive of National Power, 
991IC 113,1991-92 
100 ibid, Vol I: xxi 
101 ibid, Vol. 111: 49 
102 ibid: 49 
103 ibid: 51 Robinson added that the relatively benign environmental impact of gas turbines turned out to be a crucial 
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104 ibid, Vol. 111: 123 
105 ibid, Vol. I: xxv 
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John Baker, argued that "the early combined cycle gas turbines at gas prices then 
prevailing were competitive with marginal [coal-fired] plant on the system, and validated 
the closure of plant to make way for them. At current gas prices that is no longer the 
case". 106 
In their submission to the select committee, British Coal argued that although CCGT 
technology undoubtedly offered the lowest-cost option for new baseload plant, it was 
more expensive than existing large coal-fired steam turbine plant. '°7 BC argued that the 
dash-for-gas was now being driven by what they referred to as "structural" factors on the 
part of the RECs and large generators. For the RECs, BC suggested, CCGT plant offered 
a quick means of reducing their dependence on National Power and PowerGen. BC 
claimed that, since the RECs continued to hold a partial supply monopoly within their 
'home' regions until 1998, they were able to pass on the extra cost of gas-fired generation. 
BC concluded that "this is the driving force behind unnecessary new capacity. The REC 
is paying a premium ... 
but it is a premium which can be passed on in full to the final 
consumer". 108 John Baker, Chief Executive of National Power, also claimed that the 
RECs' interest in lessening their dependence on the big generators, allied with their 
continued local monopoly, was encouraging them to build "uneconomic" CCGT plant. 109 
In their evidence to the select committee, the RECs indicated that they saw investment in 
generation plant as a means of diversifying their business away from the more heavily 
regulated areas of distribution and supply. For example, John Harris, Chairman of East 
Midlands Electricity, stated that CCGT plant provided a way for RECs to "get equity into 
non-regulated businesses". 110 Under questioning by the select committee, the Secretary of 
State for Energy, John Wakeham, accepted that it was possible for the RECs to pass on 
their costs, but he argued that they would be inhibited from doing so in practice because it 
would be in clear contravention of their obligation in their supply licence to purchase 
power on an economic basis. I tt 
British Coal argued that the big generators had a different institutional interest in 
investing in CCGT plant. For National Power and PowerGen, BC suggested, CCGT 
technology presented a threat to their market position, since it offered the generator's 
106 ibid, Vol. 111: 92 
107 ibid: 36 British Coal estimated the cost of electricity from new CCGT plant to be 2.9p/kWh, compared to 2.7p/kWh 
from existing coal plant with FGD added on. 
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main customers - the RECs and large industrial users -a relatively quick way to capture 
some of the market for generation. BC argued that National Power and PowerGen's 
investment in CCGTs was therefore essentially defensive: they had the advantages of 
large revenue-earning plants, and pre-existing power station sites which were already 
connected to the grid and did not need planning permission for the construction of new 
plant. BC stated that National Power and PowerGen realised that there was limited 
demand for new plant in the British ESI, so that by building CCGT power stations before 
the independent consortia - even if they produced electricity more expensively than their 
existing coal-fired power stations - they aimed to pre-empt the market, and maintain their 
market dominance in generation. 112 Given these motivations on the part of the large 
generators and the RECs, British Coal argued that around half of all CCGT plant 
expected to be built in the next few years would provide electricity more expensively than 
the coal-fired steam turbine plant it was replacing. 
In their report conclusions, the Energy Select Committee concluded that the dash-for-gas 
was being driven, in-part at least, by non-economic institutional interests, in 
contravention of the generation and supply licences. The Committee stated that "there is 
no doubt that the RECs' interest in CCGTs results not just from potentially lower costs, 
but from the wish to reduce their dependence on the two main generators", and concluded 
that "some CCGT projects are economically justified as replacements for existing plant 
and others are not". 113 The Committee added that the dash-for-gas was a reflection of the 
inadequacy of competition in generation in the privatised ESI, and called for the forced 
divestment of some plant belonging to National Power and PowerGen, or, pending a 
referral to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, a break-up of the assets of the two 
generators. 114 
In the course of the select committee's inquiry, the financial and contractual details 
behind independent CCGT plants were outlined in some detail by the Thames Power 
consortium formed to develop a 1000MW CCGT plant at Barking Reach in Essex. The 
partners in the consortium included three RECs - Southern Electric, Eastern Electricity, 
and London Electricity - pooling their generation capacity limits imposed under the 1991 
Electricity Act. Thames Power was a typical example of the consortia that were formed to 
develop independent CCGT plant in the late-1980s and 1990s. Like all independent 
CCGT power stations, Barking was financed on a non-recourse loan, secured on revenue 
from future electricity sales. In all such schemes, the same RECs involved in the 
independent power producer (IPP) consortium also undertook to buy the electricity 
112 ibid: 38 
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produced under long-term contracts (known as Power Purchase Agreements, or PPAs), 
typically lasting 15 years. The same REC therefore acted as both equity partners and 
customers for the IPP scheme. Contracts for gas supplies were also arranged over the 
same period as the PPA, on a price based on the market price for electricity at any given 
time (the 'pool' price) with a 'contracts for differences' adjustment between the fuel 
suppliers and the IPP. This meant that all independent CCGT schemes were financed on 
the security provided by long term back-to-back contracts for fuel and electricity sales. In 
addition, because gas was supplied on a 'take-or-pay' basis, independent CCGT power 
plants were required to run continuously - the financial arrangements for such plant were 
predicated on their use as baseload plant. 
Thames Power also revealed that independent gas producers were reluctant to expose 
themselves to the risk of selling their gas on a non-recourse basis, so that IPPs were 
forced to contract with British Gas for their gas supplies. National Power and PowerGen, 
with strong cashflow from their existing plant, had no need to need to resort to non- 
recourse funding, and were able to contract with independent gas suppliers. 115 This meant 
that unlike the large generators, IPPs were vulnerable to price escalation by British Gas, 
at a period in which, although the independent gas supply market was growing, BG 
retained a powerful market influence. 116 
5.3.4 Industry Analysis of the Dash-for-Gas 
Amongst the evidence of independent analysts to the Energy Committee in 1992, there 
was some discussion of the relative importance of different influences on the dash-for- 
gas. In their evidence to the select committee, for example, the Watt Committee on 
Energy argued that it arose "mainly because gas was allowed to enter the electricity 
generation market rather than because of privatisation". 117 In his evidence, Eric Jeffs, the 
European editor of Turbomachinery International, stressed the coincidence of 
privatisation with other developments. Jeffs stated that the privatisation of the British ESI 
"occurred as the combined cycle became a proven generating system of high reliability 
and efficiency. At the same time, restrictions on the use of gas for generating electricity 
were relaxed across Europe". 118 He added that with these conditions established, and with 
the RECs keen to encourage independent generation, then "the way was open for the 
construction of new power plants which would challenge a system dominated by coal". 
115 ibid, Vol. 111: 65 
116 After 1990 BG was required to make 10% of new gas field supplies available to independent suppliers. 117 HC 113,1991-92, op cit, Vol 11: 37 
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Jeffs concluded that "what we are seeing is a transformation of the electricity supply 
system by introduction of the combined cycle with its high efficiency and remarkable 
operating flexibility". 119 
In a 1993 analysis of the dash-for-gas, Gordon MacKerron of Sussex University 
emphasised that CCGT plant represented a significant and sudden "technological 
discontinuity" for the British ESI. 120 MacKerron identified six reasons for the British 
dash-for-gas: the development of CCGT technology, the availability of cheap natural gas 
from the North Sea, the requirements of private investors for higher interest rates and 
shorter payback periods, the desire of RECs to gain entry to generation and challenge 
National Power and PowerGen, a regulatory framework encouraging to new generation, 
and last, and least, in his opinion, the need for environmental compliance on the part of 
the existing generators. 121 MacKerron argued that "environmental issues played only a 
minor supporting role" in the dash for gas: the RECs, he suggested, had no direct 
environmental incentive to go for gas, and National Power and PowerGen only a limited 
incentive, in the form of an easier task in complying with the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive". 122 He stated that institutional rivalry had made a greater contribution to the 
dash-for-gas, and that "without the spur of the IPPs, it is doubtful whether the incumbent 
generators would have embarked on as much CCGT construction as in practice they 
have". 123 
MacKerron went on to consider the likelihood of a repeat of the British dash-for-gas 
elsewhere in Europe. He pointed out that whilst some of the factors involved in the dash- 
for-gas were international or European in scale, others were particular to the British ESI. 
Therefore, he concluded that although CCGT use was "almost certain to grow strongly in 
power systems across Europe ... the rapidity of the British dash-for-gas will not be 
repeated". 124 Rather than a dash, he suggested, it was likely that other European countries 
would experience "a sustained canter" towards the greater use of CCGT plant. In another 
paper written in the same year, MacKerron argued that the dash-for-gas in Britain was 
primarily a response to the creation, ahead of privatisation, of a radically different 
economic environment for investment in generation plant, rather than the development of 
CCGT technology itself: 
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The reason ... [CCGT] has become dominant as a new technology ... owes less to major technical improvements than to radical changes in the 
economic environment in which the electricity supply industry operates ... The dominant change ... has been the move away from electricity supply 
as a long term, public service industry with relatively low profitability 
towards a liberalised industry exposed to normal commercial objectives 
and pressures ... Where mistakes 
in technology choices which lead to 
higher costs can no longer be passed through to consumers, utilities are 
much more averse to technological and commercial risk. In such a context 
CCGTs fit ideally ... the primacy of CCGTs owes much more to radical 
changes in economic environment than technological change as such. 125 
Other analysts and industry insiders have offered a variety of explanations of the dash- 
for-gas. In a personal interview conducted in 1994, Roger Semmens, a Development 
Engineer at PowerGen's Ratcliffe Power Technology Centre, Nottingham, stated that "the 
growth of combined cycle gas turbines was not to do with privatisation at all - the main 
reason was the availability of natural gas". 126 Nevertheless, Semmens also conceded that 
what he referred to as "the politics" of privatisation had perhaps made some difference, at 
least to the pace of technological change in the post-privatised ESI, in that if the industry 
had remained a public monopoly, it might have been prevented from "going all out for 
gas in the way that we have". 
In an article published in 1994, Ron Haywood, Director of Engineering at Rolls-Royce 
Industrial Power Group, identified "at least four factors" contributing to the dash-for-gas: 
improvements in the performance of CCGT technology, regulatory reforms (both in 
encouraging the US market for cogeneration, and also the liberalisation and privatisation 
of the ESI in Britain), tightening environmental emission standards, and finally, the 
increasing availability and reduced price of natural gas against other fuels. 127 
In a personal interview carried out in December 1994, Haywood reflected further on the 
dash-for-gas. He conceded that the level of awareness of gas turbine technology among 
the British plant manufacturers under nationalisation was low, and stated that "in the UK, 
its true to say no-one saw the dash-for-gas coming ... the views seemed so foreign and 
revolutionary at that time. Now it seems so logical". He described the established 
thinking towards gas-fired plant in the nationalised ESI: "gas turbines were only used in a 
125 Gordon MacKerron, 'Innovation in Energy Supply: The Case of Electricity' unpublished draft prepared for 
inclusion in Dodgson, M., and Rothwell, R., (eds. ), Handbook of Industrial Innovation, Cheltenham, Elgar, 1994 
126 Personally-conducted telephone interview, June 1994. Semmens added that the capital cost of CCGT plant was 
around half that of coal-fired steam turbine plant. He estimated that the capital cost of PowerGen's Killingholme CCGT 
plant was £3201kW, compared to between £600-700IkW for a coal-fired steam turbine plant lie stated that there was 
"unlikely to be any other competing generating plant in the foreseeable future". 
127 Ron Haywood, 'New Technologies in Power Generation', Rolls-Royce Magazine, No. 62, September 1994, ppl 1- 
14: 14. Haywood also stated that the improved economics of natural gas as a electricity fuel were not only a response to 
greater reserves, but also improved access through the construction of new transmission and distribution systems. 
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standby role, and peak lopping. Gas at that time was not cheap ... [it] was also seen as a 
prime fuel". He stated that this position began changing only in the mid-1980s: 
I remember before privatisation, in the mid-1980s, doing basic 
calculations about CCGT plant and it was obviously competitive. People 
were gobsmacked with the efficiency. The CEGB were very keen just 
before privatisation; attitudes changed very quickly. 
Haywood argued that lower gas prices and increased availability was the major cause of 
the dash-for-gas: "when the dash for gas started gas [prices] were at a twenty year low ... 
at the end of the day it was the price of gas which won the day ... gas was 
being 
discovered all over the world ... [once] the 
directive on the use of gas for base load power 
generation was rescinded ... nothing was going to stand 
in the way of CCGT". However, 
he also recognised that changes in the British ESI associated with privatisation had a 
significant effect on the rate of change in the industry: "without privatisation there would 
have been a slower switch to gas; in practice what we have seen is a revolution". 
Roger Smith of PowerGen, and Michael Sharpe of Siemens, who were both personally 
involved in the construction of a, CCGT plant for PowerGen at Rye House in 
Hertfordshire, also reflected on the causes of the dash-for-gas, in a paper published in 
1995.128 They pointed out that whilst other forms of generation technology were limited 
in various ways - politically (nuclear), geographically (hydro), environmentally (coal and 
oil), or economically (solar and wind) - CCGT technology was "the one form of 
electricity generation that offers many advantages: technical, economic, political and 
environmental". 129 
In their 1996 analysis of developments in the ESI since privatisation, the independent 
analysts Guy Doyle and Dominic MacLaine argued that it was the failure, of the 
Government, to introduce a fully-competitive market for generation that had driven much 
of the dash-for-gas. They stated that "the Electricity Act cleared the way for new entrants 
in generation, but it was the Government's creation of a strong duopoly in fossil fuel 
generation that provided the strongest incentive for the RECs to seek alternative 
generation sources". 130 They added that "few within the industry anticipated the 
emergence of CCGT as the plant of preferred choice". 131 In his analysis of ESI 
128 Roger Smith and Michael Sharpe, Rye House -A Further Step in the Use of Gas for Power Generation', Power 
Engineering Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp33-40, February 1995 
129 ibid: 33. They went on to describe the Rye House project in some detail; it had a lead time of 3 years - much 
shorter than conventional plant, and stage-by-stage commissioning allowed it to earn revenue in even less time. The 
plant components were built in semi-standard modules by Siemens. 
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privatisation, Alex Henney also suggested that British Coal, the Government and the 
major generators were all taken by surprise by the dash-for-gas and the determination of 
the RECs to support independent power projects. 132 
In a recent article, Jim Watson of Sussex University argued that it was mistaken to see the 
dash-for-gas as merely the product of economic factors, such as changed market 
circumstances and cheap natural gas. Rather, he emphasised, "many political and 
technological factors have had a part to play". 133 Watson identified three different aspects 
to the 'success' of CCGT technology. Firstly, technological attributes, in particular its 
versatility of application - military and commercial - which allowed its development to 
continue even through periods when its commercial market was small; secondly, the role 
of the major manufacturers, whose size and diversity enabled them to subsidise CCGT 
development, retain expertise in the technology, and take a long-term view even when 
there was little demand for the technology; and thirdly, government involvement, both by 
the direct sponsoring of military jet engine development, and also by implementing 
regulation to foster CCGT/CHP technology and promote ESI liberalisation. Watson 
concluded that the dash-for-gas arose not simply from changed economic circumstances, 
but that it could only be explained "by reference to a complex web of factors", many of 
which, he pointed out, "have not been directly concerned with the CCGT at all". 134 
5.3.5 CCGT Technology and the ESI in the mid-1990s 
In late-1992 and early-1993 the ESI entered a period of uncertainty associated with the 
coal crisis (6.3.2). The intention at privatisation was for stringent regulation by the Office 
of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) of the transmission, distribution, and supply parts of 
the ESI - which were seen to varying degrees as natural monopolies - but to allow 
essentially unregulated competition in generation. The coal crisis provoked a wide- 
ranging debate on the development of the ESI since privatisation - particularly the market 
distortions in generation which were perceived to be causing, at least in part, the dash-for- 
gas - and forced a reappraisal of the 'hands-off approach to generation by the Regulator. 
Two particular features of the industry were the subject of particular attention by the 
Regulator at this time: firstly, REC involvement as both financial partners and power 
132 Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply industry in England and Wales, London, EEE 
Ltd, 1994: 299 
133 Jim Watson, "The Technology that Drove the'Dash for Gas'", Power Engineering Journal, February 1997, ppl 1- 
19: 11 (The rather deterministic title of Watson's article belies his emphasis on the interdependency of influences. ) 
134 ibid: 19 Watson also observed that recent technological change in the ESI has had little correlation with direct R&D 
spending on generation technologies. 
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purchasers in IPP CCGT schemes; and secondly, the manipulation of the electricity 
trading 'pool' by National Power and PowerGen. 
Concern for REC involvement in CCGT schemes centred on their ability to'pass-on' any 
extra costs of CCGT plant, made possible by their retention of franchise monopolies 
for 
medium users until 1994 and domestic users until 1998. At the beginning of the coal 
crisis, OFFER decided to bring forward an inquiry it was planning into the RECs 
behaviour in this area. 135 The resulting OFFER report concluded that the RECs had not 
breached their, obligation, as Public Electricity Supply licence holders, to secure their 
power purchases at the "best effective price ... reasonably obtainable", and 
it therefore 
stated that no action on REC involvement in CCGT plant was necessary (6.3.2). In 
OFFER's 1992 Annual Report, Littlechild stated that he found that the IPP contracts 
signed by the RECs for CCGT plant "compared well with other contracts then available 
... and provided greater 
diversity of supply". 136 He concluded that in entering consortia to 
build CCGT plant, and also in signing up to long term power purchase agreements, "the 
RECs had sought to facilitate new entry into generation ... to provide protection against 
the major generators, ... [rather] than to profit, via their equity stakes, 
from higher 
electricity prices". 137 
Although National Power and PowerGen gradually lost market share in baseload 
generation to independent power producers and Nuclear Electric after privatisation, they 
had little competition in the intermittent or 'mid-merit' market - which, under the 
workings of the 'pool', set the market price for electricity. In later evidence to the Trade 
and Industry Select Committee, it was reported that 95% of non-baseload plant was 
owned by NP or PG, mostly coal plant. 138 Professor Littlechild admitted to the select 
committee that the electricity System Marginal Price was being set overwhelmingly by 
the CEGB successor companies. Following an investigation by OFFER, the Director 
General announced in mid-1993 that he would cap pool prices for two years, and also 
stated that he would be requesting the divestment of some power plant belonging to 
National Power and PowerGen before 1995.139 He added that he would consider a 
reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission if the plant divestment was not 
completed on time. According to Dieter Helm, this action by OFFER "extended 
regulation well beyond that intended at privatisation. " 40 Following the announcement, it 
was estimated that around 6GW of proposed CCGT plant was either deferred or 
135 Office of Electricity Regulation, Review of Economic Purchasing, December 1992 
136 Office of Electricity Regulation, Annual Report 1992, HC 646,1992-93, May 1993: 9 
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cancelled. 141 In February 1994, Littlechild announced that he had established 
undertakings from National Power and PowerGen on the divestment of 6GW of coal- 
fired plant - 4GW of National Power plant and 2GW of PowerGen plant. 142 The plant 
divestments were finally completed in 1996 with the long-term lease of the whole of the 
6GW to Eastern Electricity, with the intention of creating a 'third force' in mid-merit 
plant. 143 
In May 1994 the Department of Trade and Industry published the latest of the occasional 
appraisals of Energy Technologies for the UK. 144 The report stated that since the last such 
survey - published before ESI privatisation in 1987 (which had made almost no mention 
of CCGT plant, 5.3.1) - "a number of significant structural, political, economic and 
technical changes have occurred", including "the commercialisation of cheap and 
efficient CCGTs", which had "revolutionised the available future pattern of 
generation". 145 The appraisal forecasted that CCGT technology would make a major 
contribution to electricity supply in Britain to at least 2025. In April 1995 the Office of 
Science and Technology published the results of another survey of electricity generation 
technologies, carried out as part of the Government's (Technology)Foresight 
Programme. 146 The survey, which concentrated on the future market potential of various 
technologies, concluded that "the gas turbine will play an increasingly important role 
across the whole power range of duties". 147 It also stated that the drive for even more 
efficient gas turbines would continue, and that these will be achieved through "cycle 
variations and higher temperatures with enhanced component performance". 148 
In mid-1995 the Trade and Industry Select Committee carried out an inquiry into Aspects 
of the Electricity Supply Industry. 149 The inquiry adopted a less political tone than earlier 
such enquiries, and was less a general review of the ESI, rather than an attempt to 
investigate particular regulatory issues, such as the adequacy of competition in 
generation, and the consequences of the progressive loss of REC franchises. 
Nevertheless, the select committee heard some discussion of the changes to the industry 
141 ibid, Vol II: 35 (Norweb memorandum) 
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since privatisation. The DTI memorandum to the Committee stated that there were now 
ten independent CCGT plants operating in the UK (generating around 6GW of power), 
with a further two under construction (of 1.7GW output), and eight more with signed 
transmission agreements (which would provide another 6GW of power). 150 At the same 
time, it was reported that National Power and PowerGen were operating or constructing 
6.3GW of CCGT plant of their own. 151 The DTI referred positively to new CCGT plant 
as contributing to the "increasingly diverse and efficient portfolios" of generators. 152 
Changes in the supply and generation sides of the industry were increasingly interrelated 
by this time, and as the Trade and Industry Committee described, the ending of REC 
franchises for domestic users in 1998 carried with it some implications for generation. 
The Committee stated that "liberalisation of supply in 1998 will be a vast enterprise 
without precedent anywhere in the world ... the effect of opening-up competition in 
supply is to place a much more acute pressure on competition in generation ... [because it 
requires] all suppliers to buy more economically than they would otherwise have 
done". 153 It was clear that greater competition between the RECs would further restrict 
the passing-on of generation costs through the ESI supply chain. The Manchester-based 
REC, Norweb, in their memorandum to the select committee, stated that the loss of 
domestic franchise after 1998 was already making them less interested in new generation 
schemes-154 Increasingly the trend was for RECs to only enter contracts with generators 
for a limited part of their existing franchise market - that which they thought would 
continue to be their 'natural franchise' after deregulation. 155 
The inquiry made some further investigation of the dash-for-gas. 156 The Director General 
for Electricity Supply was criticised by the Select Committee for his lenient handling of 
the RECs. He was repeatedly questioned over the RECs investment in CCGT in the 
context of the 'economic purchasing' licence condition. For PowerGen, Ed Wallis restated 
his view that only the early independent CCGT power plants were economic compared to 
existing steam turbine plant-157 The Electricity Supply Trades Union Council (ESTUC) 
argued that the dash-for-gas had done little to further competition in generation, since the 
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contractual arrangements for independent CCGTs divorced them from the market for 
electricity; the ESTUC memorandum stated that "none of the ... CCGT capacity 
built by 
the independent producers can be said to be competitive when it is indifferent to pool 
prices for a full 15 years, out of a design life of not much more than 15 years". 
158 The 
ESTUC also suggested that, as old nuclear and coal stations were closed, new CCGTs 
were likely to be built in a "second dash for gas" - with increasingly negative effects on 
fuel supply diversity. The ESTUC claimed that "if there is no change in direction, ' 80% of 
all electricity will be generated from gas by the year 2020". 159 
In his evidence to the Select Committee, Professor Colin Robinson stated that the vigour 
of the dash-for-gas stemmed from a pent-up demand for natural gas as a generation fuel 
within the British ESI, created by the protection of coal and nuclear power stations under 
nationalisation. 160 Nigel Evans of the DTI's Energy Advisory Panel (an independent body 
set up by Government after the coal crisis), was questioned by the select committee about 
the extent of the dependency on gas-fired generation technology now being built into the 
British ESI. Evans referred to the suggestion that natural gas would be meeting 85% of 
the ESI's needs by 2005 as "entirely plausible"; he added that he was unsure if this 
growing dependency was cause for concern. 161 
The Department of Trade and Industry's 1995 White Paper on the Prospects for Nuclear 
Power, 162 published two months before the Aspects of the ESI report, also contained 
some comments on fuel diversity in the ESI. Here, the Government stated that market 
forces were the best means of ensuring diversity of fuel supplies. Central planning, they 
argued, had demonstrably failed in the ESI, whereas privatisation had so far brought 
about greater fuel diversity. The Government rejected any suggestion that some action on 
their part was now needed to secure fuel diversity, and instead argued that market forces 
would provide the necessary level of diversity, through price signals that reflected the risk 
of loss of supply, or customer aversion to over-exposure to any single fuel. 163 The White 
Paper concluded that there were no reasons "why the electricity market should not of its 
own accord provide for an appropriate level of diversity". 164 
In the mid-1990s, as political uncertainties associated with the coal crisis receded, the 
dash-for-gas gained renewed momentum. In their 1996 review of Generation in the 
158 ibid, Vol. 11: 63 
159 ibid, Vol. 11: 64 
160 ibid, Vo1. II: 113 
161 ibid, Vol. III: 69 He forecast that by 2000, there would be over 16GW of CCGT capacity. 
162 Cmnd 2860,1995 
163 ibid: 37 
164 ibid: 4 
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1990s, Michelle Aveline et al. confirmed that a "second dash-for-gas" was under way in 
the British ESI. 165 In another recent consideration of the future of the ESI, Guy Doyle 
and Dominic MacLaine listed five large CCGT plants under construction (all over 
700MW capacity). National Power and PowerGen were both reported to be completing 
construction of huge CCGT plants, each over 1.3GW. 166 Doyle and MacLaine stated that 
continuing technical advances in CCGT technology and fierce competition between the 
equipment manufacturers had greatly reduced the capital cost of the latest CCGT plants 
compared to the earlier ones. 
The 1996 edition of the DTI's annual Energy Report reported a collapse in wholesale gas 
prices, as excess supply led to a "gas bubble" in the UK. 167 It also stated that competition 
in the gas supply industry was accelerating, with the proposed demerger of British Gas, 
and with independent supply companies now capturing over three-quarters of new 
industrial contracts. On electricity generation technologies, the report concluded that 
"further efficiency improvements are expected from new vintages of CCGT technology 
as it matures". 168 The 1997 National Grid Company Seven Year Statement revealed that 
there would be over 14GW of CCGT installed capacity by the end of 1997, with 
proposals for this to rise to over 27GW by 2000-01, exceeding the total level of coal-fired 
capacity169; (see Appendix 1, Figs. 4,5,7). 
5.4 Industry Perspectives on the Dash-for-Gas 
5.4.1 Norweb 
Norweb (the former North West Electricity Board) was heavily involved in the 
construction of CCGT plants in the ESI during and after privatisation. In 1989 it became 
the first REC to contract for electricity from an independent plant when it agreed to take 
the entire output from Roosecote, the first completed CCGT plant in Britain, for a period 
of 15 years. Norweb also became an equity partner in Lakeland Power, the consortium 
behind the financing of Roosecote. Plant construction commenced at the beginning of 
1990, and the plant became fully operational in November 1991. Roosecote is a 220MW 
165 Michelle Aveline, Martin Brough and Daniel Sgori, Generation in the 1990s: Electricity Capacity and New Power 
Projects: The 1996 Edition, Oxford, OXERA Press, 1996 
166 Guy Doyle and Dominic MacLaine, Power as a Commodity: The Future of the UK Electricity Supply Industry, 
London, Pearson! Financial Times Energy Publishing, 1996 
167 Department of Trade and Industry, The Energy Report Vol. 1: Change and Opportunity, London, I IMSO, May 
1996 
168 ibid: 52 
169 Roland Gribben, 'New threat to coal as dash for gas gathers pace', Daily Telegraph, 19th May 1997 
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CCGT plant based on a ABB 13E 165MW gas turbine, and a 60MW steam turbine. 170 In 
1992, Norweb set up a 50/50 joint venture company with Scottish Hydro-Electric, to 
develop a 680MW CCGT power station, at Keadby in South Humberside. (The Keadby 
plant is discussed further in 5.4.2 below). 
In an interview carried out in August 1994, Graham Wilman, Major Projects Manager for 
Norweb Generation, Manchester (a subsidiary set up by Norweb to manage its 
investment in generation technology), described the motivations behind Norweb's 
involvement in electricity generation in the ESI after privatisation: 
[For Norweb] generation was a logical step, an extension of the existing 
electricity supply business ... [which] upon privatisation 
became a heavily 
regulated activity ... The regulator essentially holds the power to make Norweb's main business - that is, distribution and supply - profitable or 
unprofitable ... 
Because of the potential for regulation tightening the 
profitability of the main business, we looked at diversifying into non- 
regulated business ... and generation is one of those. 
In addition, Wilman also made clear that Norweb's interest in generation was also a 
response to the market power of National Power and PowerGen in the new structure of 
the industry: 
As a duopoly its very easy for them to watch over each others shoulders, 
and exploit the 'pool'. This is very tough for RECs, we have to buy 
electricity from a duopoly, and sell into a competitive marketplace, in 
which the duopoly is competing as well ... we're left with a duopoly which 
can rig the market ... RECs are 
interested in generation in order to break 
the power of National Power and PowerGen. 
Before privatisation, as an Area Distribution Board, Norweb was statutorily forbidden to 
become involved in generation, other than in exceptional circumstances. Wilman stated 
that this meant that they had no expertise in generation technology: "Pre-privatisation we 
were not allowed to own any generation assets, so there was no choice to make of one 
technology over another ... we had no real interest in fuel sources and fuel mix - we 
couldn't make those strategic decisions". He then explained how the decision was made to 
develop Roosecote using CCGT technology. It is clear from his account that the extra 
burden placed on independent generators by the Large Combustion Plants Directive (see 
5.3.2) was critical in the change from coal-fired steam turbines - as was initially proposed 
for Roosecote - towards CCGT technology: 
170 Sources: Roosecote: Britain's First Combined Cycle Power Station, Manchester, Norweb, September 1991, plus 
other corporate publications by Norweb Generation, Manchester. Also Michelle Aveline, European Utilities Yearbook 
1993, oxford, Oxford Economic Research Associates, 1993: 290 
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[After] Norweb established a generation business we looked at all forms of 
generation. Pre-privatisation gas-fired generation was almost completely 
excluded ... around the time of privatisation the 
UK Government began 
granting 'gas-burn consents' ... gas-fired power stations 
became possible. 
There were also significantly tightening emission standards coming out of 
the EEC ... The coal generators were given quite some time to 
bring their 
plants in line with EEC requirements, whereas any new plant would have 
to immediately meet them ... 
We looked at building new coal plant using 
low cost British coal, in the northern coast of Cumbria, where there is a lot 
of cheap open-cast coal, and we looked at clean coal technology to do it. 
The capital cost of that was so high to meet the existing standards that it 
could not compete economically with existing, less clean, larger coal 
plants. The CEGB had driven to a very large size ... so their economies of 
scale were massive. The size we were looking at was around 150-200MW 
- one tenth of a CEGB plant, so we didn't get the economies of scale, we 
had to meet higher emission standards - our output cost could not 
compete. When Roosecote was first planned, it ... was going to 
be 
repowered as coal-fired ... The cost comparison said repowering with gas 
would be the best way ... gas sulphur emissions are practically zero 
[and] 
nitrogen oxides control facilities are available. 
In addition to its superior environmental performance, Wilman also emphasised that 
CCGT technology was far better suited than established generation technologies to the 
changed investment environment established for the ESI after privatisation: 
The change from nationalised to privatised investment criteria meant the 
cost and lead time advantages of CCGTs were very significant. Pre- 
privatisation the nationalised industries typically used a 5% discount rate, 
so their interest was not in capital cost, but fuel cost ... The old industry 
could accommodate high capital, low running cost technology, the best 
example of which is nuclear. Pre-privatisation, CCGT would have always 
lost out because of the investment appraisal used. A private investor uses a 
discount rate of 15-20%, depending on the technology and risk, [so that] 
the economics swing from fuel cost to capital cost being important. CCGT 
plants are essentially modular, [and they] can be built quickly. Ten years - 
the time needed to build an old CEGB plant - is a lifetime in the capital 
markets... We've built Roosecote in 24 months. 
On the causes of the dash-for-gas, Wilman concluded that "the things that made gas [- 
fired plant] more attractive than coal were economic, regulatory or legal, and the need to 
exist in a private structure". 
He then turned to a consideration of the interaction between the ESI privatisation process 
and the development of CCGT technology. He argued that they were two essentially 
separate processes - whilst British ESI privatisation was unparalleled elsewhere, CCGT 
developments were a response to international changes in the availability and use of 
natural gas: 
I don't think the changes in the UK were driving technological 
development, they were ongoing. Roosecote was ordered in 1989, at 
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which time it was the most efficient plant in the world, at 48%. Keadby ... 
was ordered in 1992-93, at which time it was the most efficient plant in the 
world, at 53%. ABB are now talking ... of combined cycle efficiencies of 
around 58-59%, so the technology is moving very quickly, but they are ... 
the results of pressures from other countries as well. America has a 
massive gas programme, Holland as well, France are developing some, 
Japan and China too ... it was coincidental with changes 
in the UK. 
Although Norweb developed a sizeable generation business after privatisation - as well 
as Roosecote and Keadby, they also built a number of smaller CHP, landfill gas and 
renewables plants - they relied entirely on turnkey contracts for large plant construction. 
As Wilman made clear, they did not see the need to engage in their own research and 
development efforts: 
We don't do any R&D. We are profit driven, and therefore don't see 
ourselves as demonstration facilities. We are much more comfortable with 
proven technology. The R&D is generally being done by the people who 
sell the kit, and they will publicise their work widely - we don't have to be 
very proactive in monitoring technological advancements; R&D is not 
being funded by us. 
Finally, Wilman considered likely future developments in generation technology. 
Although he stated that continuing improvements in gas turbine technology would ensure 
that it would continue to be important, like many others in the industry, he argued that 
there would be a turn to clean coal technology in the British ESI. He stated that Norweb 
were "always looking at clean coal technology - when this becomes economic it will be a 
good investment for us ... I think coal technology must come back, as the clean 
technology capital costs come down ... 
I think we will see a resurgence of coal". He 
added that these predictions applied only to the UK, since much of the future 
development of generation technology in different countries still depended on local 
political conditions: "the cultures are so different it's difficult to predict - there's so many 
different vested interests". 
5.4.2 Scottish Hydro-Electric 
The experience of the ESI in Scotland after privatisation was very different to that in 
England in Wales. Following the commissioning of Torness AGR plant in 1988, the 
Scottish ESI was characterised by dominance by nuclear power and gross overcapacity. 
With the withdrawal of nuclear plant from privatisation in 1989, the nuclear plant of the 
former South of Scotland Electricity Board were kept in public ownership under Scottish 
Nuclear, and their output was given market protection to 2005 under the Scottish Nuclear 
Energy Agreement. For the privatised Scottish electricity companies, Scottish Power (the 
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former SSEB) and Scottish Hydro-Electric (the former North of Scotland Hydro-Electric 
Board), there was therefore little opportunity to expand their generation businesses in 
Scotland. 
Nevertheless, for Scottish Hydro-Electric in particular, the dash-for-gas in England and 
Wales was seized upon as a means of business growth and diversification. In late-1991 
Hydro-Electric set up Keadby Power Ltd (KPL), a 50/50 joint venture with Norweb to 
develop Keadby power station, Humberside, built on the site of a former CEGB steam 
turbine plant. Keadby is a 680MW CCGT plant based on two General Electric Frame 9F 
gas turbines, each having an output of 212MW. The gas turbines were built in the US by 
GE and installed by John Brown Engineering of Clydebank. Keadby was financed mainly 
by a $544m loan from a number of international banks, as well as over $100m equity 
each from Hydro-Electric and Norweb. Together, Hydro-Electric and Norweb also 
contracted for the entire output from Keadby for 15 years under a Power Purchase 
Agreement with KPL. 171 After a delay caused by technical problems with the gas 
turbines (which had to be returned to the US for reworking) Keadby was eventually 
commissioned in 1996. 
In the early-1990s, Hydro-Electric also investigated a number of other proposed CCGT 
plants which did not proceed. In 1994 it signed a 15 year contract for 400MW p. a. from 
the Intergen CCGT plant at Rocksavage (see 5.4.4 below). In 1995 Hydro-Electric 
formed a 50/50 joint venture with British Gas, Seabank Power, to develop a 755MW 
CCGT plant at Avonmouth near Bristol. The Seabank plant is being built on a turnkey 
contract by Siemens; construction began in August 1996. Fuel for the plant is being 
supplied by British Gas; Hydro-Electric have contracted to take the entire plant output for 
10.5 years. 172 
Although Hydro-Electric did not share the English and Welsh RECs motivation to 
develop generation projects in order to counter the threat of National Power and 
PowerGen, they have a powerful institutional rivalry of their own, with Scottish Power. 
In an interview conducted in June 1994, Phil Inskipp, Project Manager for Business 
Development at Scottish Hydro-Electric, Perth, outlined the reasons for Hydro-Electric's 
involvement in the dash-for-gas: 
171 Sources: various corporate publications provided by Scottish Hydro-Electric, Perth; also MPS Review, UP at 
Keadby will use Frame 9F Technology', Modern Power Systems, June 1992, pp 19-22 
172 Sources: various corporate publications provided by Scottish Hydro-Electric, Perth; also Guy Doyle and Dominic 
MacLaine, Power as a Commodity: The Future of the UK Electricity Supply Industry, London, Pearson/ Financial 
Times Energy Publishing, 1996: 69 
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We were always keen to expand our markets south of the border - because 
obviously we can't do anything north ... we're a net exporter... 
Investment 
in CCGT was a means of business diversification ... There were always 
people waiting in the wings waiting to do something. We wanted to make 
a stand and show we could do things on our own ... We were ... trying to 
get our feet under the table. It was really just to be in there with all the rest 
of them. 
Inskipp was closely involved with the Keadby CCGT plant from inception to financial 
closure. He described the problems involved in securing finance for the Keadby project - 
one of the first CCGT plants in the UK to use General Electric Frame 9F gas turbines: 
"On Keadby the banks who lent us the cash were very nervous that we were taking on 
new technology. We had to go through various presentations, bringing General Electric 
people over. Its all been tried and tested in aerospace ... but the banks were still nervous, 
they don't like anything new". Inskipp also explained that John Brown Engineering was 
chosen as turnkey contractor for the Keadby project because they had already developed 
a detailed specification for a similar CCGT plant with National Power, and could 
therefore offer a "fast-track" negotiated tender route for construction. 
In the nationalised ESI, the CEGB - with its technical rather than economic orientation - 
was often accused of 'over-engineering' or 'gold-plating' their power plants. As Inskipp 
described, the engineering standards involved with the CCGT plants built after ESI 
privatisation were very different to those adopted by the CEGB. He stated that "in today's 
economic climate, we can't afford to build power station like we used to do. The old 
places would easily do 40 years plus ... 
but I wouldn't imagine Keadby lasting that long; 
nobody engineers them like you used to - if you did, it would cost double the amount of 
Keadby". Indeed, Inskipp made clear that the investment horizon for the Keadby project 
was 15 years - the length of the bank loan, the fuel supply contracts, and the Power 
Purchase Agreement. He stated that "after 15 years the plant is still available, but there's 
no gas contract, and no PPA - but the thing's made its money". He also indicated that this 
time horizon, and other aspects of the project, were largely dictated by the terms of loan 
imposed by the banks: "Keadby, and all the other [IPP] plants at the same time were 
basically forced by the banks to sign up to deals for 15 years, and by and large these deals 
were [only] available with the RECs". 
Like Graham Wilman of Norweb (5.4.1, above), Inskipp argued that the development of 
CCGT technology was essentially unconnected with the British ESI privatisation process: 
[CCGT] technology wasn't available beforehand, and you could argue that 
whoever was developing it would have been trying to develop it anyway 
for the American market which was already privatised, so I don't think the 
UK privatisation had any effect on the manufacturers. I think they were 
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already trying to get these things improved ...; that was more or less 
coincidental with privatisation coming on. 
Inskipp argued that the significant developments in CCGT technology in recent years - 
improvements in materials allowing for increases in the gas turbine firing temperatures - 
were essentially a spin-off from aerospace innovations: "it's all really a spin off from 
aerospace technology ... as they try to get [gas turbines] to be more environmentally 
friendly and use less fuel. If the engines weren't being manufactured for the aerospace 
industry, then the industrial engines would be left behind". 
He then speculated on the extent to which CCGT technology would have been adopted 
within the British ESI in the late-1980s and early-1990s if the industry had not been 
restructured and privatised. He suggested that the pressure of environmental compliance - 
which had a very immediate effect on the industry's choice of new generation technology 
during and after privatisation -. would have exerted a more gradual influence on an 
unrestructured British ESI: "If privatisation hadn't come along, would the CEGB have 
invested [in CCGT technology]? ... That's a very 
difficult question to answer ... on the 
emission front, the answer would have been yes. Whether the restrictions on emissions ... 
would have come through at the same rate if ... [the industry] hadn't been privatised, is 
difficult to say". 
As the ESI moved towards complete liberalisation of supply in 1998, the economic 
conditions that had allowed for the early dash-for-gas, based on long term power 
purchase agreements offered by the RECs, were changing, and such contracts were 
becoming less available. Inskipp suggested that the loss of REC franchise could have a 
very damaging effect on the independent CCGT plants: "whilst you can get a long term 
gas contract, you can't get a long term electricity sales contract ... Come 1998 when the 
[franchise] market disappears altogether, it will be fascinating to see how that develops ... 
I wouldn't be surprised if all the independents went to the wall". He also suggested that 
greater competition in the supply-side of the industry meant that there would be little 
investment in other forms of generation technology - in particular clean coal technology 
- for the foreseeable future: "clean coal technology ... is big money, and it's new 
technology risk, and you're back to the banks again. To finance ... [clean coal projects] 
they'll want 15 year sales contracts, and they just aren't available". 
Finally, Inskipp considered the wider impact of the dash-for-gas on the British ESI. 
Although he was intimately involved in the dash-for-gas, he concluded that it was 
ultimately an unwelcome phenomenon - driven by narrow self-interests on the parts of 
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the various organisations involved, with damaging consequences for the industry as a 
whole: 
[Was] the dash-for-gas was a good idea or not? I think I'd have to say on 
balance that it wasn't ... [we have] all this coal plant ... which we've 
already invested in. National Power claim that its just as cheap as gas once 
you've cleaned it up ... [but] who knows what the true cost is ... Looking back, everybody thought that [CCGT] was a great idea, and [said] 'I've got 
to have some of that'. 
5.4.3 ICI 
Imperial Chemical Industries is the UK's largest electricity user. It has longstanding 
experience of running coal- and oil-fired steam turbine power stations on a number of its 
production sites. For a number of ICI's activities, notably chlorine manufacture, 
electricity is a major contribution to total production costs. In the nationalised ESI, large 
industrial users such as ICI were offered special power purchase terms from the CEGB. 
This special treatment ended shortly after privatisation, reinforcing ICI's determination to 
gain greater independence in electricity supply. 
At the beginning of 1989, - Enron Corporation of the USA approached ICI with proposals 
for the construction of a CCGT/CHP plant on ICI land at their Wilton chemical plant on 
Teeside. (The CCGT scheme was subsequently known as the Teeside Power Plant. ) 
Enron had already participated in similar (although much smaller) such projects with 
chemical companies in the USA. As well as ICI and Enron, the initial proposals for the 
Teeside Power Plant involved National Power as a potential power purchaser. 
In addition to ICI (who contracted for only a small proportion of the proposed plants total 
output, and chose not to become equity partners in the Teeside Power consortium), Enron 
eventually secured Power Purchase Agreements for the proposed plant with four RECs, 
rather than National Power. Following the signing of letters of intent in January 1990, 
PPA contracts were agreed in September 1990 with Midlands Electricity, Northern 
Electric, South Wales Electricity and South Western Electricity - each of whom also 
became equity partners with Enron in the Teeside Power consortium. The plant was 
financed by a 15 year £800m loan syndicated to over thirty international banks. At the 
same time, 15 year gas supply contacts were signed with a consortium of gas supply 
companies led by Amoco. The gas for the plant was provided from newly-developed 
North Sea reserves, via a purposely-built pipeline constructed by the gas supply 
consortium at a cost of £lbn. 
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At the time it was built, the 1875MW Teeside Power Plant was the world's largest 
CCGT/CHP power station. Plant construction began in November 1990, commissioning 
started in October 1992, and full commercial operation was achieved in April 1993. The 
design of the plant was based on eight 150MW gas turbines, and two 300MW steam 
turbines, all built by Westinghouse and imported from the US. Fully operational, the 
plant has a total staff complement of just 66, compared to over 300 for a similarly sized 
coal-fired steam turbine plant. 173 
In 1994, another US electricity power company, Intergen, announced the construction of 
a further large CCGT plant on ICI land, a 750MW plant at Rocksavage, near Runcorn in 
Cheshire, to be built on a turnkey contract by Bechtel at a cost of over £300m. The output 
from the Rocksavage plant was contracted for by ICI and Scottish Hydro-Electric under 
15 year PPAs. The gas for the plant is to be provided by BP Gas from North Sea reserves, 
again under a 15 year contract. The Rocksavage plant is due to commence commercial 
operation in early-1998.174 
In an interview carried out in August 1994, Phil Smith, Projects and Services Manager of 
the Research and Technology Department at ICI Chemicals and Polymers, Wilton, 
described the problems facing ICI and other large electricity users in trying to develop 
independent gas-fired power projects in the British ESI before privatisation. In particular, 
he reported, neither British Gas nor the Area Boards offered the kind of long term fuel 
supply and power purchase contracts necessary to finance such large capital investment: 
Just before privatisation ... [ICI] was looking at a number of schemes in 
the ESI with the CEGB and local area boards, but we weren't getting very 
far. We had done quite a bit of work in-house thinking what we needed, 
but we'd never made any of them into a project ... There were a number of 
problems ... to do with contracts and prices ... fuel supplies ... electricity prices and so on ... Some of the key things we needed were a long term gas 
supply, which was independent of the then silly approach of British Gas, 
[and] the potential to contract for sales for electricity on more than the 
short term basis that was then available from local area boards ... [BG] 
offered six months contracts; for a plant financed over ten years, six 
months is no good at all. We couldn't get a price that held for more than 
six months. In the same way, you couldn't get a price for electricity sales 
to the local REC under the 1983 Energy Act that held for more than a 
year. You can't build a long term project on that basis. 
173 Sources: various published and non-published papers provided by Teeside Power and Enron Power Operations 
Ltd., Stockton-on-Tees. Also: M. J. S. Gibbons, 'Lessons from the Teeside Power Project', Gas Power '91 conference, 
22nd March 1990; P. A. Stokes, 'Developments in Combined Cycle Power Technology', Energy for the 21st Century, 
I. Mech. E. Seminar 1996-3, London, ppl9-23; Alex Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply 
Industry in England and Wales, London, EEE Ltd, 1994: 222-223; Power in Europe, No. 61,26th October 1989; 
Maurice Samuelson, 'ICI Plans Gas-Fired Power Stations', Financial Times, 19th October 1989, p9 
174 Sources: IC! C&P News, 27th September 1996, BP Press Notice, 1st August 1996; Doyle and MacLaine, op cit: 69 
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Smith stated that he first became interested in gas turbine generation technology in the 
mid-1980s: "at that time I was heavily involved in converting Wilton Power Station to 
coal [from oil] ... We were looking for the next stage ... I noticed in 1985 one of our 
competitors in the US, Dow, had repowered one of its large sites with three or four large 
80MW gas turbines. After I did the calculations and modelling, this seemed to be a very 
good fit for us". He explained that ICI's interest in CCGT technology for use in CHP 
arose less from improvements in gas turbine efficiency, but rather from the capital cost 
savings such plant offered, and the ratio of process steam to power that it provided: 
We weren't too worried about gas turbine improvement, but what was 
important was the way capital costs were coming down - quite 
dramatically - and the way the market was building up, giving 
competition and choice. Gas turbines were coming of age ... Thirty years 
ago CCGTs didn't compete, their efficiency was too low, and the fuel price 
too high ... We've seen efficiency increase from 20% to 35%, maybe 40%. Combined cycle efficiencies have increased from 30%, which didn't 
compete with 36% on a coal-fired boiler plant - up to 50-55%, which does 
compete, and more than wipes out any fuel price differential. Also the 
capital cost of the CCGT is half to two-thirds that for same size coal fired 
plant. They compete in small unit sizes -a 150MW CCGT will compete 
with a 2000MW coal plant. You don't need to build big to achieve the 
efficiency gains, and you can spread your expenditure profile to match 
demand. 
Smith explained that although they were keen to lessen their dependence on the public 
electricity supply system after privatisation (see 5.4.3 above), ICI were restricted by their 
limited experience in the management of independent power plant projects: 
The ability to build and operate the plant to a high level of efficiency ... was not within the ICI area of expertise. We have a different cost-to- 
reliability relation, we tend to spend a lot more on the original machine to 
get the reliability, and that would make it uneconomic in this case. The 
final thing was finance. We're a chemical company - it's not core to our business to put millions of pounds into a utilities plant. 
Smith made clear that the involvement of Enron at this point was critical for the 
realisation of ICI's desire to promote independent generation: 
We were aware of the potential [of CCGT technology].., but finding it 
difficult to put together a commercially attractive project ... Enron decided there would be a good window for them just after privatisation ... They came along at just that time, when we were sensitive to what we were 
trying to put in place and looking for ways to make it happen ... There was an awful lot of persuasion going on. Enron had previous experience of building smaller stations, and they had a few years performance data. But 
they also had Westinghouse underwrite the gas turbine/steam turbine 
package. New technology ... [meant] the banks weren't keen, but Enron 
managed to make it happen. 
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Like Wilman and Inskipp, Smith pointed out that the improvements in CCGT technology 
were being driven by the turbojet market: "it was all to do with aero developments ... The 
aeroderivative companies have turned aero technology, which is high performance, short 
life technology, into high performance long life industrial technology". In addition, Smith 
also emphasised the importance of the liberalisation of the gas supply industry in 
enabling the dash-for-gas to take place, by encouraging the development of new gas 
reserves. He stated that before gas industry liberalisation, "there was a lot of gas in the 
North Sea not being brought ashore, because there was no market for it, nothing to justify 
investment in pipelines". 
Finally, Smith considered the extent to which the British dash-for-gas was a response to 
rivalry among the organisations involved in the ESI, rather than the relative economics of 
gas versus coal plant. He suggested that if the CEGB had been broken up into a greater 
number of competing generators, there would have been less desire on the part of the 
Area Boards and large users to participate in the CCGT schemes: "with more competition 
in generation there would have been less of a dash-for-gas ... with 8 or 10 generators 
there would have been scope for private deals". Nevertheless, he argued that some CCGT 
plant would have been introduced in any structure for the industry, as a response to 
tightening pollution standards. He concluded that in this respect, "what the dash-for-gas is 
really doing is saving a massive investment in sulphur removal - shutting plants down 
and replacing them rather than retrofitting them. It only costs you 2-3 times as much to 
replace as retrofit on existing stations". 
5.4.4 Enron 
The project to build the Teeside Power Plant (see 5.4.3 above) was characterised by a 
high risk proactive strategy on the part of Enron Corporation - the largest gas pipeline 
and supply company in the USA. Enron's urgency to get the Teeside CCGT plant built 
quickly reflected their perception that there was market opportunity in the immediate 
post-privatised period, which was associated with historically low gas prices. Enron 
awarded plant construction contracts before having power purchase letters of intent from 
the RECs, and construction commenced before the final contracts were signed by the 
RECs. 175 In reviewing the Teeside Power project, Henney stated that Enron had "bet a 
significant proportion of the company - and won". 176 Phil Smith of ICI also emphasised 
175 Doyle and MacLaine, op cit: 63 
176 Henney, op cit: 224 
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that the initiative shown by of Enron was critical to the realisation of the Teeside Power 
Plant (5.4.3, above). 
In another personal interview carried out in August 1994, Stuart Ffoulkes, of Enron 
Power Operations, Teeside, described the background to the financial arrangements for 
the Teeside Power plant. He suggested that the unanimous choice of CCGT technology 
for new plant construction in the British ESI after privatisation reflected the fact that 
finance was only available from the international banks for the most competitive projects; 
he observed that, "one of the reasons people build CCGT plants is because they can do 
it". In Ffoulkes' account of the putting-together of the Teeside plant project, it became 
clear that the terms of lending imposed by the syndicate of international banks played a 
great part in determining the contractual arrangements established by Enron: 
All the contractual arrangements are based on the fact that we have a large 
15 year bank loan, and the banks require repayment over that period ... the banks require guarantees that we have 15 years of gas ... [they also] want to be sure we have customers for that period - so we have Power Purchase 
Agreements ... That sets the financial basis ... for the first 15 years, much 
of what Teeside Power does is keeping the banks happy. 
The Teeside CCGT plant was built on an unprecedented scale. As Ffoulkes described, 
this meant that the banks were initially hesitant about the project: "we had to show them 
everything was built from standard components. Although the configuration is unique, 
every bit has been proven elsewhere". Ffoulkes also indicated that the long term power 
purchase contracts offered by the RECs in the early years after privatisation, based on 
their continued supply franchise, was vital in enabling independent CCGT projects to go 
ahead: "there's no way a plant of this size could be built if its customers were independent 
large users - it would mean thirty or so customers, which would be a nightmare with the 
banks. Its much easier for PowerGen or National Power as they're financing [CCGT 
plant] from their own capital". 
As one of the first CCGT schemes in the privatised ESI, the Teeside Power Plant was 
able to take advantage of the low gas price contracts available in 1990. As was discussed 
in 5.3.3, the growth of the dash-for-gas prompted an increase in gas prices, notably the 
35% increase in British Gas prices imposed in March 1991. Ffoulkes stated that "when 
the [gas] price was increased quite dramatically, quite a lot of proposed plants were 
quietly mothballed - the economic case was no longer there". Although, as Ffoulkes 
stated, this led to a slowing down in orders for CCGT plant, it was offset by continued 
improvements in gas turbine efficiency. He added that "without the technological 
improvements it would be much more difficult to invest in CCGTs, because of the 
increase in gas prices". 
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Before joining Enron in 1992, Ffoulkes worked for the National Grid Company, and was 
involved in the setting-up of the development of the mechanism for electricity trading 
after privatisation - the so-called electricity 'pool'. Whilst he conceded there was a 
deficiency of competition in generation under the Government's privatisation proposals, 
he suggested that there would have also been other problems - such as greater instability 
- under more competitive arrangements. He concluded that "this wasn't the best way of 
privatising the industry - but I'm also sure it wasn't the worst". 
Ffoulkes also argued that rivalry between the RECs and generators meant that there 
would have been substantial investment in new plant after privatisation - and in particular 
CCGT technology - irrespective of the number of competing generators set-up after 
privatisation: "the RECs were very keen to get involved in independent power projects 
because of their lack of control in the market. At the same time they didn't want to spend 
money, so they looked at projects in which they could achieve payback in 10 or 15 years, 
and that wasn't feasible with coal". He concluded that "the dash-for-gas almost certainly 
would have happened whatever ... whilst the RECs concern was magnified by the 
duopoly, I don't think it would have disappeared without it". 
5.5 Summary and Review 
At the beginning of 1988 the CEGB remained solely committed to nuclear power and 
coal-fired steam turbine plant for large scale electricity generation. At the same time, 
most of the generating plans of independent power producers were based on 
recommissioning of old CEGB power stations as coal-fired steam turbine plant. Across 
the British ESI, despite the looming liberalisation of the industry, gas-fired generation 
technology continued to be marginalised. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that there 
was a growing awareness of the competitiveness of CCGT technology after 1987. 
Between its 1986/87 and 1987/88 Annual Reports, published in July 1987 and August 
1988 respectively, the CEGB shifted from "design studies" concerning the adaption of 
CCGT plant for clean coal combustion, to discussions with gas producers and plant 
manufacturers about the construction of gas-fired CCGT plant, prompted by "the 
prospects of lower gas prices and improved technology" (5.3.1). At the same time, 
however, the CEGB made clear its continued commitment to new PWR and steam 
turbine plants for the bulk of its new plant. 
Although international natural gas prices had fallen substantially by the time the 
preparations for ESI privatisation in Britain got under way, established interests in the 
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industry invoked the history of rapid fluctuations in oil and gas prices to urge caution in 
considering the introduction in gas-fired plant. Such reasoning, for example, was relied 
on by the CEGB to justify its omission of CCGT from the comparison of generation 
technology options in evidence to the Hinkley Point C public inquiry (5.3.1). (The same 
argument was also used repeatedly by the Government to argue the diversity case for 
nuclear power - as demonstrated, for example, by Cecil Parkinson's comments during the 
Second Reading of the Electricity Bill in December 1988,4.3.1. ) 
The evidence submitted to the Energy Select Committee's inquiry on ESI privatisation in 
early-1988 suggested that gas turbine technology would play only a marginal role in the 
post-privatised industry. The CEGB/Electricity Council joint memorandum to the select 
committee stressed that the technical and economic advantages of large plant, and stated 
that CCGT plant would probably be of more use in "small generation" applications such 
as industrial CHP and self-generation by the area boards. The Chairman of the Electricity 
Council, Sir Philip Jones, told the Committee that he would "not wish to encourage" the 
thought that CCGT technology was going to make a big impact on the ESI after 
privatisation, and added that much of the new plant needed would "inevitably" come from 
large established technologies (5.3.1). 
Area Board evidence to the select committee was more positive, and there were some 
expressions of interest in constructing medium-sized CCGT plants. Even this evidence, 
however, came with the proviso that gas turbine technology would remain of marginal 
significance as compared to nuclear and coal-fired plant (5.3.1). It is impossible to know 
how much of the Area Board evidence to the select committee at this time, downplaying 
the impact of CCGT technology, was a reflection of their commercial interests. The 
retrospective evidence from personal interviews suggests that the awareness and interest 
of the Area Boards/RECs in CCGT developed rapidly - from a very low level - during 
1988. Graham Wilman, for example, stated that Norweb had very little interest in, or 
knowledge about, generation technology before privatisation (5.4.1). For the plant 
manufacturers, Ron Haywood of Rolls Royce, conceded that there was little awareness of 
CCGT technology in the British ESI before privatisation. Haywood's comments 
illustrated the radical departure with established thinking on generation technology 
options that was made in Britain in 1988 and 1989. He stated that in mid-1988 gas turbine 
technology "seemed so foreign and revolutionary", but added that "attitudes changed very 
quickly" (5.3.4). 
Unlike the changes affecting nuclear power technology - whose difficulties were 
anticipated by many independent analysts (as discussed in Section 4.6) - there was very 
little prediction of the dash-for-gas among independent analysts; even those analysts who 
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foresaw the introduction of CCGT plant in Britain tended to underestimate the scale of 
interest. As Doyle and MacLaine argued, "few within the industry anticipated the 
emergence of CCGT as the plant of preferred choice" (5.3.4). The widespread ignorance 
of CCGT technology in the British ESI ahead of privatisation is confirmed by the absence 
of discussion of the possible extent of its adoption in the evidence submitted by 
independent industry analysts to the Energy Select Committee in 1988 (5.3.1). 
In debate on the future development of the industry after the Government's White Paper 
proposals were published, the consensus of independent opinion was that there had been 
insufficient break-up of the CEGB's assets to provide significant scope for competition in 
generation (5.3.1). In criticising the Government's proposals, for example, Allen Sykes 
told the select committee that "it is hard to see how any genuine competition can emerge" 
(4.2.4). Nevertheless, a number of observers suggested there went a pent-up demand for 
gas turbine plant in the Britain, and that CCGT technology was set to make a major 
impact on the industry. Significantly, these views were held by long-time proponents of 
independent generation, and especially CHP technology, such as David Andrews, of the 
Association of Independent Electricity Producers, and the MPs Peter Rost and David 
Hannam (5.3.1). 
From mid-1988 onwards, plans for a number of CCGT plants emerged, and despite the 
continued scepticism of many observers, the number of proposed CCGT schemes, 
developed rapidly in 1989 and 1990 (5.3.2). A number of distinctive economic, 
legislative and organisational causal factors are identifiable in the switch to CCGT 
technology in the British ESI in 1988 onwards. An immediate stimulus to change was the 
need for compliance with the EC Large Combustion, Plants Directive, issued in June 
1988. The LCP Directive, by requiring the fitting of. desulphurisation equipment to 
recommissioned plant, proved critical in the relative cost of new independent coal-fired 
plant versus existing CEGB coal-fired plant. Graham Wilman of Norweb, for example, 
made explicit reference to the importance of "significantly tightening emission 
standards", and the fact that European legislation required independent generators "to 
meet higher emission standards" (5.4.1). Wilman indicated that its was only after the LCP 
Directive was issued that the relevant cost comparison for independent/REC companies - 
recommissioned coal-fired plant plus desulphurisation equipment, compared to new 
CCGT plant - went in favour of the more radical option. 
There is also evidence that the LCP Directive played a critical part in the investment 
plans of the established generators in the late-1980s. At the time the LCP Directive was 
issued - and for sometime afterwards - CEGB interest in CCGT technology was 
restricted to proposals for a small number of medium-sized (300MW) plants. As 
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indicated in the Board's 1987/88 Annual Report, these proposals were not seen as 
interfering with the Board's the large coal-fired and nuclear plant programme (5.3.1). In 
early-1989, after the operational splitting-up of the CEGB, National Power and 
PowerGen interest in CCGT plants developed rapidly, and their established plant 
programmes were cancelled. In the spring of 1989 both National Power and PowerGen 
announced proposals for an expanded CCGT programme based on larger plant units 
(5.3.2). In evidence to the Energy Select Committee's inquiry on the Flue Gas 
Desulphurisation Programme in 1990, both suggested that building new CCGT plant 
offered a cheaper means of generating than retrofitting existing coal-fired plant with 
desulphurisation equipment (5.3.3). This was also the view of the independent analyst Dr 
Jim Skea, in his evidence to the select committee. The LCP Directive gave both 
independent and established generators an economic motivation to switch to CCGT 
technology. 
At the same time, there is considerable evidence that institutional rivalry was also an 
important cause of the early dash-for-gas. The Area Boards/RECs certainly had more 
than one institutional reason to invest in generation technology. They were undoubtedly 
keen to enter generation so as to reduce their dependency on the CEGB's successors, 
particularly after the February 1988 White Paper made clear their continued market 
power. This was explicitly referred to by those involved in IPP consortia. Graham 
Wilman of Norweb stated that the "RECs are interested in generation in order to break the 
power of National Power and PowerGen" (5.4.1). Phil Inskipp referred to NP/PG as a 
"duopoly which can rig the market" (5.4.2). Stuart Ffoulkes of Enron confirmed that "the 
RECs were very keen to get involved in independent power projects because of their lack 
of control in the market". At the same time, Ffoulkes pointed out that a dash-for-gas of 
some size would have happened under any organisational structure for the privatised ESI 
(5.4.4). 
The RECs' interest in generation was increased after the 1988 White Paper and Electricity 
Bill made clear the Government's intention to allow essentially unregulated activity in 
fossil fuel generation - as compared to the strict regulatory regime that was being 
constructed for distribution and supply. John Harris, Chairman of East Midlands 
Electricity, in evidence to the Energy Select Committee in 1992, stated that investment in 
power plant allowed the RECs to "get equity into non-regulated businesses" (5.3.4). This 
was also identified as a reason for Norweb's interest in generation by Graham Wilman 
(5.4.1). Phil Inskipp suggested that Scottish Hydro-Electric's interest in generation was a 
secondary response to the investment of others (5.4.2). The large industrial electricity 
users had similarly powerful institutional reasons to enter generation, given greater 
liberalisation of the industry. As made clear by Phil Smith of ICI, they had been 
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frustrated in their efforts to develop independent schemes under the terms of the 1983 
Energy Act (5.4.3). At the same time, it became clear that the discount prices for 
electricity that the CEGB's largest customers had enjoyed under nationalisation were to 
end with privatisation. 
The involvement of the RECs and large users drove forwards the initially speculative 
schemes of independent power producers. Independent analysts expressed considerable 
scepticism concerning the feasibility of independent plant proposals in the early stages of 
privatisation. REC involvement was crucial to the realisation of the IPP schemes. They 
provided equity, but more importantly, they were in a unique position to offer a 
guaranteed market for new plant. The signing of long-term Power Purchase Agreements 
was critical to the securing of finance for IPP schemes. Whilst the RECs' motivations to 
become involved in generation were a product of institutional and legislative pressures, 
the expression of this desire depended on a technical and economic factors - in particular, 
the much-reduced barriers to entry into generation made possible by the development of 
CCGT technology. Another important factor here was the ongoing liberalisation of the 
British gas supply industry, which made gas supply contracts available for the first time 
in the late-1980s (5.3.1). Without the development of CCGT technology, and the 
availability of competitive gas supply contracts, the desire for new generation in the 
industry would not have been realised on anything like the same scale, particularly given 
the disadvantages of independent generators under the terms of the LCP Directive. 
The unanticipated realisation of IPP schemes provided the major generators with their 
own institutional motivations to expand their investment in CCGT plant. As was argued 
by British Coal in evidence to the Energy Select Committee in 1992, this appears to have 
been an essentially defensive reaction (5.3.4). In their own evidence to the select 
committee at this time, National Power and PowerGen concentrated on criticising the 
"uneconomic" investments of the RECs - and had earlier stated to the select committee 
they were burning gas now simply because it was now available (5.3.3). However, the 
timing of the large generators' increased interest in CCGT plant suggests a primarily 
reactionary motivation. Only in April and May 1989 did National Power and PowerGen 
announce they were greatly expanding the CEGB's plans for CCGT investment - almost 
a year after the issuing of the LCP Directive. By this time it was clear that independent 
generator interest in CCGT technology was progressing on a significant scale, and it 
seems this - rather than the economic implications of the LCP Directive itself - exercised 
greatest influence on the plans of National Power and PowerGen to scale-up their 
involvement in CCGT schemes. Even with the LCP Directive in place, it is highly 
probable that CCGT technology would have been introduced much more slowly into the 
British ESI if left to the CEGB's successors alone. It was only after it had become 
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apparent that CCGT technology was enabling a much greater and more immediate threat 
to their markets than had been anticipated, that National Power's and PowerGen's own 
interest in an immediate large-scale CCGT programme developed. 
As well as legislative and institutional factors, economic considerations were clearly a 
powerful influence on investment in new generation technology in the British ESI after 
privatisation. CCGT technology was uniquely well-suited to the demands of private 
sector investors for quick returns on investment, minimum capital outlay, and least 
exposure to risk. Graham Wilman of Norweb stated that the high rates of return for 
privately-financed IPP projects meant that "the economics swing from fuel cost to capital 
cost being important" (5.4.1). The terms of loan set down by international banks exerted a 
powerful influence on the form and scale of independent investment in generation 
technology in the British ESI after privatisation. This was the background to the 
establishment by the IPP consortia of secure long term back-to-back contracts for fuel 
purchases and electricity sales. Phil Inskipp of Scottish Hydro-Electric stated that IPP 
plants "were basically forced by the banks to sign up to deals for 15 years" (5.4.2). The 
concerns of financiers were also a powerful influence in the adoption by the IPP consortia 
of proven CCGT plant components imported from overseas. Phil Inskip described the 
problems this presented to the Keadby CCGT plant consortium, and concluded that "the 
banks were still nervous, they don't like anything new" (5.4.2). The prescribing influence 
of the conditions of loan by international banks was also clear in the accounts of the 
Teeside Power Project. ICI's Phil Smith highlighted the need for Enron and Westinghouse 
to reassure-banks about the reliability of CCGT technology (5.4.3). Stuart Ffoulkes of 
Enron stated that obtaining loans for CCGT plant construction depended on assurances of 
a guaranteed market that could only be provided by REC involvement; he added that "for 
the first 15 years, much of what Teeside Power does is keeping the banks happy" (5.4.4). 
After the substantial increases in natural gas prices for industrial customers imposed by 
British Gas at the beginning of 1991 (5.3.3), there is considerable evidence that new 
CCGT plant became a more expensive form of generation than existing coal-fired plant, 
even with desulphurisation equipment fitted. This was indicated, for example, by the 
comments of representatives from both the large generators and the RECs in evidence to 
the Energy Select Committee's 1992 inquiry on the Consequences of Electricity 
Privatisation (5.3.4). The continuation of the dash-for-gas during 1991 and 1992 
confirms the view that much of the desire by the large generators and RECs to invest in 
new plant arose from institutional rivalry rather than solely economic considerations. 
The 1992/93 coal crisis provoked a period of uncertainty in the industry, during which 
there was considerable pressure on the Director General to restrict the size of any further 
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expansion of the dash-for-gas (5.3.5). Whilst he eventually acted in a much less 
interventionist way than many of his critics demanded, the Director General's two year 
capping of pool prices, and his demand for plant divestment on the part of National 
Power and PowerGen, marked a significant re-ordering of the financial and institutional 
context for generation. The immediate effect of the uncertainty associated with the coal 
crisis was the cancellation or deferment of a significant amount of proposed CCGT plant 
- demonstrating that such investment was predicated on a stable and accommodating 
institutional and regulatory framework. 
By the mid-1990s the ESI was entering a new period of uncertainty associated with the 
complete liberalisation of supply in 1998. In 1995 Norweb stated that this was making 
them less interested in new generation schemes (5.3.5). Similarly, Phil Inskipp of Hydro- 
Electric argued that supply deregulation meant that long-term power purchase contracts 
with the RECs were harder to obtain, and added that he "wouldn't be surprised if all the 
independents went to the wall after 1998" (5.4.2). By 1997, however, there was little 
prospect of this - indeed, such were the extent of further investment plans in CCGT 
technology, that analysts were reporting that a "second dash-for-gas" was under way 
(5.3.6). 
Amongst the extensive debate on the changes to the ESI since privatisation, some 
attempts were made at identifying the most important influences of the dash-for-gas. 
Much of this discussion focused on the relative importance of local institutional and 
legislative and regulatory changes to the British ESI that accompanied privatisation, as 
compared to international technological and economic changes in the price and 
availability of natural gas, and also the cost and performance of CCGT technology. For 
example, in evidence to the Energy Committee in 1992, the Watt Committee argued that 
deregulation of gas-fired generation technology was a more important factor than the 
restructuring of the industry associated with privatisation (5.3.4). In the same way, Roger 
Semmens of PowerGen argued that the dash-for-gas was a result of the availability of 
natural gas, and was "not to do with privatisation at all" (5.3.4). Similar views were 
expressed by Ron Haywood, who stated that "it was the price which won the day". 
However both Semmens and Haywood went on to concede that the pace - if not the 
direction - of change in generation technology was influenced by ESI restructuring. 
A close examination of the dash-for-gas makes the case for the primacy of fuel prices and 
availability, over ESI restructuring, hard to sustain. Despite cheaper gas prices, at the 
beginning of 1988 the CEGB remained committed to the construction of large nuclear 
and coal fired plant, and they anticipated only a secondary role for CCGT technology at 
this time. Furthermore, the accounts of those involved in independent CCGT schemes 
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highlighted not only gas price and availability, but also to other factors such as 
institutional rivalry and environmental legislation (5.4). Doyle and MacClaine argued that 
it was the Government's creation of a strong duopoly in generation that provided the 
liberalised RECs with their strongest incentive to enter the dash-for-gas (5.3.5). Whilst 
the availability of cheap gas was undoubtedly a critical factor in the development of 
CCGT technology in the British ESI, it cannot be isolated as the only crucial factor, or 
even the most important one. 
In the same way, it is misleading to give fuel prices primacy in terms of setting the 
direction of change, with non-economic factors having influence on only the pace of 
developments. In the nationalised ESI, economic factors were never the primary 
influence on generation technology, and it is unlikely that cheaper gas prices alone would 
have significantly disturbed an unrestructured CEGB's plans for new coal-fired and 
nuclear plant for the 1990s. Rather, as both Cecil Parkinson and John Wakeham argued, 
the Board's plans would have probably progressed without comment in the absence of 
industry restructuring (4.3.1,4.3.3), with the result that there would have been much less 
need in capacity (or environmental) terms for any subsequent CCGT plant. As Pacey, 
HArd and others pointed out, the CEGB's hesitancy to adopt CCGT technology conforms 
to a pattern: monopoly bodies are characteristically associated with conservative and 
incremental innovation, and are reluctant to engage in radical technological change. As 
discussed above, there is evidence that National Power and PowerGen inherited the 
CEGB's conservatism in this regard, and only expanded their interest in CCGT plant after 
the scale of threat from IPP schemes became apparent. 
Other analysts have discussed the dash-for-gas in terms of the relative importance of 
technical versus economic influences. For example, Gordon MacKerron argued that the 
British dash-for-gas owed "less to major technical improvements than to radical changes 
in the economic environment in which the electricity supply industry operates" (5.3.5). 
Although this conclusion is valid in terms of the immediate changes affecting the industry 
in the late-1980s, from a longer term perspective it is more questionable. The evidence 
provided by the accounts of those involved in the dash-for-gas would suggest that the 
steady improvement in CCGT technology since the 1960s was crucial to its introduction 
in the privatisation period. For example, in his account of the Teeside Power project, ICI's 
Phil Smith, as well as referring to the economic and institutional factors behind the choice 
of CCGT plant, referred to the importance of the progressive efficiency gains made by 
gas turbine technology (5.3.4). Graham Wilman of Norweb pointed to the importance of 
the additional efficiency gains in CCGT technology since the start of the dash-for-gas 
(5.4.1). Doyle and MacLaine also reiterated the continuing market implications of 
increases in CCGT performance (5.3.5). 
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In another paper, MacKerron argued that environmental factors - specifically the need to 
comply with the LCP Directive - had "played only a minor supporting role" in the dash- 
for-gas, particularly for the RECs and independent generators. Instead, he stressed the 
importance of institutional rivalry (5.3.4). As discussed earlier in the present section, 
whilst institutional rivalry between the RECs, large users and CEGB successors was 
undoubtedly a source of much of the desire for new capacity within the industry, there is 
considerable evidence that the issuing of the LCP Directive was highly influential in the 
choice of CCGT technology as the technical form in which this desire would be 
expressed. Until independent power producers were placed under a greater relative 
burden by the LCP Directive, they were intending to base much of their entry into 
generation on the recommissioning of coal-fired steam turbine plant. In the period since 
privatisation, as progressively more stringent restrictions on pollution levels have been 
introduced, environmental compliance has remained an important factor in the industry's 
preference for gas-fired generation. 
As other analysts, such as Eric Jeffs (5.3.4), and Jim Watson (5.3.5) stressed, the radical 
switch in technological preference that occurred in the British ESI in 1988 and 1989, and 
continued thereafter, can only be understood by reference to a number of coinciding 
technical, economic, institutional, regulatory and political factors - the absence of any 
one of which would have limited the pace and direction of change. Some of these factors 
were local, in that they were peculiar to the British ESI privatisation process, whereas 
others reflected global/international changes in generation technology and fuel prices. At 
a local level, the partial liberalisation of the industry ahead of privatisation gave release - 
and because of its limited extent, catalysed and accelerated - the desire for entry into 
generation on the part of RECs and others. However, the manifestation of this desire in 
terms of a particular technological form was a reflection of more international forces - 
particularly those involving CCGT technology and the availability of cheap natural gas - 
which were essentially unconnected with the privatisation process itself. As such, the 
introduction of CCGT technology in Britain was an unpredictable and contingent process. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
COAL-FIRED STEAM TURBINE TECHNOLOGY 
AND ESI PRIVATISATION 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the interaction between coal-fired steam turbine technology - 
always the dominant technical form of generation - with the British ESI privatisation 
process. The commercial risks and uncertainties associated with steam turbine technology 
were much less than those of nuclear power, and the selling-off of coal-fired plant 
presented none of the immediate problems encountered with nuclear plant. As was 
described in Section 4.2, the structure for electricity generation after privatisation was 
shaped primarily by the Government's desire to secure the future of nuclear power. By 
comparison, fossil fuel plant received only secondary attention in the privatisation 
process. Consequently, rather than an examination of the influence of steam turbine 
technology on privatisation, this chapter is concerned rathermore with the effects of ESI 
privatisation of on steam turbine technology. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 6.2 reviews the changes affecting 
steam turbine technology before and during ESI privatisation, focusing particularly on the 
views of industry insiders and observers. Section 6.3 considers the fortunes of coal-fired 
generation after privatisation, including the coal crisis of the early-1990s. Section 6.4 
provides an industry perspective on changes to the dominant form of generation 
technology, based on an interview with a senior figure in the British electrical plant 
manufacturing industry. Section 6.5 considers the impact of privatisation on fossil fuel 
generation technology R&D, particularly the development of clean coal technology. 
Finally, Section 6.6 is a summary and review of the chapter. 
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6.2 Steam Turbine Technology during the Privatisation Process 
6.2.1 Industry Perceptions ahead of Privatisation 
In the run-up to ESI privatisation there were no new power stations under construction in 
Britain other than the Sizewell B PWR, and the CEGB was expressing fears of a potential 
capacity shortage by the late-1990s. The last order for fossil fuel plant had been placed in 
1977 (three 660MW turbines, built for Drax B). In February 1988 the CEGB applied for 
planning consent for two 1800MW coal-fired stations, West Burton B and Fawley B. 1 
The plants were to be based on newly-developed 900MW steam turbines, incorporating 
improved steam conditions and advanced steel alloy turbine blades, which had been 
developed jointly by the CEGB and GEC. The turbines were described by R. N. 
Burbridge, the Director of the CEGB's Generation Development and Construction 
Division, as a "modest extrapolation on the present 660MW sets, with features already 
established by experience or component development". 2 Burbridge added that "it is clear 
... that the nation 
faces a shortage of generating capacity in the mid-1990s and this is to 
be averted by the dual policy of a small family of PWR stations and new coal-fired 
stations using the 900MW units". 3 
As the ESI privatisation process got under way in 1987 and early-1988, concern for 
British Coal was overwhelmingly centred on the threat of cheap coal imports, and on the 
urgent need to establish new long term contracts between BC and the CEGB's successors, 
given the overwhelming market dependence of sales to the CEGB that had built up in the 
years after nationalisation. Since the early-1980s, over three-quarters of BC sales had 
been to the CEGB and SSEB, and under the Joint Understandings, BC had provided 95% 
of coal supplied to the CEGB. 4 Privatisation coincided with the ending, in March 1990, 
of the revised Joint Understanding, under which the CEGB was obliged to take 75mt p. a. 
of BC coal. Freeing-up the fuel choice of the electricity generators presented a clear 
threat to BC, and some analysts argued that because of this, the coal industry should be 
privatised ahead of, or at the same time as the ESI. 5 
I CEGB, Annual Report and Accounts 1988-89, London, July 1989: 7 
2 R. N.. Burbridge, 'Development of 900MW Coal-Fired Generating Units', Power Engineering Journal, May 1988, 
ppl47-154: 148-149 
3 ibid: 154 
4 ESTUC evidence to the Energy Select Committee inquiry, The Structure, Regulation, and Economic Consequences of 
Electricity Supply in the Private Sector, HC 307,1987-88, Vol 11: 159 
5 See for example, Colin Robinson and Eileen Marshall, Can Coal Be Saved?, Hobart Paper No. 105, London, Institute 
of Economic Affairs, 1985; also Peter Rost, Towards a Competitive Market-Related Energy Policy', Energy Policy. 
Vol. 16, No. 5, pp450-452, October 1988: 451 
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However, alongside the considerable concern for British Coal, there was very little 
attention devoted to the possible threat privatisation might present to the dominance of 
coal-fired steam turbine technology. As discussed in 5.3.1, the Energy Select Committee 
heard little evidence on the potential impact of CCGT technology in the course of their 
1988 inquiry on ESI privatisation. 6 
In their memorandum to the Select Committee, British Coal stated that they regarded the 
setting-up of long term fuel contracts with the generators as "essential for both 
industries", and expressed "great concern" about the threat of cheap coal imports? One of 
the CEGB's proposed new coal-fired plants, at Fawley, was well-located to receive 
imported coal, and it was known that the CEGB was proposing to build additional bulk 
importing facilities at this time. Under questioning by the Select Committee, the 
Chairman of the British Coal Corporation, Sir Robert Haslam, emphasised that BC's 
future prospects depended on reaching agreement on 10 year contracts with the 
generators. Nevertheless, Haslam also maintained that "we still believe we can establish 
ourselves as a supplier of choice to the electricity industry", and he dismissed the forecast 
of a recent Coalfield Communities report that BC would be reduced to 48 collieries by 
1992, as "going too far". 8 
In stark contrast to its handling of nuclear power, the Government made clear that it was 
not prepared to make any special provisions for the British coal industry in its plans for 
ESI privatisation. In particular, the Department of Energy was unwilling to broker the 
kind of long-term fuel contract with the generators that BC was asking for. The Energy 
Secretary Cecil Parkinson told the Energy Committee that after ESI privatisation, "there 
will be no statutory obligation on the generators to buy British coal" .9 The Government's 
public comments on the impact of privatisation on fossil fuel choice at this time were 
restricted to an expression of its confidence that - provided BC continued to make rapid 
improvements in productivity (the industry had undergone substantial rationalisation 
since the 1984/5 miners' strike) - it would be able to compete successfully with foreign 
coal suppliers. Under questioning by the Select Committee on this issue, Parkinson stated 
that "local produced electricity is going to be overwhelmingly the main source of 
electricity supply in this country ... Seventy to seventy-five per cent of all our future 
electricity is going to come from coal". 10 
6 The Structure, Regulation, and Economic Consequences of Electricity Supply in the Private Sector, IHC 307,1987-88 
7ibid, Vol 11.120 
8 ibid, Vol 111: 256 
9 ibid: 72 
10 ibid: 83 
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In Parliament, Parkinson was repeatedly questioned about the consequences of ESI 
privatisation for British Coal. In March 1988, shortly after the publication of the White 
Paper on privatisation, he was asked about the threat presented by the Government's 
proposals to the CEGB's plans for new coal-fired steam turbine plant. He replied that "we 
expect these orders to be pursued. We believe there is an important future for coal and 
that well into the foreseeable future coal will continue to be the major source of our 
electricity". 11 Sir Anthony Meyer suggested that the "form of privatisation" that 
Parkinson had chosen would "unleash competitive forces that will lead finally to the 
virtual closure of the British deep-mine coal industry". 12 Parkinson stated that this was 
"pessimistic nonsense", and he added that "there will be a need for 75 million tonnes of 
coal a year, and I refuse to believe that the British coal industry ... cannot meet the 
challenge of supplying most of that need". 13 He argued that no protection for BC was 
necessary - given the established dominance of coal-fired steam turbine technology in 
Britain's electricity generation infrastructure, and the practical restrictions on coal 
imports, British Coal would inevitably continue to be the dominant electricity fuel 
supplier - and steam turbine the dominant generation technology - for some time after 
privatisation. In the debate on the White Paper, he stated that "three quarters of our 
electricity will come from coal-fired power stations, way into the future". 14 
The CEGB was reluctant to make any statement of its plans for coal imports in the run-up 
to privatisation, but under questioning by the Energy Committee, the CEGB Chairman, 
Lord Marshall, recognised the threat to British coal from cheaper imports. Marshall stated 
that "the major issues will be about the use of coal and whether coal is imported or we 
use British coal"; he indicated that he saw no prospect of any other major change in 
choice of fuel or generation technology. 15 
The general weight of opinion of independent energy analysts at this time was that, 
although BC would inevitably lose some of its share of the generation market after ESI 
privatisation, it would nevertheless continue to be the dominant fuel supplier to the 
industry. Robert Peddie, for example, (a former member of the CEGB) told the Energy 
Committee that "whilst there would be an increase in imports, a slimmed-down United 
II HC Debates, 1987-88, Vol. 129, c3 
12ibid, c3 
13 ibid, c3 
14 ibid, c56. Whilst they were frustrated in their efforts to gain long-term contracts, British Coal itself appeared to take 
some solace from the Government's assurances. Henney argued that it was only in late-1989 that BC began to 
appreciate the scale of likely investment in CCGT plant, and that even afterwards, up to the 1992 General Election, it 
hoped for a "political solution" to its problems, with the return of a more supportive Labour Government. (Alex 
Henney, A Study of the Privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and Wales, London, EEE Ltd, 
1994: 288) 
15 HC 307,1987-88, op cit, Vol. III: I l 
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Kingdom coal industry would be capable of retaining the bulk of the power stations 
market". 16 
6.2.2 Steam Turbine Technology during the Privatisation Process 
The limits on sulphur dioxide emissions in the EC Large Combustion Plants Directive, 
agreed to in June 1988, required the fitting of desulphurisation technology to all new, and 
some existing, coal-fired plant. As discussed in section 5.3.2, the LCP Directive proved 
critical in the relative cost of electricity from coal-fired steam turbine versus CCGT plant, 
and from mid-1988 onwards, schemes for CCGT plant emerged in increasing number 
from all parts of the British ESI. At the same time there was increasing concern for the 
viability of the CEGB's proposals for new coal-fired steam turbine plants. As well as the 
challenge of CCGT technology, the Government's protective measures for nuclear power, 
announced in the February 1988 White Paper (4.2.3) and the December 1988 Electricity 
Bill (4.3.1), put additional pressure on the market for coal-fired generation. This was felt 
both directly, through the reservation of much of the baseload supply for Nuclear 
Electric, and indirectly, as the creation of a neo-duopoly in generation gave additional 
motivation on the part of RECs and large users to minimise their dependency on existing 
generation plant. 17 
Nevertheless, in the second reading of the Electricity Bill in December 1988, despite 
increasing concerns inside and outside parliament for the future of coal-fired generation, 
the Energy Secretary Cecil Parkinson argued that "if there is to be a privileged fuel for 
the future it will be - as it has been in the past - coal, which will have a five times bigger 
share of the market than nuclear power". 18 
In a climate of continued uncertainty, the CEGB announced the deferral of its application 
for the proposed Fawley B steam turbine plant in October 1988. The Financial Times 
reported that the CEGB's decision was a result of Area Boards' reluctance to give the 
CEGB any long-term commitment to purchase power from the plant. It added that the 
CEGB privately acknowledged that none of the proposed steam turbine plants would now 
be built, and that the Board was instead planning to build CCGT plants. 19 In its 1988/89 
Annual Report, the CEGB confirmed that it had decided to cancel Fawley B after failing 
16 ibid: 212 
17 In this respect, Henney stated, the "final legacy of nuclear power" was to create additional difficulties for British 
Coal" (Henney, op cit: 288). 
18 HC Debates, 1988-89, Vol. 143, c675 
19 Maurice Samuelson and Nick Garnett, 'Coal-Fired Power Station Plans Hit by Privatisation', Financial Times, 27th 
October 1988, pl 
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to secure any commitment from the Area Boards/RECs to contract for the output from the 
proposed plant. 20 At the same time, it stated that the second proposed steam turbine plant, 
West Burton B, was "under consideration". 
In April 1989, the Labour MP Joe Ashton expressed his concern in Parliament about the 
threat CCGT technology now presented to the CEGB's proposed coal-fired steam turbine 
plants (one of which, West Burton B, was to be located in his constituency). 21 Ashton 
referred to a letter he received from Lord Marshall, stating that the CEGB would be 
unable to progress with any of the proposed plants unless they were given assurances 
from the Area Boards that they would contract for power provided. In response to 
Ashton's concern, Cecil Parkinson again made clear the Government's reluctance to 
intervene in generation technology choice in the fossil fuel part of the ESI. At the same 
time, he argued that the size of coal imports would be restricted by the limited size of the 
international coal market, and also the limited capacity of bulk importing facilities, and 
he maintained that "the prospects are extremely good for the British coal industry". 22 
Nevertheless, in May 1989, National Power cancelled the proposed West Burton B plant, 
and stated that they had been as yet unable to secure long term power purchase 
agreements with the RECs. 23 
Despite their public expressions of confidence in the future of coal-fired generation, 
evidence emerged that, in private, the Government recognised the scale of the threat 
presented by ESI privatisation to British Coal. In October 1989 a presentation to the 
Cabinet by the new Energy Secretary, John Wakeham, was leaked. The report - evidently 
written some time earlier - forecast that in the first three years after ESI privatisation, 
British Coal would lose 15mt of its annual market, resulting in the loss of 30,000 jobs and 
the closure of one-third of its mines. 24 Power in Europe argued that the document 
revealed an "almost unbelievable bias against coal and in favour of nuclear power". 25 
At the beginning of December 1989, after considerable pressure from the Energy 
Secretary, John Wakeham, National Power and PowerGen agreed to contracts with 
British Coal for the first few years after privatisation. The contracts ran for three years 
from April 1990 to April 1993; they required National Power and PowerGen to take 70mt 
20 CEGB Annual Report 1988-89, London, CEGB 1989: 15 
21 HC Debates, Vol. 150,1988-89, c281-282 
22 ibid, c302 
23 Power in Europe, No. 49,11th May 1989. In the event, three-quarters of the power purchase contracts agreed 
between the National Power and PowerGen and RECs ahead of privatisation were of only 3-5 years (the rest were 6 
months short term contracts) Power in Europe, No. 52,22nd June 1989. 
24 Power in Europe, No. 61 a, 31st October 1989: 6 
25 ibid: 6 
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of BC coal for the first two years, and 65mt in the third. 26 Although they ran for a far 
shorter than BC was asking for, the agreements meant that coal imports would be much 
less than had been feared, and they were initially thought to secure the future of British 
Coal, at least in the short-term. They were greeted by Sir Robert Haslam, the Chairman of 
British Coal, as evidence that forecasts of the contraction of the coal industry were 
"seriously overstated". 27 
In the same month, the Energy Secretary, John Wakeham, discussed the prospects for the 
coal industry after ESI privatisation with the Energy Select Committee. 28 A number of 
Energy Committee members, with longstanding support for the coal industry, argued that 
three year contracts were wholly inadequate for securing the future of British Coal. 
Wakeham defended the contracts as providing a "good opportunity", for BC provided 
they continued to reduce their costs, but he refused to speculate further on the impact of 
privatisation on the coal industry. At the same time he recognised that gas turbine/CCGT 
technology was by now presenting a substantial threat to coal-fired generation 
technology. He stated that he "would anticipate that ... [British Coal's] competition will 
be very much from gas, which I think will have a good share of the future market". 29 
6.3 Steam Turbine Generation Technology after Privatisation 
6.3.1 The Accelerating Threat to Steam Turbine Technology 
In mid-1991, shortly after the flotation of National Power and PowerGen, the Energy 
Select Committee undertook an inquiry on Clean Coal Technology and the Coal Market 
after 1993.30 As well as discussing the prospects for the different types of clean coal 
technologies (see 6.5, below), the inquiry provided a forum for concern about the 
accelerating threat to coal-fired generation. 
The consensus amongst the evidence submitted to the select committee at this time was 
that the British coal industry was greatly threatened by both cheap coal imports, and also 
gas turbine generation technology. Particularly alarming evidence was submitted by the 
industry analysts Gerald McCloskey and Guy Doyle. They predicted a dramatic decline 
in the use of coal for electricity generation, so that by 1995, British Coal would be left 
26 Power in Europe, No. 64,7th December 1989, pp1-3 
27 Maurice Samuelson, 'Electricity Contracts Safeguard Coal Jobs', Financial Times, 5th December 1989, p20 28 House of Commons Energy Committee, The Structure, Regulation, and Economic Consequences of Electricity 
Supply in the Private Sector: Minutes of Evidence, HC 96,1989-90: 1 
29 ibid: l 
30 1IC 208,1990-91, published in July 1991. 
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with just 10-15 pits, and a total annual output of just 28mt. 31 By 1998, they suggested, the 
market for indigenous coal in Britain may have virtually disappeared. This decline, they 
suggested, would be the result both of large increases in the use of gas turbines for 
generation, and also imported coal. 32 
A number of witnesses to the Select Committee called for the protection of the British 
Coal industry. For example, the Watt Committee on Energy stated that "at some level of 
reduction the coal industry, or part of it, would justify being ring-fenced on the grounds 
of national need for adequate diversity of supply as per the nuclear industry" 33 In his 
evidence the Energy Secretary John Wakeham rejected the suggestion that the 
Government should intervene to restrict coal imports or investment in gas turbines. He 
maintained that "British Coal has an excellent future", and dismissed McCloskey's and 
Doyle's predictions as being "overly pessimistic"; he added that he would be "very 
concerned" if such a collapse were to come about. 34 
Both National Power and PowerGen were planning to import significant amounts of coal 
at this time, and both were progressing with the construction of deep-harbour port 
facilities. National Power told the select committee that they considered that as much as 
50% of their coal needs could be imported after the expiry of the current fuel contracts 
with British Coal in 1993.35 NP's Commercial Director, Mr. J. Webster, argued that the 
much greater use of imported coal was made inevitable by the Government's measures to 
liberalise the industry: "we have been placed by this legislation in a competitive situation. 
There is nothing we can do about that ... we must 
buy competitively". 36 Although the 
dash-for-gas was well under way mid-1991 (see 5.3.2), the Energy Committee concluded 
that "at present ... the most serious threat to British Coal's existing markets appears to be 
imported coal rather than gas". 37 The Committee argued that in the long term, natural gas 
would not be able to maintain its market share in generation. It added that, by 2000, much 
coal-fired steam turbine plant would be around 30 years old, and need replacing by 
advanced clean coal technologies, but warned that the development of these technologies 
in Britain was being sacrificed in the market-based ESI. 
31 ibid. Vol. 111: 99 
32 ibid: 104-5 McCloskey and Doyle pointed out that on the international market, virtually no British deep-mined coal 
was competitive, since large opencast mines in Australia, South Africa and the USA could produce coal far more 
cheaply than anywhere in Western Europe. They added that the collapse of the British coal industry was not dependent 
on CCGT technology or the extra cost of desulphurisation technology, since imported coal would have replaced British 
coal irrespective of these developments (ibid: 104-5) 
33 ibid, Vol 11: 40 
34 ibid, Vol. I1I: 235 
35 ibid, Vol. 111: 167 
36 ibid: 167 
37 ibid, Vol I: xxxvi 
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By the time the Energy Select Committee's inquiry into the Consequences of Electricity 
Privatisation was published in February 1992,38 the dash-for-gas was by now clearly the 
dominant threat to British Coal's market, and the Committee were forced to reconsider 
their view of just over six months ago in their Clean Coal Technology report. The 
Committee conceded that "it now appears that the threat to British Coal's market from 
gas-fired generation is more serious than that from imported coal ... New evidence has 
made it brutally apparent how drastically and rapidly Britain's coal industry will contract 
if present policies continue". 39 
A number of witnesses to the Committee at this time were highly critical of the 
Government for allowing free rein to the dash-for-gas. One of the most outspoken of 
these was Malcolm Edwards. Although still the Commercial Director of British Coal, 
Edwards was by now a marginalised figure, and he was openly critical of the 
Government's energy policy, and also what he saw as British Coal's compliance in its 
own demise. Like many others (see 5.3.3) Edwards argued that the dash-for-gas was 
being driven by non-economic forces. He stated that "it arises out of rivalry. The RECs 
were very concerned to have something with which to bargain with the generators ... the 
generators reacted to defend their market share ... and also to mop up the surplus gas" 
40 
Edwards stated that vertical separation of generation and supply meant that the generators 
now resisted all but the shortest contractual commitment with fuel suppliers, and he 
claimed that short-termism was now endemic in the ESI 41 He claimed that five year 
contracts were the minimum needed for British Coal, but stated that securing these 
required considerable managing of the total energy market, "something which in the end 
only the Department of Energy can do". 42 He went on to present an alternative agenda 
for a government-directed British energy policy, which continued to give a central role to 
indigenous coal supplies. He argued that if the Government was prepared to "manage the 
market", and ensure that proposed CCGT plants "stand up to a really thorough economic 
examination", then the British coal industry, although still likely to contract, would be 
"capable of being built upon and sustaining itself"43 
In his evidence to the Energy Committee at this time, the independent energy analyst 
Dieter Helm also argued that institutional self-interests - particularly those of the 
38 HC 113,1991-92 
39 ibid, Vol. I: li 
40 ibid, Vol. 11I: 142 
41 ibid: 141. By contrast, Scottish Coal found it much easier to negotiate with the vertically-integrated Scottish boards. 
As Edwards pointed out, there was no equivalent dash-for-gas in the Scottish ESI. 
42 ibid: 143 
431bid: 145-6 
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Government itself - had profoundly shaped the ESI privatisation process. Helm claimed 
that before privatisation, the Government had deliberately arranged contracts between 
British Coal and National Power/PowerGen to be in place for the period 1990-1993, so 
that the inevitable consequence of freedom of choice in fuel supplies for the generators - 
the collapse of British Coal - would be delayed until after the 1992 General Election 44 
He also argued that after the withdrawal of nuclear power from privatisation in 1989, 
some of National Power's and PowerGen's fossil fuel plants should have been sold off to 
third parties, despite Government protestations that there was insufficient time to change 
the structure of the industry. as 
6.3.2 The Coal Crisis and the Coal Review 
The General Election of April 1992 returned the Conservative Party to power for a fourth 
successive time, with a commitment to privatise British Coal. One of their first acts of the 
new Government was the dissolution of the Department of Energy (and alongside it, the 
Energy Select Committee). Government responsibilities for the ESI now passed to the 
Department of Trade and Industry, under the President of the Board of Trade, Michael 
Heseltine. Parliamentary scrutiny of energy policy was passed to the Trade and Industry 
Select Committee. The abolition the Department of Energy further marked the apparent 
depoliticisation of energy policy, at least within the fossil fuel sector. Within a few 
months, however, the fallout of the Government's market-led approach to fossil fuel 
choice and generation technology became a national political crisis, and focus for the 
Government's critics. 
In October 1992, after failing to agree new fuel contracts with the generators after March 
1993, British Coal announced that 31 of their 50 deep mines were to close within 6 
months, with the loss of 24,000 jobs (from a total of 54,000) 46 A number of pits were to 
close within a few days, and, for the first time in the history of the nationalised coal 
industry, the closures would involve compulsory redundancies. British Coal stated it had 
been forced into such drastic measures; National Power and PowerGen, it emerged, were 
only prepared to offer 5 year contracts for 40mt in the first year, and 30mt for the next 
four, compared to 65mt p. a. under the present contract. BC suggested that this meant that 
they would be running just 15 pits by 1997. 
44 ibid: 55 
45 ibid: 54 
46 Cmnd 2235, March 1993: 1-2 
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The announcement caused a public outcry, and in response, Michael Heseltine announced 
a moratorium on 21 of the 31 pits earmarked for closure, pending a 30-day consultation 
period, during which the Government would undertake a review of British Coal's plans, 
and also consider some wider issues of energy policy 47 At the same time, the Trade and 
Industry Select Committee announced that it would also undertake its own enquiry into 
the coal crisis. 
The Select Committee report, British Energy Policy and the Market for Coal 48, was 
published first, at the end of January 1993. The Committee heard evidence from Michael 
Heseltine on the events leading up to BC's announcement. He stated that the DTI had 
been trying to arrange for contracts to be agreed between BC, the generators, and the 
RECs for much of 1992, but added that the Government's influence on contractual 
negotiations were now greatly constrained 49 In his evidence to the Select Committee, the 
Chief Executive of National Power, John Baker, made brutally clear the approach of the 
privatised generators to coal contracts. Baker stated that "the electricity industry has no 
commercial need for long term contracts for coal supplies"50, and that given the 
abundance of low-cost coal on the international markets, National Power would ideally 
prefer just one year contracts with BC, so as to be able to take advantage of any short- 
term price reductions in the market. At the same time, Baker repeated his view that the 
more recent independent CCGT plants provided electricity more expensively than 
existing coal plant. sl 
Much of the debate during the coal crisis inevitably focused on the dash-for-gas. By this 
time fifteen CCGT stations were expected to come on-stream by 1995, displacing around 
25-40mt of coal. A large body of opinion presented to the Trade and Industry Select 
Committee was now of the view that the scale of investment in CCGT plant was 
disproportionate to its economic opportunity, and reflected instead problems with the 
structure for generation in the privatised ESI. The licensing and regulation of CCGT plant 
was given particular attention at this time. Under the 1991 Electricity Act, all new power 
plant schemes required Government consent for operation. Since ESI privatisation the 
DTI had not turned down any applications for consent, arguing that the decision to build 
and operate power stations was a commercial matter for generating companies. 52 
47 DTI Press Notice, 21st October 1992. The other ten pits, he stated, were so clearly uneconomic as to be beyond 
saving under any circumstances. 
48 HC 237,1992-93 
49 ibid: 3 
50 ibid, Vol. v: 85 
51 ibid: 93 
52 ibid. Vol. i: 15 
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The Electricity Act also granted substantial regulatory powers to the Office of Electricity 
Regulation (OFFER). Each new generator was required to gain a generation licence from 
OFFER, and each domestic supplier a public electricity supply (PES) licence. Under the 
terms of the PES licence, suppliers were required to "purchase electricity at the best 
effective price reasonably obtainable having regard to all the sources available". 53 In 
deciding their choice of generator, however, suppliers were also allowed to have regard to 
other matters, such as "future security, reliability and diversity". To date, the Director 
General of Electricity Supply, Professor Stephen Littlechild, had approved every 
application for generation licence he had received. In OFFER's first full annual report in 
1991, Littlechild stated that he "did not believe it would promote efficiency and economy, 
or be in the wider public interest, to use licensing as a barrier to entry ... I 
have not found 
it necessary to reject any application for generation licences". 54 
When questioned on this policy by the Trade and Industry Select Committee, Littlechild 
argued that since National Power and PowerGen, as existing generators, did not require 
permission from him to build new plant, he did not consider it appropriate to refuse 
licences to any independent company or REC. Such refusal, he argued, would favour the 
continued market dominance of the large generators. Littlechild stated that he saw his role 
as "an attempt to use as far as possible market forces ... not to predecide ... and 
preconstrain what kind of fuels companies chose to invest in". 55 
A number of independent observers were highly critical of the perceived leniency of the 
Director General's treatment of the RECs, in failing to give adequate attention to the 
supply licence requirement on electricity purchasing. Dieter Helm, for example, 
identified regulatory weakness as an important element in the coal crisis and the dash-for- 
gas. In his evidence to the select committee, Helm stated: 
There is no doubt that a primary reason why gas stations are coming onto 
this system is due to a particular act or omission of the regulator. These 
gas stations do not compete with the two dominant generators for coal, 
they are on long term contracts on the assumption that the RECs can pass 
through the cost to their final customers ... There are no independent gas 
stations in Britain, they are all dependent on REC contracts ... This is vertical integration through contract ... the development of these gas 
stations is in large part an act of regulatory omission. 56 
53 Office of Electricity Regulation, Annual Report 1992, HC 646,1992-93, May 1993: 8 
54 Office of Electricity Regulation, Annual Report 1990, HC 355,1990-91, May 1991: 4 
55 HC 237,1992-93: 68 
56 ibid: 55-57 
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Helm was also highly critical of the conduct of Government in regard to the ESI. He 
claimed that "current policy ... consists of public rhetoric about competition and, 
in fact, 
Government fixing contracts", and referred to "this illusion of competition, illusion of 
market force, whereas in fact, it has been fixed contracts and fixed regulatory 
arrangement" 57 Like many other witnesses to the Trade and Industry Committee at this 
time, Helm called for a greater government direction of energy policy. He stated that: 
"what we need is some kind of framework for deciding the rough mix of fuels ... that is 
something the market is unlikely to arrive at ... it is a job ultimately for energy policy and 
for Government". 58 
Various other parties gave submissions to the Select Committee highly critical of the 
Government's laissez-faire approach to fossil fuel and generation technology choice. 
Gerard McCloskey claimed that baseload coal-fired electricity generation was "a good 
deal cheaper" than baseload gas-fired electricity, and suggested that the emerging pattern 
of generation technology in Britain - in which gas-fired plant was used as baseload 
supply and coal-fired plant as a mid-merit supply - was unparalleled anywhere else in the 
world. 59 Professor Ian Fells of Newcastle University was also highly critical of 
Government energy policy. Fells argued that "the strategy we have at the moment ... leads 
inescapably to the mess that we are in ... short termism of the worst kind and going for 
the cheapest fuels that are available". 60 The General Secretary of the Trades Union 
Congress, Norman Willis, argued that the dash-for-gas was a manifestation of the 
longstanding rivalry within the ESI between generators and distributors: 
This unprecedented rush has occurred not because gas is more efficient, 
but because of acute distortions in the energy market engendered by 
electricity privatisation and deregulation ... Gas-fired capacity is the RECs latest weapon in the long-running battle with the generators for market 
power and profits. 61 
In his evidence, Peter Rost, a former member of the Energy Select Committee, now 
representing the Major Energy Users Council, claimed that the scale of the dash-for-gas - 
and the coal crisis - was an outcome of the Government's failure, ahead of privatisation, 
to break up the CEGB into more than two generators, so as to introduce more competition 
into generation. Rost stated that "the result of having only a duopoly ... has led the RECs 
57 ibid: 56-58 
58 ibid: 56-58 
59 ibid: 49 
ibid: 50 
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to go into probably more power generation than they would have done if they felt 
confident they could shop-around in a competitive generation market". 
62 
In their report conclusions, the Trade and Industry Select Committee stated that despite 
substantial productivity increases and cost reductions in recent years, BC pithead prices 
for coal were still far higher than imported coal. However, they also found that BC were 
offering future price reductions to the generators such that by 1997/98, their prices would 
become competitive with imports, so that limited government support during BC's 
transition to competitiveness was justifiable. The Committee were also highly critical of 
OFFER for not undertaking an earlier investigation into the economics of the dash-for- 
gas. 63 
The findings of the Government's own Coal Review were published in March 1993.64 The 
Review announced that 12 of the 31 pits earmarked for closure were to be reprieved and 
undergo a period of market testing to judge their competitiveness. On the relative costs of 
gas-fired and coal-fired plant, the Government argued that "new gas plant is significantly 
cheaper than new coal plant, and when decisions were made on most of the current 
tranche of gas-fired stations, it stood to produce cheaper electricity than the existing coal 
plants". 65 However, the Review also conceded that "more recently the balance of cost 
advantage has shifted towards existing coal stations". Nevertheless, the Government 
made clear that they were not prepared to impose any restrictions on investment in CCGT 
technology, and maintained that "even now, it is quite possible that further gas projects 
may be economic". 66 Therefore, they stated, the approach to licence applications for new 
plant would continue unchanged, since "as a general rule, matters such as the need for a 
generation station, its capacity, choice of fuel and type of plant are the commercial 
matters for the applicant". 67 The Review essentially amounted to a restatement of the 
Government's commitment to market-based decisionmaking in the fossil-fuel sector of 
the ESI: 
62 ibid: 201 
63 At the beginning of the coal crisis OFFER announced that, in order to inform debate on the future of the ESI, they 
would bring forwards their own review of economic purchasing by the RECs. By the time the select committee's report 
was published, OFFER had already published the early findings of its own inquiry (Office of Electricity Regulation, 
Review of Economic Purchasing, December 1992). As reported in Chapter 5 (5.3.5), OFFER concluded that none of the 
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64 Department of Trade and Industry, The Prospects for Coal: Conclusions of the Government's Coal Review, Cmnd 
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65 ibid: 5. The Government also claimed that on an avoidable cost basis, existing nuclear plant was cheaper than either 
coal or gas plant. 
66 ibid: 46 
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were probably 40 years of economic reserves in the North Sea. It also argued that some of the gas reserves developed 
for CCGTs would not be recovered for any other use. 
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Government should not attempt to impose all-embracing plans about how 
much energy of what kind should be produced or consumed by whom. The 
uncertainty of supply and demand, of technology, and above all of the 
behaviour of people and companies, doom such plans to failure ... Security 
and diversity of supply are best achieved through the operation of 
competitive and open markets 68 
The Review concluded that "despite considerable progress, British Coal proved unable ... 
to achieve cost levels fully competitive with world coal prices" 69 The Government called 
for further reform of British Coal organisation and working practices, but accepted that 
even after these had been achieved, British-mined coal would not become internationally 
cost competitive in the short term. Therefore, a number of measures were announced to 
support the British coal industry, including the offer of subsidies for additional deep- 
mined coal beyond the 5 year contract for 30mt p. a. that National Power and PowerGen 
had recently agreed to. It was also decided to offer for sale any pit no longer required by 
BC, and to provide additional 3 year transitional support for the Coal Research 
Establishment. The Government argued that these measures "should ensure that British 
Coal remains a competitive fuel for electricity generation" 70 The review also announced 
the Government's intention to bring forward its plans for the privatisation of British Coal. 
6.3.3 Industry Analysis of the Coal Crisis 
Interviewed in 1994, Graham Wilman, Major Projects Manager at Norweb Generation, 
argued that the attention given to the dash-for-gas and the behaviour of the RECs during 
the coal crisis was misplaced. Rather than a response to the introduction of CCGT 
technology, Wilman argued, the coal crisis was largely a result of changed policies by 
National Power and PowerGen: 
When the dash-for-gas was making headlines ... attention was successfully diverted by National Power and PowerGen onto the RECs. They said they 
were buying less coal because the RECs are building CCGT plants -'the RECs are putting miners out of work'. But at that time there were only two 
CCGT plants coming on stream - yet National Power and PowerGen had 
reduced their coal tonnage's from around 60mt p. a. to 40mt p. a.. That was due to a running down of the massive stockpiles the generators had built 
up, and [also] because they were buying foreign coal - the flack 
surrounding the dash-for-gas was rather engineered. 
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In considering the impact of ESI privatisation on the British Coal, Wilman stated that BC 
had suffered a backlash from its protected position under nationalisation, during which, 
he stated, "the electricity industry was used as a vehicle for supporting other nationalised 
industries". National Power and PowerGen, he suggested, had inherited the CEGB's 
resentment at being forced to pay "a high cost for coal to support deep coal-mine 
technology" during nationalisation. 
Similarly, Colin Robinson, a long-standing analyst of the industry, argued that rather than 
resulting from Government free-market dogmatism, the collapse of the British coal 
industry (in which the coal crisis was only industry the latest episode) should be traced 
back to government interventionism, and the relations between British Coal and the 
CEGB in the nationalised ESI 71 Ironically, suggested Robinson, it was the dominance of 
coal-fired generation in the nationalised ESI that had led successive governments to 
continue to' promote nuclear power in the 1970s, 1980s, and during ESI privatisation, 
despite knowing that it was uneconomic: 
Although ... [nuclear power] 
had been originally conceived in the 1950s 
and 1960s as means of producing low cost electricity, it became obvious 
by the late-1970s that nuclear costs always far exceeded initial estimates, 
and that it was a relatively high-cost means of generation. Nevertheless, 
governments, concerned at the power which their own policies had given 
to the mining industry and its unions, continued to promote nuclear fission 
as a counterweight to that monopoly power. 72 
As early as 1985, Robinson had argued that the retention of British Coal in public 
ownership after, privatisation of the ESI would result in the sharp decline of demand for 
BC coal 73 Despite this, he stated, "at the time of electricity privatisation, the Government 
apparently gave little thought to the likely disastrous impact on the coal industry". 74 Like 
others, Robinson recognised that the presence of a neo-duopoly in generation after ESI 
meant that the dash-for-gas was inflated beyond that which would have been seen in a 
more competitive environment for generation: "the lack of competition in generation ... 
led to more investment in CCGT plant ... than would otherwise have been likely" 
73 
In considering the best response to the coal crisis, Robinson rejected any further 
protection for domestic coal production, but instead called for further liberalisation of the 
ESI. He stated that "more competition is needed in electricity as a precondition of any 
71 Colin Robinson, Making a Market in Energy, Current Controversies No. 3, London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 
December 1992 
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action which will help the British coal industry", and he proposed the breaking up of 
National Power and PowerGen into a greater number of competing generators, and the 
withdrawal of all forms of protection for nuclear power. 76 Robinson concluded that "the 
Government should follow along the path on which it has already started - which is to 
de-politicise' decisions about the energy industries and to open up individual energy 
markets to competition". 77 
6.3.4 The Privatisation of British Coal 
Despite the transitional support announced in the Government's Coal Review, British 
Coal continued to contract throughout 1993. By early-1994, eight of the twelve pits 
"reprieved" by the Government had been closed. In reviewing events since the Coal 
Review, Alistair Bruce stated that "it is tempting to conclude that, so far as the 
Government was concerned, the success of the review related more to its ability to defuse 
a highly sensitive and potentially damaging political issue than its capacity to extend the 
life of the 'reprieved' pits'. "78 
In January 1994, one year after the coal crisis, the Trade and Industry Select Committee 
briefly reviewed the state of the coal industry. 79 By this time British Coal's assets had 
shrunk to 22 mines and 14,800 miners. Despite continued cost reductions, coal-fired 
generation had continued to be squeezed out of the electricity market as more CCGT 
plant came on stream (a total 18GW of CCGT licences had now been approved), and also 
due to the improved performance of nuclear power stations (see Appendix 1, Figures 2 
and 3). Coal imports, by contrast, had been reducing. The Chairman of British Coal, Neil 
Clarke, told the Trade and Industry Committee that "the picture looks gloomy, despite the 
enormous progress being made, because the markets are being taken away". 8° Clarke also 
stated that a combination of high coal stocks, and the pressure on generators to act 
competitively, had meant that the Government's additional measures to support the coal 
industry announced in the Coal Review had had little effect. lie maintained that existing 
coal-fired steam turbine generation, even with the extra costs of desulphurisation, was 
cheaper than that from new CCGT plant; he stated that "that argument in financial terms 
is well-founded". 81 He concluded that the decline in British Coal was "undoubtedly a 
76 ibid: 29 
77 ibid: 26 
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consequence of the privatisation of the electricity industry. That has resulted in the 
profound imbalance of market power where we sell 80% of our coal to two customers, 
and they have many sources of supply" 82 
The Select Committee also took evidence at this time from the Minister for Energy at the 
Department of Trade and Industry, Tim Eggar. Eggar rejected the Committee's suggestion 
that new CCGT plant was by now clearly more expensive than existing coal plant fitted 
with desulphurisation equipment. When asked to what extent he was prepared to allow 
gas-fired plant to dominate electricity supply in Britain, he replied that he could "not 
foresee making arbitrary decisions as to what level should come from one particular 
productive source", and repeated the Government's view that this was "essentially a 
matter which has to be decided by the individual decisions of different companies". 83 
At the same time as the Select Committee's inquiry, the legislation enabling the 
privatisation of British Coal was passing through Parliament. In January 1994, during the 
second reading of the Coal Industry Bill, the President of the Board of Trade, Michael 
Heseltine, conceded that had British Coal been privatised earlier - before ESI 
privatisation - it could have "headed-off at least part of the dash-for-gas". 84 The Labour 
Industry Spokesman, Robin Cook, argued that the demise of the coal industry was a 
result of the longstanding Conservative Party vendetta against the British coal industry, 
which found expression in a "rigged privatisation", which had "opened the door for the 
dash-for-gas". 85 MPs of both sides of the House recognised that privatisation was coming 
too late to save any sizeable indigenous coal industry. 
As Bruce and Wright described, British Coal's continued contraction and loss of market 
in 1994 made its privatisation problematic. 86 Bruce and Wright argued that Government 
inaction "denied coal the chance to establish a more competitive position". 87 During the 
passage of the Coal Industry Bill through Parliament, it was widely anticipated that much 
of BC would be sold by management buy-out. The Government invited bids for five 
British Coal regions. British Coal's English mining assets were sold to the mining 
82 ibid: 8 By contrast, Scottish Coal enjoyed reasonable mid-term prospects; it had recently completed the signing of a 
5-year contract with Scottish Power for increasing tonnages. Clarke argued - as was widely accepted - that this 
reflected the retention of vertical integration in the Scottish ESi after privatisation. 
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company RJB Mining at the end of December 1994.88 RJB inherited just 15 operating 
deep mines and 7000 miners, producing a total output in 1994 of 48mt 89 
By the mid-1990s the decline of coal-fired generation was attracting little new comment, 
and the Trade and Industry Select Committee's 1995 inquiry into Aspects of the 
Electricity Supply Industry, heard little discussion on this theme. Amongst the few 
witnesses addressing this issue was Dieter Helm. Helm argued that "the cost of ... [the] 
artificially fast dash-for-gas is to be measured in the rapid decline of coal". 90 He added 
that "there is now considerable evidence to show that [CCGT plant] has come into the 
market at an artificially high rate, at prices higher than those reflected in the costs of 
operating the existing coal stations, and on a contractual basis which seriously distorts the 
operation of the market" 91 However, another independent observer of the industry, Colin 
Robinson, commended the dash-for-gas - claiming that it reflected the opening-up of 
generation to competition, and greater freedom of choice of fuel and technology. At the 
same time, Robinson also recognised that there was "some bias against coal" in the post- 
privatised industry. 92 
In evidence to the Trade and Industry Select Committee in 1996, RJB Mining claimed 
that they had recently offered the generators new fuel contracts after 1998 to supply coal 
at a price which compared well to generation costs for CCGT and nuclear plant. 93 They 
asserted that "unequivocally, coal-based generation offers the best deal for electricity 
customers in the UK in the medium-to-long term" 94 Nevertheless, in 1997, with the 
ending of its existing contracts with National Power and PowerGen coinciding with the 
ending of all REC franchises in April 1998, the prospects for coal-fired generation in the 
British ESI remained very poor, and there was no prospect for the construction of any 
new coal-fired steam turbine plant in Britain. At the end of 1997 RJB announced that 
greatly reduced demand from National Power and PowerGen in 1998 meant that they 
would be forced into a further closure programme 95 
88 Peggy liollinger, 'RJB ends 48 years of Nationalised Coal', Financial Times, 30th December 1994, p17 
89 Department of Trade and Industry, The Energy report Vol. 1: Competition, Competitiveness, and Sustainabiliry, 
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6.4 Industrial Perspective: Rolls-Royce/NEI 
In an interview carried out in December 1994, Ron Haywood, Director of Engineering at 
Rolls-Royce Industrial Power Group, Newcastle upon Tyne, reflected on the impact of 
ESI privatisation on coal-fired steam turbine technology, and on some wider changes to 
the industry since privatisation. Haywood began by describing the dominant position of 
Rolls-Royce and Northern Engineering Industries (NEI became part of Rolls-Royce in 
1989) in the nationalised British ESI: 
NEI was the supplier for most power station components, coal and 
nuclear, through Parsons, International Combustion, NEI Nuclear, and 
others. Going right back, it was principally NEI companies that built 
Calder Hall. In fast reactors, we supplied replacement heaters and steam 
turbines at Dounreay in the mid-1980s. We were big. If you take boilers 
there was ourselves and Babcock. For steam turbines there was ourselves 
and GEC. That's how it stacked up. 
The development of electricity generation plant in the nationalised ESI involved intimate 
working relationships between the British plant manufacturers and the generating boards 
- the CEGB and SSEB were even involved in detailed issues of component design. 
Haywood stated that Rolls-Royce enjoyed "very close relationships with CEGB and 
SSEB" at this time, and he also conceded that there was very little competition between 
the major manufacturers: "although everyone would deny it, ... [we] used to operate a 
'muggins turn' - if you got the last contract, chances are you wouldn't get the next and so 
on". Haywood argued that this close involvement was a consequence of the generating 
boards' statutory obligation to supply: 
Previously the Central Electricity Generating Board, South of Scotland Electricity Board, and Scottish Hydro-Electric Board had a statutory 
responsibility to supply electricity. I think that is very important to what I 
am about to say. That meant that when they bought a power station, they 
were responsible to parliament to ensure that it worked. They had to 
guarantee the supply of electricity. That forced them into the position of being an 'informed buyer'. It also meant they shared risk with the 
manufacturers ... [The generators] were power system designers - they developed the design of stations, rather than going to the market and 
seeing what was available ... This is understandable in terms of their 
responsibilities. Because they developed the system design, they would go to the manufacturers with very detailed technical specifications. It was 
very much a risk sharing operation, and - to be honest - from a manufacturers position, quite a comfortable situation. 
Haywood then compared this to the very different institutional arrangements for 
investment in generation technology that emerged after ESI privatisation. He argued that 
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these differences were primarily the result of the removal of any statutory obligation to 
supply on the part of the generators: 
Once you move to a privatised market things change. Independent power 
producers emerge, without statutory responsibilities. They are motivated 
to shed risk. Risk is shed by issuing a detailed specification, [so that] if 
anything goes wrong the manufacturer can say: 'well, you issued the 
specification'. The Independent Power Producers, though, go to the market 
and say: 'we have a need for 'x' megawatts, what can you offer? ' Its a 
beautiful way of shedding risk. You end up with a turnkey contract, and tie 
up the commercial conditions such that, if anything goes wrong, the 
manufacturer is responsible. That's the big change. The manufacturers now 
have to be systems integrators, a role previously performed by the CEGB. 
In the nationalised ESI, generation technology R&D effort and expenditure was shared 
between the CEGB and the British plant manufacturers, under the Power Engineering 
Research Scheme (PERSC). Haywood stated that "the manufacturers invested, but the 
CEGB also funded research by the manufacturers ... [and] also did its own research - it 
comes back to [their role] as a system designer". Comparing this to the pattern of R&D 
responsibilities after privatisation, he stated that "the utilities are no longer interested in 
plant design, hence their downsizing. They see it now as the responsibility of the 
manufacturer". 
As well as changing the pattern of institutional responsibilities, Haywood also pointed out 
that ESI privatisation had had an effect on the character of generation technology 
development: "in R&D, the trend is that efficiency improvements are becoming less 
important, relative to capital cost and availability. This is a natural consequence of 
privatisation. Research has become highly focused ... world energy markets are now in 
transition under [the influence of] privatisation" 96 
From being in a dominant position in the nationalised EST, Rolls-Royce/NEI, and the 
other large British steam turbine manufacturer, GEC, found themselves in marginal 
position in the privatised EST. CCGT plant orders were based almost without exception 
on imported gas turbines. Amongst British plant manufacturers only smaller or licensee 
companies such as John Brown Engineering and Hawker Siddeley offered gas turbines 97 
Privatisation was associated with a sudden switch to overseas equipment manufacturers, 
building CCGT plants on turnkey contracts. Eric Jeffs pointed out that "there was no ... 
British experience of building large-frame [CCGTs] ... the main suppliers of steam 
turbines had for too long concentrated on large coal-fired and nuclear sets to the 
96 , ne "Industrial Trent" is a 50MW industrial version of Rolls-Royce's Trent' aero-engine. 97 Nick Garnett, 'Confusion for Equipment Makers', Financial Times, 29th March 1990, in 'ET Survey of the Electricity Industry', p1I 
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exclusion of others" 98 Only after the liberalisation of gas regulation, Jeffs stated, did the 
CEGB begin to look at CCGT technology in earnest. He concluded that "the most 
significant consequence of privatization is the opening up of the market to foreign 
equipment suppliers" 99 
Haywood traced the origins of improvements in industrial CCGT technology to the 
development of military aero-engines (as described in 5.2.2 and 5.2.4): "the [innovations] 
were transferred from Military to Civil and Industrial. The big benefit came from single 
crystal blades, allowing for higher inlet temperatures. The companies involved were 
General Electric, Pratt and Witney, and Rolls-Royce". As one of the world's leading 
turbojet manufacturers, Rolls-Royce played an important role in the development of 
advanced aero-engine technologies. Rolls-Royce were not involved in the conversion of 
these technologies for large electricity generation, however, and although they introduced 
relatively small "industrial versions" of their aero-engines in the early-1990s, their 
Industrial Power Group had no experience of building large gas turbines for power 
production, and were not in a position to compete for CCGT orders during the dash for 
gas. Haywood conceded that "there is no UK designer of large industrial gas turbines". 
In an attempt to gain access to the rapidly expanding market for CCGT technology in the 
early-1990s, Rolls-Royce entered into an alliance with the American firm Westinghouse, 
who had greater expertise in industrial turbines. 100 Haywood stated that the timing of EST 
privatisation - coincidentwith low gas prices - was the cause of much of the problems 
faced by British manufacturers: 
The unfortunate thing about privatisation from the point of view of the 
manufacturers was that the [EC] Directive on the use of gas for base load 
power generation was rescinded. Once that was done nothing was going to 
stand in the way of CCGT. Unfortunately it was not a technology that was 
available from UK manufacturers. 
At the same time, Haywood was critical of the Government's failure to anticipate the 
damage to British plant manufacturers arising from their proposals for ESI privatisation, 
and for not establishing mechanisms which would have allowed for greater continuity in 
the transition to a more competitive structure for the industry: 
98 Eric Jeffs, British Gas Turbine Industry Returns Experience to I lome Market'. Turbomachinery International, 
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99 Eric Jeffs, 'British Energy Situation After Privatisation', Turbomachinery International, May/June 1991, pp6O-72: 60 100 Fierce competition amongst international plant manufacturers in the 1990s eventually led Rolls-Royce to sell their Power Generation group to Siemens ('Siemens buys Ailing R-R Power Generation Plant'. The Times, 10th April 1997, 
p26). 
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With hindsight, one of the things that was not put in place in privatisation 
was a means for transferring resources from CEGB to the manufacturers ... If there had been a lot of contracts in place there would have been a 
natural mechanism for transferring people, but it didn't happen, because 
we went, to combined cycle ... There was an opportunity lost by not having 
a mechanism for people to transfer, people with a knowledge of system 
design ... they went 
into National Power and PowerGen. The 
manufacturers were product oriented - turbines, generators, boilers - not 
station. We have moved that way ... [but] nobody had sat down and looked 
at the precise relationship between the CEGB and the manufacturers. 
Haywood conceded that the dominant position of coal-fired steam turbine technology in 
British ESI under nationalisation "could be said to have been too much from a diversity 
point of view". Nevertheless, he maintained that despite their present difficulties, clean 
coal technologies would be important in the future. He suggested the commercialisation 
of many clean coal technologies may be achieved "at around 2010, depending on 
increased gas prices". He stated that "coal is still supplying a sizeable chunk of electricity 
in the UK..., clean coal technologies are important ... there has to be a future for coal - 
sufficient work is being done, especially in the US, to ensure it will be available". 
Like others disadvantaged by ESI privatisation, Haywood was critical of the Government 
for failing to intervene to secure diversity of fuel supplies. He argued that "the difficulty 
in predicting long term fuel prices has two responses: either develop a diversity of supply 
programme, or just ignore the problem and leave it to the market. The latter is the present 
UK response". He stated that "my overall feeling about privatisation is that it wasn't well 
thought through. There was little concern for the implications for manufacturing 
industry". 
Finally, Haywood considered the dash-for-gas in the light of previous episodes of radical 
changes in electricity generation technology. He argued that there were parallels between 
the causes of the sudden switch to CCGT technology in the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
introduction of oil-fired steam turbine plant and nuclear power in the 1950s. He pointed 
out that "12 GW of oil [fired] plant was built when OPEC was established. Then came 
Suez, and the UK went for Magnox". Haywood observed that despite its apparent 
continuity and incremental progression, the development of electricity generation 
technology in the twentieth century had been greatly shaped by sudden and unpredictable 
changes in the international political economy of energy supplies. Ile concluded that "the 
things that really determine technological change are not continuous, but discontinuous 
world events. This is the history of the electricity generation technologies ... so much 
depends on the availability and supply of fuel". 
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6.5 Privatisation and Steam Turbine Research & Development 
The development of advanced coal-fired steam turbine technology attracted almost 
insignificant funding in the nationalised ESI as compared to nuclear power technology. In 
1991 the Energy Secretary John Wakeham told the Energy Select Committee that just 2% 
of the Department of Energy's R&D budget was spent on coal-fired combustion, 
compared to 65% on nuclear power. 101 The development work that was undertaken 
involved two major projects. During the 1980s the CEGB and British Coal jointly funded 
an 85MW pressurised fluidised bed combustion (PFBC) plant at Grimethorpe. By 1988 
the CEGB and BC had spent £28m on the Grimethorpe project. Over the same period, 
British Gas and Lurgi had spent around £20m on the development of integrated 
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology at Westfield. 102 British Coal was also 
developing a combined PFBC and IGCC system known as the "Topping Cycle'. A 1988 
review of clean coal technology by the Advisory Council on Research and Development 
concluded that "for the near-term large scale generation of electricity, none of the 
fluidised bed designs examined offers an advantage over conventional 900MWe 
pulverised fuel units". 103 At smaller sizes, the report added, PFBC was "potentially 
attractive", whilst IGCC technology was said to show "promise of being able to compete 
with conventional plant with flue-gas desulphurisation". 104 
After 1988, it quickly became clear that the very different structure now being considered 
for the EST would carry with it significant consequences for the established pattern of 
R&D in the industry. For the most part, however, industry insiders expressed little 
concern on this issue in evidence the Energy Select Committee's inquiry on EST 
privatisation in 1988. Typical was the response of Sir Philip Jones, the Chairman of the 
Electricity Council, who stated that he was "clear that [the companies to be privatised] do 
all recognise the importance of long-term research". los In keeping with its general 
approach to the coal industry, the Government was not prepared to make any special 
provisions for clean coal R&D as part of its proposals for EST privatisation. In January 
1989, the Energy Minister, Michael Spicer, stated that "after privatisation, the nature and 
level of the [CEGB] successor companies research programmes will be matters for them 
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to decide". 106 In July 1989 Spicer conceded 'that "after privatisation, the electricity 
industry may focus on near market and operational research and development". 107 
In practice, even before their flotation, National Power and PowerGen had already 
adopted very different attitudes and policies towards technology development compared 
to that of the CEGB. This was apparent in the comments to the Energy Select Committee 
in their inquiry into Flue-Gas Desulphurisation, carried out in early-1990.108 Ed Wallis, 
the Chief Executive of PowerGen, when discussing his company's approach towards 
clean coal technology, stated that it was important to "get alongside the technology and 
spot the winner, and exploit the opportunity when it comes". 109 Rather than undertaking 
the development of generation technologies themselves, the large generators would in 
future concentrate on monitoring the efforts of the equipment manufacturers. 110 
Alongside the many proposals for CCGT plant announced during the ESI privatisation 
process, British Coal announced that they were intending to construct a 150MW clean 
coal demonstration plant at Bilsthorpe colliery in Nottinghamshire, based on circulating 
fluidised bed combustion technology. t 1t The proposal was welcomed by the supporters 
of the coal industry, as demonstrating that the underdevelopment of clean coal technology 
in the nationalised EST was about to be corrected; it was also thought to represent the first 
step towards a programme of clean coal generation plants. In Parliament, those MPs who 
supported ESI liberalisation anticipated the development of a number of similar plants 
after privatisation. In December 1988, Peter Rost, for example, stated that as well as 
CCGT technology, independent producers would also wish to develop fluidised bed 
technology. 112 In the event, however, British Coal withdrew its application for 
construction of the plant, stating that it had been unable to secure finance, or agreement 
with the local REC, East Midlands Electricity for output from the plant. 113 In the 
privatised EST, electricity suppliers refused to contract for electricity from any plant using 
generation technology other than the most competitive CCGTs. It was clear that without 
Government support, no clean coal demonstration projects could progress in the new EST. 
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In mid-1991, just a few weeks after the flotation of National Power and PowerGen, the 
Energy Select Committee undertook an inquiry into Clean Coal Technology and the Coal 
Market after 1993.114 The Select Committee surveyed the different types of emerging 
clean coal combustion technologies, such as fluidised-bed combustion and coal 
gasification. The Committee reported that Pressurised Fluidised Bed Combustion 
(PFBC) was already commercially available by this time, and by using a combined cycle 
it provided a 15% efficiency improvement over conventional (pulverised fuel) 
combustion, with 20% more expected in the second generation of development. 
Circulating Fluidised Bed Combustion (CFBC) was also thought to be important for the 
future. Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) was just beginning its 
demonstration phase (a 250MW plant was under construction in The Netherlands), but 
the Committee stated that it had greater medium and long term potential because it 
provided very low sulphur and nitrous oxide emissions. 
The general consensus amongst the witnesses to the Energy Committee was that, 
although clean coal technologies were not yet cost competitive with either CCGT or 
conventional coal combustion technology, they would become so around the end of the 
decade, at around the same time that much old steam turbine plant would be in need of 
replacement. The submission from Shell UK, for example, stated that "there is a need for 
large amounts of new generating capacity from the turn of the century, and clean coal 
technology could play a large part in these developments". 11s Therefore, the Select 
Committee recommended that clean coal technologies should be supported by 
Government during the intervening development and demonstration stages, since the 
market for such technologies would, it argued, develop strongly in the medium term. 116 
Malcolm Edwards, the Commercial Director of British Coal, drew the Energy 
Committee's attention to the stark asymmetry between nuclear and coal research 
spending. Nuclear power, he claimed, had attracted almost one hundred times the R&D 
support given to coal technology over the past decade. 117 Edwards identified a historic 
failure on the part of the British EST to develop clean coal technologies ahead of 
environmental regulation. He attributed this to the long-standing complacency of the 
CEGB towards coal-fired generation technology: 
The technical interest of the former CEGB was concentrated on developing nuclear, whereas the path for them on developing coal was fairly well mapped out; you bought roughly the same sort of plant you 
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bought ten years ago, only you bought it in a very much larger form, and 
you got considerable efficiency gain in the process. I think the CEGB was 
not basically interested in novel methods of coal technology because it did 
not believe that the environmental problems were going to catch up with 
it. 118 
The Select Committee also questioned representatives from the CEGB successor 
companies on their interest in clean coal technology. Both National Power and PowerGen 
made clear that responsibility for the development of clean coal technologies lay not with 
them but with the plant manufacturers. They now saw themselves as 'informed buyers', 
rather than developers, of generation technology - as reflected in their much reduced 
commitment to R&D compared to the CEGB. Mr J. Webster, the Commercial Executive 
Director of National Power, stated that, regarding the different types of clean coal 
technologies, National Power were "not backing any winners", but he indicated that coal 
gasification technology was the most promising, since it could be readily combined with 
CCGT technology. 119 Similarly, Dr Alf Roberts, the Commercial Director of PowerGen, 
stated that his company favoured gasification technology because it offered the 
possibility of repowering CCGT plant with coal at the end of their initial gas contracts. 120 
One technological option discussed at the beginnings of the dash-for-gas was the 
retrofitting of a combined cycle turbine on the front-end of conventional coal plant, 
enabling coal to gain advantage from the general improvements taking place in combined 
cycle turbine technology. Dr Roberts explained the problems involved with this: "There 
are very considerable technical risks with [retrofitting] which would have severe 
implications for economics ... the key to the economics of gas-fired power stations is high 
availability. They must run all the time and must not be unreliable ... there is a clear 
commercial risk in attaching new technology to something that is very old". 121 Similarly, 
Mr J. Webster, of National Power, stated that National Power did not believe that the 
price of natural gas would rise to "anywhere near the cross-over point that would favour 
new or even expensive retrofitting of clean coal technology". 122 
On PowerGen's more general attitude to R&D, Dr Roberts told the Committee that his 
company undertook research in order to "get the best out of present plant, and make 
informed investment decisions". 123 He stated that "we do not feel it is proper for us to try 
to pick winners from amongst all the technologies, when it is very difficult for us to 
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benefit, even if we are successful ... The people whose 
business it is to make profits out 
of developing a winning technology are the plant manufacturers". 124 Roberts suggested 
that the removal of the generator's ability to pass on costs was critical in the changes in 
R&D activity since privatisation: "with the obligation to supply must go the right 
basically to pass on the cost of meeting that obligation ... that was essentially where the 
CEGB was. The Government took the view that there was a more economic way of 
providing electricity to consumers". 125 The restructuring of the ESI also meant that the 
generators were no longer concerned with diversity of supply issues. For example, when 
the suggestion is put by the Energy Committee to Dr Roberts that there is a national 
interest in the setting-aside of, say, 20% of electricity demand to be met from indigenous 
coal, he replied that "it is for the Government to determine that policy". 126 
A number of witnesses to the Energy Committee at this time identified a particular a 
problem of support for clean coal technologies in the development and demonstration 
phases. By 1991, there were no remaining clean coal demonstration projects in the UK. 
Nevertheless, in his evidence to the select committee the Secretary of State for Energy, 
John Wakeham, reaffirmed the Government's faith in the ability of private companies to 
provide what R&D was necessary. Wakeham admitted that the privatised generators were 
more likely to target their R&D spend on projects that were likely to provide them some 
clear benefit, but he indicated that he felt that this was a reflection of excessive R&D 
spending under the CEGB. 127 The Energy Committee was less confident of the adequacy 
of the Government's provisions for R&D in the industry after privatisation. In their 
conclusions to their Clean Coal Technology report, they stated that they looked forward 
to "discovering exactly how the Government proposes to ensure the continuation of coal 
R&D in Britain following the proposed privatisation of British Coal". 128 
In 1991 the Department of Trade and Industry established a Coal R&D Programme, to 
coordinate research in the development of clean coal technologies. The programme was 
to be managed under contract by the Energy Technology Support Unit, with only 
minority funding from Government. By the end of 1996, ETSU reported that there were 
just under 50 advanced coal-fired power generation projects running under the scheme, 
with a total DTI contribution of £11.7m. 129 
124 ibid: 151 
125 ibid. 154 
126 ibid: 154 
127 ibid: 233 
128 ibid, Vol I: xxii 
129 'Is Thcre a Future for Coal R&D?, Energy World, No. 247, March 1997, pp 16-19: 19 
260 
In early-1992 the Energy'Select Committee again investigated research and development 
in the ESI as part of its inquiry into the Consequences of Electricity Privatisation. 130 The 
Select Committee found that total R&D spending within the British ESI had more than 
halved since ESI vesting in 1990, from over £200m p. a. to under £100m p. a.; it now 
represented less than 2% of sales. 131 Over half of research expenditure was made by the 
still publicly-owned Nuclear Electric (£50m), the rest from National Power (£26m), 
PowerGen (£14m), and the National Grid Company (£7m). 132 The Energy Committee 
reported the closure of two former CEGB research laboratories, and a chronic funding 
problems elsewhere. Throughout the ESI, the Select Committee found, there was a 
concentration on short-term development work. 133 The Secretary of State, John 
Wakeham, recognised that the industry was undergoing a significant reduction in R&D at 
the centre, but claimed that equipment manufacturers would increasingly compensate for 
this. 134 
In its evidence to the Energy Committee, the Watt Committee pointed out that 
privatisation marked a move to building power stations on a turnkey basis, so that 
National Power and PowerGen no longer needed to conduct basic research into power 
generation. The Watt Committee expressed concern for the consequences of privatisation 
on electricity-related research, arguing that "the suddenness of the transition, and the 
somewhat casual attitude of the Department [of Energy] towards electricity-related R&D 
has resulted in needless damage to R&D programmes, especially long-term 
programmes". 135 There was growing concern at this time for the future of British Coal's 
Coal Research Establishment (CRE). Malcolm Edwards, the Commercial Director of 
British Coal, told the Select Committee that the CRE would close without greater central 
government support. Edwards called for Government funding and planning of strategic 
R&D across the ESI. 136 
In its Coal Review, published during the coal crisis in March 1993, the DTI announced an 
additional £12m funding for the Coal Research Establishment, spread over three ycars. 137 
In September 1993 the Energy Minister Tim Eggar announced the establishment of a 
Clean Coal Power Generation Group to co-ordinate the development of components for 
the clean coal generation technology. At the same time a dedicated 'Topping Cycle' group 
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was set up after British Coal stated it would no longer be interested in developing the 
technology. 138 
After British Coal was privatised at the end of 1994, the new owners of BC's mines, RJB 
Mining, in evidence to the Trade and Industry Select Committee, criticised what it stated 
was a neglect of clean coal technology in the ESI after privatisation, compared to the 
considerable support given to nuclear and renewable technologies under the non-fossil 
fuel obligation. 139 The 1995 Technology Foresight review of energy technologies 
confirmed that "priorities for energy R&D have changed significantly" since ESI 
privatisation. 140 The Report identified three "high priority" generation technologies where 
there were significant market potential: CCGT, clean coal, and photovoltaic 
technology. 141 
In an interview carried out in August 1994, Stuart Ffoulkes, of Enron Power Operations, 
argued that in the case of clean coal technology, a similar missed opportunity to that 
experienced in the case of CCGT technology was being created by the decline of British 
Coal since ESI privatisation. Ffoulkes stated that US companies developed CCGT 
technology in response to the earlier liberalisation of the use of gas for electricity 
generation compared to Europe, and concluded that "there was no impetus in the UK to 
develop power generation gas turbines because there was a ban on burning gas in that 
way ... Europe effectively created no market for CCGT technology for a long time". He 
then argued that "the same thing will happen, I think, with clean coal technology. There is 
now no real market for British Coal, so they will get left behind in terms of clean coal 
technology. " 
An International Energy Agency (IEA) review of the impact of greater competition on 
innovation in the ESI in a number of countries, published in 1996, concluded that the 
research efforts of generation utilities had been greatly reduced under fierce competition 
in recent years. The IEA report stated that "as generators are unsure which customers they 
will be serving at the expiration of short term generation contracts, there is little or no 
incentive for them to engage in RD&D efforts which aim to reduce the cost or raise the 
efficiency of generation technologies over the longer term". 142 As part of the IEA report, 
Jeffrey Skeer compared the experiences of ESIs in different OECD countries; he stated 
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that the UK was the only country among those studied to have had "extensive experience" 
with increased competition. 143 Skeer reported that "whereas the UK's electric sector had a 
time horizon of five to ten years for evaluating RD&D projects at the time it was 
privatised, most projects in today's nearly fully competitive environment are evaluated 
with a one or two year time horizon", and he concluded that "only RD&D efforts with a 
nearly immediate market payback can be considered". 144 
Another analysis of the British EST in the same TEA report was made by J. A. Walker, the 
Executive Director of EA Technology -a part of the Electricity Association with 
responsibilities to coordinate research activity in the privatised EST. Walker stated that 
since privatisation, "the balance of spending in R&D in the UK [EST] has changed quite 
dramatically, driven both by the financial concerns of the electricity companies, and the 
legislative and regulatory pressures following privatisation". 145 Walker stated that "prior 
to privatisation, the research performed [in the UK EST] ... arose in the main from 
'technology push"'146, but that since privatisation, generation technology development 
was much more a response to 'market-pull. He argued that R&D activity in post- 
privatised EST in Britain was under pressure because private ownership had created "a 
much greater drive for cost reduction", and R&D programmes in particular were being 
"analysed and scrutinised in a search for relevance and value for money". 147 
6.6 Summary and Review 
6.6.1 Steam Turbine Technology and Privatisation 
From the mid-1950s onwards, the dominance of coal-fired steam turbine technology was 
in-part a reflection of the political management of the energy industries, as the EST was 
used by various governments to provide a protected market for the British coal industry 
(3.3.4). After 1979, under successive Conservative Governments hostile to the NUM, this 
continued support derived from a reluctant recognition of political necessity. After the 
1987 general election, with the NUM disempowered, it became clear that the Government 
saw this support ending with EST privatisation, and it was unprepared to make any 
concessions to the coal industry in its privatisation proposals (6.2). The Government 
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offered no protection for coal-fired generation in their privatisation proposals, and in their 
1988 White Paper, they readily anticipated the emergence of "new types of power 
station" (4.2.2). At the same time, such was the established domination of coal-fired plant 
in the British ESI, and such were the apparent technical and economic barriers to any 
challenge to this dominance, that there was little or no expectation of any serious threat 
arising from advances in generation technology. 
In the mid-1980s, the CEGB and GEC had developed proposals for the construction of 
new coal-fired steam turbine plants which were a continuation of incremental 
improvements in economies of scale and thermal efficiency, the development pathway 
that had characterised coal-fired steam turbine technology for most of the century. By 
1988 this new generation of larger and improved coal-fired steam turbine plants was 
ready for implementation. 
In debate'on the likely impact of ESI privatisation in 1987 and 1988 (6.2), whilst there 
was considerable recognition of the threat presented by privatisation to the dominant 
position of British Coal, there was very little suggestion that there would be any 
significant erosion of the dominance of coal-fired steam turbine technology - the 
dominant technical form of electricity generation in Britain since the early-twentieth 
century. Concern for coal was overwhelmingly focused on the threat to the British mining 
industry of cheap coal imports. This was clearly reflected, for example, in the views of 
the CEGB's Chairman Lord Marshall, when he told the Select Committee that "the major 
issues will be about the use of coal and whether coal is imported or we use British coal". 
The Energy Secretary, Cecil Parkinson, maintained that "seventy to seventy-five per cent 
of all our future electricity is going to come from coal" (6.2). Although they made some 
mention of CCGT, this was also the dominant view expressed in Area Board evidence to 
the select committee (5.3.2). Robert Peddie, a prominent independent advocate of 
liberalisation of generation at this time, expressed his opinion to the Select Committee 
that the coal industry "would be capable of retaining the bulk of the power stations 
market" after privatisation (6.2). 
Even the CEGB's critics and rivals apparently saw little alternative to coal-fired steam 
turbine technology, and the early independent power plant schemes developed in 1987 
and early-1988 were mostly based on the recommissioning of former CEGB coal-fired 
steam turbine plant. Only a few independent analysts, such as David Andrews, and Peter 
Rost, recognised that ESI privatisation represented a significant technological threat to 
coal, and suggested that there was a pent-up demand for alternative technical forms of 
generation (5.3.2). Significantly, both Andrews and Rost had reached their conclusions 
after many years of frustrated efforts to introduce small-scale gas-fired CIIP plant in the 
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British ESI, in the face of overwhelming CEGB opposition. Within the ESI insider 
institutions, no such awareness of the vulnerability of dominant technologies was evident. 
The commitment to established forms of generation technology in Britain was ended only 
after the issuing of the EC's Large Combustion Plants Directive in June 1988. Before this, 
the challenge to established generators was mostly taking shape within the technological 
conventions of the British ESI, using coal-fired steam turbine plant, the favoured 
technical forms the first independent power proposals (5.3.2). Only after the LCP 
Directive placed them under a greater relative burden relative to the established 
generators, did the embryonic independent producers make the radical switch to gas-fired 
generation technology (5.3.2). This was indicated by Graham Wilman's account of the 
Roosecote project - the first CCGT scheme in Britain (5.4.1). Without the issuing of the 
LCP Directive at a critical time coincident with the liberalisation of the British ESI ahead 
of privatisation, although CCGT technology would have gained some use, it is likely that 
much of the independent plant introduced in the British ESI just after privatisation would 
have' been based on the much more familiar technology of coal-fired steam turbines. In 
the event, however, coal-fired plant was unable to compete with CCGT technology on 
economic or environmental grounds, and it was abandoned with unexpected speed. 
During the ESI privatisation process itself, the previously powerful coal industry 
institutions exercised little or no influence. In the regulatory and contractual negotiations 
that took place throughout the ESI in 1988 and 1989, BC was unable to secure the 
continuation of its primary position (6.2). The three year contracts for reduced tonnages 
were only agreed to by National Power and PowerGen after considerable pressure from 
the Government - acting, according to Dieter Helm, to delay any dramatic contraction of 
the British coal industry until after the 1992 general election (6.3.1). By the end of 1989, 
coal-fired steam turbine technology - always the dominant technology of electricity 
generation in Britain - was institutionally weakly represented and essentially abandoned 
by Government. Given its poor economic and environmental competitive position with 
gas-fired generation technology, there were now no significant barriers to prevent its 
demise in the post-privatisation period. 
Ultimately, the three-year contracts established with National Power and PowerGen in 
1989 proved to do little more than postpone British Coal's decline, but for a time they 
appeared to have headed off what was seen to be the main threat to the British coal 
industry during the ESI privatisation process - cheap coal imports. As late as July 1991, 
this was identified by the Energy Select Committee as "the most serious threat to British 
Coal's existing markets" (6.3.1). The consensus at this time was that restrictions on the 
availability and price of natural gas would limit the impact of CCGT technology on the 
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ESI. In his evidence to the Select Committee at this time, the Energy Secretary John 
Wakeham repeated the Government's public view that "British Coal has an excellent 
future" (6.3.1). Just over six months later, the Energy Committee recognised that gas- 
fired generation was a more serious threat than that from imported coal (6.3.2). 
In considering the coal crisis of late-1992 and early-1993, it is difficult to separate-out the 
institutional and political manipulation of events, from the underlying technical, 
economic, and institutional forces that were driving changes in electricity generation in 
the post-privatisation period. The coal crisis was a supremely political event - 
precipitated by British Coal in order to draw attention to its difficulties, and informed 
throughout by the vested interests of Government, National Power, PowerGen, the RECs 
and others. At the same time, however, the coal crisis was also a reflection of the 
underlying institutional and economic forces driving technological change in the ESI by 
the early-1990s. 
The liberalisation of the RECs upon privatisation meant that they, and in-turn the major 
generators, were unwilling to enter long-term contractual arrangements. Even after 
considerable public outcry during the coal crisis, the Government was unwilling to offer 
any significant support for the British coal industry, except where it perceived that it 
might be politically damaging not to do so. In particular, the Government made clear that, 
it was not prepared to intervene in the dash-for-gas, nor remove any of their protection of 
the nuclear industry ahead of their nuclear review. As Bruce concluded, the Government's 
actions at this time "related more to its ability to defuse a highly sensitive and potentially 
damaging political issue" rather than any significant intervention in fuel and technology 
choice in the ESI (6.3.2). 
For some industry analysts, such as Dieter Helm the changes affecting coal-fired 
generation technology in the ESI privatisation had primarily political rather than 
economic origins (6.3.2). Ultimately, however, technical, economic, institutional and 
political influences were all deeply intertwined in the rapid decline of coal-fired steam 
turbine generation technology after ESI privatisation. The development of CCGT 
technology meant that seemingly insuperable technical and economic barriers to 
challenging steam turbine technology were overcome. Before the dash-for-gas became a 
reality, the technical and economic barriers on coal imports were repeatedly invoked by 
Government, in their rejection of the need for more direct support for the coal industry - 
see, for example, the comments of Cecil Parkinson in Parliament in March 1988 (6.2.1), 
and again in April 1989 (6.2.2). 
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At the same time, the creation of a distorted market for generation, dominated by the neo- 
duopoly of the CEGB's successors, encouraged uneconomic investment in new CCGT 
plant. Nevertheless, even after the threat to steam turbine technology became clear, a 
Government with deep-rooted hostilities to the coal industry was unprepared to intervene. 
Clearly, whilst it reflected an economic and environmental preference in the partially- 
liberalised ESI for gas-fired generation, the turn away from coal-fired steam turbine 
technology was also substantially motivated by institutional rivalry, and Government 
partisanship. 
6.6.2 Steam Turbine R&D and Privatisation 
The organisation of R&D that had developed in the ESI under public ownership was 
centred on the CEGB, an organisation which was largely created for such a role. 
However, although it dominated the nationalised ESI in terms of installed capacity, fossil 
fuel steam turbine technology occupied only a marginal position in the R&D efforts and 
technological interests of the CEGB, as suggested by British Coal's Commercial Director, 
Malcolm Edwards, in evidence to the Energy Select Committee in 1991 (6.4). At the 
same time, the CEGB was central to the design of steam turbine plant technology. As 
Ron Haywood described, even in detailed design work, the CEGB was closely involved 
with the plant manufacturers (6.4). Although Haywood claimed that the CEGB's statutory 
obligation to supply in the nationalised ESI had led them to assume the role of "informed 
buyers" (6.4), in practice their involvement in the development of generation technology 
went much further, and cannot be explained simply by reference to its statutory 
responsibilities. (It would have arguably been possible to meet these by adopting a truer 
position of informed -buyer, as assumed by National Power and PowerGen after 
privatisation. ) Instead, this close involvement requires explanation within an 
understanding of the historical evolution of the British ESI. As described in 3.3.3, the 
CEGB was created in the 1957 Electricity Act so as to assume a leading role in the 
development of generation technology, and to advance more rapidly the adoption of 
advanced techniques in British plant design. As well as reflecting immediate concerns in 
the mid-1950s, this was also motivated by a long-standing concern within the British ESI. 
From its origins, the growth of the British electrical plant manufacturing industry, had 
been frustrated by restrictive legislation and had never grown to rival its Continental and 
American counterparts (3.2.2). 
After 1957, the senior managers of the CEGB - overwhelmingly electrical and nuclear 
engineers - were allowed to shape the development of electricity generation technology 
in Britain largely in accordance their own technical preferences, rather than in response to 
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international changes in technology and fuels. Other than the CEGB and AEA, the only 
other major influence on generation technology development in this period was 
Government intervention to ensure supply diversity and support domestic industries. As 
the Plowden Committee identified, however, the CEGB's strength in plant design had its 
counterpart in weakness and dependency on the part of the British plant manufacturers. 
The Plowden Committee also pointed out that any weakening of the CEGB's position 
carried potentially damaging consequences for the electrical plant industry (3.6.4). Given 
the impregnable authority of the CEGB, this could be overlooked. In retrospect, it led the 
manufacturers to develop a false sense of security, and a dangerous insularity, reflected in 
a commitment to internationally uncompetitive domestic technological designs, such as 
the AGR (3.5.3). It also meant that the manufacturers shared the CEGB's 
unresponsiveness to developments in gas-fired generation technology (5.2.3). 
Along with the CEGB, the British plant manufacturers remained heavily committed to the 
further development of large steam turbine plant in the mid-1980s. The dangers of this 
concentration of research effort were only revealed by the ESI privatisation process from 
1987 onwards. 
The Government made few provisions for R&D in its proposals for ESI privatisation, and 
it appears to have considered the reduction of research spending in the industry was an 
inevitable part of liberalisation. After the 1988 White Paper made clear the 
disempowerment of the CEGB, the seemingly powerful technocentric culture of the ESI 
that had dominated R&D activity in the nationalised ESI, proved remarkably fragile. 
Established research programmes, predicated on the presence of a monopoly generator 
with the means of passing-on costs, were ended, and investment in the industry was 
quickly focused on short-term revenue earning activities. Aggregate spending on R&D in 
the British ESI collapsed after privatisation, in large part as a result of the ending of the 
fast reactor research programme, but also because of generating companies' unwillingness 
to support programmes for near-commercial clean coal technologies (6.5). 
Once the CEGB had been broken up, the vulnerability of the British manufacturers to 
international competition was rapidly exposed. As both Eric Jeffs and Ron Haywood 
pointed out, the post-privatisation dash-for-gas was based on technology that was largely 
unavailable from the British manufacturers, and had to be imported (6.4). Whilst 
Haywood argued that some remedial action should have been taken by Government to 
allow the British plant manufacturing industry a smoother transition to ESI liberalisation, 
the Government was more concerned by this time to foster independent generation by 
whatever means possible - particularly within an ESI structure that it recognised was 
likely to inhibit new entry. After decades of protection by Government and the CEGB, 
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the British plant manufacturers were wholly ill-prepared for the technological, economic, 
and institutional context for generation technology investment introduced in Britain in the 
late-1980s. 
The rapid run-down of fossil fuel R&D effort in the British ESI after privatisation 
reflected that fact that the major generators, who had hitherto occupied a dominant 
position in R&D activity (financially and institutionally), now saw themselves as nothing 
more than 'informed buyers' of plant. Despite a strong body of opinion, from within and 
outside the industry, that clean coal technology had an important medium and long term 
role in the British ESI, its extra costs as compared to gas-fired generation technology 
meant that it was unable to attract significant funding or institutional backing in the post- 
privatised ESI. Under demanding financial conditions, proposed schemes that were 
unable to secure a guaranteed market - notably those involving the use of technologies 
other than CCGT, such as clean coal technology - could not raise finance, and were 
abandoned. 
The changes to ESI R&D in Britain, although more extreme than elsewhere, reflected 
international changes in innovation in electricity generation technology. The worldwide 
trend towards privatisation and liberalisation of electricity supply utilities in the 1990s 
was associated with a shift towards international trade in generation technology, and to 
turnkey power plant construction contracts. As a result, R&D was increasingly the 
domain of a few international electrical equipment manufacturers, with generating and 




TECHNOLOGY STUDIES THEORY AND 
THE ESI PRIVATISATION PROCESS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter returns to the concepts and models from the technology studies literature 
introduced in Chapter 2. They are discussed here in the context of the changes to 
generation technology'within the British ESI associated with privatisation, as examined 
in previous chapters. In each case, a two-way discussion between technology studies 
theory and the evidence suggested by the ESI case study has been attempted: the various 
theories are considered in terms of the insights they provide in to the changes experienced 
by the British ESI, and at the same time, the ESI case is used as a test of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the assumptions and postulations of the various theories and models. 
Section 7.2 considers notions of technological autonomy and determinism, particularly as 
developed by Langdon Winner, and applied to nuclear power technology (as introduced 
in Section 2.2). Section 7.3 returns to Thomas Hughes' model of sociotechnical systems 
(introduced in Section 2.3). Section 7.4 assesses micro-level constructivist and actor- 
network approaches (introduced in Section 2.4). Section 7.5 considers 
intermediate/institutional approaches (introduced in section 2.5). Finally, Section 7.6 
provides a summary of the chapter, and offers a broader comment on the of the insight 
offered by a social-shaping view of technological change as applied to the British ESI 
privatisation process. 
7.2 Technological Autonomy and Determinism in the ESI 
7.2.1 Introduction: The Return to Autonomy and Determinism 
At the end of Chapter 2, it was argued that an autonomous or determinist perspective 
offered an inadequate perspective for analysing the process of technological change. In 
particular, such approaches were thought to be inherently limited because of their high- 
level generalisation, investment in the force of technology itself, and their neglect of the 
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various social forces underpinning and shaping technological change (2.6.1). At the same 
time, however, it was recognised that autonomy and determinism have been popular and 
recurrent themes in the analysis of technological change, particularly in the case of 
electricity generation technology - suggesting that they capture something of the 
character of technological change in the ESI. On this basis, it was decided that they 
merited further consideration in the context of the present study. 
7.2.2 Autonomy and Determinism in the ESI before Privatisation 
Before the 1920s, the dominant influence on generation technology within the British ESI 
appears to have been municipal authority control of public service provision, rather than 
any technological imperatives (3.2.1). The first technologies of electricity generation 
fitted into the established organisational and legislative framework for locally-provided 
public services. Only after the introduction of steam turbine generators and AC 
transmission technology at the turn of the century were the first obvious techno-economic 
imperatives impressed on the industry. Hennesssey credited these innovations with 
"destroying the technical rationale" of the established institutional and legislative 
framework for the British ESI (3.2.1). In reality, the subsequent development of the 
industry provides no support for simplistic technological determinist interpretations. The 
emergence of the steam turbine as the dominant form for electricity generation was not 
only a result of the innovations of Parsons and others, but reflected also growing demand 
for electricity, and other factors such as the high price of real estate (3.2.1). In the British 
ESI in particular, techno-economic imperatives clearly did not exert a deterministic 
influence, as the desire for larger franchise areas and larger-scale steam turbine plant was 
frustrated before the 1920s. 
The 1926 Electricity Act marked the end of the age of local government control of the 
British ESI, and ushered in a period of progressive centralisation and rationalisation. The 
development of the British ESI during the interwar years has been interpreted as a 
response to the technological imperatives of coal-fired steam turbine generation 
technology and the national transmission grid. Undoubtedly, there is a much clearer case 
for technological determinism and autonomy in the interwar period than before; Hughes 
stated that "the high momentum systems of the interwar years gave the appearance of 
autonomous technology" (3.2.2). In practice, however, the interwar expansion of the 
industry cannot be explained solely by recourse to the imperatives of generation and 
transmission technologies. The timing of the rationalisation and expansion of the industry 
was clearly as much a response to the legislative reform of the industry - after the 1925 
Weir Report made clear the urgent need for reform - as any immediate technological 
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developments. The growth of the ESI in the interwar years also involved the greatly 
accelerated diffusion of electric power throughout the economy. It was also predicated on 
central government support for a nationally-integrated supply system, and was twice 
greatly accelerated by the demands of war. Nevertheless, although autonomous and 
determinist explanation of the interwar expansion of the British ESI remain untenable, the 
years after the mid-1920s did at least see the ESI grow in accordance with the techno- 
economic imperatives of certain generation technologies, rather than opposing them, as 
had been the case before the 1920s. As Hannah and Hughes both pointed out, the interwar 
period also saw the development, for the first time, of a'technocratic tradition' within the 
industry (3.2.2). 
The trend to rationalisation and centralisation culminated in the nationalisation of the 
British ESI in 1947. For many, nationalisation was seen as a logical progression of the 
development of the industry under the direction of techno-economic imperatives (3.3.1). 
The postwar Labour Government promoted ESI nationalisation in particular as an 
appropriate response to the imperatives of electricity technology. Douglas Jay, for 
example, argued that technical progress in the ESI could only be achieved through the 
integration of the industry under government control (3.3.1). Throughout the postwar 
period up to the late-1980s, successive governments and industry institutions would 
repeatedly invoke similar such technological imperatives in support of various reforms to 
the ESI, or particular forms of generation technology. However, as Donald MacKenzie 
suggested, (2.5.4), rather than assuming that this offers evidence for technological 
determinism, the invocation of technological imperatives in this way requires 
consideration of the particular institutional and political interests involved (3.3.1). 
For the first decade after nationalisation, the ESI was dominated by a security of supply 
crisis, and generation technology design remained essentially unchanged from the 1930s 
- restricted by Government edict and BEA conservatism (3.3.1). Thereafter, however, for 
a thirty year period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, technological determinism 
appears to have had a powerful presence in the industry. The reorganisation of the 
industry in the mid-1950s was largely a response to certain technological imperatives. 
The dissolution of the CEA and the creation of the CEGB was justified in large part 
because of the perceived need give advanced technology a much higher profile in the 
ESI, and in particular, to accommodate an expanded programme of nuclear power (3.3.3). 
The 1956 Herbert Committee called for greater orientation towards high-technology 
within the industry, in order to both improve the design of conventional steam turbine 
plant, and also, to better meet the "technical problems ... in nuclear power engineering" 
(3.3.3). Government policy statements and Parliamentary debate on the restructuring of 
the industry at this time were infused with technocentrism and the advocacy of 
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technocracy. The Minister of Power, Geoffrey Lloyd, justified the reforms of the 1957 
Act on the basis that "if we are to obtain all the benefits of nuclear power" there was a 
need to "speed up the operation of the [ESI] machine" (3.3.3). Lloyd also offered a 
autonomistic vision of nuclear power with his anticipation of a time when "there is not 
enough baseload for the number of atomic energy stations". For the Labour opposition, 
James Callaghan similarly argued in a deterministic fashion that the ESI "must be built 
around ... [the nuclear] programme" 
(3.3.3). 
In retrospect, however, rather than a demonstration of technological determinism, the 
prevalence of technocentrism in debate on the industry at this time can be seen as a 
reflection of particular economic, political, and cultural circumstances. Government 
support for the initial nuclear programme was largely a response to fears for the adequacy 
of coal supplies, and intense concern for supply security (3.3.2), and broader issues of 
sovereignty and national pride, related to the Suez Crisis (3.3.3). In such a context, the 
Government willingly reorganised the industry around the perceived techno-economic 
imperatives of nuclear power. The CEGB was created as an overtly pro-nuclear power, 
technology-led organisation. Although it only ever provided a small part of the CEGB's 
output, nuclear power technology dominated the ESI's technology strategy and R&D 
spending up to the late-1980s. Thereafter, coal-fired steam turbine technology, whilst 
dominant in terms of capacity installed and power generated, was secondary in the 
CEGB's technological interests (as Malcolm Edwards later suggested, 6.5). 
At the same time, it is misleading to represent nuclear power technology as simply a 
reflection of economic and political circumstances without any consequences for the 
industry. The introduction of nuclear power was predicated on a certain degree of 
technocracy amongst industrialists and politicians, but having been become established at 
the centre of the ESI from 1958 onwards, the imperatives of nuclear power exerted a 
powerful influence thereafter, and it greatly accelerated the developing technocratic 
tendencies in the industry - seemingly offering support for Winner's suggestion of that 
inherently political technologies become autonomous once established. Certainly, the 
Labour Government of the 1960s offered overtly technocentric support of nuclear power 
technology, as demonstrated by its conclusion, in 1967, that a regular sequence was 
desirable to realise the "full potential" of nuclear power technology (3.3.4). 
The oil-shocks of the 1970s provoked an exaggerated return to security of supply fears, 
and the reinforcement of technology-led corporate planning. The technocentric response 
to the energy crisis was demonstrated by Walter Marshall's explicit omission of "non- 
technological factors" in ETSU's 1976 review of energy technology (3.4.2). Marshall's 
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implicit assumption here was that the process of technological change could be dictated 
by 'internal' technical matters alone. 
The powerful influence of nuclear power technology on ESI organisation in the 1970s 
dominated the thinking of the 1978 Plowden Committee. The Plowden Report was 
informed throughout by a technocentric perspective. It called for the unification of the 
industry on the basis of a series of techno-economic imperatives (3.4.3). The rejection of 
the Plowden Committee proposals by the new Conservative Government after 1979 
confirmed that rather than a straightforward result of technological determinism or the 
autonomy of nuclear power, the Committee's views were a product of prevailing 
economic circumstances and political/policy ideals. 
In retrospect, the appearance of the autonomy of nuclear power in the British ESI from 
the late-1950s to the late-1980s was made possible because of the stability of the 
institutional and legislative framework for the industry, and the continuity of government 
support for the technology. However, rather than a real demonstration of autonomy or 
determinism, it is more accurate to state that, in an industry without exposure to 
competitive market forces, and in supportive institutional and political circumstances, the 
techno-economic imperatives of nuclear technology were allowed priority over other 
considerations. In effect, the illusion of technological autonomy and determinism was 
deliberately created and sustained. For central government, this illusion had its 
advantages: it provided a technical rationale for the nuclear power programme, and 
disguised any more overtly political motivations. 
By the 1970s, however, the economic and political stability of the ESI was becoming 
increasingly undermined (3.4.1). Even at the height of technocentrism in the wake of the 
energy crisis, a number of industrial and political voices were promoting a decentralised 
market-based approach to energy policy (3.4.2). The 1970s also saw increasing public 
opposition to the nuclear power programme. These trends continued in the early-1980s, 
but for as long as Government support for the nuclear power programme and the CEGB 
continued, and the structure of the industry remained basically unchanged, the illusion of 
technological autonomy and determinism in electricity generation could be sustained. 
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7.2.3 Autonomy and Determinism and ESI Privatisation 
Privatisation quickly brought about the demise of technocracy in the industry - and with 
it, the discrediting of any suggestion of technological autonomy and determinism. 
Winner's argument that once established, nuclear power technology is able to "justify the 
adaptation of social life to technical requirements" was confounded by the 
Government's 
conduct in the ESI privatisation process. The CEGB's attempts to maintain 
its monopoly 
status by invoking supposed technological imperatives (4.2.1) were largely overridden 
by 
the Government's determination to introduce competition into generation. By first 
designing a structure for generation in which costs could not automatically be passed on, 
and - after it became clear that their proposals could not secure 
the successful 
privatisation of nuclear plant - by cancelling the proposed new nuclear power PWR 
programme, the Government chose to give priority to their policy commitment to 
privatisation, over and above their longstanding support for nuclear power. At this point, 
the supposed autonomy and determinism of nuclear power technology was revealed as an 
illusion, a, paper-tiger. Rather than offering support for claims for the autonomy of 
nuclear power, the events at this time reinforce the point made by MacKenzie and others 
that all technologies are dependent upon their surrounding institutions (see 7.5.3, below). 
The 1988 White Paper on ESI privatisation amounted to a substantial rejection of the 
supposed technological imperatives for the retention of the existing structure for the 
industry (4.2.2). The splitting up of the CEGB and the transfer of grid ownership to the 
RECs meant that Government's desire to liberalise the generation sector had prevailed in 
the face of CEGB's opposition, and techno-economic imperatives could no longer be seen 
as determining the structure of the industry. The White Paper also contained 
unprecedentedly critical remarks about the CEGB. In Parliament, the Energy Secretary of 
State, Cecil Parkinson, made clear that he shared the views of the proponents of 
liberalisation of the ESI, and stated that there was "no natural monopoly in electricity 
generation" (4.2.2). 
Nevertheless, nuclear power technology continued to exert a powerful influence on the 
ESI privatisation process. As Cecil Parkinson conceded, the Government's proposed 
organisational structure for generation after privatisation was, in large part, a response to 
the techno-economic imperatives of nuclear power technology (4.2.3). By devising a 
structure which, they believed, would enable the privatisation of nuclear power alongside 
conventional plant, the Department of Energy had accepted the CEGB's arguments for the 
retention of a single dominant generator with considerable market protection (4.2.3). 
However, rather than a demonstration of technological determinism, the building of ESI 
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privatisation around nuclear power - what the Energy Select Committee referred to as the 
"the nuclear tail ... wagging the ESI dog" (4.2.3) - stemmed from a political decision, by 
Government, to attempt the privatisation of nuclear plant at the same time as the rest of 
the industry. As a number of independent analysts made clear in 1987 and 1988, the 
Government could have instead chosen to retain nuclear power plant under public 
ownership, and to have implemented a much more competitive structure for the non- 
nuclear ESI, featuring a number of competing fossil-fuel generators (4.2.3). 
The withdrawal of nuclear plant from privatisation in 1989, although provoked by the 
techno-economic properties of nuclear power, was again ultimately a political choice by 
Government. As a number of independent observers of the industry suggested before and 
after 1989, the privatisation of the AGR plants and the future of the PWR plant 
programme could have been secured, had the Government been prepared to meet 
National Power's demands for what Energy Secretary John Wakeham referred to as 
"unprecedented guarantees". Wakeham himself stated that the Government had decided 
that they were "not willing to underwrite the private sector" (4.3.2). Kleinwort Benson, 
the Department of Energy's investment analysts, also argued that the Government had 
ultimately refused to "pay the price" for privatising nuclear (4.3.3). Rather than a 
demonstration of technological or economic determinism, therefore, the withdrawal of 
nuclear may be described as a result of techno-economic pressures given sanction by 
Government. 
The CEGB Chairman Lord Marshall's reaction to the cancellation of the PWR series was 
very much a confirmation of his personal technocentric commitment to PWRs. In 
announcing his resignation as CEGB Chairman and Chairman Designate of National 
Power in December 1989, he justified his role in the ESI solely in terms of the 
construction of nuclear plant, rather than any more general responsibilities (4.3.3). In the 
last-ever CEGB Annual Report, published in December 1989, he described the 
cancellation of the PWR programme as "a tragedy for civil nuclear power in the UK, and 
a personal disappointment too large to describe" (4.3.3) At the beginning of the 
privatisation process the ESI was still essentially under the control of powerful figures 
who shared a very strong commitment to nuclear power. The powerful individual 
influences of both Thatcher and Marshall were undoubtedly significant factors in the 
Government's and CEGB's failure to anticipate the unworkability of the White Paper 
proposals (4.3.3). 
The institutions that had promoted nuclear power under nationalisation had been largely 
disempowered by the Government's proposals for liberalisation, and the dominant 
organisations in the new ESI - the RECs, National Power, and PowerGen - were all to be 
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subject to some competitive pressure. As Cecil Parkinson stated in early-1989, the 
Government's proposals for the ESI meant that "in future ... [nuclear power] will have to 
justify its existence" (4.3.1). The arbiters of investment decisions in generation 
technology would no longer be the engineers and managers of the CEGB, but rather 
private financiers and shareholders, who applied an economic rather than technical test to 
generation technologies. Marshall was unwilling to accept that generation technology 
choice was no longer to decided by technical issues and experts alone. Throughout the 
privatisation process, he discussed the merits of the Government's proposals almost 
exclusively in terms of their impact on the prospects of the PWR programme. In his 
valedictory speech to the British Nuclear Energy Society in November 1989, he still 
equated the long-term health of the ESI with the degree to which it invested in nuclear 
power (4.3.3). Marshall himself never wavered in the assumption that, so long as they 
were freed from "government interference" or "short-term market considerations", 
nuclear engineers could be relied on to "get the technology right", and axiomatically, do 
what was best for the country. Under such an assumption, nuclear power technology 
became an end in itself. In this way, for Marshall and others, it is accurate to say that 
nuclear power technology did have an autonomous and deterministic character. 
Following its withdrawal from privatisation, although it continued to benefit from the 
protection of the Levy and NFFO, nuclear power occupied a very different position 
within the ESI as a whole. Rather than any shaping of the industry by the technical 
imperatives of nuclear power, it makes more sense, after 1989, to discuss the shaping of 
nuclear power technology - like other forms of generation technology - by market forces 
and electricity supply institutions. Whilst this was most clearly demonstrated by the dash- 
for-gas (CCGT technology, with its relatively low capital cost and short lead times, was 
particularly well suited to the new principles governing the industry), it was reflected also 
in changes to the nuclear industry. In other words, from 1990 onwards, rather than having 
the ESI built around it, nuclear power had largely to conform to the economic and 
financial imperatives governing the ESI as a whole - albeit from a highly privileged 
position as compared to the rest of the industry. 
After 1987, although they continued to offer a technocentric manifesto, formerly 
powerful figures such as Lord Marshall and Alistair Cruickshank were no longer able to 
impose their vision on the Government and the wider ESI. Far from being autonomous 
and deterministic, the powers residing with the nuclear industry were revealed by the 
privatisation process as having been dependent throughout on Government approval and 
support. Whilst government shared some of the ESI's technocentrism for much of the 
postwar period, their support for nuclear power also derived from wider considerations, 
such as the power of OPEC and the NUM, which were entirely unrelated to the 
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imperatives of nuclear power technology itself. In reality, a range of political and 
economic factors were critical to the establishment and maintenance of the British nuclear 
power programme, and the removal of these supports during the ESI privatisation process 
provided a powerful revelation that any suggestion of technological determinism and 
autonomy was misleading. 
7.2.4 Conclusion: The Fallacy of Autonomy and Determinism 
Even before privatisation, although technological imperatives were allowed a powerful 
influence on the development of the industry, Winner's claims for the autonomy and 
determinism of nuclear power represent a mistaken interpretation of events. Although the 
imperatives of nuclear power (and large scale generation technology in general) appeared 
to have a powerful influence on the structure and development of the ESI, their potency 
was dependent throughout on political sanction and support. Nevertheless, the apparent 
power of autonomous and determinist notions as applied to the ESI, was such that they 
were often invoked in support of particular institutional and political interests. This is 
most clear in the promotion of nuclear power by both the CEGB and AEA (reflecting 
their concern to promote their own authority), and also successive Governments 
(reflecting their concern to reduce their exposure to overseas oil and British coal 
suppliers). 
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, the supposed imperatives of nuclear power 
technology were used to justify centralised and monopoly control of the British ESI. This 
was still evident in CEGB resistance to ESI reform in 1988. Rather than an absolute 
determinant of events, nuclear power was deliberately portrayed as autonomous and 
deterministic force in order to provide backing for particular interests at particular times 
in the industry's history. At the same time, however, technocracy was a very real force 
within the industry, and those in positions of greatest authority concerning generation 
technology - particularly nuclear scientists - held views that approached a belief in the 
autonomy and determinism of nuclear power. 
Within a very short period from 1987 onwards, however, the Government's attempts to 
liberalise the ESI revealed that the autonomy and determinism of nuclear power 
technology was predicated on sustained institutional and political support. Once a 
decision was made by the Government to end this support, the apparent autonomous and 
deterministic power of the technology evaporated very quickly. Rather than a central and 
determining role, nuclear power was marginalised within the new ESI. The events of the 
British ESI privatisation process therefore amount to a rejection of Winner's suggestion 
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for the special status of nuclear power as an inherently political technology. Rather, they 
support the social shaping critique of technological autonomy and determinism, as 
described in section 2.2.3. 
A number of concepts associated with social shaping are of particular value in 
understanding technological change in the ESI. For example, the experience of the ESI 
provides considerable support for Arnold Pacey's emphasis both on the close association 
of technologies with specific organisational arrangements, and also on the irregular pace 
of technological change, with "crucial moments ... when a varied collection of 
different 
factors fit together and a new form of practice takes off" (2.2.3). As was described in 
Chapter 5, the dash-for-gas in the ESI during and after privatisation was a consequence of 
just such a coming together of diverse technical, economic, and political factors. Pacey's 
and others' suggestion that the powerful vested interests associated with mature systems 
tend to foster conservative innovations, and exclude radical innovations, is also resonant 
with the British ESI privatisation case - particularly the exclusion of CCGT technology 
in the nationalised ESI (3.5.4). Particular concepts and models of social shaping are now 
re-examined in more detail in the context of the present case. 
7.3 Hughes' Sociotechnical Systems Approach and ESI Privatisation 
7.3.1 Sociotechnical Systems and the ESI before Privatisation 
Hughes' analysis of the development of electric power systems in Networks of Power 
ended in 1930. By this time, he suggested, the sociotechnical system of the British ESI 
had acquired considerable momentum, and had developed entrenched vested interests 
around the dominant form of generation technology, coal-fired steam turbines. Hughes 
also pointed out that changes in generation technology, by this time, although advancing 
at a considerable pace, were essentially conservative and incremental, under the guidance 
of powerful institutions which were committed to established organisational and 
technological forms (3.2.2). He added that generators and plant manufacturers directed 
their R&D efforts at securing progressive gains in the thermal efficiency of steam 
turbines, scale economies, and the overall efficiency of use of the supply network. 
After 1930 the British ESI continued to develop along the lines observed by Hughes. 
Progressively larger and more efficient coal-fired steam turbines were introduced, and 
organisationally, the industry became increasingly rationalised and centralised. The trend 
towards centralisation was greatly accelerated during World War II, and culminated in 
the postwar unification of the industry under the control of the BEA (3.3.1). From the 
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sociotechnical systems perspective, nationalisation may be seen as the successful 
extension of ESI's system-builders' efforts to extend control to their economic and 
institutional environment (2.3.3). 
Although it was borne out of longstanding tendencies within the industry, nationalisation 
brought about a significant re-ordering of the 'contextual influences' shaping the 
development of electricity generation technology. The nationalised utilities were not 
required to meet any demanding financial targets, and what Hughes had identified as 'soft 
determinisms' in the development of the ESI in the interwar years - economic principles, 
such as capital interest rates - became much less influential. Instead, the most powerful 
contextual influences on generation technology in the nationalised period were 
institutional and political - the interests and values of the CEGB and AEA, and the 
concerns of successive governments for diversity and security of supply. 
The changed environment of the British electric power system in the 1950s was reflected 
in changes in the forms of generation technology. Although coal-fired steam turbine 
technology continued to provide the bulk of electricity generated, government security of 
supply fears prompted the politically-led diversification into oil-fired steam turbines - an 
essentially conservative technology without significant consequences for the structure of 
the industry - and nuclear power -a much more radical technological departure. 
Although the first British nuclear power programme was accommodated in the existing 
structure for the ESI set up in 1947, the demands for an expanded nuclear programme led 
to the re-ordering of the industry around nuclear power technology, enacted in the 1957 
Electricity Act. As well as reflecting certain political interests, from the systems 
perspective, the changes to the industry at this time may be seen as a powerful 
demonstration of the action of the technical core of nuclear power. From this perspective, 
the exploitation of the highly complex and capital intensive nuclear power technology 
required the creation of a technocentric monopoly generator. Thereafter, having been 
established at the centre of the ESI, nuclear power promoted the further centralisation of 
the industry. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the British ESI could still be characterised as a high 
momentum sociotechnical system, whose organisational form was a largely a reflection 
of internal system dynamics, particularly the technical core of steam turbines and nuclear 
power, and also the success of the industry's system builders to control their economic 
and political context. In his 1970 anticipation of the next 25 years of the ESI, the CEGB 
Chairman Stanley Brown was confident that the established trends for electricity 
generation technology would continue, and the context for the industry would remain 
stable (3.4.1). Brown's views echoed the outlook of an earlier generation of the industry's 
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leaders; as Hughes' stated, before the First World War, "the combination of growing 
momentum and reinforcing context was expected to overwhelm contingent perturbations" 
(2.3.3). 
In the event, after 1970 the momentum of the British electric power system, in common 
with many others, was increasingly undermined by changing environmental 
circumstances. The 1970s energy crisis and the challenge of North Sea gas ended the 
market assurances that had supported the confidence of the industry's system-builders 
(3.4.1). At the same time, from the 1970s onwards, the development of both coal-fired 
steam turbine and nuclear power technology came up against what Hughes might have 
referred to as intractable 'reverse salients' (2.3.3). In more recent work, Hughes himself 
recognised the disturbances to electric power system development since the 1970s (2.3.3). 
Despite these difficulties, however, the integrity of the ESI system remained basically 
intact, and in 1985 the CEGB Managing Director John Baker was still in a position to be 
able to anticipate the future technological development of the industry for the next 35 
years as essentially the continuation of existing trends - what Hughes described as 
"prediction by extrapolation" (2.3.3). Although it had experienced a number of significant 
changes, the basic pattern of development of the electric power system had continued 
essentially unbroken from the 1920s to the 1980s - apparently in broad accordance with 
Hughes' sociotechnical systems model. In particular, throughout this period, changes to 
the industry seem to have enhanced the control of industry's system-builders, and to this 
extent seems to confirm the pattern of development suggested by the Hughesian model. 
7.3.2 Sociotechnical Systems during and after ESI Privatisation 
The development of the British ESI during the privatisation process presents substantial 
difficulties for Hughes' sociotechnical systems model. The Conservative Governments of 
the early-1980s expressed their continued support to the CEGB, and the established 
pattern of generation technology. By 1987, however, having been frustrated in their initial 
efforts to liberalise the industry (3.4.5), and increasingly concerned about criticism of 
privatised neo-monopolies, they were openly prepared to 'confront and overrule the 
CEGB's system-builder authority. 
From the point at which the Government decided to force competition on the industry in 
the face of CEGB opposition (4.2.1), it was clear that the leading system-builders in the 
nationalised ESI - most notably the CEGB Chairman Lord Marshall - no longer exerted 
significant control over the system. The 1988 White Paper made a series of implicit 
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criticisms of the CEGB, and in unveiling the proposals in Parliament, Parkinson readily 
admitted that he "did not expect the CEGB to welcome the reorganisation" (4.2.2). 
Marshall's personal disempowerment after 1987 symbolised the decline of the established 
pattern of system-building in the ESI, and with it, arguably, much of the analytical power 
of the sociotechnical systems approach. 
In his later work, Hughes stated that the possibility of the overthrow of established 
sociotechnical systems "can be seen as a conflict between technological momentum and 
the social construction of technology" (2.3.3). In these (rather polarised) terms, the 
liberalisation of the British ESI amounted to the victory of constructivism over 
momentum. 
As critics of the sociotechnical systems perspective have pointed out, Hughes' analytical 
emphasis on system-building and the perspective of the system-builder implicitly carries 
with it the assumption that, in general, the most powerful influences on change are to be 
found within the system (2.3.4). For much of the twentieth century, this was apparently 
reasonable, as applied to the British ESI. However, it was also the case that throughout 
this period, the efforts of the system-builders for greater control of the industry were 
supported by Government policies sympathetic to centralisation and unification (see 7.2.2 
above). To this extent, system-builder power in the nationalised ESI - rather like 
technological autonomy and determinism - can be seen as something of an illusion: in 
reality, any power residing with the industry's system-builders was dependent throughout 
on Government sanction and support. Hughes' himself stressed that sociotechnical 
systems were never autonomous, but to the extent that he downplays the regulatory and 
political preconditions of system-building, he credits the system-builders themselves with 
too much authority. In this way the British ESI privatisation case exposes weaknesses 
with the sociotechnical systems approach not apparent during more stable periods of 
change, and validates the criticisms of Hard and others concerning Hughes' over- 
concentration on system-building in the process of technological change (2.3.4). 
Another of HArd's criticisms of the systems approach - that it is overly consensus. 
oriented, and fails to recognise conflict over competing technical forms - is less easy to 
sustain on the evidence of the present case. Undoubtedly, certain forms of generation 
technology were disadvantaged and excluded in the nationalised ESI. Russell explored 
this in the case of CHP technology, and a similar exclusion is evident in the case of 
CCGT technology (3.5.4). However, although he downplayed the development of rival 
technologies, Hughes pointed out that established systems tended to "suffocate" more 
radical technological options (2.3.3), and the emphasis on dominant technologies in the 
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systems approach may be seen as an appropriate reflection of the exclusion of radical 
technologies in mature systems. 
Whilst he stressed the control of system development by the system-builders, Hughes 
also recognised the possibility of sudden disruption to system development by what he 
referred to as "contingent historical events". For the period analysed by Networks of 
Power, this was most clearly exemplified by the First World War. Hughes argued that 
this "cleared away the political, economic, and other non-technological factors that 
prevented or retarded the utilization of existing technologies" (3.2.2). From the same 
perspective, the ESI privatisation process may itself be considered just such a 
contingency. Certainly, as proponents of liberalisation such as Peter Rost anticipated, it 
can be seen as 'clearing away' the institutional and political factors that had held-up the 
greater use of gas-fired generation technology in Britain. ESI privatisation conformed to 
Hughes understanding of historical contingencies, in that it usurped the momentum of the 
established sociotechnical system, put in place a new set of contextual factors, and 
demonstrated that electricity generation technology development is "not necessarily a 
simple extrapolation of its past, or a working out of inherent technological implications" 
(2.3.3). 
However, ESI privatisation was very different, in 'intention' and consequence, than 
previous examples of contingent events. All earlier cases - including both World Wars, 
the Suez Crisis, and the oil-shocks - were external events that 'unintentionally' resulted in 
an acceleration of the industry's tendency to centralisation and unification; by promoting 
economic and political uncertainty, they deepened political faith in technology-led 
searches for supply security, and led governments to act so as to bolster system-builders' 
efforts to gain greater control of the electric power system. By contrast, ESI liberalisation 
and privatisation involved the deliberate removal of system-builder control of their 
environment, and the replacement of centralised technology-led planned solutions to 
electricity supply by decentralised market-based provision. 
In his more recent consideration to the possibility of mature system breakdown, Hughes 
suggested that "dinosaur-like" long-established technologies were vulnerable to an 
"overpowering change in environmental circumstances", as a result of their embodiment 
of anachronistic economic and political values (2.3.3). This is clearly a fitting description 
of both nuclear power and coal-fired steam turbine technology by the late-1980s, as 
reflected in their declining fortunes during and after privatisation. In the nationalised ESI, 
nuclear power technology embodied a number of institutional and political interests - 
government fears for security of supply arising from the threat of hostile fuel suppliers, 
and also the powerful technocentrism within the industry and across wider society for 
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much of the postwar period. In the same way, the dominant position of coal-fired steam 
turbine technology can be seen as embodying the institutional power of the NCB and 
NUM, the CEGB's commitment to established large-scale generation technology in the 
pursuit of scale economies, and an economic and legislative framework for the industry 
which gave negligible weight to environmental pollution. By the late-1980s, both nuclear 
power and coal-fired generation technology were essentially anachronistic technical 
forms whose vulnerability was swiftly exposed in the course of privatisation. 
Hughes has also recently given some suggestions of the possible causes of the breakdown 
of mature systems. He stated that to achieve this, "a counterforce of comparable 
magnitude" to the momentum of the established system was needed. (Since the 
momentum of the British ESI had been considerably eroded since the 1970s (3.4), its 
overthrow in the late-1980s was a greater possibility than at earlier times. ) Hughes went 
on to suggest that "the most likely cause of displacement of large, centrally controlled 
systems would seem to be a confluence of contingency, catastrophe, and conversion" 
(2.3.3). In searching for the possible source of such a change, he discussed further fuel 
supply interruptions, technological catastrophes, and broader social "value changes" such 
as environmentalism and anti-consumerism. Perhaps surprisingly, he did not mention the 
potential of economic liberalisation to affect such a change. 
Hughes went on to argue that the removal of old systems was followed by their 
replacement by new ones which showed essentially similar characteristics of system- 
building and momentum-gathering, albeit operating on a wider international scale (2.3.3). 
He added that in the case of the ESI, this was demonstrated by the continued search for 
scale economies and load diversity, and by the increasing concentration of international 
electrical plant manufacturers. The British ESI case offers mixed evidence in support of 
these claims. Certainly, as Haywood and others described, the liberalisation of the 
industry was associated with a much greater role for international plant manufacturing 
companies (6.4). 
However, the evidence from the present case suggests that the ESI systems of the 1990s 
are fundamentally different to the ones they replaced - to the extent that it is misleading 
to suggest that system-building at the level of the international plant manufacturers has 
substituted that formerly done at national level by state-owned utilities. In particular, 
monopoly generators such as the CEGB were able to exert far greater influence on their 
economic and political environment than is possible for the international plant 
manufacturing companies in the 1990s. Indeed, the organisational and regulatory 
framework developed for the British ESI in the course of privatisation was purposely 
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designed to minimise the control exerted on the industry by any one institution or 
company through vertical or horizontal integration. 
The accounts of those involved in the development of generation technology projects in 
the post-liberalised ESI (5.4) offer no real evidence of system-building by the 
international manufacturing groups. Rather, the manufacturers were restricted to offering 
tenders for plant projects in a fiercely competitive market. To some extent, the 
liberalisation of the British ESI appears to have resulted in-part in the localisation rather 
than globalisation of system-building; IPP projects were largely financed and managed on 
a project-by-project basis, with new consortia established for each project (5.3.3,5.4). At 
the same time, however, there have been some moves towards greater concentration and 
re-integration in the industry since privatisation - such as seen in the takeover of RECs 
by US power companies. As yet, however, these changes have not provided for the 
development of centralised system-building on anything like the extent seen under 
nationalisation, and given the new institutional and regulatory framework for the 
industry, they appear unlikely to do so. l 
The case-studies of CCGT projects also revealed the extent to which British ESI 
privatisation has been associated with a transformation of the Hughesian 'contextual 
factors' of the environment of the electric power system. Liberalisation resulted in the re- 
emergence of economic principles as a powerful influence on generation technology, to 
the extent that they again fit Hughes' description as 'soft-determinants' in the interwar 
years. In other respects, however, the electric power system of the 1990s is very different 
to that of the inter-war years. In particular, the dominant role of economic factors is not 
accompanied by what Hughes identified as the other soft determinant in the interwar 
years - the momentum of the system itself. Indeed, the liberalisation of the industry 
resulted in a transformation in the industry from being producer-led to consumer-led - 
the consumers in this case being the public electricity suppliers and large users. (The 
transfer of power from the generators to the suppliers was a deliberate part of the 
Government's proposals for privatisation, as described in 4.2.2). The weaknesses of 
Hughes' approach as applied to consumer-led industries was previously recognised by 
Carlson (2.3.4). 
However, whilst the ESI privatisation case exposes some substantial weaknesses of the 
systems approach, in other areas, it confirms its continuing value, and it would be going 
too far to suggest that the systems perspective is completely invalidated by the present 
1 Nevertheless, this is an area which remains in some flux, and the application of Hughes' systems-building perspective 
on newly emerging international alliances in the power industry offers considerable potential for further investigation. 
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case. It was recognised from the outset of the present study that certain aspects of 
Hughes' analytical approach - the emphasis on the perspective of the system-builder, and 
the various stages of system evolution - were inappropriate, and these aspects were 
deliberately downplayed in the review of Hughes' work in Sections 2.3 and 2.6.1. Instead, 
attention was focused on those areas of the systems approach which appeared to offer 
particular insights to ESI privatisation. Particular focus was therefore given to Hughes' 
distinction between 'system' and 'contextual' influences on technological change, and the 
insight that this provides to the role of technology as both cause and effect of social 
change, and to the distinctive and potentially unpredictable action of the technical core 
(2.3.2). 
Applying these concepts to the recent changes in electricity generation technology in 
Britain directs attention to the role of CCGT technology as cause and effect of change in 
the industry, and the distinctive action of the CCGT technical core. As stated earlier in 
this section, privatisation may be considered as a powerful contingent event which 
reconstructed the financial, legislative and institutional environment for electricity 
generation technology, and thereby resulted in the replacement of one established 
sociotechnical system - with a nuclear power and steam turbine technical core - for 
another, with a gas turbine technical core. 
Gas turbine generation technology was essentially excluded from the nationalised ESI in 
Britain (3.5.4), and was developed by overseas manufactures and utilities, using 
techniques developed for turbojet engines (3.5.2,3.5.3). As a result, the gas 
turbine/CCGT technical core exhibits quite different technical and economic properties 
than those of the established ESI system - it is far less capital intensive, is competitive in 
small units, has short lead times, and is capable of minimal environmental pollution. As 
such, it provides a powerful demonstration of a technical core developed for a specific 
context (the aerospace engine industry) which proved to have unanticipated consequences 
when transferred to another - electric power systems, particularly the British ESI. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, few predicted the speed or scale of the dash-for-gas (5.3.1). 
CCGT technology was far better suited to the liberalised environment for the British ESI 
than the established core - and thereby reflected the institutional, economic, and 
legislative changes made to the industry by Government. However, CCGT technology 
was a cause as well as an effect of the changes affecting the industry after 1987. By 
reducing entry barriers to generation, the CCGT technical core enabled the development 
of independent generation to an unforeseen extent. When the Government's proposals for 
privatisation were first unveiled, the consensus amongst industry insiders and 
independent analysts was that there could be no significant independent generation 
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challenge to the CEGB successors for many years after flotation (5.3.1). Such forecasts 
were confounded by the dash-for-gas. CCGT technology effectively transferred novel 
economic characteristics to electricity generation in Britain, and thereby enabled the 
realisation of IPP projects to a far greater degree than would otherwise have been 
possible. By doing so, it also accelerated the decline of established interests in the 
industry, particularly those associated with coal-fired generation, to a degree that the 
Government and others apparently thought inconceivable (6.2.1) . 
The changes to the British ESI since privatisation also offer support for Hughes' concept 
of technological style, and his suggestion for the causes of similarity and difference 
in the 
adoption of technologies (2.3.2). In a similar fashion as Hughes described for steam 
turbines, CCGT T technology was developed internationally, and has been adopted by 
different ESI's in the past decade to degrees which reflect their particular economic and 
political circumstances. As MacKerron pointed out (5.3.4), the British dash-for-gas 
has 
not been repeated in speed and scale in any comparable country - reflecting the 
unprecedented nature of the structural and regulatory reforms to the ESI in Britain (6.5.2). 
In Hughes' terms, the environment for the electric power system in Britain reflected a 
particular emphasis in British politics with economic liberalisation, and this provided for 
a distinctive style of generation technology in the British ESI of the 1990s, featuring an 
unparalleled use of CCGT technology. 
Although it provides some support for the analytical value of associating distinctive 
properties with a technical core, the British ESI case also provides a warning against any 
lapse into technological determinism in discussion of the action of the core. Whilst the 
CCGT technical core enabled changes to the British ESI after privatisation, the dash-for- 
gas was also a result of the longstanding desire for independent generation in the British 
ESI, fed by institutional rivalry and the perceived inefficiencies of the CEGB (as 
discussed in Section 5.6). Therefore, rather than the straightforward acting-out of the 
techno-economic imperatives of the CCGT technical core, the dash-for-gas should be 
seen as an outcome of the interaction of the potential of CCGT technology with the 
institutional and regulatory changes to the ESI environment associated with privatisation, 
and also the historical development of the industry before these changes were realised. 
In Networks of Power, Hughes himself tended to discuss the technical core in rather 
deterministic terms. When he referred to steam turbines introduced in the interwar years 
as "supply in search of demand" (2.3.2), he over-privileges technical imperatives, and 
underplays the market and political factors supporting ESI expansion in these years. 
Although steam turbines made possible cheap and abundant electricity, without 
favourable organisational, economic and legislative conditions, they would have 
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remained undeveloped. Similarly, in the case of the post-privatised ESI, the action of the 
CCGT technical core was greatly circumscribed by context. The reorganisation of the 
fossil fuel generation sector ahead of privatisation was not a response to the technical 
core of CCGT (or any other) generation technology. Rather, the CCGT core exhibited 
properties well-adapted to the new ESI's 'selection environment'. (Interestingly, when the 
Government attempted to introduce an organisational structure for generation which was 
a response to the technical core of nuclear power, its policies proved unsustainable in the 
course of liberalisation. ) 
In a consideration of the suitability of Hughes' systems approach to recent changes in the 
US ESI, Richard F. Hirsh and Adam H. Serchuk concluded that, although there have been 
significant changes in the US ESI in the past 20 years, the industry's established system 
managers had retained control, and radical technological options, such as wind turbines, 
had been integrated into the existing systems, rather than being associated with the 
overthrow of the systems. 2 In the same terms, the privatisation of the British ESI 
represents a radical rather than conservative change, in the course of which the industry's 
established system managers were disempowered. 
7.3.3 Conclusion: The Value and Limits of Sociotechnical Systems Theory 
Hughes' broad based social shaping approach to the analysis of technological change 
provided an analytical starting-point for the present study, and his view of technologies as 
"cultural artifacts" that reflect and shape the society around them is firmly supported by 
the events described here. Hughes went further than many other social shaping analysts in 
recognising and exploring the ways in which technologies act as agents of economic, 
institutional, and political change. This perspective is highly informative as applied to the 
events in the British ESI associated with privatisation. Within this, certain aspects of the 
sociotechnical systems model have offered particular insights. For example, Hughes' 
distinction between the internal and contextual influences on sociotechnical system 
development has provided a rewarding insight into the displacement of the dominant 
system in the course of privatisation associated with the reconstitution of the industry's 
environment, and also into the way in which CCGT technology acted as both cause and 
effect of changes in the post-privatised ESI. 
2 As such, they concluded, supposedly radical innovations had had an essentially conservative role: "though we 
concede the presence of change, we classify it as conservative ... employment of wind turbines ... constituted responses to conserve the utility system with as little change as possible" (Richard F. Hirsh and Adam H. Serchuk, 'Momentum 
Shifts in the American Electric Utility System: Catastrophic Change - or No Change at All? ', Technology and Culture, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp280-31 1, April 1996: 281,310 
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At the same time, however, the British ESI privatisation case presents a number of 
difficulties for the sociotechnical systems approach, and draws attention to some of its 
underlying weaknesses. Hughes' stages of system development ends with system 
maturity, and he offered little with which to examine the decline and overthrow of 
systems, and the replacement of one system by another. Essentially, all that can be said 
here is that privatisation may be conceived as an external 'contingent event', powerful 
enough to usurp the momentum of the existing system, and impose new institutional, 
legislative and economic priorities that were associated with a radical change in 
generation technology. 
The limitations of the systems approach for the ESI privatisation case may be seen to 
some extent as an inappropriate application of Hughes' model to a situation for which it 
was not designed. In more recent work, Hughes himself pointed out that his model of 
sociotechnical system development developed in Networks of Power was designed to 
describe the growth of young systems, and he recognised its limitations as applied to 
declining or disconnecting systems - and the need for other perspectives in such cases. 
Undoubtedly, some of the difficulties associated in applying the sociotechnical systems 
model to the present case relate to the very different conditions of the British ESI of the 
1990s as compared to the 1920s. 
At the same time, however, the British ESI case exposes underlying flaws in the 
assumptions and perspective of the systems model. In particular, the present case 
confirms many of the weaknesses of the systems approach highlighted by its critics. A 
particular difficulty is the emphasis on the perspective of the system-builder; this 
inevitably locates too much power on the system builders and the technological core, and 
gives too little recognition to the importance of supporting institutional structures and 
policies. By locating the system as the most influential source for the causes of 
technological change, it encourages functionalist and determinist interpretations. The 
demise of technocracy associated with privatisation, as well as discrediting autonomous 
and determinist notions, also exposes the more technocentric aspects of the sociotechnical 
systems model. ESI restructuring revealed the (often hidden) supports of the dominant 
generation technologies of the nationalised system, and with it, exposed the extent to 
which the systems model privileges certain dynamics above others in explanations of 
technological change. 
Hughes himself recognised the dangers of deterministic interpretations of his approach, 
and he warned against anything more than a "loosely-structured" use of theory. Used with 
an awareness of its limitations, the sociotechnical systems model remains of considerable 
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analytical value. Despite its weaknesses, it has provided uniquely valuable insights on the 
changes in the British ESI associated with privatisation. 
7.4 Constructivist/Actor-Network Approaches and ESI Privatisation 
7.4.1 Introduction 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, social constructivist and actor-network approaches have 
considerable limitations as applied to highly politicised technologies, such as those of 
electricity generation. They both presume primacy for micro-level dynamics, and tend to 
underplay structural and political influences on technological change (2.4.3). At the end 
of Chapter 2 (2.6.1) it was decided that such was the extent of these weaknesses in the 
context of the present case, that neither a constructivist nor an actor-network perspective 
would be explicitly adopted here. At the same time, however, it was also recognised that 
both approaches offer particular perspectives and insights into the process of 
technological change, and these are now considered. 
ESI liberalisation was associated with the disempowerment of the formerly dominant ESI 
institutions, reduction in government intervention in fuel and generation technology 
choice, and the introduction of an organisational and regulatory framework for fossil fuel 
generation technology which gave much greater rein to competitive market forces. Within 
this new environment, much of the decisionmaking processes affecting technology 
development was relocated to the project level, so that analytical approaches such as 
constructivism and actor network theory became much more appropriate. 
7.4.2 Social Constructivism and ESI Privatisation 
Before 1987, the dominant forms of generation technology in the British ESI were 
essentially a reflection of the entrenched vested interests of the ESI institutions and 
central government. Against these, rival technical forms were essentially unable to 
compete, even after the passing of the 1983 Electricity Act (3.4.4). From the perspective 
of social constructivism, generation technology had achieved closure, and the dominant 
technical forms - coal-fired steam turbine technology and nuclear power - reflected the 
dominance of particular groups, namely the CEGB, AEA, NCB, NUM, and government. 
As Bijker and Law suggested, stability of social form was mirrored by stability of 
technical form. 
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The ESI case offers broad support for Bijker's observations on the interconnectedness of 
technical and social change (2.4.1). ESI liberalisation involved the destabilisation of the 
economic and institutional environment of generation technology, and with it, the 
destabilisation of technical forms. In accordance with Bijker's suggestion that "instability 
is more revealing about a systems characteristics than stability" (2.4.1), the ESI 
privatisation process exposed the institutional and political supports that had supported 
the dominant technologies under nationalisation. At the same time, by stripping those 
supports away, it made social constructivism -a perspective oriented towards instability 
-a much more relevant framework for studying the development of generation 
technology. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, within a short period in 1988 and 1989, CCGT technology had 
become overwhelmingly the favoured generation technology in the British ESI (5.3.2). 
From the constructivist perspective, this can be seen as the establishment by certain 
relevant social groups, such as international plant manufacturers, independent power 
producers, and international financiers, of a new preferred design of generation 
technology. Established groups in the British ESI, such as National Power and 
PowerGen, which were formerly committed to coal-fired steam turbine plant and nuclear 
power, rapidly accepted this redefinition. Other formerly powerful groups, such as the 
AEA, British Coal, and British plant manufacturers, who refused to accept this 
redefinition, but were unable to impose their alternative definition, were quickly 
marginalised. 
Although a plausible reading of events, the constructivist description of changes in 
electricity generation technology after 1987 remains a restricted one. In particular, the 
success of certain groups in imposing their new 'interpretation' of generation technology 
cannot be understood without reference to less immediate factors - notably the 
restructuring of institutional and regulatory environment of the industry by Government. 
In this sense, the successful actions of independent power producers and RECs in the 
post-privatised ESI, as Williams and Russell stated, "cannot be explained on their own 
terms" (2.4.3). Whilst social constructivism is better able to provide insight on change in 
the industry after privatisation than before, it cannot, by itself, provide a satisfactory 
account of the dash-for-gas. For this, as Williams and Russell also pointed out, an 
approach capable of capturing the interplay between action and context is needed, such as 
Hughes' systems model. 
Bijker's later modifications to constructivist theory add little to the understanding of the 
British ESI case. Clearly, the British ESI before and after privatisation provide cases of 
very different 'technological frames' (2.4.1), but this offers no new insight not provided 
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by other approaches. Furthermore, what Hard referred to as the "consensus orientation" of 
constructivism (2.5.2) remains a weakness as applied to the British ESI after 
privatisation. To view the dominance CCGT technology after privatisation as a reflection 
of successful consensus formation, through the 'amalgamation' of different interests, 
ignores the ongoing hostility towards the dash-for-gas from the proponents of other 
technical forms, most notably the coal industry and its supporters, as was evident during 
the coal crisis (6.3.2). Overall, the present case offers support for the criticisms of social 
constructivism as discussed in Chapter 2. At the same time, the post-privatised 
ESI is 
much more amenable to constructivist interpretations than previously, and 
here the 
approach offers a valuable - if limited - perspective on technological change. 
7.4.3 Actor-Network Theory and ESI Privatisation 
From the actor-network perspective, the technical and social elements of steam turbine 
and nuclear power actor-networks in the nationalised ESI in Britain were durable, and 
those actors who tried to introduce alternative technical forms were unable to enrol key 
technical, institutional and political actors. The relative impotence of micro-level actors is 
a measure of the limited value of actor-network concepts as applied to the nationalised 
ESI. 
As with social constructivism, however, actor-network theory is more appropriate - and 
offers considerably greater insight - when applied to the post-liberalised ESI. Indeed, the 
case-study accounts of those involved in CCGT projects (as described in Section 5.4) 
offer an implicitly micro-level perspective on technological change that fits particularly 
well into an actor-network perspective. 
The actor-network model highlights the importance of both 'technical' and 'social' 
elements in the dash-for-gas. The introduction of CCGT technology was predicated on 
both technical and social innovations - on improvements to gas turbine technology and 
the price and availability of gas on the one hand - and also on the politically-led removal 
of economic and institutional barriers to new entry in generation in Britain. From the 
actor-network perspective, this may be described as the successful enrolling of technical 
and social actors in the CCGT actor-network. As such, the technology provides a stark 
contrast with the failure in this respect in Callon's electric-vehicle case (2.4.2). Within 
CCGT actor-networks, both non-human actors: advanced gas turbine blades, natural gas 
fuel, combined cycle technology - and human actors: RECs, large users, and international 
financiers - were all successfully enrolled. For example, Enron's activities in developing 
the Teeside Power Plant (5.4.3,5.4.4) can be readily seen as the successful building of a 
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network of heterogeneous elements - both technical (CCGT technology from 
Westinghouse, gas supply from the North Sea pipeline) - and social (persuading ICI to 
provide land and purchase power, successfully enrolling RECs as both equity partners 
and power purchasers, and securing international finance). 
Because it allows for recognition of structure and differentiated power, Law and Callon's 
conception of interacting global and local networks (2.4.2) is particularly applicable to 
the British ESI case. Following this model, the implementation of CCGT technology after 
privatisation can be seen as the successful mobilisation of global and local networks. 
(Indeed, three different levels of network are identifiable in the development of 
generation technology projects: local (project), national, and international. ) The global 
network included the international provision of CCGT technology itself, the international 
financiers supporting their development, and also the institutional and regulatory context 
for the British ESI. The local network included the various institutional, financial, and 
technical elements of the IPP consortia. Both global and local networks were essential for 
the successful development of CCGT projects. The global network provided a new 
technical form for generation, and the means to finance it, whilst the local network 
provided a powerful institutional desire to enter generation, and also the secure market 
which, as Summerton stressed, is essential for the introduction of any radical (and capital 
intensive) technology (2.4.2). 
This distinction in scale makes clear the dependency of micro-level generation 
technology projects on conducive institutional and regulatory conditions. The local 
network of a CCGT scheme can be seen to be predicated upon the existence of a higher- 
level global network - including the new institutions and regulations of the privatised 
ESI, as well as the international technology of CCGTs. Before privatisation, any local 
network created to develop CCGT plant projects would have been frustrated by a failure 
to enrol sufficient support from the 'global network' of the institutions of the nationalised 
ESI. By contrast, after the liberalisation of the industry, particular CCGT projects such as 
Roosecote and Wilton (5.4) were able to successfully impose themselves as "obligatory 
points of passage" between the global and local networks. They enabled the injection of 
global technical and financial resources into the British ESI, and at the same time, they 
gave expression to a local desire for entry into generation. For the ESI case, Summerton's 
emphasis on the interdependency on different actors in the network offers a more 
appropriate perspective (2.4.2). 
Nevertheless, whilst becoming much more relevant to the British ESI case since 
privatisation, the actor-network approach remains, like social constructivism, an 
inherently limited perspective on technological change in the industry. Whilst the 
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privatisation process gave power to project-level decisionmaking, it was itself a powerful 
confirmation of the importance of structural and political factors in the process of change. 
The focus on project-level dynamics within constructivism and actor-network approaches 
would tend to suggest that the 'heterogeneous engineers' involved with IPPs were all- 
powerful figures in the new ESI. In practice, as privatisation revealed, their successful 
development of such projects was predicated on a supportive political and institutional 
framework, analysis of which requires a more structurally- and historically-informed 
perspective. 
7.5 Institutional Level Approaches and ESI Privatisation 
7.5.1 Russell's Institutional Interests Approach and ESI Privatisation 
Stewart Russell's analysis of CHP/DH technology provided a powerful demonstration of 
the importance of an institutional interests perspective in order to understand the pattern 
of generation technology in the nationalised ESI (2.5.2). The exclusion of CHP closely 
resembled the marginalisation of CCGT technology in the same period. CCGT plant was 
of no real interest to the powerful institutions under nationalisation (3.5.4). For the 
turbojet manufacturers such as Rolls-Royce (who developed much of the technology 
which would eventually find application in CCGT plant), it was an irrelevance, given 
their concentration on aerospace markets. For the large electrical plant manufacturers, its 
development was not merited because utility disinterest provided insufficient sales 
revenue. For the utilities themselves, it was a distraction from their long-term focus on 
coal-fired steam turbine plant and nuclear power. Such was the institutional hostility 
towards gas-fired plant, that there is evidence that its development was actively opposed 
by those committed to the existing pattern of energy supply in Britain (3.5.4). 
Whilst ESI liberalisation involved the confrontation of entrenched institutions of the 
nationalised era, institutional rivalries and interests continued to play a powerful role 
during the privatisation process, and on the changes to generation technology since 
privatisation. As a result, the institutional interests perspective has remained relevant to 
the analysis of the fortunes of the different generation technology options. From this 
perspective, the marginalisation of the historically dominant form of generation 
technology in the British ESI - coal-fired steam turbine technology - was associated with 
the disempowerment of British Coal and the NUM. Although this disempowerment 
became obvious after 1987, it can be traced to the defeat of the NUM in 1985, and a 
longer term decline under nationalisation (6.3.3). Given Conservative Government 
hostility to the coal industry, coal-fired generation technology, although still dominant in 
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terms of installed capacity, went into the ESI privatisation process without any significant 
institutional support (6.6). 
By contrast, nuclear power technology went into the privatisation process still 
commanding the support of the most powerful ESI institutions and Government. Indeed, 
even after the proposals for the liberalisation of the industry were made known, nuclear 
technology was still favoured by National Power (who were to retain considerable 
institutional power after privatisation), and also the Department of Energy. However, a 
largely unanticipated consequence of the Government's proposals was the significant 
turnaround it provoked in the vested interest of National Power as compared to the CEGB 
regarding nuclear power. In the nationalised ESI, the CEGB, protected from competitive 
market forces, developed a strongly embedded technocentric commitment to nuclear 
technology. However, the proposed removal of generator monopoly in the Government's 
privatisation proposals meant that National Power would be ultimately responsible for the 
costs of nuclear electricity. As a result, from 1988 onwards, it became in National 
Power's interest to emphasise the costs and risks associated with nuclear power, in order 
to gain maximum protection from Government ahead of flotation (4.6.1). This reversal 
provoked a series of disclosures from National Power concerning the uncompetitiveness 
of nuclear electricity. Even so, such was the continued strength of political support for 
nuclear power in Britain, that it was only after it threatened the entire ESI privatisation, 
that the Government abandoned its commitment to new nuclear plant and the 
privatisation of existing plant. 
The dramatic transformation in the institutional interests of the CEGB/National Power 
towards nuclear power in 1988 and 1989 confirms Russell's contention that institutional 
support for particular technologies is a contingent matter, sensitive to particular economic 
and political conditions. Before privatisation, however, this contingency was not at all 
evident, and institutions such as the CEGB showed an essentially unwavering 
commitment to nuclear technology. Indeed, for the most committed proponents of nuclear 
power - such as the CEGB Chairman Lord Marshall, and Alistair Cruickshank of the 
AEA (4.5.3) - this support was not a contingent matter: no change in their views occurred 
in the course of ESI privatisation. For these individuals in particular, support for nuclear 
power technology went beyond any concern for its economic viability. 
For all parts of the ESI, the transition to privatisation marked a significant change in the 
character of institutional influences on generation technology. As confirmed by the 
accounts of those most closely involved in CCGT plant development (5.4), in the post- 
privatised industry, financial and economic criteria became highly influential factors in 
the choice of new plant type. Whilst the desire to enter generation was clearly in-part the 
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result of institutional interests and rivalries, the choice of generation technology 
for the 
expression of this desire was greatly circumscribed by financial restrictions. 
Independent 
producers wishing to develop plant proposals based on technology other than 
CCGT, 
such as clean coal technology, were unable to secure either a guaranteed market or 
financial backing for their schemes (6.5). Although the established generators were not 
subject to these financial constraints, their choice of generation technology 
in the new 
ESI was similarly restricted by the need to sell bulk electricity into a market where 
suppliers were given much greater freedoms. In contrast with the nationalised 
ESI, even 
those bodies that retained institutional power after privatisation - National Power, 
PowerGen, the RECs and Nuclear Electric - were no longer in a position to develop 
particular technical forms for generation on the basis of their own 
institutional 
preferences. 
In outlining his analytical approach, Russell pointed to the institutional and political 
aspects of economic criteria (2.5.1). The radical accounting changes applied by the 
CEGB/National Power to nuclear power in the course of privatisation is a powerful 
example of this (4.3.3). Beyond this, however, Russell gave little consideration to 
economic influences on generation technology - perhaps reflecting the insignificance of 
market forces on technology choice in the nationalised ESI. His approach is therefore 
unable to fully reflect the importance of the different economic characteristics of the 
competing forms of generation technology in the privatised ESI, which - alongside 
institutional interests - were undoubtedly highly significant factor in the dash-for-gas. 
By itself, the institutional interests approach is unable to explain the institutional and 
technological transformation of the ESI associated with privatisation. Russell argued that 
throughout the period he analysed, organisational restructuring of the industry had served 
to preserve the dominance of the producer organisations, and established technological 
forms. Clearly, the liberalisation and privatisation of the ESI does not conform to this 
pattern; there is no anticipation within Russell's analysis of the possibility of such a 
radical reconstruction. Russell himself recognised that an analytical focus on institutional 
interests had to be placed within "the specific character of the British economy and state" 
(2.5.1). The institutional interests perspective, although still valuable in considering the 
development of the ESI after 1987, was devised for a period of broadly stable political 
and legislative context, within which market forces were insignificant. In the course of 
privatisation, both government and market influences on generation technology choices 
changed radically, and the institutional interests perspective, although it provides 
continuing insight, offers only a partial view. 
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7.5.2 Härd's Social Conflict Approach and ESI Privatisation 
Hard's "conflict theory of technology" (2.5.2), like Russell's institutional interests 
approach considered above, offers a number of insights into the technological changes 
experienced by the British ESI associated with privatisation, whilst at the same time 
being inadequate by itself to fully recognise and describe the diversity of the process of 
change, and the range of influences involved. Institutional conflict was undoubtedly a 
significant influence on the dash-for-gas. In particular, from Hard's perspective, the 
liberalisation of the ESI can be seen as enabling the manifestation of conflict between the 
Area Boards/RECs and the CEGB/National Power/PowerGen, that had remained latent 
within the structure for the industry set up by the 1957 Electricity Act. The role of CCGT 
technology in this conflict after 1988 (5.3.2), offers a powerful validation of Hard's 
suggestion that "latent conflicts may become manifest when new technical opportunities 
appear" (2.5.2). (The same may also be said for the longstanding conflict between 
Conservative Government and the NCB). Furthermore, the employment of CCGT 
technology by RECs, overseas power companies and plant manufacturers offers support 
for Härd's argument concerning the introduction of new techniques by certain groups to 
gain "positional advantage" (2.5.2). 
Härd's observations on the relationship between innovative activity and the distribution of 
institutional power are also vindicated by events in the British ESI. Along with other 
analysts (such as Pacey and MacKenzie) Hard suggested that bureaucracy and monopoly 
was essentially inimical to innovation. This is clearly demonstrated by the CEGB's 
entrenched commitment to steam turbine and nuclear power technology, and resistance to 
CCGT technology. Hard also suggested that technological change was most likely in a 
context where "power and influence were unequally distributed", rather than in a 
perfectly competitive market (2.5.2). As was discussed at the end of Chapter 5, the 
limited degree of the Government's liberalisation of the ESI, and the remaining 
concentration of power in the CEGB successor companies, proved to be a powerful 
incentive for the RECs and large users to seek entry into generation (5.5). 
Nevertheless, whilst offering valuable insights, the social conflict perspective cannot fully 
capture the range of influences involved in the dash-for-gas. In a similar manner to 
Russell's institutional interests approach discussed above, it fails to properly consider the 
extent to which economic pressures influenced the choice of CCGT technology. In 
addition, the social conflict perspective cannot account for the development of certain 
technical forms rather than others, and the favouring of one technology over another. 
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Hard himself recognised that the conflict perspective was essentially complementary to 
others; used as such, it is of some value as applied to the British ESI case. 
7.5.3 MacKenzie's Historical Sociology Approach and ESI Privatisation 
Like Hughes, MacKenzie offered a broad based social shaping approach to the analysis of 
technological change of the kind that has been implicitly followed throughout the present 
study. As was argued at the end of Chapter 2, such a perspective was considered essential 
for the development of any realistic understanding of the process of change in the British 
ESI associated with privatisation (2.6.2). Within this, many aspects of MacKenzie's 
'historical sociology' approach devised for Inventing Accuracy have been supported by 
events in the British ESI. Without a historical understanding of the institutional and 
political interests associated with generation technology in the nationalised industry - and 
the ongoing development of gas turbine/CCGT technology outside of the British ESI - no 
understanding could have been reached concerning the pattern of generation technology 
forms going into the privatisation process, and the subsequent transformation of that 
pattern. 
More specific elements of MacKenzie's analysis have also proved of value. For example, 
his observations of the role of technological knowledge and expertise in the development 
of nuclear weapons technology has direct parallels with the British nuclear power 
programme (2.5.3). Much of the activities of the CEGB and AEA can be seen as the 
establishment and maintenance of the credibility of nuclear power. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the emphasis in the early nuclear power programme was on demonstrating that 
nuclear power was technically feasible rather than economically competitive (3.3.2). 
Within such a context, technical expertise became a highly useful resource for the nuclear 
industry, and technologists had a powerful influence on the development of the nuclear 
programme. This was particularly true of the fast reactor research programme, which 
occupied a central role in the British nuclear programme, on the strength, Gowing stated, 
of "its inherent scientific promise" (4.5.1). 
In parliament, the technical expertise offered by former scientists or engineers was 
privileged in early discussion of nuclear power, and those MPs without such expertise 
willingly deferred to the views of others, This was most evident in debate on the 
restructuring of the ESI during the Second Reading of the Electricity Bill in 1956, at the 
height of the Suez Crisis (3.3.3). The British nuclear power programme has been often 
judged in primarily technical terms, and its supporters have often seen it as a technical 
success confounded by changing economic or political circumstances. For example, the 
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1964 White Paper on the Second Nuclear Power Programme stated that "nuclear power, 
from a technical standpoint, has achieved all that was expected of it" (3.3.4). Similarly, 
Alistair Cruickshank defended the fast reactor programme by stating that "we proved the 
technology ... we've 
done everything we were asked to do, essentially", and described the 
cancellation of the Dounreay PFR as a "successful operation" in which the "patient died" 
(4.5.3). 
In the nationalised ESI, the CEGB and AEA were successful for many years in 
maintaining the credibility of the nuclear power programme. At the same time, they 
seemingly managed to maintain the separation between 'technology' and 'politics' - in 
MacKenzie's terms, to keep closed the black-box of nuclear power generation technology 
(2.5.3). In reality, however, to an extent that only became clear in the course of ESI 
privatisation, their success owed much to a favourable institutional framework created 
and maintained by government. Whilst governments voiced technical rationale's for the 
British nuclear programme, their actions fit into MacKenzie's suggestion that technically- 
based arguments provide a resource for those wishing to justify developments - what 
Nelkin referred to as the legitimising role of technical expertise (2.5.3). The invocation of 
the 'technical imperatives' of nuclear power was a less controversial means of justifying 
support than political concern, for example, to reduce dependency on the British coal 
industry. 
The nationalised ESI also provides a powerful example of MacKenzie's characterisation 
of conservative technological change within a well-established institutional framework as 
a self-fulfilling prophecy (2.5.3). The industry's R&D programmes under nationalisation 
encoded the interests and values of the politicians, scientists and engineers, involved in 
policymaking for the industry. Research efforts were channelled largely according to the 
preferences of the CEGB, AEA and Government. 
Much energy policy debate in the postwar period - especially in the crisis periods of the 
1950s and 1970s - was based on presumptions about the inherently 'special' nature of 
electricity generation technologies, in particular their capital expense, long lead times, 
and on their long-term strategic importance to the wider economy given projected fuel 
scarcities. With such assumptions in-place, policy discussions were dominated by the 
perceived need for long-term planning, and the projected needs of the next generation. On 
this basis, the favoured generation technology was almost invariably nuclear power -a 
highly complex technical form, involving high capital costs, long lead-times, but which 
offered security of fuel supply. From MacKenzie's perspective, the policy process can 
been seen as providing generation technologies that seemed to confirm the assumptions 
regarding the special status of electricity generation technology. 
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By contrast, CCGT technology, the dominant form for generation technology 
in the 
British ESI since liberalisation, is characterised by relatively low capital cost and short- 
lead times. Although it was a radical departure for the British ESI, it was also an adapted 
form of a well-established technology. Whilst the success of CCGT technology in the 
late-1980s reflected changed economic circumstances, such as the price and availability 
of natural gas, it also suggests that much of the earlier presumptions concerning the 
inherently special character of electricity generation technology were mistaken and self- 
perpetuating. 
The liberalisation of the ESI involved challenging the CEGB's technical expertise in 
respect of supposed technological imperatives supporting monopoly control of generation 
and transmission. The 1988 White Paper proposals were a substantial rejection of the 
CEGB's technical expertise and authority (4.2.2), and revealed the importance of 
government sanction for such expertise in the nationalised ESI. Whilst CEGB and AEA 
expertise was increasingly challenged in the 1980s (3.4.4), it remained unopposed by 
industry's sponsors at the Department of Energy. After 1987, independent expert 
challenge to the CEGB intensified, but it was the challenge by Government which was 
critical. In effect, economic liberalisation of generation brought with it the pluralisation of 
technical authority in regard to generation technology. 
The cancellation of the CEGB's nuclear power programme after 1989 offered clear 
confirmation of MacKenzie's conclusion concerning the "fallacy of technological 
determinism", and a stark example of his description of the dependency of even the most 
deeply embedded and apparently autonomous technologies on their surrounding 
institutions. MacKenzie's words, "take away the institutions that support technological 
change of a particular sort, and it ceases to seem 'natural' - indeed it ceases altogether" 
(2.5.3) could have been written to describe the collapse of the British nuclear power 
programme after the break-up of the CEGB. 
ESI liberalisation was associated with the demise of technocracy and the rise of demand- 
side influences on the process of technological change. From MacKenzie's perspective, 
the Government's success in introducing market forces into the industry can be seen to 
reflect the failure of technologists to maintain the separation of 'technology' from 
'politics', or to prevent the incursion of external influences into technological 
development. Within technologists accounts of the recent changes to the ESI, there are 
some examples of such views. Alistair Cruickshank of the AEA, for example, referred to 
"political reasons" for the difficulties experienced by the British nuclear power 
programme associated with privatisation (4.5.3). Similarly, Roger Semmens, a PowerGen 
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engineer, was dismissive of the role of "politics" in the dash-for-gas (5.3.4). In his 
valedictory speech as CEGB Chairman, Lord Marshall attributed the difficulties of the 
nuclear power programme with a long history of political interference (4.3.3). In 
retrospect, the removal of the CEGB's monopoly meant that the apparent separation of 
generation technology development from its economic and regulatory environment 
became impossible. 
Even so, the 'black-boxing' of technological knowledge is still evident in the liberalised 
ESI. Since the privatisation, much of the technical expertise concerning generation 
technology has, literally, been an imported black box, since CCGT plant has generally 
involved turnkey contracts with overseas plant manufacturers (5.4). This enables other 
groups, such as the RECs, to rely on others for technological expertise. National Power 
and PowerGen are no longer concerned with retaining such expertise within their 
organisations. In the new ESI, however, the dimensions of the black box are strictly 
circumscribed - not by technologists, but by international financiers - who apply 
primarily financial rather than technical criteria on technology choices. 
The British ESI privatisation process also offered a powerful example of the importance 
of MacKenzie's attention to ethnoaccountancy, or financial and accounting practices, 
within a wider social shaping perspective (2.5.3). The liberalisation of the economic 
environment for generation technology - at least within the fossil fuel sector - was a 
central part of the Government's proposals for ESI privatisation. As was described in 
Chapter 4, a number of political and economic concerns - including criticisms of 
'privatised monopolies', and the desire to encourage independent generation in a structure 
which, because of the demands of nuclear power, preserved market power in the CEGB 
successors - meant that the Government had resolved to separate out the 'natural 
monopoly' aspects of the ESI from those potentially competitive parts. Within this, 
generation was seen by both Government and independent analysts as the part of the 
industry where the greatest benefits from liberalisation were to be found (4.2.1,4.2.2). 
The ending of generator monopoly, and the transfer of ownership of the grid to the 
supply-side of the industry, meant that, in the new structure for the industry potential 
generation plant schemes could not be assured of a market for their output. In addition, 
private sector financial and accounting practices were imposed on the industry for the 
first time. 
Although the Government had intended that nuclear power should be relatively protected 
from competitive - pressures after privatisation, the most immediate impact of 
liberalisation was the withdrawal from privatisation of existing nuclear plant, and the 
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cancellation of the proposed PWR series (4.3). In the detailed investigations into the 
withdrawal of the causes of these events (4.3.3), it became clear that the difference in 
accounting practices between the nationalised ESI and private sector norms was central. 
In particular, the Energy Select Committee inquiries in late-1989 and 1990 highlighted 
the change from cost-plus to fixed-price fuel contracts between the CEGB/National 
Power, and BNFL, and changes in the discount rate and amortisation period (4.3.3). The 
Energy Secretary John Wakeham told the Committee at this time that the difficulties 
facing nuclear power were primarily due to the fact that "a different view was taken of 
the same set of costs" (4.3.3). 
In the fossil fuel sector economic criteria appeared to play a similarly powerful role in 
determining technology choices. The abandonment of coal-fired steam turbine 
technology, and the adoption of CCGT technology for all new plant was apparently a 
response to the desire of private investors for shorter lead times, less capital investment, 
and quicker returns (as well as the collapse of gas prices in the late-1980s). For 
independent power plant schemes in particular, the international loan arrangements used 
to finance plant construction clearly had a leading role in the choice of plant type and 
operation (5.3.3,5.4). 
Although it is apparently possible to interpret the changes in both nuclear and fossil fuel 
generation technology in the privatised ESI as primarily a response to economic 
liberalisation and the imposition of a tougher set of accounting practices, such an 
interpretation disguises many of the forces influencing changes in the industry. It is here 
that MacKenzie's emphasis on the social constructedness of such practices provides a 
guide to interpretation. As was discussed above (7.2.3), the withdrawal of nuclear plant 
from privatisation was a result of a political choice by Government to limit its subsidy to 
National Power for the running of nuclear plant. Similarly, the dash-for-gas and the 
demise of coal-fired plant was a reflection of a range of institutional, legislative and 
political concerns: the imposition of the EC Directive at a critical time coincident with 
privatisation, the desire on the part of the RECs and large users to reduce their 
dependency on the CEGB successors, and Conservative Government hostility to the 
British coal industry (5.5,6.6.1). 
In addition, Russell's observation, in his study of accounting practices in the nationalised 
ESI, that "there was no single method or universal set of criteria. The terms of appraisal 
were clearly dependent on the performing institution and the precise constraints on it", 
applies equally well in the privatised ESI (2.5.1). The starkest contrast here is clearly the 
very different financial and economic environments between nuclear and fossil fuel 
generation. Within the fossil fuel sector, however, the financial criteria adopted differed 
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considerably between IPP consortia, who were forced to resort to non-recourse funding, 
and National Power/PowerGen, who were able to finance CCGT schemes from their own 
assets and revenues (5.3.3). Although private sector financial and accounting practices 
assumed a much more powerful role in the privatised ESI, there is no evidence of a 
economic or financial determinism of generation technology choice. Rather, the case 
confirms MacKenzie's and Russell's suggestions that financial criteria are formulated and 
applied in response to particular institutional interests, political priorities, and wider 
social concerns. 
7.5.4 Rip and Kemp's Technological Regimes and Radical Innovation 
The changes in generation, technology associated with the British ESI privatisation 
process offers broad support for Arie Rip and Rene Kemp's emphasis on meso-level 
technological regimes, and for their analysis of the conditions favourable to the 
deployment of radical innovations (2.5.4). In Rip and Kemp's terms, the privatisation of 
the ESI clearly represented an example of a "situation in flux", in which predictability 
over outcomes was low. Furthermore, the dash-for-gas in the post-privatised ESI 
provided a powerful example of Rip and Kemp's claims for an association between such 
situations and the successful deployment of radical innovations. 
However, before assessing the 'fit' between Rip and Kemp's characterisation of radical 
innovations and the dash-for-gas in the privatised ESI, it is first necessary to qualify the 
status of CCGT as a truly radical change in generation technology. Within the 
technology studies literature, a particular technology is generally understood to be radical 
in terms of its social consequences. Rip and Kemp, for example, defined radical 
innovations as those which "challenge the existing [socio-technical] paradigm or regime, 
which ... gradually grow and see the paradigm replaced" 
(2.5.4). In Networks of Power, 
Hughes also made clear that he understood the political status of a particular technology 
in terms of its consequences: "a conservative technology will maintain the existing 
structures and trends, and ... liberal ones will bring changes in the direction of societal 
development" (2.3.1). 
A follow-on from this understanding is that a particular technology can only be described 
as radical or conservative with reference to its socio-economic context. It also follows 
that a technology may, in principle, be radical or liberal in one context, and conservative 
in another. This relativism in the politicisation of artefects is exemplified in Hughes' 
analysis of the 'impact' of steam turbines. When first introduced in the small-scale ESIs of 
the turn of the century, coal-fired steam turbines were a radical innovation. Hughes 
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referred to their "unprecedented and unexpected" impact at this time, and added: 
"the 
largely unforeseen consequence ... was the sharp acceleration of the quest 
for load 
sufficient to fulfill the economy-of-scale potential of a large, efficiently loaded turbine. 
The turbines were, in effect, supply in search of demand" (2.3.2). One generation later, 
however - in the expanding systems of the 1910s and 
1920s - steam turbines had become 
established at the core of the ESI sociotechnical system, and were a conservative 
technology. By this time, Hughes stated, "sociotechnical systems had high momentum, 
force, and direction ... this momentum was a conservative 
force ... rarely were radical 
inventions ... 
introduced" (2.3.3). 3 
Applying this understanding to the present study suggests that the introduction of CCGT 
technology to the British ESI in the late-1980s and 1990s should be seen as an example 
of radical innovation - whereas the introduction of nuclear power 
(an ostensibly more 
radical technology) into the postwar ESI was a primarily conservative 
innovation .4 
Certainly, the initial deployment of CCGT technology in Britain conforms to both Rip 
and Kemp's description of such innovations as presenting a "challenge the existing 
paradigm or regime", and also Hughes' qualifier that such innovations should challenge 
"existing structures and trends". As analysed in Chapter 5, the first CCGT schemes were 
developed by independent producers seeking to challenge incumbent producers (5.3.2, 
5.4). As was also discussed in Chapter 5, however, much of the subsequent dash-for-gas 
was driven by established generators seeking to pre-empt the challenge of the 
independent producers and hold on to their market share (5.3.3). In this sense CCGT 
technology, although initially liberal, was subsequently both liberal and conservative. 
The status of CCGT technology as a radical innovation is now considered further by 
returning to Rip and Kemp's characterisation of such developments. 
The dash-for-gas offers considerable support for Rip and Kemp's detailed description of 
the dynamics of radical innovation, and the circumstances in which such innovations 
3 Within the wider technology studies literature, Hughes has been criticised by some for failing to give enough 
recognition to the dependency of the impact of core technologies on context. Hirsh and Serchuk, for example, 
suggested that Hughes had implied that the effects of a technology depended on the intrinsic qualities of the technical 
core - on whether it exhibited essentially radical or conservative properties. In practice, they asserted, this was entirely 
a contingent matter: "Nothing inherent in the technologies determined that they would be used either to destroy the 
existing system nor enhance its stability ... The technologies did not exert a one-way influence on their environment, as 
if a radical or conservative character was embedded in their design. Those qualities had to be determined as a result of 
negotiations between actor in the system" (Richard F. Hirsh and Adam 11. Serchuk, 'Momentum Shifts in the American 
Electric Utility System: Catastrophic Change - or No Change at All? ', Technology and Culture, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp280- 
311, April 1996: 310-311). Whilst this description of contingency is welcome, the above extracts from Networks of 
Power would suggest that Hirsh and Serchuck's criticism of Hughes here is misplaced. As was described in 5.3.4, 
although it promoted the interests of independent generators, CCGT technology was also adopted by the established 
generators to defend their vested interests - it was at once politically liberal and conservative. 
4 By the time nuclear power was introduced in the mid-1950s, the British ESI was already highly centralised under the 
control of the BEA (3.3.2). At the same time, however, the emphasis given to nuclear technology in the ESI carried 
with it significant institutional implications in terms of an accelerated technocentrism under the CEGB (3.3.3). 
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were likely to prosper. For example, they suggested that the technological variety on 
which radical changes were built were often already available, but that a change in wider 
circumstances was necessary for their deployment. Under such circumstances, they 
added, actors were forced "against their inclination" to look for novel solutions (2.5.4). 
As was discussed in Chapter 5, CCGT technology was already available by the time the 
ESI underwent liberalisation in 1988. As Williams and Larson stated, the "revolution ... 
under way in electricity generating technology ... [involved] not an exotic new 
technology, but rather the upgrading of the familiar but little-used gas turbine" (5.2). As 
was also discussed in Chapter 5, the initial proposals for new generation plant in the 
liberalised ESI were based on conventional coal-fired technology, and it was only after 
the 1988 Large Combustion Plants Directive imposed an extra cost on such technology 
that independent producers were forced to reconsider their options, and plans for CCGT 
technology deployment developed (5.3.2,5.4.1). 
Rip and Kemp's statement that "innovations which are radical for a regime may 
themselves have been constructed out of incremental use of various complementary 
technologies", such as the transfer between regimes of advances in engineering and 
materials technology, is also well demonstrated by the dash-for-gas. As described in 
Section 5.2, the commercialisation of large scale CCGT technology in the late-1980s was 
based on the transfer of established turbojet technology, particularly after the collapse of 
gas prices in 1986. 
Rip and Kemp also argued that the success of radical technologies was "in some way 
linked to structural problems or crises of [the existing] 'system"', such as the perception of 
a pressing technical or market problem which could not be met with available 
technology, or the reaching of technical limits or increasing marginal costs with existing 
trajectories (2.5.4). As was discussed in Chapter 3, steam turbine technology - both 
nuclear and fossil fuel fired - was reaching technical limits and diminishing returns to 
investment as early as the late-1960s. Flavin and Lennsen stated that "the advances in ... 
[steam turbine] technology ... stemmed from a surprisingly narrow frontier of advances ... 
by the 1960s, this bag of tricks was nearly empty" (3.4.3). A more pressing difficulty to 
the established technological regime in the British ESI during privatisation was the 
imposition of the Large Combustion Plants Directive in June 1988. This presented a 
significant technical difficulty for coal-fired steam turbine plant in terms of pollution 
emission reduction, and was translated into an extra cost which proved critical in the 
relative cost of such plant versus CCGT plant for independent power producers keen to 
develop generation schemes (5.3.2). 
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Furthermore, Rip and Kemp also suggested that radical innovations were more likely to 
be promoted by 'outsider' institutions rather than existing leaders, and that such 
innovations presented an opportunity to outsiders, since "thresholds are temporarily low 
when paradigms change, and windows of opportunity ... open for new participants" 
(2.5.4). Again, this accurately characterises the dash-for-gas. The introduction of CCGT 
technology into the British ESI was fostered by a combination of overseas power 
companies, international plant manufacturers, Area Boards/RECs, and large users - all of 
which were marginalised in the nationalised ESI. As testified by those directly involved 
in such schemes, CCGT was deployed precisely as a means of countering the market 
strength of the CEGB successor companies (5.4.1,5.4.2). At the same time, this radical 
technology offered outsiders significantly reduced barriers to entry in generation, in terms 
of reduced capital cost and lead times, and also circumvented their disadvantages in terms 
of established technological know-how. The Wilton CCGT plant scheme, in particular, 
was rapidly developed and implemented precisely because - as ICI's Phil Smith stated - 
"Enron decided there would be a good window for them just after privatisation" (5.4.3). 
Finally, Rip and Kemp emphasis on wider structural and political factors in the 
displacement of one regime by another is also resonant with events surrounding the dash- 
for-gas. In particular their focus on regulatory and institutional change, and on the crucial 
role of government in "inducing a technological regime shift", is clearly supported by the 
present case. As was argued at the end of Chapter 5 (5.5), and also in the discussion of 
technological determinism and autonomy earlier in this chapter (7.2), the Government- 
imposed institutional restructuring and economic liberalisation of generation in the 
British ESI was fundamental to the conception and realisation of independent CCGT 
plant. The Government actions here were largely unintentional: their policies were not 
developed (as Rip and Kemp go on to propose) with the goal of a technological regime 
shift - in this case from coal-fired to gas-fired technology - but were rather the outcome 
of a more general wish to liberalise the industry. As discussed, very few politicians or 
industry analysts anticipated that such liberalisation would manifest itself in terms of 
CCGT technology (5.3.3,5.4.4). Nevertheless, however unwitting its consequences, the 
Government's direct intervention in the institutional, regulatory, and financial structure of 
the ESI was an essential precursor to the technological regime shift which followed. 
In all of this, the introduction of CCGT technology into the British ESI during 
privatisation conforms particularly well with Rip and Kemp's characterisation of the 
dynamics of radical innovation. Beyond this, Rip and Kemp's more general observations 
on the nature of technological change are also upheld by the present case. The lack of 
anticipation of the dash-for-gas amongst politicians, industry figures and independent 
analysts (5.3.1), reflects Rip and Kemp's observation that "technical change has its own 
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dynamics, somewhat independent from firm strategies and actor goals in general". 
Finally, as has been argued throughout this study, the changes in the British ESI can best 
be understood in terms of an interaction between distinctive technological, economic, and 
political forces - or in Rip and Kemp's terms, as a "process of co-evolution of technology 
and society". 
7.6 Conclusions: Technology Studies and the Analysis of ESI 
Privatisation 
7.6.1 Introduction: The Limits of Theory 
As stated in Chapter 2, the concepts and models from the technology studies literature 
discussed here have not been presented as competing or as mutually exclusive. Neither 
has an attempt been made to establish a comprehensive model for explaining the process 
of change in the British ESI before and after privatisation. Rather, in reflection of the 
complexity of the process of technological change and the variety of influences shaping 
it, it has been argued that the use of a range of analytical concepts and models is most 
appropriate. The development of generation technology has been the product of particular 
technical, economic, legislative, regulatory, institutional and political influences. The 
dominant technical forms of generation, and the pace and direction of change, have been 
the product of the complex interaction of all of these forces - changes to any one of 
which would have provided for different technological outcomes. Those analysts who 
have promoted the importance of one or two particular influences on change, and 
relegated others as insignificant, have inevitably lapsed into misleading 
oversimplification. 
Within this, the different models considered above have been found to have distinctive 
points of strength and weakness that have proved more or less appropriate at different 
points in the ESI's history. At the same time, the present case has offered support for 
some approaches, and exposed flaws and weaknesses in others. In the distinctive periods 
of the industry's history, before, during, and after privatisation, there are clear differences 
in the character and weight of the different influences on change, and on the most 
appropriate analytical approaches for their examination; these are now briefly 
summarised 
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7.6.2 Technology Studies Theory and the ESI before Privatisation 
Before privatisation, up to 1987, the pattern of generation technology in the British ESI 
was primarily governed by powerful institutional and political interests. Sustained 
institutional backing meant that considerable momentum was built up behind large steam 
turbine plant and nuclear power, reflected in continued incremental progress in steam 
conditions and scale economies up to the 1970s. After 1970, the technical and economic 
progression of established generation technology began to falter, but the continued 
support of government and the CEGB up to 1987 meant that this had no significant 
impact on plant choice. Financial and economic pressures carried little influence in this 
period. Rather, there was a powerful technocratic orientation in the industry, particularly 
under the structure set up after 1957, which was dominated by the CEGB. 
The strength of embedded institutional and political power in this period was such that 
micro-level analytical approaches, such as social constructivism and actor-network 
theory, are inappropriate, in that they are unable to reflect the restrictions on technology 
choice. Hughes' sociotechnical systems model is of much greater value as applied to the 
nationalised ESI, and is apparently well fitted to the character of change - high 
momentum and incremental innovation under the control of identifiable system-builders 
- in this period. At the same time, however, the systems model tends to over-estimate the 
authority of ESI system-builders, and underplay the importance of less obvious 
supportive economic and political context. Other approaches, such as Russell's 
institutional interests, and MacKenzie's focus on the political role of technical expertise, 
are a necessary complement to the systems approach here. The apparent dominance of 
technocracy and technology-led solutions to the choice of generation technology in this 
period gave credibility to autonomous and determinist notions. 
7.6.3 Technology Studies Theory and the ESI during Privatisation 
During privatisation itself, political dynamics necessarily assumed dominance over 
technical, economic or other influences. The primary influence on the ESI and on 
changes in generation technology, resided inevitably with the Government - in particular, 
its desire to liberalise generation and at the same time secure the successful privatisation 
of nuclear power. These two policy goals found regulatory and organisational form in 
significant steps towards liberalisation, but also to some remaining institutional power 
and political intervention. Nevertheless, ESI liberalisation rendered impotent the 
technocentric interests that had been a dominant influence on the development of 
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generation technology in the nationalised ESI. During the course of privatisation, the 
dominant generation technologies were displaced as new investment options, in 
preference for CCGT technology, which although previously unused, offered a much 
better fit to the new economic, regulatory and institutional framework for the industry. 
Hughes' sociotechnical systems approach becomes much less appropriate for the British 
ESI after 1987, and it is unable to account for the breakdown of mature systems other 
than in the most general terms. Nevertheless, particular aspects of the systems model 
remain useful, particularly in capturing the role of CCGT technology as both cause and 
effect of change. The overriding influence of Government in the privatisation process 
means that social constructivism and actor-network theory remain of limited value. 
During this period, particularly valuable perspectives are provided by Hard's conflict 
model, and Russell's institutional interests approach, both of which are concerned with 
the more overtly political aspects of technological change. The dash-for-gas also provides 
a powerful example of Rip and Kemp's characterisation of radical innovation and the 
displacement of technological regimes. At the same time, the demise of technocracy in 
the privatisation process exposed the fallacy of technological autonomy and determinism 
as applied to generation technology. 
7.6.4 Technology Studies Theory and the ESI after Privatisation 
After privatisation the British ESI developed in response to new imperatives. Within the 
limits of the Government-constructed framework for the industry, financial and economic 
factors became a powerful influence on investment in new generation plant. Those bodies 
which retained some institutional power: National Power, PowerGen and the RECs, were 
no longer able to dictate the direction and pace of change in the industry solely on the 
basis of their own interests, but were instead forced to respond to competitive regulatory 
and economic pressures. CCGTs was the only technology adopted for new large-scale 
generation plant in this period. The direct influence of government on generation 
technology choice was much reduced. Nevertheless, certain institutional interests and 
rivalries - notably the rivalry between the large generators and the RECs, and 
Conservative Government support for nuclear power and antipathy towards the British 
coal industry - remained powerful influences on changes in generation technology. 
Economic and regulatory liberalisation was reflected in the emergence of independent 
generation technology projects, and micro-level approaches, particularly actor-network 
theory, became much more readily applicable. At the same time, technological 
development in the post-privatised ESI remains substantially mediated by meso-level 
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institutional interests and structures which are more suited to alternative analytical 
approaches such as that provided by Russell or Rip and Kemp. Hughes' sociotechnical 
systems approach is of less value to the post-privatised ESI, although particular aspects of 
his model - such as the distinction between system and context, and the action of the 
technical core, remain of value. In addition, changes in generation technology remain 
predicated on the wider historic and political context for the industry, full consideration 
of which requires a broad social shaping perspective, such as that offered by Hughes and 
MacKenzie. 
7.6.5 Comment: The Analysis of Technological Change 
The concepts and models of technology studies have provided considerable insight into 
the process of change in the British ESI. In particular, they have allowed for 
consideration of the distinctiveness of techno-economic dynamics, as they evolve 
alongside - and interact with - ongoing economic, institutional, and regulatory changes. 
They have also enabled attention to be given to both the social shaping of technology and 
the technological shaping of society -specifically, the ways in which developments in 
generation technology acted as both cause and effect of wider changes to the ESI. 
In applying the technology studies literature to the changes in generation technology 
associated with British ESI privatisation, however, no single model or conceptual 
framework has proved capable of a fully-satisfying explanation. Electricity generation 
technologies are the result of the complex interaction of a range of technical, economic, 
institutional, regulatory and political forces, operating at various level of social 
aggregation, whose analysis ultimately requires a broad based social shaping perspective. 
As the British ESI case demonstrated, technological dynamics retain a distinctive quality 
and an essential unpredictability within the broader process of economic and social 
change. In exploring these relations, the insights offered by technology studies concepts 
and models, whilst being necessarily limited, are of continuing value. 
Although this study has not been directed primarily at policymaking in the 
energy/electricity industries, a number of policy and management lessons can be drawn 
from its findings. Firstly, whilst the British ESI developed under nationalisation 
apparently in accordance with technical and economic imperatives, excessive 
centralisation and technocentrism led to the pursuit of grossly uneconomic forms of 
generation, that failed to reflect prevailing technological and economic opportunities. As 
a result, by the mid-1980s, the large British generators and plant manufacturers were 
internationally uncompetitive, and in a poor position to respond to the challenges of 
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liberalisation and privatisation. This suggests that, as far as is possible, electricity 
generation technology should be developed within a decentralised and competitive 
financial, institutional and regulatory framework. At the same time, market forces need to 
be tempered in the ESI by the need for some central co-ordination of supply and demand, 
and for sustained commitment to long-term research and development of generation 
technology options. 
Technological change is a complex process, the outcome of a range of technical, 
economic, organisational and political influences. Whilst technological change is shaped 
by, and embodies, prevailing economic and political interests, it cannot be controlled by 
them. Rather, it has its own distinctive dynamism, stemming from unpredictable 
developments in scientific and technological knowledge and practice. Even in a context 
of apparently entrenched institutional control, technological dynamics have the potential 
to introduce unpredictability and subvert established practices and authority. Social 
science concepts and models which fail to recognise this as a starting point are inevitably 
misleading and misdirected. Despite this complexity and unpredictability, however, the 
analysis of technological change as a social process is not without value or reward. In 
establishing patterns and parallels in technological developments, and by exposing the 
often hidden forces laying behind such developments, technological change may then be 
seen more realistically - not as an external force impacting on society, but as a distinctive 
element within the wider process of social change. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
HISTORIC AND PROJECTED CHANGES IN GENERATION 
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Figure 6: Share of Total Electricity Generated by Type of Plant, 
1990-1996 
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Figure 7: Share of Total Electricity Generated by Type of Plant, 
1996/97-2002/03 (Projected) 
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17th March 1994: Alistair Cruickshank, Special Projects Manager, AEA 
Technology, Dounreay. 
17th March 1994: Evan Sutherland, PFR Power Plant Manager AEA Technology, 
Dounreay. 
18th March 1994: Yves Depierre, Nuclear Engineer Attache CEA, France, 
Dounreay. 
18th March 1994: Shingo Tanigawa, Chief Engineer, PNF Japan, Dounreay. 
20th June 1994: Roy Hall, Development Engineer, Scottish Hydro-Electric, 
Perth. * 
22nd June 1994: Roger Semmens, Senior Engineer, PowerGen Ratcliffe 
Technology Centre, Nottingham. * 
27th July 1994: Phil Inskipp, Project Manager, Business Development, Scottish 
Hydro-Electric, Perth. 
18th August 1994: Graham Wilman, Major Projects Manager, Norweb 
Generation, Manchester. 
24th August 1994: Phil Smith, Projects and Services Manager, Research and 
Technology Department, ICI Chemicals and Polymers, 
Middlesbrough. 
24th August 1994: David Hearn, Energy Purchasing and Policy Group ICI 
Chemicals and Polymers, Middlesbrough. 
24th August 1994: Stuart Ffoulkes, Enron Power Operations, Stockton-on-Tees. 
13th December 1994: Ron Haywood, Director of Engineering, Rolls-Royce Industrial 
Power Group, Newcastle upon Tyne 
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